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IThe International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International 
IDEA) is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democratic 
change worldwide, including support to the constitution-making process. Since 2006, 
and on the basis of  requests by national parties including political parties and more 
recently the Constituent Assembly, International IDEA has been providing support to 
the constitution-making process in Nepal. This support has focused mainly on the pro-
visioning of  resource materials and the convening of  dialogues among national political 
actors on topics of  key importance to the constitutional process. 
International IDEA will continue supporting the constitution-making process by open-
ing avenues through which a broad cross-section of  Nepali society can come together 
to discuss a host of  constitutional issues. International IDEA will provide access to 
international expertise through its own comparative publications and through its net-
works of  international experts. 
Following Jana Andolan II, much debate has arisen on the Nepali constitution. Hence, 
Creating the New Constitution: A Guide for Nepali Citizens comes on the heels of  much rich 
discussion and research into contemporary issues that Nepali constitutional experts 
have had to grapple with. 
The publications provides a brief  history of  past constitutions in Nepal. It includes 
a more detailed examination of  the substance of  the 1990 Constitution, analyzing its 
strengths and weaknesses, as a means to provide a better understanding of  the current 
issues and debates. It also identifi es proposals and controversies surrounding political 
reform and provides cross-reference to the experiences  of  other countries relevant to 
the current process in Nepal. 
The publication does not offer particular solutions; rather it provides an analysis of  
different options that emerge when making a new constitution. It aims to encourage 
full participation in the process of  constitution making by introducing readers to con-
stitutionalism, the roles of  constitutions, and to key constitutional concepts, relating the 
latter to the current issues of  political reform.
Vidar Helgesen
Secretary General
August 2008
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CHAPTER 1
CHAPTER 1
1Deciding the Nature of the New Nepali Constitution
It may be useful to think of  a constitution as an agreement among a group of  people 
who have decided to live together and form a political community. Today, the people 
of  Nepal, having decided to remain together, have to create a new constitution that will 
lay down the rules of  governance. When creating the new constitution, the people will 
have to work out the answers to questions such as the following: 
 Who will be the leaders of  the community? Will they be chosen by the people? 
Will the offspring of  previous leaders become the next leaders? Will the leaders 
be leaders for life or for only some defi ned and shorter period? 
 What are the purposes of  having leaders? What powers should the people give to 
the leaders to carry out those purposes? Should the people give up all their power 
to the leaders or should they keep some for themselves, for example, powers that 
concern the individual or the family? Will there be different kinds of  leaders, 
with different functions?
 If  only limited powers are given to the leaders, how will the community ensure 
that the leaders stay within those powers?
 If  people are not happy with the leaders, can the leaders be removed? If  so, 
how?
 If  a person or a group breaks the agreement that the people have made, what 
should be done to them?
 Who will settle disputes among the people or between the people and the 
government? The leaders? Some independent body?
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2 What arrangements, if  any, will the community make to look after the weak and 
the disabled? Are the weak and the disabled the responsibility of  the family or of  
the whole community?
 How will the expenses incurred by the leaders for running the affairs of  the 
community be met? Through a contribution from the people? From all the 
people? From some of  the people?
 Who decides how the resources of  the community are to be distributed or 
used?   
 Can the constitution be amended, and if  so, who should make the amendments? 
The leaders? The people?
How and Why Constitutions Were Developed around the World
An issue that may not be discussed during the drafting of  constitutions, but one which 
underlies all the discussions and negotiations relevant to the making of  constitutions, 
is the issue of  the values that a society has. Does the society in question value women 
as much as it values men? Does the society have a shared religious belief ? Is social 
harmony more important than effi ciency? While a constitution may not say anything 
about these values, a careful reader of  any written constitution can see what many of  
the values of  the society are, and most modern constitutions say something explicit 
about these values. 
In most instances, societies do not come together as a result of  agreement. Most 
of  today's states were created when larger and stronger states invaded smaller and 
weaker territories and forcibly included the smaller entities in the bigger states. Many 
present states came into existence as colonies, often bringing within common borders 
communities or even states that were previously separate. The people had no say in 
these processes. To consolidate the rule of  the invaders, constitutions were imposed on 
the people. Until recently, constitutions were 'granted' by kings or military commanders 
or a small section of  the elites. Constitutions created under such circumstances cannot 
be called social contracts. 
Today, however, most constitutions are made through processes in which the people 
participate directly. They are the result of  negotiations among political parties, members 
of  key sectors of  society, members of  linguistic or ethnic communities, and other 
stakeholders. Often, these negotiations and participatory processes are conducted 
through a constituent assembly. It is argued that it is only through this broad participation 
that competing interests can be balanced and a basis for national unity and prosperity 
established. Furthermore, it has been argued that a fair process of  constitution making 
increases people's respect for the constitution and their willingness to abide by its 
terms.
3Earlier constitutions tended to assume the existence of  a common nation and made no 
provision for ethnic, religious, or linguistic differences. In many countries, this approach 
to creating constitutions often resulted in the dominance of  the majority community 
over the others, and these countries are now facing problems because there is no 
feeling of  togetherness among its communities. Such countries, when making a new 
constitution, will feel especially strongly the need for a participatory process. Today's 
constitutions do not assume the existence of  a common political nation, but instead 
expressly acknowledge the existence of  communities with different languages, religions, 
and histories. Today's constitutions try to deal with these differences in a constructive 
way so that communities feel positively about belonging to a common nation.
In many parts of  the world, especially but not only in the former colonies, new thinking 
was shaped by the experiences of  Western countries. The characteristics and organizing 
principles of  the Western countries were refl ected in the independence constitutions 
of  many countries in Asia and Africa. This was especially true in Asia; for example, 
the independence constitution of  India refl ected as much British ideas of  governing 
a state as it refl ected Indian social, economic, and political realities. On looking back, 
some commentators have said that it was neither inevitable nor wise that the developing 
societies should have followed Western developments. 
Nepal and the Constitutions It Has Had
Nepal is not an exception to the general pattern described earlier of  how communities 
come together to form a nation.  It consists of  many communities, each of  which did 
indeed at one time have a body of  laws and practices of  their own that dealt  with 
issues of  governance. Those local laws were not written; their rules were to be found 
in customary laws and practices, in the values of  the communities, in their concepts 
of  leaders and leadership, and in their rules about leadership or councils, property, and 
family. To some extent, these bodies of  law could be described as traditional community 
constitutions. But as kings unifi ed Nepal, they brought under their rule disparate 
communities (each with its own norms of  governance).
For a very long time, there was no such thing as one written 'Nepali constitution.' 
The rules for government were based on the way the kings (or the Ranas during the 
Rana period) ruled the country. Perhaps because Nepal was never colonized and was 
somewhat isolated, it got something that we would recognize as a constitution only 
in 1948. That constitution was proclaimed by the Rana prime minister. The people 
were not involved in its preparation, although the proclamation of  the constitution 
was the result of  internal and external pressure, perhaps stimulated by constitutional 
developments in India. Ironically, the fi rst constitution came at about the same time that 
the long period of  Rana rule was about to collapse, and the constitution failed in its aims 
of  propping up an increasingly discredited regime. With the restoration of  the authority 
of  the monarchy, King Tribhuvan promulgated a new constitution in 1951 (now on 
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4the advice of  the Council of  Ministers). Intended as an interim constitution until a 
constituent assembly was to be formed, the Interim Constitution was not replaced until 
1959; and when the Interim Constitution was fi nally replaced, it was done so not by a 
constituent assembly but by King Mahendra. But this new constitution did not last long 
either, as the king took over the administration of  the state while he commissioned the 
preparation of  yet another constitution that gave all powers of  the state to the king. 
King Mahendra proclaimed this newest version of  the constitution in 1962. The 1962 
Constitution  remained in force until 1990, when a new constitution, proclaimed by 
King Birendra, brought to an end the Panchayat system of  rule. 
The 1990 Constitution was based on the recommendations of  a Constitution Commission 
(which for the fi rst time consulted the people) and was intended to acknowledge the 
sovereignty of  the people (the people had achieved sovereignty through Jana Andolan I). 
The 1990 Constitution did introduce multiparty democracy, but it still gave considerable 
powers to the king—powers that were later abused by King Gyanendra to reassert 
direct monarchical rule in 2005. The achievements of  Jana Andolan II, however, forced 
King Gyanendra to give up his powers and emphatically acknowledge the people as 
the source of  all sovereignty. The Nepali people have now agreed that the people's 
sovereignty will be manifested in the Constituent Assembly that was elected in 2008, 
which will create a new constitution that will incorporate the reform proposals of  Jana 
Andolan II.
We can see from this brief  account of  Nepal's political and constitutional history 
(of  which a detailed analysis is given in the chapter 'History of  Constitutions and 
Constitution Making in Nepal') that both the contents of  and the methods of  making 
the constitutions were determined by social forces and that the progress made in 
the content from one constitution to the next represented a gradual transition from 
autocratic to democratic rule. Of  these constitutions, the 1990 Constitution was the only 
one that could be considered a modern democratic constitution: the 1990 Constitution 
was created through a relatively participatory process; the 1990 Constitution signalled a 
clear movement to democratic rule by providing for an elected government accountable 
to the people through the legislature; it  included a bill of  rights; it sought a separation 
of  powers; and it created a judiciary that was supposed to ensure the supremacy of  the 
constitution.
The 1990 Constitution was different from the traditional community constitutions in 
many ways. New types of  education, new attitudes towards identity and religion, new 
concepts of  the status of  the individual and the role of  the community, new ideas of  self-
determination and of  democracy—especially among the members of  the marginalized 
communities that had had their cohesion undermined by the formation of  the Nepali 
state— and the effects of  urbanization all gave rise to a new consciousness. This new 
consciousness in the people created different expectations and led to new demands 
5by the people. In the face of  these changes, traditional authorities started losing their 
hold over the people, particularly the educated people, and the traditional authorities 
were less able to provide discipline and control over their communities than they used 
to be able to in earlier times. Furthermore, the enormous growth in the power of  state 
institutions required new forms of  control and accountability. These realities, combined 
with the interests and the vision of  a newly emerging group of  political leaders, led to 
new ways of  thinking about the state and the political community, and the best way to 
govern the nation.  
The Major Issues That Are Addressed by Modern Democratic 
Constitutions
Here we discuss the nature of  modern democratic constitutions, which echo in 
important ways key elements of  the reform agenda of  the Nepali people. To maintain 
the special legal status of  a constitution as the compact among the people on how to 
govern the country, a constitution is often termed the 'supreme law.' This means that all 
other laws and public policies must be consistent with the constitution, and if  they are 
not, they cannot be enforced. Usually, there are special legal procedures to ensure that 
the provisions of  the constitution are respected and enforced. Thus the constitution, 
among its other functions, serves to protect the rights of  the people. The status of  the 
constitution is also preserved by the special procedures outlined for its amendment. The 
legislature cannot use the ordinary procedures of  law making to change the contents of  
the constitution. Normally, a constitution can only be changed by special majorities in 
the legislature or by the participation of  other institutions in addition to the legislature, 
such as regional authorities or, through a referendum, by the people themselves. 
Sovereignty
Historically, countries belonged to their king ('sovereign'), the authority of  the state 
fl owed from the sovereign monarch, and constitutions were granted, amended, and 
replaced by the sovereign monarch. The monarchs themselves were above the law. 
Gradually, the idea developed that the country belonged to the people. At fi rst, some 
sections or layers of  society, such as the aristocracy or propertied and educated men, 
were given this recognition, and later, it was given to all the people. Now, it is generally 
assumed that the authority of  the state comes from the people. 
The 1990 Constitution was the fi rst constitution in Nepal to refer to the people's 
sovereignty (all earlier constitutions proclaimed, or assumed, only the sovereignty of  
the king). But the 1990 Constitution was still ambiguous in its treatment of  sovereignty. 
It recognized both state authority and people's sovereignty, thereby leaving itself  subject 
to interpretation, even confusion and manipulation. For example, in the beginning of  
the preamble to the 1990 Constitution, it was stated by the king that 'We are convinced 
that in independent and sovereign Nepal, the source of  sovereign authority is inherent 
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6in the people,' but at the same time, the constitution was enacted by the king 'by virtue 
of  the state authority.' Similarly, King Gyanendra too acknowledged the people as the 
source of  sovereignty in his proclamation of  April 2006, when he reinstated Parliament, 
although it was he who was actually reinstating Parliament.
A constitution must refl ect the sovereignty of  the people and regulate the exercise of  
power and authority that fl ows from it. The regulation (and limitation) of  state authority, 
as delegated by the people through the constitution, is essential for safeguarding the 
liberties of  citizens and for ensuring the proper and fair administration of  the country 
(it is this idea that is captured in the notion ‘constitutionalism').
State sovereignty has two aspects, internal and external:
In its internal aspect, sovereignty means 
 the state has actual and legal control over its territory;
 the state is free to organize its institutions and to determine its internal affairs.
In its external aspect, sovereignty means
 the state is independent, and other states cannot interfere in its internal affairs;
 the state has fi xed and secure boundaries;
 the state is a member of  the international community, which is organized on the 
principle of  state sovereignty, and it has the right to participate in international 
organizations and affairs.
Because of  the growing recognition of  the people as the source of  sovereignty, 
constitutions have increasingly tried to provide a role for the direct participation of  the 
people in the affairs of  the state and to ensure the proper accountability of  the people's 
representatives in the executive and the legislature.
In recent decades, there has been an interesting development in the concept of  
sovereignty, which is refl ected in some constitutions of  states that are made up of  many 
communities. At one time, sovereignty was often understood as requiring one centre of  
power. But now, the idea of  undivided sovereignty is out of  favour with communities 
or states that want to promote forms of  self-government. The older federations, like 
the United States of  America, have always accepted  divided sovereignty, but now, even 
in predominantly unitary states, extensive powers are devolved to and are exercised 
autonomously by regions. Some recent constitutions, such as the Constitution of  
Ethiopia, say that they are based on the sovereignty not of  the 'people' but of  distinct 
communities within the country, thus according a high constitutional status to ethnic or 
religious communities.  
7Separation of the State and Its Institutions from Communities
The state is made up of  people—in their communities and their groups. But the state 
is not the same thing as its people. The existence of  the state has its own justifi cation, 
principally, to provide for the welfare of  the people, and it has its own institutions. This 
separation between the state and its people produces the distinction between the public 
and private spheres. The purpose of  this distinction is to preserve the independence of  
both state institutions and non-state organizations from each other. 
Control of and Accountability of State Power
Modern states that are democratic involve rule by the will of  the people. Since not all 
people can participate directly in state affairs, the state is organized on the principle of  
representative democracy; that is, people elect their representatives to state institutions, 
particularly the legislature and the executive. Therefore, free and fair elections play an 
important role in a democracy.
Although a democratic state is based on the will of  the people, which for many purposes 
means the will of  the majority, it is also committed to at least three other values:
 the protection of  minorities, whose views would be disregarded in a system that 
is based entirely on majority rule, and who could be oppressed;
 the limitation of  the powers of  state authorities, to prevent them from oppressing 
the people or encroaching upon the independence of  non-state groups and 
organizations. Power is limited in a number of  ways, including restricting what 
the state can do, separating state powers (such as the legislative, executive, 
and judicial) and giving them to different institutions, and enabling each state 
institution to operate as a check on others, such as the legislature on the executive 
and the judiciary on both (which is often referred to as checks and balances);
 the accountability of  state institutions, in order to ensure effi ciency and legality 
of  government and to prevent arbitrary, unlawful, or dishonest conduct (this is 
particularly important because state institutions, unlike community organizations, 
are not governed directly by community values or control).
Limiting and controlling power has become diffi cult because the people expect much 
from the state. The modern state is viewed as a 'developmental' state: people expect 
the state to promote economic and social development. But a state cannot promote 
development without exercising substantial powers over the community, natural 
resources, and public fi nances. And the state cannot promote development without the 
presence of  a large civil service and development and regulatory agencies. Balancing 
these substantially increased functions and powers with the goal of  limiting and 
controlling state power is a great challenge.  
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8Individualism, Equality, and Human Rights
The modern state is committed to the equality of  all persons. This is such an important 
goal that it can be described as an essential principle. The principle is implemented in 
several ways, including
 the granting of  citizenship, which defi nes the special relationship that individuals 
have with the state, and which means that the state cannot discriminate against 
any citizen, but must treat everyone as an equal.
 guarantees of  individual rights, particularly protection against discrimination, but 
also rights of  association, public participation, religion, and so on.
 The principle of  the equality of  all persons has certain important consequences 
that may be of  particular concern when constitutions are being made.
 The obligation of  the state to protect the equality of  all persons may affect the 
independence of  communities within the state; for example, can a community 
insist that women may not inherit or own property because this was a traditional 
rule of  the community, or that people with disabilities cannot hold certain 
positions in community institutions?
 Can the state recognize communities and groups as legal entities that have rights 
and obligations, and give them the power to regulate their internal affairs in 
accordance with their own decisions or customary practices? What is the status 
or role of  group rights in a state committed to the equality of  all individuals?
 Does the commitment to equality restrict the power of  the state to take 
special measures (often called 'affi rmative action') to help groups that have 
been historically disadvantaged, such as women or indigenous or marginalized 
communities?
The state has to protect the fundamental rights of  all persons. These rights include the 
people's rights to personal liberty and security (extending to protection from torture or 
detention without trial), access to and protection of  the legal system, the right to live in 
any part of  the state and to leave and enter it at will, the right to form political parties 
and other associations, the right to express themselves freely, and the right to practise 
their beliefs. 
Social Justice, Basic Needs, and the Environment
In recent years, there has been increasing recognition that the state also has obligations 
to ensure that people can live in dignity and security, that state policies do not prevent 
people from pursuing their lawful activities and taking care of  themselves and their 
families, and that all people have access to education, shelter, and health services. 
9The state is also increasingly obliged, under national and international law, which is often 
refl ected in constitutions, to protect the environment and to consider the responsibilities 
of  the state and its people to future generations; such provisions are included in 
constitutions to prevent the state and the people from destroying the environment.
Membership of International and Regional Communities
The state is a member of  the international community of  states, and as such, has rights 
as well as obligations. These obligations are increasing because there is now growing 
awareness about the interdependence of  states and peoples. More and more international 
and regional organizations have been established or strengthened to impose national 
responsibilities and to promote international co-operation to meet the challenges of  
our time, including the protection of  human rights and the environment. Since these 
developments seriously affect national policies and institutions, foreign affairs are no 
longer just a matter of  the ruler's dealing with her or his neighbours, and the rules for 
conducting foreign affairs are integrated into the national constitutional system. This 
development is refl ected in constitutions in a number of  ways: special provisions on 
foreign policy, regulation of  the exercise of  treaty-making powers and the application 
of  treaties and regional laws, provisions on membership of  regional or international 
organizations and the authority of  the state to participate in peace keeping forces abroad 
are all included in constitutions. 
Addressing the Challenges That Modern Constitutions Face
Although so many constitutions seem to have failed the world over, people still have 
great faith in constitutions to provide for democracy and stability. In 1990 in Nepal, there 
was great hope in the new constitution. In 1997, there was tremendous enthusiasm in 
Thailand for the promulgation of  the new constitution, which was seen as the solution 
for countering authoritarian and military rule and corruption. But is it wise to put so 
much trust in constitutions? When constitutions do not fulfi l the aims they embody, is 
it the constitutions or the people that fail? 
A country needs a constitution that can make a meaningful contribution to effective and 
fair government. However, one can point to some diffi culties that constitutions have 
faced or can face:
Personalization of Power
State power in the modern constitution is impersonal, which means that
 well-defi ned powers are vested in the holders of  offi ces, not in individuals;
 powers are given for specifi c purposes to promote the public good and other 
national goals, and can only be exercised for those purposes;
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 the manner and the procedure by which power is to be exercised are set out in the 
constitution or the law; 
 the exercise of  power can be challenged in courts or in other lawful ways by 
people who consider that power has not been exercised in accordance with the 
above principles.
But leaders have not always followed the procedures for the exercise of  power or the 
purposes for which power is given. Nor have they always respected the division or 
separation of  powers, and thus it has sometimes been very diffi cult to control their 
action or to make them accountable. Ministers and other offi cials often follow suit and 
exercise their powers in similarly irresponsible and irregular way. Furthermore, large 
parts of  a constitution may remain inoperative because of  the dominance by individuals 
at the head of  government and by the leaders' failure to empower other intermediary 
institutions. We have seen how even good constitutions can become weak, as in Nepal 
recently, in Thailand under Thaksin, and in India under Indira Gandhi.
Corruption
Politicians can be tempted to use their control over or access to the state to make money 
for themselves: 
 When given bribes, some leaders may use their power for the benefi t of  only a 
person or a company. 
 Some leaders may set up companies in the names of  their wives or relatives to 
which profi table state contracts are awarded, and payments are made to these 
companies even if  they have not performed their job or performed it in a shoddy 
way.
 Some leaders may appoint their friends and relatives to posts in the government 
or its agencies, even when the appointees are not competent or qualifi ed for the 
jobs. 
Thus corruption may become a way of  life in government and other public institutions. 
A small number of  people became very rich while others get poorer and are unable 
to meet the basic necessities of  life. Corruption also results in the abuse or waste 
of  national resources. A culture of  corruption discourages honest and enterprising 
persons and companies from making investments in the running of  the state. In corrupt 
governments, prime ministers, ministers, and offi cials may also do all they can to ensure 
that the institutions and mechanisms of  control and accountability do not work, and 
indeed they may even try to involve fi gures of  authority, such as judges, in their own 
corrupt schemes. Few practices have so fundamentally undermined the spirit and letter 
of  constitutions all over the world as has corruption.
11
Although corruption is not just a problem restricted to developing countries, its impact 
on developing countries tends to be greater because these countries are poorer—and 
because their powers to investigate and control wrongdoings are weaker. Corruption 
survives to some extent in all 'developed' economies as well, but many countries, both 
more and less developed, have had success in dealing with corruption. Corruption can be 
checked. A constitution cannot stop corruption, but it can help create the conditions in 
which corruption can be controlled, and to some extent, prevented and discouraged.
Ethnic Diversity  
It has been argued that the modern constitution, based on the values of  individualism 
and the equality of  all citizens, best refl ects the goals of  a state whose population is not 
divided by ethnicity, religion, or language. It is argued that the constitution assumes the 
existence of  a well-established, common political accord for communities among whom 
there are common values and who share a common culture, and among whom there 
are relatively few points of  confl ict. But in many instances, the modern constitution 
has actually complicated and made diffi cult the task of  governing a state inhabited by 
peoples of  diverse ethnic origins, speaking different languages, or affi liated to different 
religions. 
In today's world, politics and the economy have become ethnicized. The members of  an 
ethnic community may tend to support their ethnic leaders regardless of  their morality, 
effectiveness, and conduct, for they may think that leaders from their ethnic community 
will bring development to their area, and that leaders who are of  a different ethnicity 
will not. Thus people's ethnic consciousness tends to reduce their concern for human 
rights or public morality. Even more alarmingly, ethnic differences have led to major 
confl icts, which have challenged the stability of  the government and the legitimacy, or 
even the survival, of  the constitution. 
It is sometimes argued that ethnicity is not a serious problem in Nepal, as it is, for 
example, in Sri Lanka or India. But from the perspectives of  Dalits, Janajatis, and Madhesis, 
the history of  Nepal is one of  their steady subordination—militarily, politically, and 
socially—to the dominant upper castes who draw their ideology from Hinduism and 
who are deeply embedded in the ruling class and closely associated with the monarchy. 
In any case, with the increasing focus on poverty and social justice, attention will turn 
to the structures of  exploitation that have proved inimical to the marginalized groups, 
who are now increasingly conscious of  the structures of  the state and society that have 
led to their own marginalization. These groups are seeking a re-organization of  the state 
that will recognize and respect their cultural, linguistic, and religious differences from 
the dominant communities, as well as their unequal social bases. If  the experience of  
other countries is any guide, identity politics is likely to play a critical role in discussions 
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on constitutional reform and in the design of  institutions that will fashion the new 
constitution in Nepal. The new constitution will have to confront issues of  ethnic 
diversity and social oppression.
In recent years, there has been much scholarly discussion on how to structure the 
state. One suggestion is that instead of  balancing the interests of  only individuals, the 
constitution should also balance the interests of  ethnic or religious groups. It is argued 
that the task of  the constitution is not merely to govern a 'national' or common political 
community, but to create a common political community. It is not easy to determine 
how to create a common political community in which the people's primary loyalty is 
to that larger community—the state—and secondarily to ethnic, religious, or linguistic 
communities. Some scholars and policy makers think that this is best done through 
a liberal constitution in which all individuals are treated equally, but in which special 
opportunities are created for those who have been historically disadvantaged. Others 
say that the constitution has to recognize political and legal rights within communities 
and establish state institutions in which all communities share power (through devices 
like coalitional cabinets, federalism, and proportional representation in the legislature, 
judiciary, public services, armed forces, and regimes of  personal laws). 
One of  the biggest challenges to the making of  and attribution of  roles to constitutions 
today, as is the case in Nepal now, is to create a common political community out of  
diverse groups. The future of  Nepal will depend fundamentally on how that matter is 
resolved.      
Weak Civil Society
Apart from the formal institutions and mechanisms that the constitution establishes 
to safeguard and enforce the constitution, an important body that ensures that the 
government observes the directives of  the constitution is civil society. Civil society in 
this context means non-state organizations other than the family, and includes religious 
bodies, professional associations, economic institutions, the media, and NGOs. An active 
civil society, committed to the rule of  law and to making the government accountable 
for its actions, can mobilize and control institutions of  the state and galvanize the public 
to pressure the government. Civil society is generally stronger and more vocal in South 
Asia than it is in many developing countries, but it still faces many problems: 
 Society has been divided into a number of  ethnic, religious, or caste groups, 
which have been unable to act together. 
 The government, with its infi nitely greater resources, has dominated civil 
society.
 A substantial number of  people live in rural and remote areas; and the people 
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who live in such areas are primarily occupied by local concerns. Many of  them are 
not familiar with national politics, nor do they have opportunities to participate 
in political processes. 
 Most people do not know much about the constitution—how it may impact their 
own rights, or how they can use the constitution to challenge bad laws or acts of  
the government.   
The Way Forward 
Various conclusions or interpretations can be made about modern constitution from 
the issues that have been discussed. It can be argued that in certain respects, the modern 
constitution is absolutely essential for governance: the constitution acknowledges the 
sovereignty and unity of  the state, protects human rights, and limits state power. But for 
various reasons, these provisions have not always been honoured and made effective. 
If  this analysis is correct, then the task for constitution makers is to design devices and 
instruments that could ensure the implementation of  these provisions. Most constitutions 
contain relatively few devices to ensure the implementation of  their provisions and rely 
principally on the political process to secure respect for the constitution. Since the 
political process has not helped in developing the people's respect for an undermined 
constitution in many countries, alternative methods should be provided. These methods 
could include measures that strengthen constitutional mechanisms as well as measures 
that increase public awareness of  the constitution and facilitate the role of  civil society 
in the affairs of  the state.
It could also be argued that in some respects the modern constitution is indeed defi cient; 
for example, it does not acknowledge or acknowledge suffi ciently the existence of  
ethnic diversity and ethnic consciousness, and so it fails to respond to the tensions that 
arise from the confl ict between national unity and ethnic autonomy. The vision that 
modern constitutions have of  a united political community, the nation, is misleading 
or premature. The constitution may also be defi cient in not providing for social and 
economic justice and in tackling issues such as poverty. If  this analysis is correct, then 
the solution would be to modify the constitution.
Yet another interpretation may be that the modern constitution is so alien to the 
people that it cannot serve their needs. Those who subscribe to this interpretation 
argue that notions of  power, political community, democracy, and human rights, and 
the mechanisms for ensuring them are not understood or supported by the ordinary 
people, and therefore, remain paper provisions and do not enter the domain of  reality. 
Resolving such issues would require a radical review of  the constitution, and perhaps, 
fundamentally different types of  constitutional arrangements. 
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Refl ecting the People's Choices in the New Nepali Constitution
The decision to negotiate and adopt a new Nepali constitution provides the people of  
Nepal with an opportunity to  
 refl ect on the social and constitutional history of  Nepal 
 consider the strengths and weaknesses of  the modern democratic constitution, 
and
 decide 
 what kind of  society they want to establish
 which values they want to live by
 how they want their various communities to co-exist 
 how these communities relate to the wider political community that is 
Nepal
 what kinds of  safeguards must be included in the new constitution to prevent 
the misuse of  the constitution
 what kinds of  provisions must be included in the new constitution to ensure 
that the constitution is implemented properly.
15
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Governance According to Traditional Laws
Although modern Nepal came into existence with the unifi cation of  Nepal by King 
Prithvi Narayan Shah in the latter half  of  the 18th century, the country did not have what 
we could call a constitutional document before 1948. Some of  the rules for governing 
the country were based on the norms, values, and teachings of  Hinduism mentioned 
in the Dharmasastras, and some were based on the norms and values prevalent in the 
local communities. The governing principles of  dharma (righteous conduct) referred to 
the privileges, duties, and obligations of  man, his standard of  conduct towards god, 
to society, and to himself, and served as the moral standard against which all religious, 
political, or social actions were to be tested. The king was to be a strong ruler, recognizing 
the supremacy of  dharma as a form of  higher law; the rules governing the Raj dharma 
(righteous conduct for the king) were to guide the king in his executive, legislative, 
and judicial functions; and the subjects in turn had obligations to uphold the king's 
authority. 
The Hindu system envisaged no confl ict if  the king and the subjects were able to uphold 
their respective dharmas. There were no standard methods to govern the relationship 
between subjects and the state, nor was there a constitutional method to resolve the 
confl ict of  interest between subjects and the state; and the legal, political system and the 
various social and communal traditions that the king was bound by lacked theories of  
rights that could form the basis of  constitutionalism. The so-called varna (caste) system 
adopted by the Hindu and Newar kingdoms discriminated against a large segment of  
the population, especially Dalits.   
In 1846, following factionalism and internal power struggle in the palace, Jung Bahadur 
Rana, a military leader, emerged victorious and founded the Rana lineage of  hereditary 
History of Constitutions and Constitution 
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prime ministers, limiting the king to a titular role. His usurping of  power gave rise 
to a tightly centralized autocracy. Jung Bahadur Rana also helped to promulgate the 
National Civil Code of  1854, which codifi ed the existing customary laws, introduced 
the necessary rules for governance, and placed all the ruling class, as well as commoners, 
under the umbrella of  an explicitly codifi ed law. The code was mostly concerned with the 
relationships among the castes. The code also tried to adopt Hindu laws being practised 
in the other states in the subcontinent, making the local legal system more infl exible. 
Although initiated in good faith, the code also disturbed the traditional coherent 
relationship that dharma had with local traditions. The patriarchal social system, the lack 
of  any universality of  laws,  the inequality among social groups, and the diffused nature 
of  religion and law—all of  these factors contributed to the evolution of  a unique social 
and political system that often had problems in restraining and regulating the exercise 
of  power at the highest level. 
The Hindu mode of  governance allowed the kings to practically assume all power and 
imposed almost no restriction on the kings: the fear of  god wasn't going to rein in the 
kings all the time. The system throughout the period emphasized the government of  
law instead of  will, but dharma was more like a religious manifesto than a legal concept. 
Even this limited concept of  constitutionalism that Nepal had was undermined 
when the kings were sidelined and state power was taken over by the Ranas. Another 
important characteristic of  the rule of  the kings and Ranas was the highly centralized 
and militarized nature of  the Nepali state.
The Succession of Constitutions 
Nepal has had six constitutions: the Constitutions of  1948, 1951, 1959, 1962, and 1990, 
and the Interim Constitution of  2007. The table at the end of  this chapter compares 
some of  the major features of  these constitutions.
There had been stirrings of  dissent earlier in Nepal, but the political scenario really 
started to change only in the 1940s, with the independence that India achieved and 
the constitution that India produced infl uencing events in Nepal. The people in Nepal 
started demanding that they be allowed to participate in the political system, and they 
also demanded civil rights and liberties. In response, the Rana prime minister Padma 
Shamsher promulgated the Government of  Nepal Act 1948, the fi rst ever constitutional 
law of  Nepal. This document, written in a modern constitutional language, was drafted 
by a committee whose members had differing views on what the document should say. 
Included in the committee were experts from India. However, in the eyes of  the prime 
minister, the basic purpose of  the document was not to transform the traditional regime 
into a modern constitutional government, but to neutralize the demands from the people 
for a constitutional government and to give a constitutional veneer to Ranarchy. 
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But Padma Shamsher was forced out of  his offi ce by a less liberal successor, and the 
constitution was discarded even before it came into operation. The period of  absolutism 
that followed precipitated the 1951 revolution, which restored the powers of  the 
monarch, who on 18 February 1951, made the following proclamation: 
Hereafter, our people shall be administered in accordance with a democratic 
constitution to be framed by the Constituent Assembly elected by the people. 
Until such a constitution is framed, a council of  ministers, composed of  popular 
representatives having the people's confi dence, shall be constituted to aid and advise 
our administration. 
An interim coalition-government was then formed, in which the Ranas and the Nepali 
Congress, the political party that had led the revolution, were equally represented. And 
the prospects for the Nepali people's participating in the making of  the constitution and 
the governance of  the country looked promising. An interim constitution was drafted, 
again with the assistance of  Indian experts.
The Interim Constitution lasted eight years. The entire character of  the constitution 
changed due to the repeated amendments and efforts made to deal with the instability 
caused by the frequent changes of  government (10 governments were formed in those 
eight years). In the process, the constitution, which had been promulgated with the 
intention of  transferring state powers to the people, ended up transferring the powers 
back to the king. King Mahendra, who succeeded King Tribhuvan (who had promised 
to elect a constituent assembly), aspired to exercise active leadership in accordance with 
Hindu traditions and refused to hold elections for a constituent assembly. 
However, because of  mounting public pressure, King Mahendra had to eventually 
set up a constitution-drafting commission. The commission drafted what became the 
Constitution of  the Kingdom of  Nepal 1959, on 12 February 1959, with input from 
a British constitutional expert, Ivor Jennings. The country then held parliamentary 
elections, in which the Nepali Congress won more than two-thirds of  the seats. 
Unfortunately, however, the elected Nepali Congress government led by B.P. Koirala 
did not last for more than eighteen months, as King Mahendra, invoking his emergency 
powers, dissolved the elected Parliament and suspended most of  the constitutional rights. 
The king declared that the parliamentary system, as under the 1959 Constitution, was 
unsuitable for Nepal on account of  the lack of  education and political consciousness 
on the part of  Nepalis, and he imposed on the country a system that purportedly had 
its roots 'in the soil of  the country.'  The king formed a Council of  Ministers under 
his own chairmanship and ruled until 1962. In accordance with the king's directions, a 
small committee made up of  only Nepalis drafted the 1962 Panchayat Constitution, in 
one month. 
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The Panchayat system continued for almost thirty years. In between, a referendum 
was held on 24 May 1979, in response to an outbreak of  student agitation, and the 
referendum gave the people an option to vote for either the Panchayat system, with 
suitable reforms, or the multiparty system—as the opposition demanded. But the 
referendum was manipulated in various ways, and those supporting the multiparty system 
lost. The Panchayat system, however, allowed for some changes, such as the introduction 
of  direct elections and the concept of  ministerial responsibility to the legislature. But 
the system could not function properly because of  the confl ict of  interests between the 
democratic institutions and the forces surrounding the king. Furthermore, amendments 
to the constitution strengthened the position of  the king.
As a new wave of  democratic change swept Eastern Europe at the end of  the 1980s, 
in Nepal, the two biggest political parties rallied the people onto the streets in Jana 
Andolan I. This movement eventually led to change and to the promulgation of  the 
1990 Constitution. But the manipulation of  the constitution by the king, some fl aws in 
the constitution, and the ineptitude of  successive governments, along with the Maoist 
insurgency, which began in 1996, and the royal takeovers led to the rejection of  the 
constitution; and the 1990 Constitution was replaced by the Interim Constitution, which 
was passed in January 2007. The Interim Constitution paved the way for a constituent 
assembly and yet another new constitution.
In light of  the current discussions about the making of  a new constitution, it would 
be informative to look back at the earlier constitutions and see how they differed from 
each other and whether there has been any development in their contents. 
Processes Used in Making the Constitutions 
It was only when the 1990 Constitution was in the process of  being drafted that any 
attempt was made to consult with the Nepali people in the making of  a constitution. 
But the consultations were neither extensive nor systematic, and it is not clear whether 
the consultations had any impact on the constitution that was created. The constitution 
that was passed was largely the work of  the Nepali Congress and the CPN (UML). The 
2007 Interim Constitution, on the other hand, is the result of  an understanding among 
eight party leaders. Until now, the Nepali constitutions have all been drafted by a small 
group of  experts or members of  the elite or members of  political parties.  
Promulgators of the Constitutions
The 1948 Constitution was brought into law by the Rana prime minister, a de facto 
ruler.  The Interim Constitution of  1951 was promulgated by King Tribhuvan, on the 
advice of  the Council of  Ministers. The 1959 Constitution was promulgated by King 
Mahendra, exercising his sovereign power over the country that he inherited. The 1962 
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Constitution was also the handiwork of  the king. Surprisingly, even the 1990 Constitution, 
which declared that sovereignty was vested in the people, was promulgated, as a result 
of  a sleight of  hand, by a king.  None of  the constitutions was brought into existence 
through the will of  the people or Parliament. 
System of Government
The basic structure of  the system of  government in Nepal has been based on a 
parliamentary system, as in the UK and India, in which the prime ministers and ministers 
have to be members of  the legislature. Although the fundamental requirement of  a 
parliamentary system is that the government in order to stay in offi ce must have and 
retain the support of  the legislature (or its main, elected house), only the 1959 and 1990 
Constitutions had such requirements in a real sense. In the 1948 Constitution, the Rana 
prime minister could not be removed; in 1951, there was no elected legislature; and 
under the Panchayat regime, the National Panchayat could pass a vote of  no confi dence, 
but the king did not have to uphold the outcome of  the vote.
The Role of the King
Initially, the adversaries of  the political parties were the Ranas, and the king supported the 
political parties in their struggle for the overthrow of  the Ranas. But after the monarchy 
was restored, and after the king fi rst reneged on his promise to hold constituent-
assembly elections to draft a new democratic constitution, there has been a constant 
tussle between the parties and the kings. The Panchayat Constitution was the triumph of  
the monarchy and, thus, represented a defi nite step backward in constitutional progress. 
Other steps backward involved the abrogation of  the constitutions, or in the case of  
the 1951 document, the abandonment of  its central promise to form a constituent 
assembly.
The Constitutions of  1951, 1959, and 1990 showed progress towards the instituting 
of  constitutional monarchy, where the authority of  the monarch was based on the 
constitution. In a constitutional monarchy, although the monarch may have certain 
powers that he can exercise at his discretion, these powers are limited and are specifi cally 
concerned not with policy, but with maintaining a constitutional system. Under the 
1959 Constitution, although it seemed that most of  the powers of  the king were to 
be exercised on the recommendation of  the government, the king had the fi nal say on 
whether, under the constitution, he did have discretionary powers on any matter. There 
was also a chapter called 'Powers of  the King,' and it was unclear whether these powers 
were also to be exercised on the recommendation of  the government. Unfortunately, 
the drafters of  the 1990 Constitution did not learn from the problems created by the 
imprecision of  the 1959 Constitution and included provisions in the 1990 Constitution 
that could be interpreted in many ways. One of  the results of  including such ambiguous 
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articles in the 1990 Constitution was that the king was able to dismiss the elected 
government of  Sher Bahadur Deuba in 2002 by interpreting according to his needs 
the meanings of  the articles, and the king subsequently formed the government of  his 
choice. 
The Role of the Judiciary
A system of  independent courts is essential for the success of  any constitution and for 
the enforcement of  rights enshrined in the constitution. The 1948 Constitution could 
establish a High Court, and, interestingly, a Judicial Committee of  the Legislature (with 
two outsiders) to act as a fi nal court of  appeal. This system for the judiciary seems to 
have been modelled on the House of  Lords in its judicial capacity (the British fi nal appeal 
court). The Rana Prime Minister could appoint the judges, but he would have been able 
to dismiss them only if  the Judicial Committee (which he had appointed) recommended 
the dismissals. The 1951 Constitution merely mentioned the High Court. The High 
Court Act of  1952 created the fi rst independent judiciary in Nepal, but following a 
few controversial court decisions against executive actions, the High Court's power 
of  judicial review was removed by a law in 1954. The 1959 Constitution set up the 
Supreme Court but gave no details of  the court's jurisdiction. A commission appointed 
by the king could recommend the removal of  a judge, but the king did not have to 
accept the recommendation. The 1962 Constitution provided for recommendation for 
the removal of  judges by a commission or the National Panchayat, and for the fi rst time, 
provided the Supreme Court with the jurisdiction to enforce human rights and other 
rights (modelled on the Constitution of  India). The 1990 Constitution did fi nally set 
up a full judicial system by establishing the district courts, the appellate courts and the 
Supreme Court and by providing security of  tenure to Supreme Court judges (less so 
for judges in the lower courts). 
Democracy and Elections
Only under the 1959 and 1990 Constitutions were there freely elected legislatures in 
Nepal. A primary feature of  some of  the constitutions was indirect elections. Half  
the members of  the Rastra Sabha under the 1948 Constitution could be elected by the 
presiding offi cers of  local Panchayats. Under the 1962 Constitution, the National Panchayat 
was indirectly elected by people whose own election had been indirect, and the right 
to stand for elections was limited to the members of  certain classes and professional 
organizations. Even under the 2007 Interim Constitution, all 73 of  the Maoist members 
and 48 other members were party appointees, and the term of  offi ce of  the rest of  the 
members, who were elected in 1999, had actually ended by 2004. Another common 
feature in the systems Nepal has had so far has been the appointing of  House members 
by the king, or as in 1948, by the prime minister. 
23
The 1948 Act did not make room for political parties. Parties did contest elections 
under the 1959 Constitution, but parties were banned in 1960, although they were 
briefl y permitted to operate during the referendum campaign on that constitution. 
Under the Panchayat Constitution, provisions for the representation in the National 
Panchayat of  various interest groups were made through a constituency of  university 
graduates and various class organizations that were devised as a substitute for political 
parties and to direct the political process. A unique body called the Back to the Village 
National Campaign (BVNC) was introduced in 1975 to further restrict the election 
process. Only those candidates who were approved by the BVNC—that is, essentially 
by the king—could contest elections at any levels of  the Panchayat, and this body 
could remove a member of  the National Panchayat on the grounds of  bad conduct or 
unacceptable political activities, thereby negating the concept of  political participation 
and democracy.
The principal objective of  the 1990 Constitution, on the other hand, was multiparty 
democracy, and it did recognize parties explicitly and, indeed, regulated them. 
Human Rights
All the constitutions have had some provisions for human rights: The 1948 Constitution 
had only token provisions; in the 1951 Interim Constitution, all the rights were included 
under a chapter on directive principles, which, as in the Constitution of  India, could 
not be made the basis of  any legal claim before the courts and so were hard to enforce; 
and the constitutions that came later mostly drew on the provisions of  human rights 
as they were outlined in the Constitution of  India. The 1959 Constitution, however, 
undermined all the human rights enshrined in it, as one of  its clauses said that the 
provisions for human rights would not affect the validity of  any law that was supposed 
to be for the 'public good,' and public good was defi ned in a broad way. Also, the human 
rights provisions did not apply to the army at all, and could not be applied to the police, 
as well. We can trace the rather broad limitations placed on certain human rights in the 
1990 Constitution and the 2007 Interim Constitution to this provision, which was put 
in place to safeguard the 'public good' in the 1959 Constitution.
Directive principles, which, as mentioned earlier, cannot be used as the basis for legal 
claims, have been included in several Nepali constitutions. There was no chapter on 
directive principles in the 1959 Constitution. Although there was a chapter on directive 
principles in the 1962 Constitution, it was short and vague. In 1990, the chapter was 
long and detailed, and much of  its contents were drawn from the Constitution of  India. 
The 2007 document also has a long chapter, with some additions refl ecting the spirit of  
Jana Andolan II. But these additions tend to be vague. 
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Hinduism
Interestingly, successive constitutions have been increasingly 'Hindu' in some ways. 
Apart from a preambular mention of  Lord Pashupatinath, the 1948 Constitution was 
silent on Hinduism, and it had a freedom-of-worship provision. The 1951 Constitution 
said nothing about religion, except for mentioning that discrimination on the basis of  
religion should be prohibited. The 1959 Constitution did not mention Hinduism either, 
except to say that the king would have to be Hindu. The 1959 Constitution included, 
for the fi rst time, a provision that allowed the people the freedom to worship according 
to the tenets and norms of  their ancestral religions. The 1959 Constitution, however, 
didn't allow proselytizing. The 1962 Constitution had a declaration that Nepal was a 
Hindu state and that the cow was the national animal. The 1990 Constitution retained 
these provisions. Though the 2007 Constitution has declared Nepal a secular state, it 
has retained most of  the other provisions.
Inclusiveness
The 1951 Interim Constitution said that the members of  the Advisory Assembly would 
have to be chosen in such a way as to represent various regions, classes and interests. 
The 1959 Constitution added a provision that the king had to be an adherent of  'Aryan 
culture.' In a country where many are of  'non-Aryan' stock, this provision made people 
feel excluded. This provision remained intact in the 1962 Constitution but disappeared 
from the 1990 Constitution, which also recognized all mother tongues as national 
languages and Nepal as a multiethnic and multilingual country. The 2007 Constitution 
went further, promising the restructuring of  the state and the ending of  the problems 
related to race, religion, region, caste, and gender. But Nepali has remained the only 
offi cial language.
Accountability of the Government
Governments were not really accountable to the legislature or to the people until the 1990 
Constitution. Also, there was no effective judicial system to enforce rights and duties. 
Other organs of  accountability in most systems around the world include the auditor 
general who scrutinizes the accounts of  the government to ensure that money is spent 
as approved and in accordance with the law. The auditor general has been established 
in all the Nepali constitutions. Except for the 1951 Constitution, all the constitutions 
have guaranteed some degree of  security of  tenure for auditor generals (an important 
safeguard for people whose responsibilities include holding governments to account). 
Other constitutional bodies now include the Election Commission (fi rst mentioned in 
the 1951 Constitution), the Public Service Commission (mentioned in all constitutions), 
the Commission for the Investigation of  Abuse of  Authority (since 1990) and the 
Human Rights Commission (fi rst mentioned in the 2007 Interim Constitution). 
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Features 1948 1951 1959 1962 1990 2007 (Interim 
Constitution)
Systems 
of gov-
ernment
The hereditary Rana 
prime minister was 
the head of govern-
ment (executive 
power was vested 
in the PM); the 
Council of Ministers 
was made up of 
members of the 
legislature and the 
ministers were 
chosen by and could 
be dismissed by 
the PM; the cabinet 
could also dismiss 
ministers.
The PM was 
appointed 
by the king; 
ministers 
were ap-
pointed on 
the advice 
of the PM; 
all the 
ministers 
became 
members of  
the Advisory 
Assembly.
Parliamentary sys-
tem; the PM had 
to be a member 
of the House of 
Representatives; 
ministers had to be 
or had to become 
members of either 
House; the House 
of Representatives 
could pass a vote of 
no confi dence.
The PM and 
ministers had to 
be members of 
the National Pan-
chayat; the cabinet 
was chaired by the 
PM or the king; 
the king could  
dissolve the cabi-
net; the National 
Panchayat could 
pass a vote of no 
confi dence, but 
the king could 
disapprove it; the 
Raj Sabha (the 
PM, ministers 
and various 
other senior of-
fi ce holders or 
people appointed 
by the king) was 
to advise the king; 
the king appointed 
a commissioner 
for each zone.
The PM was the 
leader of the largest 
party/combination of 
parties in the House; 
the House could pass 
a vote of no confi -
dence; the king could 
remove the PM; the 
Raj Parishad was to 
advise the king.
The PM was 
appointed by 
consensus; 
ministers 
need not be 
members of 
the House; a 
provision for 
passing a vote 
of no confi -
dence was 
later added 
through an 
amendment.
The Need for Refl ecting on Past Constitutions
There is some degree of  continuity in the constitutions that Nepal has had. Many of  the 
basic ideas and the language in which they were expressed were taken from the British 
system of  government, either directly or through the Indian Constitution. Directive 
principles were drawn from the Constitution of  India (which took the idea and some of  
the language from the Irish Constitution). The 1962 Constitution owed something to the 
Panchayat System of  the 1948 Indian Constitution, and interestingly, had some features 
similar to the 'guided democracy' constitution already in force in Indonesia. Many of  
the institutions mentioned in the constitutions before 1962 can still be seen in the 1990 
and 2007 Constitutions. However, progress towards a truly democratic and inclusive 
constitutional system has not been smooth. Constitutional changes have refl ected shifts 
in power, and several of  the constitutions have been short lived. At times, some of  the 
constitutions have been less democratic than the ones they replaced (for example, the 
1962 Panchayat Constitution was distinctly retrogressive).
The instituting of  major changes in the constitutions has been preceded by the creation 
of  interim constitutions and interim governments—as is the case now. The people 
have been repeatedly deprived of  the chance to understand their constitutions and to 
be involved in their making. None of  the Nepali constitutions was drafted with the full 
involvement of  the people—even that of  1990. Will things be different this time?  
Features of Different Constitutions of Nepal
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Features 1948 1951 1959 1962 1990 2007 (Interim 
Constitution)
Role of 
the king
None; it was only 
mentioned that 
citizens were to be 
loyal to the king.
The king 
had ex-
ecutive and 
legislative 
powers; he 
could ap-
prove a bill 
presented 
by the cabi-
net (which 
would have 
to go to the 
Advisory 
Assembly, 
if it was in 
existence 
and was 
in ses-
sion); the 
king could 
dismiss the 
govern-
ment.
The king had formal 
executive powers; the 
king could appoint a 
PM on his discretion 
but the PM-designate 
would have to be a 
person who com-
manded a majority in 
the House; the king  
could suspend the 
cabinet Government 
if he could  not fi nd 
a suitable  PM-des-
ignate; most of the 
king’s functions were 
carried out on the 
advice of the cabinet, 
but the king himself 
had the fi nal say on 
whether to heed the 
advice given or not; 
there were formal 
provisions in place 
that provided for the 
cabinet to consult 
with the king about 
forthcoming recom-
mendations, assign-
ment of portfolios, 
etc; the  king could 
reject a recommen-
dation to dissolve 
Parliament; the 
king could dismiss 
civil servants, grant 
honours and exercise 
powers of mercy. 
Sovereignty was 
vested in the 
king; there was 
no compulsion 
for the king to act 
on advice given; 
the king had the 
power of mercy, 
could confer titles, 
dismiss civil serv-
ants and appoint 
ambassadors.
Sovereignty was 
vested in the people; 
the king had to gener-
ally act on advice 
given to him.
No func-
tions/roles for 
the king have 
been outlined 
(some of the 
king's previ-
ous functions 
are to be 
performed 
by the PM or 
the Council 
of Ministers; 
bills are to be 
signed by the 
speaker of the 
House).
Parlia-
ment
PM and two cham-
bers; the Rastra 
Sabha had 60-70 
members (60 per 
cent of the members 
were elected—six 
by functional con-
stituencies and the 
rest by the presiding 
offi cers of certain 
local Panchayats; 40 
per cent of the total 
number of members 
were appointed 
by the PM); in the 
Bharadari Sabha, all 
the 20-30 members 
were appointed by 
the PM, to represent 
various national 
interests; 25 per 
cent of the members 
retired each year.
The Advi-
sory As-
sembly was 
selected by 
the king to 
represent 
various 
regions, 
classes and 
interests; 
the cabinet 
consisted 
of-ex offi cio 
members.
The HoR comprised 
109 directly elected 
members; half of all 
the members in the 
Senate were  elected 
by the HoR and the 
other half were nomi-
nated by the king.
The National 
Panchayat 
was indirectly 
elected— by zonal 
assemblies, speci-
fi ed organizations 
and university 
graduates;  15 per 
cent of the mem-
bers to the Na-
tional Panchayat 
were chosen by 
the king.
HoR comprised 205 
directly elected mem-
bers; the National 
Council had 35 mem-
bers elected by the 
HoR, three from each 
Development Region 
elected by local gov-
ernment members, 
and 10 were nomi-
nated by the king.
The HoR 
comprises 
198 members 
who had been 
directly elect-
ed in earlier 
elections, 48 
additional 
members 
appointed by 
parties and 83 
Maoists.
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Human 
rights
There was a list of 
basic rights and 
freedoms—these 
rights and freedoms 
could be removed 
if they confl icted 
with the purported 
aims of the state to 
uphold public order 
and morality.
None as 
such— pro-
visions 
similar to 
the Indian 
Constitu-
tion were 
included in 
the directive 
principles.
There was a fairly 
short chapter on hu-
man rights— though 
adequate for the 
time.
A short chapter on 
human rights.
Longer chapter on 
human rights.
The chapter 
on human 
rights is 
similar to that 
in the 1990 
Constitution, 
with some 
provisions 
for economic, 
social and 
cultural rights 
added.
Directive 
princi-
ples
Not named as such: 
there was a section 
providing that the 
state would intro-
duce education.
There was a 
DP chapter 
(non-jus-
ticiable); 
about half 
of these 
principles 
were similar 
to HR provi-
sions in 
other con-
stitutions.
None. Very short and 
non-specifi c.
Long and detailed. Longer.
Courts Village Panchayats 
were to deal with 
small cases; the 
judges in the High 
Court were ap-
pointed by the PM; 
the members of the 
Judicial Committee 
of the legislature, 
with two qualifi ed 
outsiders, were all 
appointed by the 
PM—the Judicial 
Committee was also 
the Supreme Court 
of Appeal; judges 
could be dismissed 
by the PM on the 
recommendation of 
the Judicial Com-
mittee 
High 
court was 
mentioned 
– a law was 
required; no 
other courts 
were men-
tioned.
Only the Supreme 
Court was men-
tioned; the Supreme 
Court's jurisdiction 
was not indicated; 
judges could be 
removed by the king 
only if a commission 
appointed by the 
king (government) 
recommended their 
removal (the king did 
not have to accept 
recommendations).
Supreme Court 
judges were ap-
pointed by the 
king (after con-
sultation); judges 
could be removed 
by the king after 
recommendation 
by the Commis-
sion or by the Na-
tional Panchayat; 
writ jurisdiction 
for fundamental 
rights and other 
rights.
Supreme Court— 
with writ jurisdiction; 
Appellate Courts, Dis-
trict Courts. Security 
of tenure for Supreme 
Court judges.
Similar to the 
1990 Consti-
tution.
Local 
govern-
ment
Gram Panchayat for 
each village/group; 
Nagar Panchayat 
for each town; Zilla 
Panchayats elected 
by presiding offi cers 
of lower Panchayats.
The setting 
up of a 
system of 
Panchayats 
was a 
directive 
principle.
Not mentioned. Village Assemblies 
elected Village 
Panchayats; Dis-
trict Assemblies 
were elected by 
Village and Town 
Panchayats;  
Zonal Assemblies 
(comprising all 
members of Dis-
trict Panchayats) 
Interim local 
bodies at the 
district, mu-
nicipality and 
village level to 
be constituted; 
country to 
be federal 
(amendment 
to IC).
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Features 1948 1951 1959 1962 1990 2007 (Interim 
Constitution)
Religion Lord Pashupatinath 
was mentioned in 
the preamble; free-
dom of worship.
No mention. King had to  be a 
Hindu; Right to prac-
tise one's traditional 
religion provided 
for; no conversion to 
other religions was 
allowed.
As in the 1959 
Constitution, with 
the additional 
mention that 
Nepal was to be 
a Hindu state; the 
cow was deemed 
the national 
animal.
As in the 1959 Con-
stitution, with the 
additional mention 
that Nepal was to be 
a Hindu state; the 
cow was deemed the 
national animal.
Secular state; 
the cow re-
mains the na-
tional animal; 
people have 
the right to 
practise their 
traditional 
religions; no 
conversion to 
other religions 
is allowed.
Inclu-
siveness
No mention of 
equality or non-
discrimination, nor 
caste, etc.
Members of 
the Assem-
bly were to 
represent 
different 
regions, 
classes and 
interests. 
The king had to be 
an 'adherent of Aryan 
culture'; No discrimi-
nation on the basis 
of religion, race, 
caste, sex, tribe was 
permitted; no person 
would be allowed to 
create enmity be-
tween classes.
Similar to the 
1959 Constitution.
Similar to the 1959 
Constitution on is-
sues regarding equal-
ity and discrimination, 
but also additional 
mention was made 
about all mother 
tongues, national lan-
guages; people were 
deemed equal 'ir-
respective of religion, 
race, caste or tribe' ; 
Nepal was deemed a 
'multi-ethnic, multi-
lingual' country.
State to be 
restructured 
to do away 
with problems 
related to 
class, caste, 
region and 
gender; moth-
er tongues 
may be used 
in local of-
fi ces.
Other 
points
Auditor general; 
Public Service Com-
mission; PM could 
make rules to 
remove diffi culties 
in introducing the 
constitution; PM 
could make emer-
gency regulations 
that could last for six 
months.
Auditor gen-
eral; Public 
Service 
Commis-
sion—both 
were ap-
pointed by 
the govern-
ment; the 
Election 
Commis-
sion was 
appointed 
by the king 
on the 
advice of 
the govern-
ment.
Auditor general; 
Public Service Com-
mission—both were 
appointed by the king 
(government); the 
king (government) 
could issue  orders 
to remove diffi cul-
ties in bringing the 
constitution into 
force (not after two 
years).
Auditor gen-
eral; Public 
Service Commis-
sion—both were 
appointed by the 
king; attorney 
general; Election 
Commission; the 
king had Emer-
gency powers; the 
king could issue 
orders for remov-
ing diffi culties 
about bringing the 
constitution into 
force—but not af-
ter the fi rst sitting 
of the National 
Panchayat.
Auditor general; 
Public Service Com-
mission, Election 
Commission—all 
appointed by the 
king on the advice 
of the Constitutional 
Council; the Com-
mission for the The 
Commission for 
the Investigation of 
Abuse of Authority 
was similarly created; 
attorney general; 
provisions on political 
parties were included; 
power to remove dif-
fi culties orders could 
be made by by the 
king (must mean on 
advice of the cabinet) 
to be laid before Par-
liament; no time limit 
for this; the National 
Defence Council (two 
ministers and the 
king) was to provide 
recommendations for 
using the army.
Human Rights 
Commission 
was added; 
Council of 
Ministers may 
remove dif-
fi culties—the 
motions must 
be approved 
by the leg-
islature; no 
time limit for 
removal of 
diffi culties; the 
National De-
fence Council 
(all ministers) 
to make 
recommenda-
tions on the 
use of the 
army.
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Introduction 
As the last chapter shows, over the last sixty years, Nepal has been governed under fi ve 
different constitutions. Each constitution represented the dominance of  a particular 
class (but not necessarily of  a particular ethnic or regional group). Each constitution 
was adopted to promote (and occasionally to resist) social and political change. The 
purpose of  this chapter is to establish the context of  the present process of  adopting 
a new constitution. Since the new constitution is being created because the 1990 
Constitution needs to be replaced, it is necessary to examine the record (strengths and 
defi ciencies) of  the 1990 Constitution. It is also necessary to examine the changing 
social circumstances (and struggles) that affected the relevance or acceptability of  the 
1990 Constitution. Just as the 1990 Constitution was the result of  the people's struggle 
for a democratic and just social order, the present process of  making a constitution is 
the result of  the people's struggle for an inclusive, just and peaceful social order. Both 
the process of  making a new constitution and its contents must refl ect the ethos and 
agenda of  Jana Andolan II and open up opportunities for all the people to participate in 
the designing of  new institutions of  the state. 
The 1990 Constitution was made through greater consultations with the people than 
were the previous constitutions. However, it has been argued that those consultations 
did not turn out to be meaningful. Although meetings with the people were held 
through the agency of  government offi cials, few members of  the Dalit, ethnic and 
marginalized communities, women, and rural people participated in the consultation 
process. The commission charged with drafting the constitution disregarded most 
of  the recommendations related to the rights and demands of  these groups. And the 
cabinet and subsequently the then king made changes in the draft prepared by the 
commission, moving the constitution even further away from the aspirations of  the 
The 1990 Constitution and Its Collapse
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people. The stage is now set for a more participatory method of  constitution-making 
through a constituent assembly, representing, at least in theory, the sovereignty of  the 
people. However, it remains to be seen whether in practice it will be the sovereign 
people who decide on the new constitution.
This chapter discusses the underlying principles of  the 1990 Constitution, how they were 
incorporated and how far they were implemented. It also examines the shortcomings 
of  the constitution and its failure to provide a clear and binding programme of  social, 
political, and economic reform. It tries to ascribe responsibility for the failure to achieve 
these and other objectives prescribed by the constitution. It also suggests that there are 
some lessons that can be learned from the collapse of  the 1990 Constitution, as Nepal 
prepares to adopt a new constitution to fulfi l the agenda of  Jana Andolan II.  
The Underlying Principles of the 1990 Constitution 
As stated in the preamble to the 1990 Constitution, there were four interconnected 
principles that informed the drafting of  the 1990 Constitution: multiparty democracy 
based on adult franchise, parliamentary system of  government, constitutional monarchy, 
and national unity. The constitutional provisions for achieving these objectives are 
briefl y discussed and assessed below. 
Multiparty Democracy
Democracy
Since the 1990 Constitution was created in reaction to and after the demise of  the 
partyless Panchayat system, multiparty democracy became a principal objective of  the 
1990 Constitution. Multiparty democracy emphasizes both democracy and the specifi c 
method of  its practice through the organization and functioning of  political parties. 
Democracy is a system in which the sovereignty (i.e., the power and authority) of  the 
state is vested in the people. Democracy is based on values that recognize the dignity, 
liberty and rights of  all persons and operates through fair and generally accepted 
procedures. Political parties compete, mainly through free and fair elections, for the 
right to exercise state power on behalf  of  the people. That power has to be exercised 
in accordance with the constitution, which is the supreme manifestation of  the will of  
the people. In this section, we discuss fi rstly the provisions for the recognition of  the 
importance and establishment of  democracy and then the provisions for the role of  
political parties.
The 1990 Constitution was historically important because it recognized, for the fi rst 
time in Nepal, the sovereignty of  the people. Previously, sovereignty was deemed to 
be with the king, who was addressed as the 'sovereign.' The 1962 Constitution, which 
immediately preceded the 1990 Constitution, had its main principle outlined thus: 'The 
sovereignty of  Nepal is vested in His Majesty and all powers—executive, legislative, 
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and judicial—emanate from him' (Art. 20(2)). It is interesting (and ironic) that in 1990, 
although King Birendra claimed and exercised the power to enact the constitution, he 
stated that 'We are convinced that in the independent and sovereign Nepal, the source 
of  sovereign authority is inherent in the people' (preamble) and that henceforth, the 
constitution could be amended ultimately by the people themselves through their duly 
elected representatives in Parliament (Art.116). 
The 1990 Constitution included a number of  human rights, which are the foundations 
of  democracy. Foremost among them was the equality of  all citizens before the law. 
Article 11, stating this equality, prohibited discrimination against any citizen on the 
grounds of  religion, race, sex, caste, tribe, or ideology. The constitution guaranteed 
the freedom of  expression, press and publication, and the right to form associations 
and to assemble. These rights, so critical to democracy, allow like-minded people to 
work together, express their views, and lobby and infl uence others. The constitution 
also included guarantees of  a fair trial to opponents of  the government in power, to 
prevent their harassment (Art. 14).  Article 16 guaranteed the right to demand and 
receive information on any matter of  public importance, information being essential 
to accountability for and over the exercise of  power.  Personal and collective rights of  
religion and culture were also protected (Arts. 18 and 19), although not as fully as they 
should have been.  
The constitution also required periodic elections to the House of  Representatives, and 
indirectly, for the formation of  a government. Citizens of  age 18 or older were entitled 
to vote (Art. 45(6)), and citizens of  25 years or older were able to stand as candidates 
for elections (Art. 47). The elected representatives could then choose the prime minister 
for the new government. Elections also gave the people the opportunity to remove 
parliamentarians and governments who/that failed to do their job well or honestly. 
Checks and Balances
In order to prevent concentration of  power in one authority, state powers were divided 
among the king, Parliament, the Council of  Ministers, and the judiciary. There were 
some attempts to introduce a system of  checks and balances so that the government 
could be accountable to the legislature, and an independent Supreme Court had the 
authority and obligation to enforce the constitution and thus to hold state authorities 
within the limits of  their powers (although as is shown later, the Supreme Court, at least 
in the early years, seemed to be less than impartial and paid undue deference to the king). 
A number of  other independent authorities (the auditor general, the Public Service 
Commission, the Election Commission and the Commission for the Investigation of  
Abuse of  Authority) were established to reinforce the principle of  accountability and 
to insulate the offi cials who were performing public tasks (such as the managing of  
electoral process) from political infl uence. The procedure for making appointments to 
these bodies, through a Constitutional Council consisting of  the prime minister, chief  
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justice, presiding offi cers of  the two legislative houses, and the leader of  the opposition 
(Art. 117), was designed to reduce the infl uence of  the government. Nor could the 
appointees be dismissed by the government because, just as in the case with judges, they 
could only be removed after appropriate procedures in Parliament. And their salaries 
could not be reduced. 
The system of  government was parliamentary, which meant that the party or coalition 
of  parties with the majority of  seats in the House of  Representatives formed the 
government. The government was responsible to the House, so that it had to secure 
approval in the House for making new laws and for raising and spending money; the 
government had to be accountable to the House. The government could be removed 
through a vote of  no confi dence by a majority of  the members of  the House. 
Parliament consisted of  two houses. The members of  the House of  Representatives 
were elected directly by the people in single-member constituencies. The members 
of  the National Assembly were of  three kinds. Ten were appointed by the king from 
amongst distinguished persons, 35 were elected by members of  the House, and 15 were 
to be elected by chairpersons and deputy chairpersons of  local authorities (Art. 46). 
Unitary State
The presence of  only a small number of  representatives from regions and zones meant 
that the state was unitary and centralized (meaning that most powers of  the state were 
vested in the government at the national level). In a country as diversifi ed as Nepal 
and with such limited means of  communications, a unitary and centralized system 
limits the possibilities of  people's participation in public affairs (which is an index of  
the democratic nature of  the state). In recognition of  this weakness, the constitution 
required the government to 'bring about conditions for the enjoyment of  the fruits 
of  democracy by providing opportunities for the maximum participation of  people in 
the governance of  the country by means of  decentralization of  administration' (Art. 
25(4)).  
The constitution also established other principles of  policy, which state authorities had 
to implement to strengthen democracy, particularly participation. Some of  these policies 
were concerned with social justice and improvement of  the economic, educational, and 
health standards of  the people, particularly of  the marginalized communities.
The Role of Political Parties
It is clear from the preceding account that the principal components of  democracy were 
included in the 1990 Constitution. As the principal objective of  the 1990 Constitution 
was multiparty democracy, marking the end of  partyless Panchayat rule, the status and 
roles of  political parties were emphasized (see chapter on political parties in this book). 
Beside the general freedom to form associations, the specifi c right to form political 
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parties and carry on political activities was guaranteed (Art. 112(1)). A one-party system 
was prohibited (Art. 112(2)). In a parliamentary system of  government, parties play 
an important role in the formation and dismissal of  governments, and the stability 
of  a government depends on the emergence of  clear and disciplined majorities in the 
legislature; accordingly, the government is formed by the majority party or a coalition 
of  parties with the support of  the legislature, and a government can be dismissed by a 
vote of  no confi dence, which is often orchestrated by the opposition party or parties. 
To strengthen party discipline, legislators were forced to give up their seats if  the party 
(or the parties) that sponsored their candidacy notifi ed that they had been expelled from 
the party (Art. 49(f)). A party had to establish a minimum degree of  public support 
before it could be registered (Art. 113(2)(d)). It had to establish internal democracy 
within the party (Art. 113(2)), and a party could not discriminate against any person 
with regard to membership on the grounds of  religion, caste, tribe, language, or sex 
(Art. 113(3)). In the 'fi rst past the post' system, it is more diffi cult for party leaders to 
control the nomination of  candidates than it would be for leaders in a proportional 
representation system, but elections, in general, place parties (through their ability to 
nominate candidates and their election campaigns) in a stronger position than social 
groups and other such entities. 
The functioning and credibility of  the government depends on the nature of  the 
organization of  political parties. As we have seen, the 1990 Constitution helped parties 
to maintain control over their  members by allowing  parties to expel their members 
and thus drive him or her out of  Parliament—and to prevent an opposition member 
from crossing the fl oor to join the government. Equally, the rule helped the ruling party 
to maintain its majority. Therefore, the organization and ethos of  parties had a major 
impact on the working of  the political system and its degree of  transparency. 
An equally important function of  political parties is to facilitate the engagement of  the 
people in public affairs. Parties offer policy alternatives from which people can choose, 
and parties are the principal vehicles for people's participation in public and political 
life of  the country. Opposition parties provide a check on the policies and activities of  
the government. But parties can perform these diverse roles only if  they are internally 
democratic, well organized, and disciplined.
In Nepal, however, the political parties were seen as playing a crucial role in maintaining 
the principal character of  the state as united, harmonious, and hegemonic. The freedom 
of  association could be restricted if  it 'undermined the sovereignty and integrity' of  
Nepal or 'disturbed the harmonious relations subsisting among the various castes and 
communities' (Art. 12(2)(3)). A party could not be registered if  its name, objective, 
symbol, or fl ag indicated that it belonged to any particular religion, was communal, or 
of  a 'nature tending to disintegrate the economy' (Art. 113(3)). The decision of  the 
Election Commission on this matter was fi nal (Sec. 17(2) of  the House of  Representatives 
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Members Election Act, 1991). The parties did little, it is said, to bring the marginalized 
communities (Dalits, women, Janajatis, and Madhesis) into the mainstream of  politics or 
into institutions of  the state. Membership of  political and state offi ces remained the 
preserve of  the traditionally privileged communities. 
The nature of  Nepali democracy, therefore, depended greatly on the nature and 
organization of  political parties and their behaviour when in the government or 
opposition. But the behaviour of  parties did not help the cause of  Nepali democracy. 
Parties were obsessed with power, and they rarely thought about how they could use 
power constructively. This obsession with power led to intrigues and splits among 
parties. The rule for dissolving the House of  Representatives was improperly used to 
settle scores among parties (which, as is argued later on in this chapter, led to  the palace's 
intervening in parliamentary affairs). No government lasted the full term of  fi ve years. 
Parties were condemned for not implementing any of  the constitution's participatory, 
democratic norms. They remained the bastions of  privileged castes and communities 
and their tenures were marked by personalized styles of  leadership. There was the 
growth of  'partyism,' whereby political and government leaders identifi ed themselves 
more with political parties than with the national state, state institutions, and the lives of  
ordinary citizens.  This led to a culture of  clientelism, political patronage, and impunity, 
which affected other aspects of  society and diminished the effectiveness of  policies and 
initiatives. Parties paid undue deference to the palace, failed to uphold the rule of  law, 
and all this led to, as one commentator put it, 'the total collapse of  law into politics.'  
Constitutional Monarchy
Limiting the Power of the Monarch
The central feature of  the 1990 Constitution was the balancing of  the power of  the 
king with that of  the government. The preamble identifi ed 'constitutional monarchy' as 
a principal objective of  the new political order. A constitutional monarch was the head 
of  state but had limited powers, many of  them symbolic. Most powers of  the state 
were vested in an elected legislature and executive. In a symbolic way, the constitutional 
monarch personifi ed and expressed the unity of  the country (as was also stated in the 
constitution, Art. 27(2)). The king was obliged to abide by the constitution (Art. 27(3)), 
although it was also stated that the conduct of  the king could not be questioned in 
court (Art. 31). His property and income could not be taxed (Art. 30). He had the sole 
authority to determine questions of  succession to the throne (Art. 28). These provisions 
strengthened the institution of  monarchy. 
Let us now analyse the state powers the king had and the king's relationship to the 
government and the legislature. The general principle was that the powers of  the king 
regarding the government were to be exercised 'by and with the consent of  the Council 
of  Ministers', unless the constitution stated that a power could be exercised by the 
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king at his 'own discretion' (i.e., he himself  would decide how to exercise it) or on 
the recommendation of  any other institution or offi cial (Art. 35). This is a standard 
provision in parliamentary systems with a monarch or president (as in India). Under this 
formula, the effective power of  the government rested with the Council of  Ministers. 
But the prime minister had to keep the king informed of  the business and decisions 
of  the government and on matters relating to peace, security, politics, economics, and 
foreign affairs (Art. 43), which presumably gave the king the opportunity to offer his 
advice to the government.
Discretionary Powers of the King  
The powers of  the king that were to be exercised at his own discretion were very few: 
• appointing the prime minister, although within rules that were intended to ensure 
that the prime minister had the majority support in the House of  Representatives, 
and which seriously restricted the king's discretion (Art. 36(1)); 
• asking Parliament to reconsider a bill before giving his assent (Art. 71(4)); 
• possibly assigning a judge to a non-judicial task (Art. 92).
Examples of  the powers the king exercised on the recommendation of  other bodies 
included  
• dismissing the prime minister following a vote of  no confi dence by the House of  
Representatives (Art. 36(5)(b));
• appointing judges on the recommendation of  the Judicial Council, except for 
the chief  justice, in which case he had to follow the recommendation of  the 
Constitutional Council (Art. 87(1)); 
• appointing members of  independent bodies on the recommendations of  the 
Constitution Council; 
• appointing an auditor general on the recommendation of  the prime minister 
(Art. 109); 
• deploying and managing the army on the advice of  the Defence Council (Art. 
118(2).
Powers Dependent on Decisions of Ministers
The king was supposed to perform all other acts or make his decisions (such as 
convening, summoning, proroguing, or dissolving the House of  Representatives (Art. 
53); declaring an emergency (Art. 115); passing or repealing of  ordinances (Art. 72); 
addressing Parliament (Art. 54), appointing ambassadors (Art. 120); and taking remedial 
action to remove diffi culties in bringing the constitution into force (Art. 127)) on the 
recommendations (meaning instructions) of  the Council of  Ministers.
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Ambiguity Resulting in the Misuse of Power 
Unfortunately, the signifi cance of  the formulation of  Article 35(2) appears not to have 
been generally understood, and the many references to the king's powers, which he 
was to exercise on the instructions ('advice and consent') of  the government, gave 
the impression that too much power had been given to the king. This problem was 
compounded by the fact that it was not possible to question in court whether advice 
had been given to the king or what the advice was (Art. 35(6)). This too is a standard 
provision (intended to ensure the confi dentiality of  the business of  the Council of  
Ministers and to keep the judiciary out of  political disputes). But the result could be 
that certain acts of  the king that were in violations of  the constitution could not be 
challenged. For example, the power to dissolve the House of  Representatives could only 
be exercised by the king on the recommendation of  the prime minister (Art. 53(4)); but 
if  the king were to dissolve the House without the prime minister's recommendation, it 
would not be possible to challenge the king's decision in court. Moreover, the conduct 
of  the king could not be discussed in Parliament (Art.  56), another sort of  impunity. 
Therefore, the 1990 Constitution did not fully accomplish the project of  bringing the 
monarchy within the confi nes of  the constitution. 
The king also assumed for himself  powers that were clearly reserved for the government. 
Soon after the constitution was enacted, King Birendra appointed an ambassador of  
his own liking to France, without seeking the recommendation of  the prime minister. 
The Supreme Court justifi ed the appointment by invoking Article 120, which gave the 
king the power to appoint ambassadors without anyone's being able to inquire into 
whether he had been advised by the Council of  Ministers. This decision encouraged the 
king to exercise more and more powers later. For example, after the 1991 elections, he 
nominated ten members of  the National Assembly without the advice of  the Council 
of  Ministers (as required by Art. 46(a)). Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala did not 
protest this usurpation of  the Council of  Ministers' authority. 
Bias of the Supreme Court and Prime Ministers towards the Monarchy
More importantly, the king used the powers to dissolve the legislature in an unprincipled 
manner. The practice of  dissolution started when, with the recommendation of  
Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, King Birendra dissolved the House. When 
parliamentarians from the ruling party challenged the constitutionality of  the dissolution, 
the Supreme Court justifi ed the dissolution on the grounds that the king had to follow 
the recommendation of  the prime minister. On another occasion, the king granted 
dissolution on the recommendation of  Prime Minister Manmohan Adhikari. When 
challenged, the Supreme Court declared the dissolution unconstitutional, on the 
grounds that a minority government could not recommend the dissolution. However, 
when on a later occasion, Sher Bahadur Deuba, heading a minority government, was 
unable to get the approval of  the House to extend the emergency and recommended 
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dissolution, King Gyanendra granted it. The House acted as an impediment to the 
wishes of  both the king and the Deuba government  to extend the emergency. King 
Birendra also refused to accept the recommendation of  Prime Minister Surya Bahadur 
Thapa to dissolve the House. Instead, without the recommendation of  the government, 
the king asked the opinion of  the Supreme Court, which gave him the discretion to 
decide, and the king refused to grant dissolution. Thus, the constitutional principles 
were not consistently followed. 
Contentious Articles 127 and 71
After the October 2002 takeover, King Gyanendra formed a Council of  Ministers of  
his own choice, ignoring Articles 36 and 42. In doing so, he relied on Article 127, which 
stated that the king could issue orders if  necessary to 'remove diffi culties' in bringing 
the constitution into effect. Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba also used Article 127 
when he recommended the postponement of  elections in October 2004, which the 
king promptly accepted. From 2002 until Jana Andolan II in April 2006, the country was 
governed by ordinance, under the authority of  Article 127. The National Assembly was 
unconstitutionally marginalized, and it was not able to meet after the dissolution of  the 
House of  Representatives. 
There is little doubt that the king used Article 127 improperly. Firstly, this article, which 
was probably taken from the Indian Constitution, was to have been used to facilitate 
the transition to the new constitution; the article was not meant to be used as a standing 
authority for future emergencies. Secondly, when applying Article 127, the king had to 
act on the recommendation of  the Council of  Ministers (in accordance with Article 
35(2)), although the Supreme Court  interpreted Article 127 as not being covered by 
Article 35(2). Thirdly, the purpose of  Article 127 was to ensure the fulfi lment of  the 
constitution, not its subversion. Under the 1959 Constitution a similar removal-of- 
diffi culties provision was limited to two years, and required the approval of  both houses 
of  Parliament. 
King Birendra is also considered to have violated Article 71 concerning assent given to 
legislative bills passed by Parliament. Except for bills dealing with fi nancial matters, the 
king could have, within one month, referred a bill back to Parliament for reconsideration. 
If  in a joint session of  the House of  Representatives and the National Assembly, the bill 
had been passed again, with or without amendments, the king would have had to give 
his consent within a month. Since Article 71 did not refer to the personal discretion of  
the king, presumably he would have had to act on the recommendation of  the Council 
of  Ministers. But no government was able to enforce Article 71. Almost none of  the 
bills were assented to by the king within the one-month period from the date that the 
bills were tendered to him. King Birendra never assented to the Citizenship Bill 2001. 
He asked, without the recommendation of  the Council of  Ministers, for the opinion 
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of  the Supreme Court on the validity of  the bill, and the Supreme Court advised him 
that the bill was unconstitutional. In these ways, the kings undermined the authority of  
Parliament. 
The King, the Government, and the Army
Even more problematic was the relationship between the king, the government, and 
the army. The army has been traditionally regarded as the king's army, fully loyal 
and personally accountable to him (see the chapter on national security). The 1990 
Constitution changed the organization of  the army and aimed to bring the army under 
the control of  the government. It established a National Defence Council consisting of  
the prime minister (as chair), the minister of  defence, and the commander in chief  (Art. 
118). The commander in chief  was appointed by the king on the recommendation of  
the prime minister (Art. 119(2)). The king was the supreme commander of  the army, 
presumably a formal role, as he was to 'perform the operation and management' of  
the army on the recommendation of  the National Defence Council (Art. 118(2)). The 
organization and operation of  the army were to be determined by law (and, therefore, 
by the government and Parliament).  
However, it was widely perceived that these provisions failed to transfer the loyalty 
of  the army from the king to the people (Parliament). No prime minister was able to 
mobilize, control, and operate the army. Girija Prasad Koirala once resigned as prime 
minister because the Royal Nepal Army did not cooperate with him. The army seemed 
to be sympathetic to the king's attempts to undermine democracy. It did not directly 
take over state power, but did support the king's takeover of  powers. The episode of  
the emergency is revealing. When Sher Bahadur Deuba's government, constitutionally 
appointed, imposed an emergency, Parliament refused to approve the extension of  the 
emergency beyond three months. Why the army withheld cooperation with one prime 
minister but allowed another to continue the emergency with the army's support (despite 
parliamentary opposition), well beyond the limits of  the constitution, is explained by 
the interventions of  the king. 
Why the Provisions Failed 
In summary, the constitution did aim to make the king a constitutional monarch, but, 
for a variety of  reasons, it did not succeed. One, there seems to have been an inadequate 
understanding of  the status and role of  a constitutional monarch. Two, the provisions of  
the constitution concerning the king were drafted in a style that could mislead those not 
brought up in a constitutional monarchy system (particularly the way in which formal 
and real powers are divided, as is evident from the way in which Article 35 operated). 
Three, the political parties and prime ministers seemed to have been overly deferential to 
the king and exaggerated his constitutional role. Four, the political competition between 
political parties and the use of  powers of  dissolution or votes of  no confi dence by the 
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party leaders for purely personal and political reasons gave the king opportunities to 
intervene in politics. Finally, the aura that the monarchy had—given the monarchy's 
centrality in Nepali politics throughout Nepal's history—had the effect of  diluting the 
restrictions on the king's constitutional powers.  
National Unity
The unity of  Nepal was an important theme of  the 1990 Constitution. The preamble 
referred to the principles outlined above as promoting 'among the people of  Nepal the 
spirit of  fraternity and the bond of  unity on the basis of  liberty and equality.' Article 2 
said that the 'people of  Nepal being united by a bond of  common aspirations and faith 
in the independence and integrity of  the Nation, irrespective of  religion, race, caste, or 
tribe, collectively constitute this Nation.' 
But the notion of  unity was deeply driven by the commitment to a specifi c sense of  
Nepali identity based on one religion, one language, and one culture (even to the extent 
of  dress)—this even though the constitution described Nepal as being multi-religious 
and multilingual (Art. 4(1)). The state itself  was unitary and highly centralized, with 
all state powers (executive, legislative, and judicial) given ultimately by the constitution 
to institutions  in Kathmandu. The character of  the state was exclusionary, as it was 
oriented towards the majority religion and the majority language, and thus, also towards 
the majority culture. The unitary nature of  Nepal and the centralization of  power 
accentuated the consequences of  dominance by established elites, drawn from limited 
classes, castes, region, and one gender. It denied others the possibilities of  the exercise 
of  the power to determine policies at the local level or to use the local language for 
offi cial purposes. 
In many countries, second chambers are used for the representation of  minorities or 
regions. A different form of  representation from that in the other house is considered 
valuable if  the second chamber is to act as some kind of  check on the Lower House 
or if  it is to create a more representative and participatory legislature and recognize 
social and cultural diversity. Under the 1990 Constitution, the National Assembly largely 
reproduced party membership (and even the king's appointees were drawn from well-
off  communities). Such arrangements neither served the purpose of  scrutinizing the 
Lower House nor the representation of  or concern for minorities. 
Religion, Language, and Culture
The 1990 Constitution declared Nepal a Hindu state (Art. 1). The king had to be 
an 'adherent of  Aryan Culture and Hindu Religion' (Art. 27)—at the same time, the 
king was declared to be the 'symbol of  the Nepali nation and the unity of  the Nepali 
people.' Apart from this, the implications of  Nepal's being a Hindu state were not 
spelled out. But the dominance of  Hindu beliefs and rituals was pervasive. Provisions 
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about the monarchy tended to emphasize and reinforce the Hindu and 'Aryan' aspects 
of  Nepal. When too many Hindu values and rituals are associated with the monarchy, 
the very symbol of  the nation can be seen as divisive and marginalizing of  non-Hindu 
communities. 
Although the 1990 Constitution guaranteed the adherents of  all religions the freedom 
to 'profess and practice' their own religion (Art. 19), the freedom seemed to be qualifi ed, 
since it only related to belief  or practice as 'coming down to him hereditarily having 
regard to traditional practices.' This provision could restrict reform of  religious practices. 
It reinforced another restriction, that 'no person had the right to convert a person to 
another religion,' although, presumably, this did not prohibit a person from changing 
his or her religion. 
Although other languages were not ignored, the 1990 Constitution made Nepali the 
offi cial language (written in the Devanagari script) (Art. 3). This meant that all offi cial 
business had to be conducted in Nepali. The article also declared, 'All languages spoken 
as mother tongues in various parts of  Nepal are the languages of  this nation,' although 
the implications of  a language's being a national language were not stated and the 
state seemed to have no responsibility for promoting the use or development of  these 
languages. Article 18, which dealt with culture and education, gave every community 
within Nepal the right to 'conserve and promote its language, script, and culture.' They 
were free to 'establish schools for providing primary level education to the children in 
their mother tongue.' But the way these rights were formulated suggest that they were 
to be exercised in the private domain, without assistance from the state. 
The 1990 Constitution could also be read, additionally, as preventing the constitutional 
recognition of  political rights associated with other cultures. As we have seen, the 
constitution prohibited the creation of  a political party 'on the basis of  religion, 
community, caste, tribe, or regionality' (Art. 112(3)). An elaboration of  this rule was 
the prohibition of  any party which 'prejudicially restricted' membership on the basis of  
religion, caste, tribe, language, or sex. A party was also prohibited if  its 'name, objective, 
symbol, or fl ag indicated it as belonging to any particular religion or being communal 
or of  a nature tending to disintegrate the country' (Art. 113(3)). Such was  the concern 
with communal harmony that even the right to move freely in the country and to reside 
in any part of  Nepal could be denied if  it 'disturbed harmonious relations subsisting 
among various castes and communities' (Art. 12(2)(4)).
It is possible that these restrictions (along with the restrictions on freedom of  speech, 
assembly, and association) inhibited legitimate political activity, obscured elements 
of  Nepal's diversity that needed to be recognized, and forced minorities to operate 
through political parties over which they had little infl uence. It could also have led to 
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the centralization of  power in parties, in a mirror image of  the centralization of  power 
in the state (as mentioned below). 
In contemporary times, national unity also depends on fairness and justice, a sense on 
the part of  all sections of  society that the state treats them with respect, that they have 
reasonable opportunities to participate in the affairs of  the state, and that they are fairly 
represented in its institutions. As will be evident below, the constitution's failure in this 
regard lay at the root of  the 1990 Constitution's collapse.  
The Collapse of the 1990 Constitution
Despite the commitment in the 1990 Constitution to multiparty, parliamentary 
democracy, there were problems with some of  its provisions and with the lack of  their 
proper implementation. The fact that some people proclaimed the 1990 Constitution 
as the 'best in the world,' while others rejected it shows that it was divisive from the 
very beginning (even among its drafters). The openings that the constitution allowed, 
indeed required, for the harmonization of  these views (e.g., affi rmative action, better 
representation, and decentralization) were not taken up by the elite.  
Driven by concern for personal and party gain, political parties failed to establish a 
genuinely participatory democracy; state affairs remained the preserve of  a caste-based 
elite. Ministers and offi cials were corrupt and indulged in favouritism—and frequently 
disregarded the rule of  law. Intra-party intrigues led to splits and unstable governments. 
Governments took relatively few policy initiatives, frequently invoking royal intervention 
to justify their inaction, and they thus gave ample opportunities to the palace to meddle 
in politics. They acquiesced in the unconstitutional initiatives of  the king, and thus to 
some extent, legitimized them, opening opportunities for the king to take over power 
(in October 2002 and February 2005). Even the Supreme Court (without a single judge 
from marginalized communities) seriously misread both the letter and the spirit of  the 
constitution, and failed to develop its democratic and participatory potential. In 1998, 
the Supreme Court invalidated the use of  the Maithili and Newari languages in local 
administration. The Supreme Court banned regional parties although it is doubtful if  they 
would have disturbed inter-ethnic relations. The court upheld various unconstitutional 
acts of  the king, thereby weakening democracy and accountability. 
The greatest failure of  the 1990 Constitution lay in its inability  to address the diversity 
of  the Nepali people. The state declared Nepal as a Hindu state and gave primacy to 
Hindu religion. Harka Gurung, a prominent intellectual, wrote that the primacy given to 
Hinduism 'sanctifi es the caste system... State advocacy of  a particular religion militates 
against equality in practicing one's faith… The state alignment to Hindu ideology 
continues to perpetuate the social exclusion of  millions of  people with its economic 
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and political ramifi cations.' Gurung believed that the Hindu identity in the constitution 
attenuated the citizens' sense of  belonging to the state. 
Although Article 11(3) prohibited discrimination on the grounds of, among others, 
religion, the article on religious freedom itself  sanctioned discrimination, as it restricted 
that freedom to the exercise of  a person's own traditional religion—'the freedom to 
profess and practice his  own religion as coming down to him hereditarily having regard 
to traditional practices' (Art. 19(1)). In response to this, the Muluki Ain was amended 
in 1993 to include an explanation, which said that the dignity of  traditional practices at 
religious places should not be deemed discriminatory. Harka Gurung commented on its 
implication, saying: 'maintaining the dignity of  traditional practices means perpetuation 
of  the past or inequality towards certain sections of  the population.' In fact, the Supreme 
Court held that this explanation was unconstitutional. Article 18(2) provided for the 
teaching of  non-Nepali languages only up to primary school. Gurung concluded that 
these provisions 'constrained the formulation of  progressive policies on social inclusion 
in political and social development.' 
A number of  commentators have said that the representation of  and other circumstances 
of  the marginalized groups worsened under the 1990 Constitution. There is evidence 
that after the introduction of  democracy in 1990, the disparity increased in favour of  
the high-caste communities. Some groups even felt more severely politically excluded 
than they had felt during the autocratic Panchayat regime. Dalits were almost completely 
excluded from Parliament, the cabinet, and other organs of  the state and constitutional 
bodies. The presence of  Muslim and Madhesi communities in these bodies declined 
too. 
The national crisis inherent in these developments was triggered by the assumption of  
power by King Gyanendra in 2002 and 2005 and the autocratic manner in which he ruled 
the country. But the opportunity for the king to act in this unconstitutional way had 
been brought about by the gradual loss of  legitimacy of  the political parties. The crisis 
was further aggravated by the Maoist insurgency in the mid-1990s. The insurgency itself  
gained support from various communities because the political parties had lost their 
legitimacy and because the parties failed to deal with the social problems of  exclusion, 
discrimination, and oppression. It is unnecessary to recount the events well known to 
all Nepalis that led to the fall of  the king. The coming together of  the seven political 
parties with the Maoists and their agreeing to respond to the wishes of  the people—to 
establish a new social, political, and economic order (discussed in the fi rst chapter)— 
were critical. The parties and the Maoists agreed to hold a round-table conference, create 
an interim constitution and government, and elect a constituent assembly to implement 
a reform agenda that promised Nepal an inclusive and participatory democracy, respect 
for human rights, the rule of  law, and social justice. These developments prompted the 
people to come out in their thousands in Jana Andolan II to protest against royal rule and 
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demand the restoration of  democracy. Many sacrifi ced their lives or suffered serious 
injuries in the struggle for reform.  
Jana Andolan II succeeded in bringing the king to his knees. The king conceded that 
sovereignty belonged to the people. He was forced to recall the House of  Representatives, 
which promptly passed a resolution that claimed sovereignty for itself  and repealed 
all provisions relating to the monarchy. Meanwhile, the seven-party alliance and the 
Maoists negotiated various agreements for transitional arrangements, which culminated 
in a comprehensive peace accord, including the disposal of  weapons and the creation 
of  an interim constitution that provided for the adoption of  a new constitution by an 
inclusive constituent assembly.
So who is to be blamed for the collapse of  the 1990 Constitution? Perhaps the 
constitution itself, which might have contained a basic fl aw within itself ? Or the kings 
who refused to accept the limits on their power, and who—if  they had performed their 
proper roles—might have facilitated the transition to democracy? Or the political parties, 
in not respecting fundamental principles of  democracy, participation, inclusiveness, 
and social justice that the constitution required of  them? Or the Supreme Court for 
its bias towards the monarchy or for its major misunderstanding of  the principles of  
constitutional monarchy? Or the Maoists in turning to insurgency and violence rather 
than mobilizing the people, the marginalized, and the disadvantaged, through democratic 
and constitutional practices? Or civil society, which allowed the parties to capture it and 
which failed to play an autonomous role in upholding values of  democracy and social 
justice? 
Lessons from the Experience that Nepal Had with the 1990 
Constitution
What lessons can we draw for the current round of  constitution making? 
Participatory Process of Constitution Making
The fi rst lesson has to do with the process of  making the constitution. All people, but 
particularly the marginalized communities, must be allowed to, and must, participate 
fully in the process, articulate their grievances, and lobby for their demands. A good 
process can be a great public education in democracy and responsibility—without which 
a constitution cannot easily take root. The promise that the constituent assembly will 
be the manifestation of  the sovereignty of  the people, and not merely the dominance 
of  political parties, must be realized. The reason for having a participatory process 
and an inclusive constituent assembly is not just that this would produce legitimacy for 
the constitution. Equally important is that the constitution will have to defi ne Nepali 
values and identity in a more inclusive way than the 1990 Constitution did, and this 
cannot be done except through negotiations among all key communities and groups. 
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A participatory process also offers an opportunity to engage the people in a dialogue 
on democracy and to prepare the people for the understanding of  and participation in 
public affairs, without which democracy cannot develop or fl ourish. 
True Social Equality
The second lesson is that formal equality, which a provision of  the constitution specifi es, 
is not suffi cient. There must be real equality, of  opportunity and access. That requires 
pro-active policies and affi rmative action on the part of  the state, the redistribution 
of  resources and the empowerment of  the disadvantaged. This is particularly the case 
when the real problem is not legal or political but social. The marginalized communities 
constitute a majority and have enjoyed the right (and power) to vote. Yet they have 
remained marginalized. The grant of  universal right to vote did not help them because 
they were weighed down by centuries of  social oppression and exclusion. What they 
needed in order to enjoy the status formally conferred on them was constructive, 
practical steps in terms of  representation, affi rmative action, specifi c opportunities and 
respect, so that they could exercise rights granted to them under the constitution. 
Protection and Implementation of Basic Rights
Third, the constitution must impose clear obligations on the state to secure all of  the 
people's rights, particularly the rights to education, health, shelter, and human security. 
Many components of  the directive principles need to be converted into rights. But the 
enforcement of  rights should not be left to private initiatives. There should be a clear 
timetable for their implementation by the state, and where relevant, by the corporate 
sector. Special institutions, such as a constitution implementation commission, should 
be established to ensure adherence to the timetable.
Reform of Political Parties
Fourth, it is not enough to impose obligations on the state. A grandiose bill of  rights 
may remain a mirage, unless the institutions of  the state, particularly the legislature and 
the executive, are also rights-friendly. Political parties must become real instruments of  
democracy and accountability. Therefore, institutions must be so structured that they 
allow the participation of  and respond to the needs and demands of  the disadvantaged. 
The reform agenda of  the 1990 Constitution was not fulfi lled mainly because these 
institutions became the bastions of  the privileged and the established elite. A major 
reform of  the organization and functioning of  political parties is imperative if  the goals 
of  the Andolan are to be achieved. 
Clarity of Language in the Constitution
Fifth, a point about the style of  drafting the constitution needs to be mentioned here. A 
major problem with the 1990 Constitution was that powers were given to one authority, 
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but they were to be exercised at the instructions of  another (this, as we have seen, 
was a particular problem with the monarchy). But the word 'instruction' was not used; 
instead the words used were 'on the advice and consent' or 'recommendations,' both 
of  which in ordinary language fall short of  'instruct' and do not suggest that advice or 
recommendations are binding. The language used was very confusing, particularly to 
those who had little experience with the 'Westminster' style constitutions. So not only 
did the 1990 Constitution give the impression of  giving a lot of  powers to the king, 
but the king and other institutions, whether deliberately or inadvertently, assumed that 
many of  these powers indeed belonged to the king. Consider Article 120:
(1) His Majesty shall appoint the Royal Nepali Ambassadors.
(2) His Majesty may designate Royal representatives to represent him on special 
occasions. He may also appoint special envoys for specifi ed purposes. 
The fi rst sub-clause can certainly be read together with Article 35(2) as requiring the king 
to act on the instruction of  the Council of  Ministers. But what about the fi rst sentence 
of  the second sub-clause? One might think that in the appointment of  a person to 
represent the king, the king should have some say, but not if  the representation is for 
the purposes of  the state. And what about the second sentence? The representatives 
mentioned seem more like envoys for a special state assignment who should be appointed 
at the instruction of  the government. But one cannot be sure. There are other examples 
of  similar ambiguities.
It is best if  the constitution prescribes in clear and simple language who has what 
powers and how they are to be exercised. Relying on the conventions or practices of  
other systems not familiar to Nepalis is not sensible, especially in areas as sensitive as 
the exercise of  fundamental state powers. 
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The Interim Constitution
When a country emerges from a state of  confl ict and state institutions have either 
collapsed, been discredited, or are unacceptable to one or more groups, an interim 
constitution is usually adopted to provide for the governance of  the country until a 
new government under a new constitution is established, and to set out the road map 
(goals, institutions and procedures) for the making of  the new constitution. Sometimes 
an interim constitution is short (especially when the previous constitution has been 
modifi ed) and sometimes long and comprehensive (when the previous constitution 
is completely rejected). Sometimes interim arrangements take the form of  a political 
agreement among the key actors. 
In Nepal, the seven parliamentary parties that had negotiated a political alliance with 
the Maoists in 2005 were in favour of  using the 1990 Constitution, with its unsuitable 
provisions modifi ed or deleted, as an interim constitution, on the restoration of  the 
House of  Representatives (in a proclamation in May 2006, the seven parties attempted to 
do precisely this). Thus the modifi ed older constitution became the Interim Constitution 
(although doubts had been raised by some about the legality of  this procedure) for 
the period leading up to the inclusion of  the Maoists in the legislature (and ultimately 
the government). The Maoists were not enamoured of  the 1990 Constitution and had 
insisted on its replacement by a specially tailored constitution. 
On 15 January 2007, that Interim Constitution was adopted by the former House of  
Representatives and ratifi ed by the (new) Interim Legislature-Parliament. The Interim 
Constitution is a lengthy document and covers most topics that one would ordinarily 
fi nd in a permanent constitution. But this chapter concerns itself  with the process for a 
new constitution, the central feature of  which is the Constituent Assembly. 
The Making of the New Constitution: The Interim 
Constitution's Road Map
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The Constitution-making Process
In the last three years or so, there has been extensive discussion on how an inclusive 
and effective constitutional system of  government could be established in Nepal. These 
discussions became all the more important as the institutions of  the state came under 
severe attack from the Maoist insurgency, the House of  Representatives was abolished, 
and the authoritarian rule of  the monarchy replaced the parliamentary system of  
government. Negotiations between an alliance of  seven parliamentary parties and the 
Maoists on 22 November 2005 led to an agreement that on the cessation of  hostilities, 
a constituent assembly would be elected to frame a new constitution. One of  the main 
demands of  the 2006 Jana Andolan was that the new constitution should be made by a 
broadly representative constituent assembly, and thus in this agreement made between 
the chief  political actors, considerable emphasis was placed on the sovereignty of  
the people and their participation in the constitution-making process. This defi ning 
characteristic of  the process that would be adopted was emphasized in the second 
understanding among the parties, and the parties and their civic organizations promised 
that they would actively work 'to establish full democracy with the sovereignty and the 
state power of  the country completely in people through the election of  a constituent 
assembly on the basis of  the determined process.' 
The Interim Constitution gives effect to this agreement, guaranteeing a constituent 
assembly 'to formulate a new constitution by the people themselves' (Art. 63). Thus 
considerable public attention has focused on the composition and role of  the Constituent 
Assembly, but it is doubtful if  the provisions meet the test of  an inclusive assembly or 
if  the process will be particularly participatory. 
Constituent Assembly: Membership and Representation
Originally, the Constituent Assembly was to have 425 members, consisting of  three 
categories of  members (Art. 63(3)): 205 members were to be elected in single-member 
constituencies in the 'fi rst past the post' system; that is, the winner would be the person 
who won the largest number of  votes, even if  the winner could not garner an overall 
majority ('the fi rst category'); 204 members were to be chosen on the basis of  party lists, 
by a system under which voters would vote for a party ('the second category'); a party 
would be given seats in proportion to its share of  the votes, and the party would draw 
its members from its list; the third category would consist of  16 persons prominent in 
national life, to be nominated by the Council of  Ministers. 
These provisions have been changed three times, as the result of  agreements with various 
groups. The provisions now call for 240 single-member-constituency seats (designed to 
increase the number of  seats in the Tarai) and 335 proportional-representation seats (the 
second category). The Interim Constitution provides that when parties are nominating 
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candidates for constituency seats, they must take inclusiveness into consideration. And 
when composing party lists, the parties have to ensure 'proportional representation of  
women, Dalits, oppressed tribes and indigenous tribes, backward regions, and Madhesis 
and other groups,' as provided in the law. The provision is more specifi c in the case of  
women: at least one-third of  the total number of  candidates from the two categories 
must be women. And there are now to be 26 members nominated by the Council of  
Ministers. These nominees will be selected from among distinguished persons and from 
ethnic and indigenous groups who fail to be represented as a result of  the elections.
The terms 'proportional' or 'proportionality' as used in the directives regarding the 
Constituent Assembly connote two meanings: one meaning refers to proportionality 
between the parties, the other to proportionality among categories of  communities 
and between the two genders. Achieving proportionality in the fi rst sense does not 
necessarily mean that the second type of  proportionality will also be achieved, but 
the Interim Constitution aims to achieve both types of  proportionality at least among 
the second category of  seats. The Constituent Assembly Election Law goes into more 
detail about this issue: The law requires that each party must have a certain percentage 
of  candidates from specifi ed groups in its list (Janajatis, Madhesis, Dalits, representatives 
of  backward regions, and others [meaning hill Brahmins and Chhetris]). Within each 
group, half  of  the candidates must be women. After the elections, when the number 
of  second-category seats that each party is entitled to has been determined, the parties 
will make their fi nal selections from their lists, again respecting the same proportions 
outlined for inclusive representation. The parties are then entitled to deviate from the 
proportions to a limited extent.
There are various problems with these provisions that cannot be explored in this paper, 
but it must be said here that many groups fear that their hopes of  being represented 
will not be completely fulfi lled. In the fi rst category of  seats, there is no guarantee 
that even if  the parties do respect the directive to take inclusiveness into consideration 
when nominating candidates, this will produce proportionality of  members from the 
marginalized communities. In fact, there is widespread speculation that parties could 
place candidates from marginalized communities in those constituencies where the 
parties have the least prospects of  success. 
There is to be a two-vote system: voters will cast a separate vote for their constituency 
member and another for a party list. Voters will have the opportunity to calculate the 
impact of  their votes, and to vote, if  they so wish, for a geographical candidate on the 
basis of  that individual's merit or party affi liation, and to vote for a list on the basis of  
the make-up of  the party lists. But this system will only work if  voters understand the 
system—if  they have been educated about it. And it will only work if  voters actually 
care enough about inclusiveness for the issue to affect their voting choices—if  the issue 
of  inclusiveness is more important than, say, their traditional choice of  party.
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Furthermore, even if  members of  marginalized communities were to be represented 
in signifi cant numbers, the extent to which they would be able to present and lobby for 
the interests of  their communities would be affected by the fact that virtually all their 
representation would be through the parties. Consequently, they would be subject to the 
party whip, which could inhibit their ability or willingness to lobby for their interests. 
This possibility of  representatives from marginalized communities being subject to the 
parties' wishes, which has worried many sections of  the marginalized communities, has 
been reinforced by the rule that a member may be removed if  the party of  which the 
member was a member at the time of  the election gives notice that the member has 
left the party or no longer holds membership (presumably meaning that the party can 
effectively expel such a member) (Art. 67)).
There is also the fear that the 26 nominated persons will be distributed among the eight 
political parties for patronage purposes rather than to secure expertise and relevant 
experience. So they too could be subject to party discipline, a factor that could reduce 
the value of  such membership (although the Interim Constitution prescribes, as one 
criterion for the registration of  a party that its own constitution should provide for an 
effective system of  discipline for its members (Art. 142(3 (d)).
In the Interim Constitution, the provisions regarding the Constituent Assembly 
election are biased in favour of  political parties, rather than ethnic, community, or 
professional groups. This bias is particularly evident in certain provisions; for example, 
Article 142(5) says that while parties that are represented in the interim legislature 
are entitled to registration without showing signifi cant support, other parties have to 
present signatures of  at least 10,000 supporters. The second category of  members 
will be elected on the basis of  one national constituency, rather than on the basis of  
regional or zonal constituencies. This provision allows the central committees of  the 
parties to increase their control over candidacies in the second category. Moreover, only 
political parties will be eligible for party-proportionality seats. There is a danger that 
such exclusive membership through the mechanism of  existing parliamentary parties 
will exclude scholars, professionals, social workers, and special groups, like the disabled 
and linguistic minorities, all of  whose participation is essential to ensure a balanced and 
professional constitution.
And attempts to set up new parties more closely related to the marginalized groups that 
discriminate in granting membership on ethnic or gender grounds or with objectives 
that 'would disturb the religious or communal harmony or divide the country' (Art. 
142(4)) may run afoul of  the rules in the Interim Constitution regarding rules about 
party formation. In fact, some sectional parties, especially pro-Madhesi parties, were 
registered, but they won exemption from the rule in the law which was mentioned in the 
Interim Constitution to ensure that only a certain percentage of  members in an ethnic 
party could be members of  the ethnic group the party was created to represent. 
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It has now been agreed that the Constituent Assembly will consist of  601 members. 
Such an assembly is undoubtedly very large and may not prove conducive for holding 
detailed discussions or for building consensus. To ensure proper participation in this 
large assembly, careful thought needs to be given to the procedures that must be 
followed in the Constituent Assembly: the procedures should not unduly prolong the 
proceedings, and yet they must offer proper opportunities for debate.   
Free and Fair Elections to the Constituent Assembly
Whatever the system of  voting adopted, there is general acceptance that the actual 
elections must be free and fair. The very fi rst responsibility of  the state is to ensure the 
conducting of  a free and impartial election for the Constituent Assembly. This principle 
is stated in the agreements between the SPA and the Maoists and now constitutes 
the mandate of  the United Nations Mission in Nepal (UNMIN). An independent 
electoral commission is to 'conduct, supervise, direct, and control the elections' to the 
Constituent Assembly (Art. 129). As a pre-condition to embarking on a free and fair 
electoral process, it has also been widely accepted that the weapons held by the Maoists 
(and a similar number of  weapons belonging to the army) must be stored away, and all 
intimidation of  citizens will have to be stopped. It is the responsibility of  the Electoral 
Commission and UNMIN to ensure that these and other necessary conditions are met 
before elections are held.  
But although the prime minister and other party leaders made several public statements 
of  their commitment to the Constituent Assembly, and to the original June 2007 deadline 
for the Constituent Assembly election, progress on fi nalizing the details of  the electoral 
laws was slow. As the parties had not consulted other groups, it became necessary, as 
shown above, to have consultations with the Madhesis, Janajatis, and Dalits. Thus the 
June deadline could not be met, and the Interim Constitution was amended to extend 
the deadline to mid-November 2007. But even though a new scheme for representation 
was successfully negotiated, elections could not be held in November either because 
the Maoists threatened to boycott the elections unless certain demands were met. By 
the time the demands were settled, it was too late to hold the elections in November, 
and the constitution was amended yet again, this time specifying that elections would be 
held by the middle of  April 2008. 
Procedures for Dealing with Election Disputes
A special court known as the Constituent Assembly Court is to be established to 
resolve complaints regarding elections to the Constituent Assembly (Art. 118). Petitions 
regarding electoral disputes can only be submitted in this court. Only this court, and not 
even the Supreme Court, can interpret the law on electoral issues (Art. 102(4)). 
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Fundamental Binding Constitutional Principles that Underlie the 
Mandate of the Constituent Assembly
As discussed in chapter 5, there are considerable advantages in adopting fundamental 
constitutional principles in order to bind or guide the constitution-making process, 
in terms of  the contents of  the new constitution. That chapter shows the kinds of  
fundamental principles that emerged from the 2006 Jana Andolan, the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement, and the Interim Constitution. The Interim Constitution does not 
clearly specify that the Constituent Assembly is bound by any fundamental principles, 
except decentralization of  state power in the form of  federalism. But the Interim 
Constitution does contain many fundamental principles of  state policy and directive 
principles, and it could be argued that these principles are intended to be the guidelines 
for the Constituent Assembly. 
The most important of  these principles pertains to the restructuring of  the state, which 
appears in several places in the Interim Constitution (the issue is discussed in detail in 
the chapter on restructuring and federalism). For example, the chapter on the form 
of  state and local self-governance calls for the 'inclusive, democratic, and progressive 
restructuring of  the state' to bring about 'an end to the discrimination based on class, 
caste, language, sex, culture, religion, and region by eliminating the centralized and 
unitary form of  the state' (Art. 138). 
We fi nd that Articles 33 and 34 contain many broad principles (set out in more detail 
in chapter 5), just as the preamble of  the Interim Constitution does. Many of  these 
articles are concerned with democracy, inclusiveness, participation, human rights, and 
self-governance. None of  these articles is binding, in the sense that persons could not 
go to court claiming that these principles had been breached. Instead, these principles 
are meant to be guidelines for the state. These goals are indeed the inspiration for and 
the aspirations of  the Jana Andolan, and since the Constituent Assembly is the child 
of  the Jana Andolan, it is not unreasonable to argue that these goals have the status of  
fundamental constitutional principles and that they bind the Constituent Assembly. 
However, despite the emphasis on, and the frequent reiteration of  these goals, the 
Interim Constitution does not provide for any method for adopting these principles in 
the new constitution, to verify or certify that the new constitution has successfully and 
effectively incorporated them. 
High Level Commission on Restructuring 
A High Level Commission is to be set up by the government to make recommendations 
on the restructuring of  the state (Art. 138). The term 'restructuring' is used in Nepal to 
mean changes that will need to be made in the structure and institutions of  government, 
measures that will need to be taken to advance historically disadvantaged communities, 
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methods of  governance that will need to be adopted to ensure a greater degree of  
public participation, and so on. In the Interim Constitution, however, it seems that the 
term 'restructuring' is used in a narrower sense, referring only to the elimination of  
the 'centralized and unitary form of  the state,' and the term is used to respond to the 
demand for a federal or devolved system. But this concept of  restructuring ('inclusive, 
democratic, and progressive') actually refers to a broad and ambitious agenda: to bring to 
an end discrimination based on 'class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion, and region' 
(not all of  which might be compatible). There is considerable controversy on whether 
the basis of  federalism should be ethnicity (‘cultural’) or geography ('developmental'), 
and Article 138 does not resolve this controversy, as it refers to both 'caste, language, and 
religion' and 'region.' A detailed discussion of  federalism and restructuring is contained 
in chapter 14.
Federalism or devolution is a complicated and controversial issue and will require 
careful thought. The High Level Commission (yet to be appointed 19 months after 
the enactment of  the Interim Constitution, as this book goes to press), can provide 
a useful source of  ideas, analyses, and options for the Constituent Assembly if  the 
commission is independent and is run by experts. It is unclear whether the commission's 
recommendations are to be made directly to the Constituent Assembly or if  the 
recommendations are to be vetted by the government, although Article 138(3) does 
state that the fi nal decision on the restructuring would be made by the Constituent 
Assembly.  
Time Lines 
The general principle is that the Constituent Assembly shall function for two years from 
the time of  its fi rst meeting (Art. 64) (the fi rst meeting must be held within 21 days 
after the election results are announced (Art. 69). However, the Constituent Assembly 
may dissolve itself  earlier by a resolution (Art. 64). No explanation is provided as to the 
reasons for which an earlier dissolution may be made. The only justifi able reason would 
be if  the constitution were to be adopted before the two-year tenure of  the Constituent 
Assembly comes to an end. But that possibility is already provided for in Article 82, 
which says that save for a temporary extension to enable elections to the legislature 
under the new constitution to be held, the Constituent Assembly would automatically 
be dissolved on the adoption of  the new constitution. There may indeed be a case 
for the dissolution of  the Constituent Assembly if  it fails to meet the deadline (or the 
extended deadline under Article 64, as was stipulated in the Iraqi Interim Constitution). 
But might there be any justifi cation for a premature dissolution of  the Constituent 
Assembly by its members (given that the members will be elected to enact the new 
constitution)? Could this power of  dissolution be used to disrupt—indeed permanently 
sabotage—the Constituent Assembly if  the nature of  constitutional changes to be made 
were not to suit the political party with the majority of  members? And what majority 
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would be required to pass the resolution? (Normally resolutions can be passed by a 
simple majority of  members present and voting, unless expressly provided otherwise 
(Art. 68), as would be the case for the adoption of  the new constitution.) 
It is also possible to extend the life of  the Constituent Assembly for another six 
months, by a resolution of  the Constituent Assembly, if  the constitution is not ready 
due to 'an emergency situation in the country' (Art. 64). As defi ned in Article 143, 
'war, external invasion, armed rebellion, or extreme economic disarray' could lead the 
government to formally declare an emergency. Article 64 could, therefore, be read as 
requiring the Constituent Assembly to fi nish its task within the two years, but for any 
exceptional situation, and even in that situation, it has to complete the work within 
the period of  extension (which presumably cannot be extended further—in Iraq, the 
word 'one off' was used to specify that no further extension would be possible, and in 
the case of  failure, the Constituent Assembly would automatically be dissolved). The 
extension would require a resolution passed by a simple majority of  members present 
and voting.
Presumably, to justify the extension, it would be necessary for the Constituent Assembly 
to establish that the delay was caused by the proclamation of  an emergency. But what 
if  the proclamation takes place a week before the end of  the stipulated two-year tenure 
of  the Constituent Assembly? And there has been no provision made for a scenario 
in which an emergency has not been declared but the Constituent Assembly's task still 
has not been fi nished. Should such a situation result in the automatic dissolution of  the 
Constituent Assembly? 
On the question of  the duration of  the Constituent Assembly or the length of  time 
allowed for the conclusion of  the process, there are generally two opposing views. One 
says that constitution making is so critical to the future of  the country that it should not 
be rushed; that people must be given ample opportunities to participate in the process; 
and that there must be enough time provided for educating the people and to consult with 
them. Others argue that if  too much time is allowed, the members of  the Constituent 
Assembly, not wanting to let go of  the prestige and fi nancial benefi ts of  membership, 
will drag out the process as long as possible. If  the process is unduly stretched for 
this or other reasons (e.g., if  the ruling clique opposes reform), the opportunity for 
change may be lost. Constitution reform is a highly political process, with great but 
also narrow interests at stake, and there are always people who are willing to sabotage 
the process. A drawn-out process gives such people ample opportunities to do so. On 
the other hand, given the kinds of  purposes served by the process (for example, the 
people and the representatives will have to educate themselves on the purpose and 
structure of  the state and on questions of  public policy), the presumption must be 
against a rushed process.  What constitutes a happy medium between too long and too 
short a process depends on the context, and on whether the people are knowledgeable 
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enough to engage in the process. But because the elections have been delayed, people 
have had some opportunities to learn about the process, through the efforts of  local 
and international organizations (including International IDEA and UNDP), and the 
prolonged interim period has given the people the time to discuss the substantive 
issues, like federalism and the rights of  marginalized groups. A number of  books and 
pamphlets regarding these central issues have been published, and there have also been 
some negotiations between the government and representatives of  marginalized groups 
(including Madhesis) that have clarifi ed the kinds of  issues that must be negotiated in 
the Constituent Assembly. Since this process of  education and consultation has, to an 
extent, been carried out, it should be possible for the Constituent Assembly to make 
relatively speedy progress.      
The Rules and Procedures of the Constituent Assembly
The Constituent Assembly will perform a dual role—as a constitution-making body and 
as a legislature. To some extent, the two tasks are different and may require different 
procedures. Parliamentary procedures are quite technical, and those members of  the 
assembly not familiar with them may fi nd themselves at a disadvantage. The rules for 
the Constituent Assembly's constitution-making function should be made simpler and 
more facilitative of  exchanges and should not have too many points of  order. If  the 
Constituent Assembly utilizes the provision in the Interim Constitution for it to set up a 
legislative affairs committee, it would be easier to have two different sets of  procedural 
rules (Art. 83(1)). In any case, the Constituent Assembly in its role as a legislature will 
be bound by the normal rules of  fi nancial procedures (Art. 83(4)). 
In general, it is left up to the Constituent Assembly to determine the rules of  its 
procedures, subject to the provisions of  the Interim Constitution (Art. 78).  The most 
important of  these rules concerns the system of  voting (which is discussed separately 
in this paper). The fi rst meeting is to be convened by the prime minister within 21 days 
of  the elections; subsequent meetings will be convened by the presiding offi cer, or on 
the request, for good reason, of  one-fourth of  the members (Art. 69). The Constituent 
Assembly will elect its chairperson and vice-chairperson from among its members, 
subject to the proviso that both should not come from the same party (Art. 71). For 
most purposes, the quorum will be one-fourth of  the total membership, but when 
decisions regarding the new constitution are to be made, then at least two-thirds of  
the entire membership will need to be present to constitute a quorum (Art. 70(2)). 
Decisions other than those about the new constitution are to be made by a simple 
majority of  members present and voting (Art. 75). 
According to Article 74, a vote cast by a non-member cannot be invalidated. This rule 
may need to be reconsidered, at least for occasions when issues such as the inclusion of  
provisions in the new constitution are being determined, for a vote by a non-member 
may prove to be decisive. 
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Privileges of the Constituent Assembly
In order to ensure complete freedom of  speech in the Constituent Assembly, no member 
of  the Constituent Assembly can be 'arrested, detained or prosecuted in any court for 
anything said or for any vote cast in the Constituent Assembly' (Art. 77). Persons who 
publish any documents or reports regarding the votes taken or proceedings made under 
the authority of  the Constituent Assembly are immune from any legal proceedings. 
Members cannot be arrested during the period of  constitution drafting, except on a 
criminal charge. 
The Constituent Assembly has been given considerable authority to protect its 
proceedings from external control as well as to discipline outsiders who criticize it. 
The Constituent Assembly and its committees have been given the 'exclusive power to 
decide whether or not any proceeding is regular' (Art. 77(6)). Courts are excluded from 
making any enquiry into these matters. 
The Interim Constitution prohibits anyone from making any comments 'about good 
faith concerning any proceeding of  the Constituent Assembly' as well as any 'publication 
of  any kind' about 'anything said by any member which intentionally misinterprets or 
distorts the meaning of  the expression' (Art. 77(3)).  
The violation of  any of  these privileges constitutes contempt of  the Constituent 
Assembly. The Constituent Assembly is the sole judge of  whether a violation has been 
committed. If  the Constituent Assembly decides that a person has committed contempt, 
the chairperson, in consultation with the Assembly, may issue a reprimand or impose a 
fi ne or order the imprisonment of  the person. Presumably, there is no appeal from this 
decision to the courts or other authority.
But while it is true that the issues that the Constituent Assembly will consider and 
decide on are so fundamental to the future of  Nepal that there should be the least 
restrictions on free speech and debate in the Constituent Assembly, some of  the 
privileges that the Constituent Assembly has been endowed with seem excessive: the 
Constituent Assembly should not be protected from judicial review if  its members 
commit legal irregularities; the chair should not be able to punish those who are critical 
of  the Constituent Assembly ('judge in their own cause'); and the Constituent Assembly 
should be accountable. 
System to Be Used for Voting on the New Constitution 
The Constituent Assembly will vote separately on the preamble and on each article of  
the bill for the constitution (Art. 70). At the fi rst voting, the proposed provision will 
be passed only by unanimity (that is, only if  no member votes against the provision; so 
presumably, an abstention from voting is not counted as a negative vote). If  unanimity 
cannot be achieved, the political leaders of  the parliamentary (legislative) parties 'shall 
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carry out mutual consultation to develop consensus' (Art. 70 (3)). A maximum period 
of  15 days is allowed for consultation. Within seven days after the consultation is 
concluded, a vote may be taken again. If  there is still no unanimity, a further vote may 
be taken during which, if  a two-thirds majority votes in favour of  the provision, the 
provision is passed.   
But the rules regarding unanimity may cause problems too. For one, while it is good to 
have a rule that encourages consensus, unanimity is almost impossible to achieve; also, 
if  the rules state that in the absence of  unanimity, a two-thirds majority suffi ces, the 
majority may have little incentive to compromise. 
It is also undesirable that only party leaders should be involved in consensus-building 
exercises—perhaps the drafting committee assumed that only parties will be able to 
contest elections. 
Public Consultation and Participation
As stated in the preamble, a primary goal of  the Interim Constitution is to guarantee 
'the rights of  the Nepali people to frame a constitution for themselves.' The preamble 
also guarantees persons qualifi ed to vote the right to participate in a 'free and impartial 
election of  the Constituent Assembly in a fear-free environment.'
The Interim Constitution does not give the people the right to participate in the processes 
that lead up to the formation of  the Constituent Assembly and during the Constituent 
Assembly's tenure. The original version of  the Interim Constitution had provided for an 
awareness-raising committee to inform the public about the process and to collect their 
views and recommendations to assist in the drafting of  the constitution. The present 
version of  the Constituent Assembly does not contain any such provision, although it 
does provide for a commission to make recommendations on the restructuring of  the 
state (Art. 138, discussed above).
Since the Constituent Assembly is free to establish rules for its procedure, it would be 
possible for the Constituent Assembly to provide for a greater degree of  participation 
(for example, by setting up a committee of  its members to consult with the people, or 
by inviting views and recommendations from the public). But might the Constituent 
Assembly also be able to require that the new constitution be put up for approval in a 
referendum to the public? Article 157 authorizes the Constituent Assembly, through a 
vote of  two-thirds of  members present, to refer to a referendum matters of  'national 
importance' on which it is necessary to make a decision ('except as otherwise provided 
elsewhere in the constitution'). The purpose and scope of  this article is not immediately 
clear, but some clues regarding its function may be gleaned by noting where the article 
has been placed in the Interim Constitution and by parsing the defi nition of  what 
constitutes conditions under which the article can be used: the article is located in the 
chapter titled 'Miscellaneous,' just before the article dealing with the 'power to remove 
T
h
e M
akin
g
 o
f th
e N
ew
 C
o
n
stitu
tio
n
60
diffi culties'; and the referendum is to deal with a matter not 'otherwise provided elsewhere 
in the constitution.' This treatment accorded the article suggests that a referendum may 
be used for deciding the outcome of  something unexpected, something suffi ciently 
critical that it must be decided by the people, regardless of  the cost or complexity of  a 
referendum. As the procedures for the adoption of  provisions of  the new constitution 
are set out at some length in Part 7 of  the Interim Constitution, it is unlikely that the 
referendum can be used to resolve an issue relating to the new constitution.  
How and When the New Constitution Will Come into Force    
There are no express provisions in the Interim Constitution about when the new 
constitution would come into force. Perhaps it is assumed that it would come into force 
on the day specifi ed in the new constitution. That day could be the date of  its adoption 
by the Constituent Assembly, but it would be possible for the Constituent Assembly to 
postpone the time of  its coming into force. Could the Constituent Assembly specify that 
the constitution would become effective only if  it were to be approved in a referendum? 
The answer, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, is a likely 'no.' It is relevant to 
note here that Article 64 envisages that the maximum duration of  the Constituent 
Assembly will be two years (with the possibility of  an extension for another six months). 
Presumably, if  the Constituent Assembly were to continue after its two-year tenure, it 
would then be necessary to move to new constitutional arrangements. But Article 82 
envisages the possibility of  the Constituent Assembly's continuing until elections for 
the fi rst legislature under the new constitution are held. It is unclear for how long the 
new elections can be postponed. It is also unclear whether the coming into force of  the 
entirety of  the new constitution can be postponed, or merely the parts dealing with the 
legislature. It would be important for the Constituent Assembly to specify these matters 
clearly in the transitional provisions of  the new constitution. 
Amending the Interim Constitution
There is only one method for amending the contents of  the Interim Constitution. An 
amendment can be passed if  it is voted for by at least two-thirds of  all the existing 
members. Since members of  parties are subject to party discipline, and because all 
important decisions are being taken by party leaders, the leaders of  the three main 
parties have been able to change the Interim Constitution at will. As of  now, there is 
no real entrenchment of  the provisions of  the Interim Constitution; indeed, we have 
seen how easily they have been changed on fi ve occasions. This fl aw in the procedures 
for amendment has somewhat devalued the Interim Constitution and its image as a 
supreme, constitutional document.
Normally, an important function of  an interim constitution is to entrench decisions in 
the road map, and in this way to give to the people a sense of  security and predictability 
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about the process. While there is an advantage to having a fl exible interim constitution, 
that fl exibility is only desirable for provisions that pertain to the interim arrangements, 
rather than for the roadmap to the new constitution. A culture of  changing the Interim 
Constitution at will may allow more groups who are unhappy about the original 
provisions, or the changed provisions, to advance their own claims for amendment. It 
is unlikely that this 'fl exibility' is good for the overall process.
Nor is the procedure whereby these changes are negotiated good for the process. These 
negotiations take place between the seven parties on the one hand and the 'agitating' 
community on the other. These sorts of  bilateral negotiations are inconsistent with the 
notion of  a constituent assembly, where all interest groups get together to examine all 
claims and to settle differences. Neither the eight parties nor the interim government has 
any electoral mandate or legitimacy to negotiate these claims. This mode of  negotiations 
also gives the impression that it is within the authority and grace of  the seven parties 
(for the most part representing the old elite) to make concessions to the marginalized 
communities—thus reinforcing forms of  relations that are to be eliminated.   
Conclusion
A Constituent Assembly of  over six hundred members is perhaps not ideally suited 
to frame a constitution. There will be complex problems of  logistics, funding, 
accommodation, and most of  all, with devising appropriate forums and venues for 
meaningful negotiations (in committees that may have as many as 80 members). 
It is clear that the constitution-making process will be dominated by political parties. 
And among the political parties, the most infl uential members will probably be drawn 
from the same circle that dominated the constitution-making process in 1990. Such a 
setup may not be fully compatible with Nepal's new credo of  inclusiveness. After all, it 
is from the widely held perception of  lack of  inclusiveness that many of  the challenges 
to the Interim Constitution have come. Even if  excluded groups are now admitted 
to the Constituent Assembly, they will have to be included as members of, mostly, 
established parties, and thus their infl uence will be marginal.  
It is also essential that adequate preparations be made to assist the Constituent Assembly. 
An independent commission could still make a big difference. If  an independent 
commission is not set up, then civil society organizations, such as universities and 
think tanks and NGOs, must make up the defi cit. They must undertake research on 
the complex issues that the Constituent Assembly will face, and they must mobilize the 
people to participate in the process. 
Finally, there is a lack of  space for the people, in general, and civil society, in particular, 
contrary to the earlier commitments made by the seven parties now in government. 
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The Interim Constitution has no provisions for the involvement of  the people, other 
than in their capacities as voters. The participation of  the people would depend on their 
own efforts or on the efforts of  the private sector and civil society. Since full and active 
participation is essential for the transition to a new Nepal, civil society must now take 
the matter in its own hands. 
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This chapter considers a number of  issues related to the recognition and incorporation 
of  fundamental values in the new constitution of  Nepal. It fi rst examines whether the 
Constituent Assembly should be bound by a set of  constitutional principles, and then it 
examines how these principles should be incorporated in the constitution.  
Formulation and Status of Constitutional Principles
Rarely does a country embark upon the making of  a new constitution without very 
good reason. Even when the reasons are valid, a group or region may sometimes resist 
such a process out of  fear that the outcome will be unfavourable to it. If  this is the 
case, agreeing on the goals of  the process, perhaps even limiting the scope of  the 
changes that will be made, may help to overcome such resistance. A prior agreement 
on goals has other advantages too. Identifying priorities early helps to give direction 
to the process of  making a new constitution and assists in balancing different aims 
and interests. For example, agreeing that national unity and identity may require both 
effective state institutions and forms of  self-government for different regions and 
communities, and thus the processes for creating a balance between individual and 
community rights, would certainly be an issue best tackled early. Increasingly, goals are 
defi ned by reference both to local traditions and culture and international norms (such 
as democracy, national unity, human rights, social justice, and gender equity). 
People's understanding of  the process of  constitution making can be enhanced if  a 
few clear principles are agreed upon in advance; otherwise there is a danger that, with 
attention focused on details, people may become confused and thus may not be able 
to participate in the process. Goals can also orient the direction and modalities of  
the process. In Nepal, the objectives of  the 1990 Constitution—multiparty democracy 
Fundamental Constitutional Principles
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and constitutional monarchy (seen as the mandate from Jana Andolan I)—were clearly 
spelled out and became, effectively, the terms of  reference for the Constitution 
Recommendations Commission. The laying out of  these objectives, to some extent, 
precluded a detailed consideration of  goals of  social justice or the elimination of  social 
and political exclusionary practices. But that does not mean that the objectives pertaining 
to social justice should be left out in Nepal's new constitution. In fact, if  a progressive 
agenda is adopted during the making of  the new constitution, it will encourage wide 
participation and help to give voice to the people. 
However, it is important that the process leave room for ideas and recommendations 
that may emerge from consultations with the people—particularly with representatives 
of  the rural people, the marginalized groups, the women, or minority groups, who may 
have little infl uence on the initial choice of  goals.  
It has sometimes been argued that to bind the Constituent Assembly in this way is 
inconsistent with the sovereignty of  the people that the Constituent Assembly represents. 
It is of  course possible to leave the Constituent Assembly to decide its goals, as among 
its fi rst tasks. This happened in both the Indian and Pakistani constituent assemblies, 
but only after the restrictions that were placed to protect the rights of  minorities in 
the original British proposals on the constituent assembly had been removed with the 
partition of  India. But in a nation where a diversity of  interests vies for representation, 
a constituent assembly could quickly get bogged down in controversy over the goals of  
the new constitution, and the process could get delayed or may even completely stall.
One compromise would be to restrict the fundamental principles to those matters on 
which there is a near-universal consensus. Important issues for which there is demand 
from substantial sections of  the people can be placed on the agenda of  the CA as 
matters that must be addressed by the assembly. This approach was adopted in Kenya. 
Although one might think that it would not be necessary to set out formal goals if  there 
is universal agreement about them, the truth is that some groups may fi nd that these 
accepted principles do not suit them after all; or some groups may be so concerned with 
other objectives of  interest to them that they may lose interest in the carrying of  the 
fundamental principles into the new constitution.
Who Decides the Goals?
There is no uniform method for deciding goals. Sometimes the vision of  a dominant 
leader is a suffi cient mandate, while in some cases, elaborate negotiations among a 
host of  'stake holders' are necessary. In some African countries, delegates at national 
conferences that bring together political groups, former 'dissidents,' and religious and 
civil society groups have been the principal actors driving the processes for setting 
out the goals of  reforms. Sometimes the fundamental principles have been set by the 
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political parties, as was the case in Fiji and South Africa. In Eastern European countries, 
goals have been decided through round table conferences of  political parties. In India 
and Pakistan, after independence, the goals were decided by their respective constituent 
assemblies. In countries like Namibia and East Timor, where the international community 
has played a key role, the goals have been set by the UN Security Council. In other 
countries like Cambodia and Afghanistan, the goals have been set by a consortium of  
concerned states. The terms on which the European Union was willing to recognize 
states that emerged out of  the former Yugoslavia—upholding democracy and the 
rule of  law, and the protection of  minorities—served effectively as the framework for 
drafting their constitutions.  
In Nepal, important sections of  the people and civil society seem to think that 
fundamental principles must bind the Constituent Assembly. In their submissions to 
the committee for drafting the Interim Constitution, many groups wanted to express 
these principles in detail. In order to consolidate the objectives of  Jana Andolan II, the 
political parties in the seven-party alliance and the Maoists discussed certain fundamental 
principles in a series of  agreements that concluded with the Peace Agreement and the 
formation of  the Interim Constitution. 
We can identify certain principles agreed in the Jana Andolan, the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement, and the Interim Constitution. These are 
(1) The new constitution must 
(a) be based on the wishes of  the people of  Nepal, and
(b) respect the goals agreed upon in the 8- and 12-point agreements, the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution, including
(i)  sovereignty of  the people;
(ii)  the constitution as Supreme Law;  
(iii)  inclusive democracy;
(iv)  national independence, sovereignty, geographical integrity of  the country, 
and national unity; 
(v)  accountability and integrity of  state institutions;
(vi)  non-discrimination on the basis of  class, caste, ethnicity, gender, region, or 
religion;
(vii)  independence of  the judiciary;
(viii)  rule of  law; 
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(ix)  basic needs and human rights;
(x)  recognition of  diversity of  languages and cultures;
(xi)  federalism and decentralization (the specifi c commitment to federalism 
being introduced by an amendment to the Interim Constitution); 
  (xii) righting past wrongs.
Compliance with Constitutional Principles
How can it be ascertained that the goals have been adequately incorporated in the 
constitution? There is no standard way to ensure compliance with the obligation to 
incorporate fundamental principles. In South Africa, the prior goals (acting as the 
parameters of  the constitution) were so critical to the process that a provision was made 
for the Constitutional Court to verify that the draft constitution conformed to the goals 
before the constitution came into force. In fact, the court referred the draft back to the 
constituent assembly on two issues, and it was only after these issues had been rectifi ed 
that the court certifi ed the draft and had it approved by President Mandela. 
In many countries, a referendum is necessary on the fi nal product. This can be seen 
as a validation of  sorts, even though the principal reason for agreeing in advance on 
fundamental principles is to avoid the consequences of  majoritarianism. 
The South African method of  using the Constitutional Court to certify the draft is 
unusual, and such a process was possible only because the parties had agreed to a 
detailed list of  constitutional principles. Such a procedure might not make sense in 
Nepal, where there appears to be broad agreement on fundamental principles. Also, 
leaving the fi nal word to the courts would detract from the status of  the Constituent 
Assembly  as a sort of  paramount political body (especially if  the Constituent Assembly's 
rules of  procedure provide suffi cient safeguards against the majority's imposing their 
will). Finally, only some of  the principles could possibly be decided in the courts, for 
most of  the deliberation needed would essentially be a matter of  political, rather than 
legal, judgment.
When there is no formal procedure for determining compliance, it is useful to remind 
the members of  the Constituent Assembly, in particular the chairs of  its committees, 
of  their obligation to respect the fundamental principles. In order to ensure that the 
fundamental principles have been incorporated, the Constituent Assembly may instead 
set up its own committee to review the draft before its adoption. Such a committee 
might be formed from the chairs of  the various thematic committees in the Constituent 
Assembly. These chairs should be assigned the responsibility of  harmonizing the 
chapters prepared by all the committees. To reconcile differences between the thematic 
committees, the members should refer to the principles.
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Methods of Incorporating Values
Preamble
The preamble is still one of  the oldest and most common ways of  incorporating values. 
The preamble is the introductory part of  the constitution that normally sets out some 
or all of  the following:
• the history of  the constitution (especially if  the constitution is written just after 
the struggle for independence or democracy); 
• the values and aspirations of  the people;
• the reasons for the constitution's being enacted;
• the nature of  the state, either as democratic or referring to the ethnicity of  the 
dominant community or to the plurality of  communities;
• the authority under which the constitution is made: nowadays, the authority is 
normally the people with a reference, perhaps, to the guidance or blessings of  the 
Creator.
The real signifi cance of  the preamble is political rather than legal (in some legal systems, 
though, the preamble can be used as an aid for interpreting the constitution and is even 
binding), and it is written to speak to ordinary persons, not lawyers. The preamble, often 
written in a 'fl owery' or ringing tone, gives grandeur to the constitution, and it can have 
great symbolic signifi cance; an example of  the usual language employed can be gleaned 
from a reading of  the preamble to the US Constitution, which says:
We the People of  the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, establish 
justice, ensure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the 
general welfare, and secure the blessings of  liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of  America.
Nepali Preambles
All the Nepali constitutions except the 1962 Constitution have had preambles. An 
interesting way to understand the reasons the constitutions were created and the 
dynamics of  the politics of  the time is to analyze these preambles. They provide an 
insight into the source of  authority of  the constitution makers and the objectives of  
the constitutions. The 1948 Constitution was 'ordained and proclaimed' by Maharaja 
Padma Shumsher Jung Bahadur Rana, under authority given to the Ranas by the 'sacred 
Panja-patras by Shree Panch Maharajadhiraja of  Nepal' in 1903. The preamble to the 
'Interim' Constitution of  1951 was ordained and promulgated by His Majesty the King 
of  Nepal 'on the advice of  the Council of  Ministers,' thus acknowledging a signifi cant 
shift of  authority. By the time of  the 1959 Constitution, there seems to have been a 
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certain regression—the constitution was enacted and promulgated by King Mahendra 
Bir Bikram Shah Dev 'in the exercise of  the sovereign powers of  the Kingdom of  Nepal 
and prerogatives vesting in Us in accordance with the traditions and customs of  our 
country and which devolved on Us from our August and Respected forefathers.' The 
preamble to the 1990 Constitution shows an interesting contradiction. The constitution 
was enacted and promulgated by King Birendra Bir Bikram Dev 'by virtue of  the State 
authority, as exercised by Us,' but the king also acknowledged that 'in the independent 
and sovereign Nepal, the source of  sovereign authority is inherent in the people' and 
declared his 'desire to conduct the government of  the country in consonance with 
the popular will.' Will the preamble of  the new constitution refl ect the complete 
transformation of  sovereignty from the kings and Ranas to the people?
Fundamental Principles and Objectives of the State
Some constitutions contain a statement on the fundamental principles, objectives, and 
obligations of  the state. These appear in addition to the preamble when the preamble is 
kept short in order to maximize its impact and also because the principles can be more 
programmatic and specifi c than the preamble. This practice of  including additional 
statements is more common in civil law countries, but is also being used in common 
law countries now because of  the perceived limited legal signifi cance of  the preamble. 
Most constitutions now try to defi ne the character of  the state and may declare their 
philosophical or other basis:
• The French Constitution, for example, says: France shall be an indivisible, secular, 
democratic, and social republic. It shall ensure the equality of  all citizens before 
the law, without distinction of  origin, race, or religion. It shall respect all beliefs 
(Art. 1). 
• The Portuguese Constitution defi nes the Portuguese state as being 'based upon 
the dignity of  the human person and the will of  the people and is committed to 
building a free and just society united in its common purposes' (Art.1). Another 
section defi nes Portugal as a 'democratic state that is based upon the rule of  
law, the sovereignty of  the people, the pluralism of  democratic expression, 
and democratic political organization, and respect and effective guarantees for 
fundamental rights and freedoms and the separation and inter-dependence of  
powers, and that has as its aims the achievement of  economic, social, and cultural 
democracy, and the deepening of  participatory democracy' (Art. 2). 
• The declaration of  the character of  the state is sometimes part of  a wider set 
of  principles of  the state, as in Portugal. Other principles in the Portuguese 
Constitution include as basic obligations of  the state the promotion of  'the welfare 
and quality of  life of  the people, and actual equality between the Portuguese 
in their enjoyment of  economic, social, and cultural and environmental rights, 
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through the transformation and modernization of  the economic and social 
structures' (Art. 9(d)). These principles are generally intended to guide the state, 
public institutions, and citizens but are seldom legally enforceable.
Directive Principles of State Policy
Directive principles of  state policy are similar in many ways to state principles and 
obligations (and sometimes they are combined, as in Papua New Guinea). India 
popularized the use of  directive principles in the Commonwealth; today, directive 
principles are also found in the Constitutions of  Uganda, Namibia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, and Sri Lanka. The most detailed and specifi c statement 
of  directive principles is to be found in the Indian Constitution. The principles include 
obligations on the state to
• promote the welfare of  the people by securing and protecting as effectively as it 
may a social order in which justice—social, economic, and political—shall inform 
all the institutions of  the national life;
• minimize inequalities in income;
• eliminate inequalities in status, facilities, and opportunities, not only among 
individuals but also among groups of  people residing in different areas or 
engaged in different vocations;
• secure that 
• the citizens, men and women equally, have the right to an adequate means to 
livelihood;
• the ownership and control of  the material resources of  the community are 
so distributed as best to subserve the common good;
• the operation of  the economic system does not result in the concentration 
of  wealth and the means of  production to the common detriment;
• there is equal pay for both men and women;
• the health and strength of  workers, men and women, and the tender age 
of  children are not abused and that citizens are not forced by economic 
necessity to enter vocations unsuited to their age or strength;
• children are given opportunities and facilities to develop in a healthy manner 
and in conditions of  freedom and dignity and that childhood and youth are 
protected against exploitation and against moral and material abandonment;
• make effective provision for securing the right to work, to education, and to 
public assistance in case of  unemployment, old age, sickness, and disablement 
and in other cases of  undeserved want.
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Most constitutions that have directive principles of  policy state that they are not 
justiciable, which means that the courts would not enforce the principles directly. The 
Indian Constitution says, for example, that the directive principles are 'not enforceable 
by any court, but the principles therein laid down are nevertheless fundamental in the 
governance of  the country' and that the state is under a duty 'to apply these principles 
in making laws.' The Ghanaian Constitution goes further when it says that directive 
principles 'shall guide all citizens, Parliament, the President, the Judiciary, the Council 
of  State, the cabinet, political parties, and other bodies and persons in applying or 
interpreting this Constitution or any other law and in taking and implementing any policy 
decisions, for the establishment of  a just and free society.' The Ghanaian president has 
to report to Parliament, at least once a year, the steps taken for the realization of  the 
directives, particularly those regarding basic human rights, a healthy economy, the right 
to work, the right to good health care, and the right to education. Similar provisions 
exist in Uganda.
Consequently, courts, among other institutions, have to take directive principles into 
account when interpreting the constitution. Increasingly, courts are using the directive 
principles in different ways, as justifying qualifi cations on rights: the right to equality, 
for example, has been marshalled to justify affi rmative action when a directive principle 
requires the state to redress historic or contemporary injustices infl icted on a section 
of  the community. The right to life has been interpreted, with the help of  directive 
principles, to include the right to basic needs and a clean environment. To promote 
social justice, courts have used directive principles as the basis for giving directions to 
governments, legislatures, and administrators. They have also used directive principles 
to restrict the scope of  fundamental rights when the exercise of  the rights threatens a 
protection accorded by the directive principles. For example, the directive principle on 
living wages and decent conditions of  work has been used by some courts to uphold the 
reasonableness of  the restrictions imposed by minimum-wages legislation. 
Directive Principles in Nepal
Directive principles fi rst appeared in Nepali constitutions in 1951 (in the Interim 
Constitution). That constitution did not have a separate chapter on human or 
fundamental rights and such rights as were given appeared as directive principles. 
The scheme of  directive principles was greatly infl uenced by the Indian Constitution, 
which had just been enacted. So the directive principles were not 'justiciable' and had 
no bearing on the validity of  past or future laws although they were to be treated by 
the government as 'fundamental in the governance of  the country' and had to 'apply 
the said principles in adapting the existing Nepali laws as early as possible, as well as in 
framing laws hereafter.' Directive principles included 
• promotion of  'the welfare of  the people by securing and protecting as effectively 
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as it may, social order, in which justice—social, economic, and political—shall 
inform all the institutions of  the national life;' 
• right of  all citizens, 'men and women equally,' to an adequate means of  
livelihood; 
• equitable distribution of  resources 'as best to subserve the common good';
• protection of  children and youth against 'exploitation';
• assistance to the elderly, the sick, and the disabled, and 'other cases of  undeserved 
want;'
• securing to all workers a 'living wage, conditions of  work, ensuring a decent standard 
of  life, and full enjoyment of  leisure and social and cultural opportunities';
• promotion, 'with special care,' of  the educational and economic interests of  
the weaker sections of  the people and protection against 'social injustice and all 
forms of  exploitation';
• promotion of  village Panchayats; 
• a uniform civil code throughout Nepal.
Directive principles disappeared in the 1959 Constitution, but the 1959 Constitution 
did include an enforceable set of  fundamental rights. The 1962 (Panchayat) Constitution 
reintroduced directive principles, but they were more limited in scope than they were in 
the 1951 Constitution. The 1962 Constitution defi ned the aim of  the Panchayat system as 
the promotion 'of  the welfare of  the people by setting up a society which is democratic, 
just, dynamic, and free from exploitation by bringing about harmony in the interests of  
different classes and professions from a comprehensive national outlook.' This might be 
read as an aim concerned more with 'stability' and 'harmony' than with social justice. 
Directive principles occupy a prominent place in the 1990 Constitution. They are broader 
than in the past, covering matters like the environment and land reform, and placing 
considerable emphasis on economic and technological development, while retaining the 
focus on public welfare, social justice, and a special concern for the more marginalized 
and vulnerable members of  society.   
The substantive provisions of  the 1990 Constitution deal with the parliamentary, 
multiparty system with a constitutional monarchy. The demands of  the marginalized 
communities for specifi c provisions for their participation and development were 
disregarded in the structures of  the state (particularly in the legislature and the 
government). But their concerns were refl ected in the directive principles which, they were 
told, would be implemented by future governments. The directive principles that were 
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intended to deal with major politically contentious issues concerned the decentralization 
of  the state and the promotion of  the interests of  the economically and socially 
backward groups. The directive principles on these issues were therefore critical to the 
growth of  a balanced and harmonious society, on which the constitution places so much 
importance. But fi fteen years on from the adoption of  the directives on decentralization 
and participation, and social justice and the advancement of  disadvantaged groups, little 
progress has been made. That failure contributed signifi cantly to the rise of  discontent 
with the state and laid the foundations for the Maoist insurgency.  
The weak and ambiguous nature of  directive principles raises the question of  whether 
they would serve a useful purpose if  included in the new constitution and whether, if  
they are included, they should be made more binding.  
Preambles and state and directive principles identify national aspirations, goals, and 
priorities, but they achieve little by themselves. At best, they are instructions or even 
only guidelines to those in authority (often inserted in constitutions more for their 
cosmetic value than as serious commitments). Little progress will be made unless the 
institutions that exercise state authority are designed to respond to the imperatives of  
state principles. Take the example of  the Nepali Constitution's directive principles: they 
are not binding by themselves; they depend on positive initiatives by agencies of  the 
state, particularly the government, the legislature, and the courts; the benefi ciaries of  
the principles are not able to enforce them except through political action, but the 
directives can only be invoked with any degree of  success if  the plaintiffs or petitioners 
have political clout, connections to representatives in state institutions, and access to 
centres of  authority. 
Dominated largely by high-caste groups, state institutions have largely ignored directive 
principles aimed at the sharing of  power and the advancement of  marginalized groups. 
The lesson is that unless the marginalized groups are brought centrally into powerful 
state institutions and power is shared with local organizations, governed by local 
communities, there will be little prospect of  the reform, in whose name the Constituent 
Assembly is being convened. 
Questions
1. Should there be a formal agreement on fundamental principles that the new 
constitution must refl ect?
2. If  so, where should those principles be enshrined?
3. How should the Constituent Assembly be reminded that it has the obligation to 
make a new constitution that refl ects those principles?
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4. What mechanism should be used to ensure that those principles have indeed 
been refl ected in the new constitution?
5. What common experiences of  Nepalis should be refl ected in the preamble?
6. What principles should be set out in the preamble? 
7. Should the directive principles be made binding?
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For a long time, human rights have been an integral part of  constitutions. It is 
inconceivable that a constitution today would not contain a bill of  rights. Additionally, 
human rights have infl uenced conceptions of  constitutionalism and fairness, a fact that 
is refl ected in the design of  state structures and procedures. However, ideas about the 
purposes and scope of  human rights have changed since the US and French constitutions 
of  the late 18th century. At fi rst, human rights were seen as protective mechanisms for 
citizens against arbitrary exercise of  state power and as giving citizens certain freedoms, 
principally that of  expression and association.  Now, more and more aspects of  people's 
lives—relationships between individuals and communities, between them and the state, 
and among states—are governed by the regime of  human rights.  
Human rights are closely connected with the history of  constitutions and the 
development of  democracy and constitutionalism in Nepal, too. By criticizing the 
army and insurgents alike for abusing human rights during the civil confl ict in Nepal, 
the human rights defenders were able to create a groundswell of  opposition to the 
culture of  oppression in Nepal. In fact, Jana Andolan II was triggered when the Nepali 
people's human rights were grossly violated. Respect for human rights features high in 
the aspirations of  the people; this is refl ected in the 8-and 12-point agreements between 
the Seven-Party Alliance and the Maoists. Human rights are an important component 
of  the peace process and are highlighted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It 
is widely accepted that there can be no lasting peace or justice without respect for and 
promotion of  human rights. The Interim Constitution gives a constitutional status to 
the Nepal Human Rights Commission and has a more extensive chapter on human 
rights than any previous constitution. 
There are several reasons that human rights, which are critical in defi ning the 
relationship of  individuals and communities to the state, are given so much importance 
Human Rights as the Framework for Freedom, 
Diversity, and Social Justice 
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in constitutional and political systems: 
• Human rights are inherent in the human being and are not surrendered to the 
government when people form a political community. Indeed one of  the reasons 
for forming a political community is to strengthen protection of  human rights.1 
• Human rights are necessary if  human beings are to live in dignity, fulfi l their 
potential, and satisfy their physical, cultural, and spiritual needs. 
• Implicit in the above points is the protection of  individuals and communities 
against the state; as the power and reach of  the state increases, there is a 
corresponding emphasis on people's rights and freedoms.
• Human rights empower citizens and residents by giving them a central role in 
decision making in the organs of  the state; these rights also allow citizens to form 
the associations they want, and prevent their vital interests from being violated by 
the state.
• Provisions for human rights protect citizens against the excesses of  
'majoritarianism,' provide justifi cation for special treatment of  minorities and 
other disadvantaged communities, and help promote their identity and culture. 
• Many rights, such as the right to vote, the freedom of  expression and of  the media 
and access to information, are necessary for the establishment and protection of  
democracy, and for holding the public authorities accountable to the public.
• Rights provide guidance to organs of  state regarding the exercise of  state 
power.
• Respect for human rights limits internal and external confl icts and strengthens 
national unity.
Different Kinds of Rights 
Historically, rights emerged with the rise of  strong states and markets (due to the 
realization that the state and the market placed individuals at risk of  exploitation and 
oppression, and that certain guarantees were essential for the market economy). In recent 
years, the concept of  rights has been broadened to include a variety of  entitlements that 
are considered necessary for protecting individuals and to allow them to fulfi l their 
needs, including material ones. 
The fi rst rights to be protected were individual rights, and the protection was restricted 
to political and civil rights—rights of  life and liberty; civil rights, such as the right to 
1This idea is expressed in the Ugandan Constitution (1995) as follows:
Fundamental rights and freedoms of  the individual are inherent and are not granted by the State (Art. 20(1))
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associate and assemble;  freedom of  expression; and political rights, such as the right to 
vote and stand for elections, and the right to participate in public affairs.
Economic, social, and cultural rights were recognized next. These rights were given 
prominence in socialist theories, which attached great importance to social justice and 
providing fair living conditions for all. They include the right to education, employment, 
shelter, health, and food. 
Solidarity rights were recognized next: right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable 
environment, peace, and development. These rights are important for the community 
as well as for the individual.  
These categories represent different dimensions of  rights. Civil and political rights are 
directed at ensuring a secure space for individuals to pursue their values and interests 
and are aimed at limiting state intervention in their lives. Economic, social, and cultural 
rights, on the other hand, impose obligations on the state to take specifi c action to 
facilitate the enjoyment of  social and economic rights. The state is not necessarily 
required to provide free education or medical services, and so on, but the state is 
obligated to pursue policies that enable individuals, families, and groups to earn a living; 
the state is also responsible for maintaining an honest administration, for  distributing 
resources equitably, and for formulating appropriate policies. The third category of  
rights also requires an active role for the state, in part as a regulator. It requires the state 
and other authorities to pursue sensible policies that do not exhaust or destroy natural 
resources or waste money on weapons; and the state must create conditions for peaceful 
and consensual living and establish opportunities for individuals and groups to pursue 
economic and social interests in fair, conducive, and equal conditions. 
To some extent, these categories represent different economic and philosophical 
ideologies. Some commentators have even argued that these categories are in confl ict 
or should not be given the same degree of  priority. Nevertheless, today it is recognized 
that all categories of  rights are equally necessary for people to live in dignity and peace, 
and that these rights are interdependent. For example, rights to education and literacy 
(which are classifi ed as social rights) are necessary for the freedom of  expression (which 
is classifi ed as a civil right), because to express themselves, people have to be able to 
read and communicate. Similarly, a clean environment is necessary for everyone's health 
and the right to life, more generally (bringing together all categories of  rights).
The notion of  who the benefi ciaries of  rights are has also changed. At fi rst, only citizens 
were given rights, as in France, and even the concept of  citizenship was limited (as in the 
early years of  the USA). Today, all persons are entitled to human rights, although in most 
countries, political rights connected with elections or employment in state institutions 
are still restricted to citizens.  The concept of  who the benefi ciaries are has also changed 
from the early period, when rights were considered appropriate only for individuals. 
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The individualistic orientation of  rights was criticized for promoting selfi shness and 
leading to the disregard of  the values and interests of  the community or the state, and 
this view has resulted in some countries' imposing wide restrictions on the enjoyment 
of  rights, on the grounds of  'public interest' (as in earlier Nepali constitutions). 
Another solution is to fi nd ways to balance rights with the responsibilities of  individuals 
and groups. Examples of  duties and responsibilities can be found in a number of  
constitutions, including in India, Papua New Guinea, Uganda, and Portugal. Typically, 
these responsibilities include duties to
• defend the constitution
• protect the security and independence of  the state
• obey the law
• pay taxes
• respect the rights and culture of  others
• take responsibility for the welfare of  family and children.2
Placing undue emphasis on individual rights, particularly political rights, can lead to 
'majoritarianism,' under which the culture and values of  the majority community dominate 
society and in which the members of  the majority community participate at much higher 
levels in the governance of  the country than do others. To offset majoritarianism, many 
countries are now increasingly recognizing collective and group rights, particularly of  
ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities, and indigenous communities. Cultural rights, 
as well as forms of  self-government for minority communities through autonomy, are 
now given increased attention. Special provisions are made in international treaties and 
national laws for the promotion of  the rights of  vulnerable sectors of  society, such as 
women and children. 
Other forms of  collectivities to which rights are generally extended are commercial 
and social organizations, such as companies or trade unions. Associational rights are 
particularly important to trade unions, while property rights are critical for commercial 
organizations. For trade unions, the freedom of  expression is important because that 
freedom allows them to organize protests and so on and lobby for their interests; and 
the freedom of  expression is important for companies because  that freedom allows 
2 The notion of  duties is strong in Vedic thought and was included in the very fi rst document granting rights in Nepal. 
The 1948 Constitution decreed that within his capacity, 'it shall be the duty of  every citizen to promote public welfare, 
to contribute to public funds, to be in readiness to labour physicially and intellectually for the safety and well being of  
the Realm and bear true allegiance to His Majesty the Maharajadhiraja Shree 5 and His Highness the Maharaja Shree 
3 and be faithful to the State and its Constitution' (Art. 5).
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them to advertise their products and the services they offer (although some countries 
give a lesser degree of  protection to 'commercial' speech than, for example, to political 
or intellectual speech). 
At fi rst, only the state had obligations under the regime of  human rights. Individuals 
or collectivities could violate the rights of  others (through discrimination, for example) 
without incurring legal penalties. In some instances, special laws were passed to outlaw 
racial, ethnic, or gender discrimination (and of  course, the criminal law protected several 
rights of  individuals). But with the growing power of  companies and with the increasing 
recognition that much discrimination and oppression takes place in society and within 
the family, there is a move towards extending obligations that arise from the rights of  
others to corporate and social groups. The South African Constitution provides an 
example:  
Article 8 (2) A provision of  the Bill of  Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, 
and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of  the right and 
the nature of  any duty imposed by the right.
Nor are corporations automatically benefi ciaries of  human rights, as the following 
clause of  Article 8 indicates 
(4) A juristic person is entitled to the rights in the Bill of  Rights to the extent required 
by the nature of  the rights and the nature of  that juristic person. 
These developments have increased the scope and the complexity of  rights, but there 
are also tensions between different categories of  rights. Rights also provide a framework 
for balancing competing interests; equality, for example, can be seen as requiring non-
discrimination, but others see effective equality as being (at least in some circumstances) 
the justifi cation for special provisions for the disadvantaged or the vulnerable. The 
notion of  rights as universal and individual oriented is increasingly challenged as being 
'majoritarian,' insensitive to minority cultures. The call is for 'differentiated,' rather 
than 'uniform,' rights, with considerable shift in emphasis from the individual to the 
'community.' In multi-ethnic societies, human rights have become intertwined with 
questions of  identity. Rights groups have challenged the notion of  the 'nation-state' 
theory, by drawing attention to diversity and cultural rights. The prominence that this 
shift gives to culture raises issues not only about relations between communities, and 
between them and the state, but also about the internal organization of  each community. 
It may be that culture is not an unqualifi ed good (ask women in Asia and Africa, and 
ask Dalits), and constitution makers may have to decide between rights as traditionally 
understood (as individual rights) and cultural values. How this dilemma is to be solved 
remains a great challenge in our times. 
Fresh ways of  thinking about rights have also come with the search for social justice—
with the increasing recognition of  the importance of  economic and social rights as 
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ensuring the basic needs of  the people. This factor has led to a more fl exible approach 
to the notion of  equality and non-discrimination. And the interest in democracy-as-
participation has expanded our notion of  political rights. 
The Internationalization of Rights
Today, human rights are no longer a matter of  concern or interest to the state only. 
There are international and regional systems of  rights, consisting of  treaties and 
declarations on rights and institutions to supervise the implementation of  rights. The 
most important document is the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights adopted by 
the General Assembly of  the UN in 1948, which has provided the basis on which many 
treaties and declarations have been made. The principal treaties are the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, which 
between them cover most rights. There are specialist treaties for protection against racial 
discrimination and torture, and for the protection of  the rights of  women, children, 
refugees, and indigenous peoples. There are Declarations on the Rights of  Minorities 
and of  Indigenous People, which while not legally binding, carry considerable moral 
authority. 
Regional human rights systems exist in Europe, Latin America, and Africa—but there 
is none in Asia. Perhaps Asia is too large and too diverse a continent, with enormous 
cultural and religious diversity, and several authoritarian regimes, and maybe sub-regions 
provide a more workable category in Asia; but despite occasional proposals for an 
ASEAN human rights scheme, little concrete progress has been made. Regional or 
national schemes, with their own courts that make binding decisions, are stronger than 
the international schemes, in institutional terms. 
Each of  the international treaties is supervised by an international committee of  experts, 
set up under the treaty, to which member states are required to submit periodic reports. 
Some countries (including Nepal) have accepted additional protocols under which 
individuals can complain to the committee, although in most cases, these committees, 
while able to interpret state obligations, are unable to enforce their decisions. Some 
states, however, are prepared to follow the decisions made by committees.
There are other components of  the international system. It is now widely accepted that 
the international community, especially under the authority of  the UN Security Council, 
can intervene in the internal affairs of  a country if  there are massive violations of  
human rights, to restore order or to protect victims (as in Serbia, East Timor, Kosovo, 
and Sudan). The United Nations' Council of  Human Rights has the responsibility of  
examining individual country records on the observance of  human rights, which it 
discharges partly through special representatives and rapporteurs, and the Council is 
now about to begin peer reviews of  countries' records.   
The international community has set up special judicial tribunals for trials in respect 
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of  the crimes against humanity (for example, in Rwanda, Cambodia, and the former 
Yugoslavia). The international community now has a permanent International  Criminal 
Court with broad jurisdiction, at the Hague. National courts can also exercise jurisdiction 
over any person who is charged with crimes against humanity, wherever the crimes may 
have been committed (this is known as 'universal jurisdiction' and was exercised in the 
case of  former Chilean president Pinochet).   
There are other ways in which the internationalization of  rights occurs; for example, 
the decisions and general comments of  the treaty bodies are frequently cited in national 
courts, and the judgements made by international and regional human rights courts are 
also a source of  interpretation in national courts. Furthermore, national courts borrow 
from other national courts (Nepali and Indian courts survey a wide array of  US and 
British cases)—and in this way, there is a rich and productive trade in precedents. 
Key international instruments make it clear that the international community has a duty 
of  mutual obligation to assist states in the fulfi lment of  their human rights responsibilities, 
for example, through technical, fi nancial, and other forms of  assistance. Human rights 
are seen as manifestations of  global responsibility and solidarity. The international 
community has promoted the establishment of  human rights commissions at the 
national levels, based on principles designed to ensure independence, competence, and 
commitment ('the Paris Principles'). In 2005, the summit of  heads of  governments of  
member states of  the UN made a commitment on behalf  of  the UN to protect groups 
and communities against wide-scale violations of  their human rights. The engagement 
of  the international community is very evident (and appreciated) in Nepal, where the 
fi rst forms of  international involvement, based on international norms, in the confl ict 
and insurgency were driven by humanitarian concerns. One of  the largest fi eld offi ces 
of  the Offi ce of  the High Commissioner of  Human Rights, a principal UN agency, is in 
Nepal, and it has played an important role in promoting and monitoring human rights. 
Human rights, therefore, are no longer a matter just for a state, but are deeply woven 
into a state's international obligations. The framers of  Nepal's new constitution need to 
keep this fact in mind.  
Development of a Rights Regime in Nepal
Although the Muluki Ain (1853) is viewed as an instrument of  exclusion, because it 
enshrined the hierarchical system of  Nepali society, with its inequalities, it did have 
some elements of  a reforming nature. It granted freedom of  religion, in the sense that 
a person could practice his or her religion. Conversion of  Hindus to any other religion, 
however, was prohibited. It prohibited forced labour except for public purposes. It 
placed restrictions on the practice of  'sati,' although it did not abolish it entirely. And 
it restricted the severity of  physical punishments previously permitted, and forbade 
torture to exact confessions. 
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The modern movement for human rights began with the contacts the Nepali elite 
and middle class made with Indian freedom fi ghters in the 1940s and the return of  
Gorkha soldiers from abroad, where they came across democratic states that placed 
great emphasis on rights and freedoms. Under domestic and international pressure, the 
Rana regime under Prime Minister Padma Shamsher introduced a constitution (the fi rst 
such document in Nepal; see chapter 2), the Government of  Nepal Act 1948, which 
purported to grant (in one article) basic democratic freedoms: 'the freedom of  the 
person, freedom of  speech, liberty of  the press, freedom of  assembly and discussion, 
freedom of  worship, complete equality in the eyes of  the law, cheap and speedy justice, 
universal and free elementary education, universal and equal suffrage for all adults, 
security of  private property as defi ned by the laws of  the state as at present existing, and 
laws and rules to be made thereafter' (Art. 4). Some specifi c legislation was subsequently 
passed to implement these rights. Nevertheless, the Act suffered from several serious 
shortcomings: the rights were subject to past and future legislation (which effectively 
rendered them useless); the implementing legislation imposed various restrictions on the 
exercise of  the rights and freedoms; the fi nal judicial authority to determine violations 
of  rights was not formal courts, but a body set up by the government (Art. 52); and 
there were insuffi cient democratic reforms to sustain these liberal rights.   
But the conservative forces were against even this limited form of  rights, and they 
resisted reforms, overthrew Padma Shamsher, and scrapped the constitution. This 
turn of  events, however, mobilized the forces for democracy and rights, and led to the 
overthrow of  the Rana regime and the restoration of  the monarchy. King Tribhuvan then 
proclaimed the 1951 Constitution, which had a detailed section on rights and freedoms 
(Part II). These rights and freedoms included equality before the law, prohibition of  
state discrimination on the grounds of  religion, race, caste, sex, or place of  birth, and 
equal opportunity for employment in state services. The constitution aimed to guarantee 
various rights and freedoms (personal liberty, speech, and expression; peaceful assembly; 
forming associations and unions; free movement and residence within Nepal; acquiring 
and disposing of  property; and the right to practice any profession). The constitution 
prohibited employment of  children who were under 14 years of  age in 'any factory 
or mine or … other hazardous employment' (Art. 21). Various provisions ensured 
due process of  rights in respect of  criminal trials. The constitution also guaranteed a 
number of  social policies to promote egalitarianism; to create humane conditions of  
work; to provide for maternity relief; to provide welfare for the old, the disabled, and 
other weaker sections of  society; and to provide social justice. The formulation of  these 
rights and policies was greatly infl uenced by the newly established Indian Constitution. 
As with the 1948 Constitution, there was considerable reluctance about rights in the 
1951 Constitution. No distinction was made, as in India, between rights and social 
policies, all appearing under the rubric of  Directive Principles of  State Policy. As such, 
none of  them was legally enforceable, and laws inconsistent with the rights could not 
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be challenged (although the government was to treat them 'as being fundamental in the 
governance of  the country,' (Art. 3(2)). Even without this exemption, the rights were 
made subject to the 'existing law' (and therefore without any superior force)—and law 
making was fi rmly under the control of  the king. However, there was a provision for 
a stronger judicial machinery in the form of  the Pradhan Nyayalaya, and a subsequent 
executive order attempted to give it independence of  the executive and increased 
jurisdiction. But because of  a few bold decisions made by the Pradhan Nyayalaya, the 
king cut back its jurisdiction and immunized various laws against judicial review, by 
constitutional and legislative means. In fact, the king assumed full executive, legislative, 
and judicial powers, becoming the supreme power, with no accountability, and he lay 
down the 'foundation of  Royal absolutism.'3
Yet once again, this assertion of  royal 'prerogative' provoked such strong public 
protests, that the old law that bestowed constitutional jurisdiction on the Pradhan 
Nyayalaya and gave fi nality to its decisions was restored. HB Tripathi says that after 
this re-establishment of  the old law, the Pradhan Nyayalaya, presided over by the late 
chief  justice Hari Prasad Pradhan, fi rmly established its role as the protector of  human 
rights, promoter of  the rule of  law, and the guardian of  the constitution, in a number 
of  landmark decisions (p. 33). But the very success of  the Pradhan Nyayalaya incurred 
royal displeasure, and the legislative basis of  the Pradhan Nyayalaya was removed by 
an executive order, and legislation was enacted for the creation of  a Supreme Court, 
to which were appointed all the judges of  the Pradhan Nyayalaya, except for the chief  
justice! This was an attempt to clip the wings of  the judiciary. 
But the pressure for reform continued, compelling King Mahendra to promulgate the 
1959 Constitution. The 1959 Constitution had no directive principles, but the rights it 
gave were enforceable in courts. It provided for the right to life and liberty, equality before 
the law, rights to property, freedom of  expression and speech, the right to assembly 
without arms, the right to form  associations or unions, and the freedom to move and 
reside in any part of  Nepal. It allowed freedom of  religion, but in a restricted way (the 
defi nition of  religion was confi ned to traditional practices, and there was prohibition of  
converting a person to another religion)—and the constitution restricted kingship to a 
Hindu and 'adherent of  Aryan culture' (Art. 1(3)). The constitution also granted, for the 
fi rst time in Nepal, the right to constitutional remedies, through a petition to the Supreme 
Court, for the redress of  violations of  a right (Art. 9). Moreover, any person could seek 
a ruling from the Supreme Court to determine the validity of  a law for consistency with 
the constitution (Art. 54)—the constitution having been declared supreme law (Art. 1). 
The independence of  the Supreme Court and of  its judges was established by fettering 
3 H B Tripathi, Fundamental Rights and Judicial Review Nepal (2007), p. 31.
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the king's power to dismiss the judges, and by protecting other provisions that assured 
Supreme Court judges security of  offi ce and terms of  appointment. 
But these positive developments were negated by the very wide restrictions that could 
be placed on rights by immunizing considerable existing legislation and providing for 
limitations on rights for the 'public good,' a term that was very broadly defi ned.4 Nor 
could courts examine the validity of  the limitation if  the law recited that it was made for 
the 'public good.' This effectively meant that the extent to which a right was available 
depended entirely on the will of  the king. The king made extensive use of  this restriction 
and much repressive legislation was enacted. 
The Panchayat Constitution of  1962 marked a fundamental departure from the political 
progress made in the earlier constitutions.5 However, it retained the supremacy of  the 
constitution and the right to seek redress through the courts. It introduced the idea 
of  fundamental duties, of  which 'devotion to the nation and loyalty to the state' were 
emphasized (Art. 9). The rights given included life, liberty, and due process of  law, 
the equal protection of  the law, the usual rights, and the usual freedoms (of  speech, 
etc. and property, in a formulation that was becoming traditional), and the restricted 
version of  the freedom of  religion. The wide grounds for limitation of  rights under 
the previous constitution were retained (with the addition of  'the interests of  minors 
or women'). During the Panchayat regime, it became customary to insert the formula (in 
the preamble) for exemption from the rights, and thus exclusion of  judicial review, in all 
legislation, and in this way, most rights were negated. 
Directive principles (unenforceable) were introduced and formulated in the context of  
the Panchayat system, subject to the overriding goal of  the 'welfare of  the of  the people' 
through a 'society which is democratic, just, dynamic, and free from exploitation by 
bringing about harmony in the interests of  different classes and professions from a 
comprehensive national outlook' (Art. 19).  
The 1990 Constitution, which was created after the fi rst Jana Andolan, was made with 
the aim, inter alia, to 'guarantee basic human rights to every citizen of  Nepal' and to 
'transform the concept of  the Rule of  Law into a living reality' (preamble). As was to 
be expected, the 1990 Constitution retained the supremacy of  the constitution and the 
4 Public good was defi ned: maintenance of  law and order, maintenance of  national security, good relations between 
Nepal and other countries, good relations between different classes or sections of  the people, as between the people 
of  different areas, or generally good manners, health, comfort or convenience or decency or morality and economic 
welfare of  citizens, or to prevent internal disturbance or any attempt to subvert this Constitution or any law or any 
other like attempt or for the prevention of  contempt of  court or house of  Parliament (art. 8(2)). 
5 Anirud Gupta writes, 'The Constitution of  1962 seeks to vest in the king every set of  political power that could be 
obtainable in a despotic order,' in his book Politics in Nepal (1993), p. 261.
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right to constitutional remedies. It distinguished directive principles from fundamental 
rights. Fundamental rights covered the right to equality, freedom of  speech, and so 
on (although now with the specifi cation of  grounds for derogation from each right, 
covering the same sorts of  exemptions as in preceding constitutions). It had a separate 
article for freedom of  press and publication (Art. 13). It had detailed provisions for the 
protection of  personal liberty (not signifi cantly different from previous constitutions). It 
introduced four new rights—the rights to information and communal culture, in respect 
of  language, script and education, privacy, and the abolition of  capital punishment.   
The directive principles and policies of  state (the distinction between the two is not 
too clear) covered a large number of  goals. Apart from goals set out in previous 
constitutions, the constitution placed a clearer emphasis on social and economic rights 
and economic processes and institutions. It provided specifi cally for the provision of  
legal aid for indigent persons, to 'establish justice for all' (Art. 26(14))—which was in 
keeping with the emphasis on the rule of  law and the independence of  the judiciary 
and of  legal processes. 
Although the rights in the 1990 Constitution were not much different from those in its 
two immediate predecessors, the grounds for limitation were more carefully defi ned. 
The machinery for enforcement and the general ambiance for the rule of  law were 
much stronger, with strong democratic institutions and an independent judiciary. The 
constitution established a new body, an independent commission, to receive complaints 
about and to investigate the abuse of  authority and an improper or corrupt act by a 
person holding a public offi ce. There were other independent bodies to ensure the fair 
exercise and accountability of  power. The prospects for the promotion of  democracy 
and rights were more promising than had been in any previous constitutions. The status 
and authority of  the Supreme Court was established, with a number of  interesting 
judgments (referred to in chapter 17). But democracy as it functioned under the 
constitution did not fulfi l its other aims, particularly of  social justice or the devolution 
of  power. 
The Interim Constitution was drafted both to provide for a transitional government 
and to refl ect the goals of  Jana Andolan II. More so than the 1990 Constitution (where 
the primary emphasis was on democracy), the Interim Constitution is oriented towards 
social and ethnic inclusion, the constructive recognition of  diversity, and the fundamental 
goal of  social justice—by the restructuring of  the state and society. This orientation is 
refl ected in, among others, the scheme of  fundamental rights and directive principles. 
The innovative features as regards rights are (a) stronger and more expansive prohibition 
of  untouchability and racial discrimination; (b) rights of  security and social justice for 
the marginalized communities; (c) rights of  vulnerable groups (women and children); 
(d) rights of  labour; and (e) the prohibition of  torture.
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However, it is in the directive principles and policies that the agenda of  the Jana 
Andolan is more evident. The Interim Constitution requires 'an inclusive, democratic, 
and progressive restructuring of  the state' (Art. 3(d)). This will be done in substantial 
measure by the introduction of  federalism and the principle of  proportionality. Another 
pervasive theme is the advancement of  the economic and social status of  not only the 
better-known marginalized communities, but also labour, farmers, the disabled, and 
Kamaiyas. Reservations and other forms of  special assistance may be established to 
achieve these objectives. The state also has more general obligations, particularly to fulfi l 
citizens' rights to education, health, housing, employment, and food sovereignty. Since 
these appear as policies rather than rights, their benefi ciaries have no recourse to legal 
redress in case of  default. However, Article 21 does give marginalized communities the 
right to participate in state structures on the basis of  proportionality; Article 17 gives 
the right to receive primary education in the mother tongue as well as to receive free 
education up to the secondary level; and Article 13 authorizes special measures for the 
marginalized. 
Nepal's International Human Rights Commitments 
Nepal has signed a number of  human rights treaties. Except for the International 
Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Racial Discrimination (which Nepal 
signed in 1971), all the treaties were signed after the restoration of  democracy under the 
1990 Constitution. Apart from the two major covenants and protocols, Nepal is bound 
by the Convention Against Torture, the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms 
of  Discrimination Against Women, the Convention on the Right of  the Child (and 
the protocol on the sale of  children for prostitution or pornography), and the recently 
signed the ILO Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples. But this still 
leaves out a number of  important treaties. Nepal has a patchy record of  reporting to 
the treaty bodies. Although its record is certainly better than that of  many countries, it 
has come under considerable criticism from the Offi ce of  the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights for serious and widespread violations of  human rights.  
Conclusion
Nepalis have had to struggle hard to obtain human rights and freedoms because the state 
has conceded rights only when under national and international pressure. But there has 
been a gradual broadening and deepening of  rights, as is obvious when the 1948 and 
the 2007 Constitutions are compared. Rights have steadily become more enforceable, 
the status of  the Supreme Court as the guardian of  rights is now established, and the 
Human Rights Commission provides additional means for the promotion of  rights. 
On the negative side, social and economic rights are, for the most part, not given a 
high priority and are not enforceable. Successive constitutions have restricted rights to 
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citizens, although now more rights are given to 'all persons.' Most economic, social, and 
cultural rights are still in the domain of  directive principles, and are thus not enforceable. 
It is still too easy to impose legal limitations on rights in the ways shown above. The 
emphasis is still on individual rights (and particularly citizen rights when some long-
term inhabitants fi nd it diffi cult to acquire citizenship). A review of  the constitutions 
shows that the drafters have been reluctant to express in concrete terms the diversity of  
Nepal (although the Interim Constitution does take some strides in this direction). 
The Constituent Assembly will face considerable challenges in devising a bill of  rights 
that responds to the sense of  dignity and aspirations of  Nepal's various communities—
and this issue will be examined in the next four chapters.
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CHAPTER 7
CHAPTER 7
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The Nation-state and Its Critics
The post-Second World War development of  the regime of  human rights was based 
on the assumption of  a nation-state. A 'nation-state' is understood to refer to the 
convergence of  the territory of  a state with a nation, whose members are united by 
ties of  history and culture and commitment to a common future. The principal basis 
of  rights and obligations in a nation-state is citizenship. All citizens are equal before the 
law and enjoy the same rights. The sovereignty of  the people is expressed through the 
state, which provides a common regime of  laws, the machinery for justice, democratic 
rights of  franchise and candidacy in elections, and the protection of  other rights of  
individuals. The state ensures law and order through its monopoly of  the use of  force. 
A citizen's linguistic, religious, and cultural affi liations and membership of  a community 
are irrelevant to his or her relationship to the state. In so far as there are differences of  
culture (which in a nation-state are assumed not to be serious), these differences are 
expressed in the private sphere or civil society. As chapter 3 has shown, this approach 
dominated the 1990 Constitution.
This model of  the nation-state has come under considerable attack in recent decades, 
in Nepal as elsewhere, challenging the very concept of  the nation-state. No country 
today has cultural, religious, linguistic, or even historical homogeneity. A nation-
state based approach, in effect, privileges the culture or language of  the majority and 
marginalizes that of  other communities, even where the state professes neutrality. The 
attack is sometimes conducted in terms of  identity, which has become a fashionable 
term. Minorities in so-called 'nation-states' do not get proper recognition of  their 
culture or history or other basis of  identity, and this lack of  recognition is demeaning 
to them. While this attack has its basis in the psychological harm a community suffers, 
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the marginalization of  minorities takes other forms as well: exclusion from or under-
representation in the institutions of  the state, limited opportunities in the economy, 
social discrimination, lack of  access to the legal system, and the denial of  justice in 
many sectors of  life.
A considerable part of  the attack is expressed in the terms of  human rights. Minorities 
and other disadvantaged communities emphasize the rights of  participation (as, for 
example, in Article 25 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights), 
which are not possible unless they have separate representation in state institutions or 
access to the basic necessities of  life (as guaranteed in the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights) or special measures to overcome their historic or 
cultural discrimination and injustices. They claim that their right to culture is threatened 
by educational systems in which their children have to learn in a foreign language, and 
that the conducting of  state business in another language further marginalizes their own 
language; at the same time, their economic, political, and social prospects are jeopardized 
(due to their insuffi cient familiarity with the offi cial language). All these, they claim, are 
violations of  the fundamental right of  equality. 
Disadvantaged communities sometimes invoke the right of  self-determination to 
advance their claims. This is a complex idea, and its meaning in international law has 
changed somewhat in the last half-century. There is a detailed discussion of  the topic 
in chapter 9.
The challenge to individual, citizen-oriented rights was cast in terms of  group or 
collective rights: rights to autonomy, language, special measures ('affi rmative action' 
or 'reservations'), regimes of  personal laws, separate electoral laws, representation in 
the government, and proportionality in public services. In these instances, citizenship 
right of  equality would have to be sacrifi ced to the claims of  particular communities. 
While there is an increasing recognition of  collective rights, the matter remains deeply 
contested and controversial, not only at the philosophical level, but also at the material 
level, for it concerns the distribution of  resources and benefi ts. Some say that if  there are 
too many group rights, the national interest suffers and the national unity is threatened. 
Others say that unless group rights to benefi t minorities are provided, they will protest 
and try to secede. Yet others say that individual and collective rights have to be fairly 
balanced so that both national and group identities are recognized, for it is only in this 
way that national unity can be preserved or enhanced. 
Nepal is facing this problem, as the marginalized communities are demanding greater 
representation in state institutions as well as the recognition of  their languages and 
cultures. This chapter explains the diversity of  the Nepali people, ways in which some 
communities have been marginalized, and what can be done for their advancement.  
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Diversity of Nepal 
Ethnic, cultural, and linguistic diversity is the most characteristic feature of  Nepal as 
a nation; its communities differ in their social and racial origins. Broadly speaking, its 
people can be classifi ed into three major groups in terms of  their ethnic origin, namely 
the Aryan Nepalis, Tibeto-Mongol Nepalis, and indigenous tribal Nepalis.  The fi rst 
group—comprising Hill and Tarai Brahmins, Chhetris, Thakuris, and Dalits—has 
inhabited the more fertile lower hills, river valleys, and Tarai plains. The second major 
group, comprising communities of  Tibeto-Mongol origin, occupies the higher hills 
from the west to east. The third group comprises several indigenous communities such 
as Tharus, Dhimals, Chepangs, Botes, Santhals, and Rautes. The Hill castes are about 
40 per cent of  the population, the non-tribal Tarai groups are about 30 per cent and 
the tribal groups 25 per cent. Academics tend to divide the population into fi ve broad 
cultural groups: i) the caste-origin Hindu groups; ii) the Newars; iii) the Janajatis or 
nationalities; iv) Muslims; and v) others. 
The monopolization of  power by certain caste groups has been a persistent feature of  
the last two hundred years. The autocratic and absolute Shah monarchy, followed by the 
Rana oligarchy, played a crucial role in the feudal structuring of  the state. Both these 
regimes used 'caste-based' structure as an instrument of  order and social regulation. 
Although the caste system was eliminated in principle in 1964, it still formed the basis 
of  societal relations, politics, and statecraft. None of  the constitutions promulgated 
after the 1951 revolution addressed the problem of  caste-based exclusion.  
Social Structure 
Brahmins and high ranking Thakuris, Rajputs, and Chhetris among the Aryan Nepali 
group dominate the nation socially, politically, and economically. The Dalit community, 
although Aryan, is socially ostracized, politically excluded, and economically deprived. 
The indigenous communities (of  which there are about 61 nationalities) are excluded 
politically. The second and the third groups, known as the indigenous nationalities and 
minorities, are politically excluded. Altogether, there are about one hundred caste and 
ethnic groups. 
According to the 2001 census, 92 languages are spoken as mother tongues. Since language 
and culture are inseparably connected and infl uence each other, a system of  governance 
and development should refl ect all cultures and languages. However, the recognition of  
Nepali as the only offi cial language has led to the exclusion of  other languages. In this 
way, a large segment of  the population has been unable to take advantage of  services 
and opportunities provided by the state. 
While the majority of  people are Hindus or Buddhists, or practise a combination of  
both faiths, the Nepali population includes other religious groups as well. According 
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to the 2001 census, Hindus make up 86.5 per cent of  the total population, Buddhists, 
7.78 per cent, and Muslims, 3.35 per cent. A small section of  the population is tribal 
and animist. These fi gures have been challenged, as several nationalities not classifi ed 
as Buddhists, Muslims, or Christians have been randomly and inaccurately classifi ed 
as Hindus. For example, Janajatis (indigenous communities) such as Magars (7.14 per 
cent of  the total population), Tharus (6.75 per cent), Limbus (1.58 per cent), and Rais 
(3.94 per cent), who have their own religious rituals, are classifi ed as Hindus. These 
communities, together with Buddhists and tribal groups, constitute a signifi cant part of  
the population not governed by Hindu faith. The Hill Brahmin, Chhetri, and Thakuri, 
the major Hindu groups, approximately constitute 30 per cent of  the total population. 
The Tarai population is also largely Hindu, though there are some Muslim groups.
Nature and Extent of Exclusion
The exclusion of  indigenous, Dalit, and tribal groups is a deeply rooted problem. 
Constitutions and laws have institutionalized their exclusion. The following groups are 
affected by the exclusion:
• The people of  Karnali zone: Karnali zone is the most remote and inaccessible 
part of  Nepal. Set in rugged and high mountains, the amount of  arable land in 
this zone is extremely limited. Its upper hills are covered by snow most parts of  
the year, and productivity in these hills is very limited. The entire zone suffers 
from illiteracy, ignorance, poverty, and serious health problems. All governments 
have ignored the welfare of  the people in this part of  the country. The problem 
of  this zone is therefore that of  geographical exclusion.
• Dalits: Approximately 13 per cent to 20 per cent of  the population comprises 
the Dalit community, which has been socially maltreated for generations. The 
exclusion of  Dalits is a socio-economic, political, and psychological problem.
• Indigenous communities: Indigenous communities constitute approximately 
40 per cent of  the total population. Many are now displaced from their native 
habitation. Their cultural and linguistic identities are under threat.
• Tribal groups: There are over thirty small tribal groups who are extremely 
backward, socially and economically. They are the most disadvantaged population 
in terms of  socio-economic development. A larger part of  their population is 
landless, jobless, and disenfranchised. Their presence in politics is almost non-
existent. 
The following two tables (drawn from an unpublished paper by Krishna Hachhethu) 
show graphically the disparities on a number of  indices on welfare and participation 
between the dominant groups and the marginalized groups. But these fi gures alone 
cannot capture the humiliation, helplessness, alienation, and suffering experienced by 
the marginalized communities. 
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Table 1 (A) Human Development by Caste and Ethnicity: 1996
Dominant Groups Marginalized Groups
Brahmin Chhetri Newar Madhesi Janajati Dalit Nepal
1 Life Expectancy 60.8 56.03 62.2 58.4 53.0 50.3 55.0
2 Adult Literacy Rate (%) 58.00 42.00 54.80 27.50 35.20 23.80 36.27
3 Mean Years of Schooling 4.4647 2.786 4.370 1.700 2.021 1.228 2.254
4 Per Capita Income Nrs. 9921 7744 11953 6911 6607 4940 7673
5 Per Capita PPP Income US$ 1533 1197 1848 1068 1021 764 1186
6 Life-expectancy Index 0.957 0.522 0.620 0.557 0.467 0.422 0.500
7 Educational-attainment Index 0.490 0.342 0.462 0.221 0.280 0.186 0.295
8  Income Index 0.237 0.181 0.289 0.160 0.152 0.110 0.179
9 Human-development Index 0.441 0.348 0.457 0.313 0.299 0.239 0.325
10 Ratio to HDI Nepal = 100 135.87 107.31 140.73 96.28 92.21 73.62 100.00
Source: NESAC. 1998. Nepal: Human Development Report 1998. Kathmandu: Nepal South Asia Centre.
Table 1 (B) Integrated National Index of Governance: 1999
Dominant Groups Marginalized Groups
Brahmin/Chhetri Newar Madhesi Janajati Dalit Other Total
1 Court 77 13.6 7.6 1.7 0 0 235
2 Constitutional Bodies 56 24 12 2.8 0 0 25
3 Cabinet 62.5 9.4 15.6 12.5 0 0 32
4 Parliament 60 7.6 17.4 13.6 1.5 0 265
5 Public administration 77.6 17.6 3.7 1.2 0 0 245
6 Party Leadership 58.8 10.9 15.8 15.2 0 0 165
7 Leadership: Local Elected bodies 55.5 15.7 16.2 12 0 0 191
8 Leadership: Commerce and 
Industry
16.7 47.6 35.7 0 0 0 42
9 Leadership: Educational Arena 77.3 11.3 7.2 2.1 1 1 97
10 Leadership: Cultural Arena 69.1 17.9 0 4.9 0 0 123
11 Science/Technology 58.1 29 9.7 3.2 0 0 62
12 Civil-society Leadership 75.9 14.8 7.4 1.9 0 0 54
Total 66.5 15.2 11.2 7.1 0.3 1
Population (%) 31.6 5.6 30.9 22.2 8.7 1
Difference from Population (%) + 34. 9 +9.6 - 19.7 - 15.1 - 8.4 -1
Source: Neupane, Govinda. 2000. Nepalko Jatiya Prasna (Question of  Caste/Ethnicity in Nepal). Kathmandu: Centre for 
Development Studies.
These patterns of  exclusions had the following implications:
• The state was monopolized by political elites belonging to the dominant groups. 
Other cultural and linguistic groups were prevented from participating in the 
political process and the system of  governance.
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• Civil and political rights had no meaning for the general public. The exercise of  
such rights by women, indigenous groups, Dalits, and tribal groups was effectively 
barred by the dominant presence of  upper-caste political elites in politics, the 
bureaucracy, and the military. 
• Economic and social rights were not considered to be 'basic or fundamental 
rights.' The state thus failed to 'take responsibility for ensuring a dignifi ed life for 
the people.' 
Demands of Different Communities
All the marginalized groups have been seeking proper representation in the Constituent 
Assembly so that they can negotiate for constitutional provisions to protect their legitimate 
interests (the Janajatis, for example, want every Janajati community to have at least one 
representative, while Madhesis are placing more importance on proportionality). As seen 
in chapter 4, the original provisions in the Interim Constitution were inadequate, and 
perhaps the amendments are not necessarily fully satisfactory. Janajatis and Madhesis have 
entered into agreements with the government as to how this and other demands would 
be met (some prior to the creation of  the Constituent Assembly). What provisions do 
the marginalized communities hope to achieve in the Constituent Assembly?
Dalits
For Dalits, the following are among the main issues which should be addressed in the 
new constitution. 
Reservations 
Reservation is a form of  affi rmative action in which members of  a community are 
assured a minimum number of  seats in the legislature (e.g., by restricting the candidates 
in a number of  constituencies to that community) or a quota of  places in the public 
service and educational institutions. India has for a long time provided reservations for 
Dalits and Adivasis to allow the disadvantaged communities to catch up with others, and 
although intended to be temporary, reservations continue 60 years after independence. 
Dalits want reservations in the private sector too. The private sector follows discriminatory 
hiring practices, which causes ineffi ciency in the market. As the private sector receives 
support from the government, there is a thin line between private and public spheres. 
These factors, coupled with the notion of  fairness, justify requiring social responsibility 
on the part of  the corporate sector towards marginalized groups and the promotion of  
diversity.  
Reservations can be controversial, because although one community considers that they 
are an appropriate measure to compensate it for past disadvantage or injustice, others 
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consider them as giving an unfair advantage to one community, often at the expense of  
merit, and leading to ineffi ciency in the bureaucracy and economy. Some people say that 
reservations do not remove disadvantage, but perpetuate discrimination instead. Some 
say that reservations in their very nature violate equal opportunity of  others. But the 
fact is that reservations are a remedy against discrimination that is based on historical 
denial of  equal opportunity. The aim of  providing reservations is to create true equality, 
not discrimination, to give opportunities to the disadvantaged to realize their potential. 
Reservations also help in the psychological and spiritual integration among diversifi ed 
groups, increase the sense of  belonging, and help prevent favouritism. Furthermore, 
the Indian experience shows that reservations can be an effective way to bring the 
disadvantaged into the mainstream, to give them self-confi dence, and to give them 
opportunities to have their views listened to. 
Elimination of Untouchability and Caste-based Discrimination
Dalits want all forms of  untouchability (whether in the state or non-state sectors) to 
be abolished and penalized. Untouchability is demeaning for both the victim and the 
perpetrator. Its perpetuation is against the notion of  rights (and its fundamental principle 
of  equality), democracy, the rule of  law, the principle of  equality, and human rights. 
Socio-economic Rights 
As the most socially and economically disadvantaged community, Dalits have a particular 
interest in social justice. They favour the adoption of  economic and social rights as 
justiciable and enforceable rights (economic, social, and cultural rights are the subjects 
of  chapter 10). The new constitution should acknowledge the context of  the Dalits' 
socio-economic reality. 
Janajatis
The principal demands of  Janajatis are the following:
Federalism and Autonomy
Janajatis want a federal state based on 'ethnicity, language, geographic region, economic 
indicators, and cultural distinctiveness' and the right of  self-determination. Sometimes 
they have asked for the second chamber of  the legislature to be declared the House of  
Nationalities (the issue of  federalism is discussed in chapter 16). 
Recognition
Janajatis want local languages to be given constitutional recognition along with Nepali. 
Everyone must be able to seek and receive information in their respective mother 
tongues on matters of  public importance. They have also asked for the right to form 
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indigenous peoples' parties (prohibited in the 1990 and Interim Constitutions). The 
state must ensure that the traditional knowledge, skills, practices, and technology of  
Janajatis are harnessed and preserved. They want the state to respect their cultures and 
their practices. 
Representation and Participation
Janajatis would want all genders, classes, regions, and communities to be represented 
according to their population in state institutions and in political party institutions, at all 
levels. They also want that there be a mechanism for consultation with the marginalized 
communities when decisions that concern their interests are being made.
International Norms
The state should ratify and implement treaties and declarations on indigenous peoples' 
rights, particularly the ILO Convention 169 (now ratifi ed by Nepal in 2007) and the 
General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples (2007).
Secular State
They want the state to be secular since Nepal is a multi-religious country; they say that 
a theocratic state is not only contrary to modern democratic ideas and values, but also 
that a theocratic state hinders communal and religious harmony.
Welfare of Kamaiyas 
The state must fi nd a permanent solution to the problems faced by freed Kamaiyas 
(bonded labourers).
Land
Kamaiyas are of  the opinion that much of  their land was improperly alienated to 
new upper-caste settlers, rendering Kamaiyas either landless or marginal land holders 
or displaced from their ancestral homelands. They want their rights to such land 
recognized. 
Madhesis
The following are the key demands of  the Madhesis:
Federalism and Autonomy
The major demand of  Madhesis is federalism with substantial powers ('autonomy'), 
preferably, with the whole of  Madhes (or the Tarai) as one of  the states in the federation, 
though some fl exibility has been shown recently on this point. They want a better 
distribution of  revenue, a signifi cant part of  which is generated in the Tarai, to the 
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Tarai and other underdeveloped areas. However, they have made it clear that they are 
committed to the sovereignty and integrity of  Nepal, and that the detailed decisions 
should be made by the Constituent Assembly.
Citizenship
The inhabitants of  the Tarai have found it diffi cult to acquire Nepali citizenship, although 
they have lived for centuries in that area (due to the stringent criteria based on descent, 
the absence of  birth certifi cates, and lack of  titles to land, which cannot be acquired 
without citizenship!). Consequently, they were deprived of  many rights. In November 
2006, the law was changed to make it easier for people to acquire citizenship—and 
many people took advantage of  it. But some did not receive the information on time, 
and a further round for granting citizenship seems necessary.
Proportionality
Madhesis, like other marginalized groups, are underrepresented in all state institutions, 
particularly the armed forces. They demand proportional representation in the 
legislature, the executive, the judiciary, and in the public services, at the national level. 
They also want most senior posts in administration in the Tarai to be 'localized,' that is, 
given to Madhesis.
Language
Madhesis resent the fact that all business of  the state has to be conducted in Nepali, 
which disadvantages them in terms of  access to state appointments and marginalizes 
their culture. They advocate a three-language policy comprising (a) native language, 
(b) Nepali language, and (c) English language, in government, business, education, 
and international correspondence. Some advocate recognition of  Hindi, which is an 
important language in Madesh.
Minority and Cultural Rights
Madhesis want national recognition for the customs, languages, and cultures adhered to 
by the Madhesi people, including those of  Muslims. They want full guarantee of  human 
rights through the elimination of  all kinds of  discrimination based on race, language, 
gender, religion, culture, national and social origin, and political and other ideology. 
They want affi rmative action for Tarai Dalits, claiming that the Tarai Dalits are the most 
deprived of  all Dalits. 
Accommodating Diversity
These demands made by marginalized groups are not merely demands for the recognition 
of  cultural or linguistic diversity. They constitute a claim for political inclusion, and in a 
fundamental way, these demands are about social justice. They imply a major restructuring 
of  the state and the re-allocation of  political power and economic resources, with a 
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greater recognition of  group rights. A distinguished Nepali scholar, Mahendra Lawoti, 
has shown that these demands were also made to the commission that drafted the 
1990 Constitution, only to be rejected.1 In his other writings, Lawoti has pointed to 
constitutional devices that might accommodate these claims. Various chapters in this 
book indicate how these claims might be met: through federalism, electoral systems, 
democratization of  political parties, economic and social rights, the executive system, 
gender rights, empowerment of  communities through civil and political rights, and 
fairer citizenship rules. 
To a considerable extent, the claims of  the marginalized communities have been 
acknowledged in the Interim Constitution, if  not always accommodated in a concrete 
form. There is now a move towards a form of  proportional electoral system and gender 
representation; the state has been declared secular; the principles of  affi rmative action 
and reservations have been accepted (and partially implemented in recent amendments 
to the public service legislation); there is greater fl exibility as regards language policy; 
eligibility for citizenship has been eased; some economic and social rights are now 
enforceable; there is a strong anti-discrimination and anti-untouchability ethos; and 
most importantly, there is the obligation to restructure the state through federalism 
(although the subject remains controversial). 
Whither Nepal?
Will these changes (particularly the adoption of  a federal structure), as some argue, lead 
to the break up of  Nepal? Will the changes disturb what some regard as the 'harmonious 
relations' between different communities? The dynamics of  ethnicity are hard to predict, 
but some comparative insights might provide some guidance. 
The roots of  discontent in Nepal lie in the economic, social, and political exclusion 
of  communities and their members. There is a close correlation between a person's 
being poor and being a member of  an ethnic minority group. Although a powerful 
case for a more inclusive state system is based on the threat to the culture of  minority 
communities, and therefore, to their identity, self-respect, and social orientation, many 
ethnic protests and insurgencies are less about the preservation of  culture, religion or 
tradition than about the marginalized communities' lack of  access to the state and the 
economy. In this way, ethnicity itself  becomes a social and political force, a means to 
mobilize and organize members of  the community, as its leaders advance claims for full 
participation in the affairs of  the state.  
Today, around the world, it has become exceedingly hard to resist such claims. Such 
claims now fi nd support in both moral and legal theories, on bases of  justice and 
1  'Democracy, Domination and Constitutional Engineering,' which appears in his edited book, Contentious Politics and 
Democratization in Nepal (2007), p. 55-63.
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self-determination. The international community urges political leaders to agree on 
measures of  self-government or power sharing, putting both the government and the 
insurgents under considerable pressure, as a way to resolve internal confl icts. Because 
internal confl icts are, for the most part, fuelled by a deep sense of  grievance felt by 
certain communities, and sustained by the easy access to supply of  arms in international 
and regional markets, it is diffi cult today to suppress ethnic sentiments, demands and 
mobilization—paradoxically, the more the attempts to suppress such movements, the 
stronger they become, with increasing capacity for disruption. 
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge to constitution making is that in situations 
like that of  Nepal, the making of  a new constitution is more than just the rebuilding 
of  the state. The building or rebuilding of  the state assumes a prior agreement made 
by all parties to come together, to form a political community. But when people 
disagree on the fundamental values of  the state or when people do not have a sense of  
belonging to a common political community, the task of  the constitution is two-fold. 
The fi rst is the building of  consensus, developing a framework for co-existence and co-
operation among communities, based on social justice and the negotiation of  national 
values and national identity. In short, constitution making is about nation building, an 
undertaking in which the process is as important as the substance of  the constitution. 
The second, state building ('restructuring of  the state'), follows from the way the fi rst 
task is resolved.
Consequently, in a number of  states, new norms, emphasising the virtues of  diversity, 
and a re-conceptualization of  the political community and of  the division and sharing 
of  sovereignty, have found their way into constitutions. Clear alternatives to the 
single nation-state, based on the political and legal recognition of  ethnic or 'national' 
communities, have emerged. These developments have drawn attention to different 
models or approaches through which ethnic claims and confl icts are resolved, some of  
which are now part of  the discourse in Nepal as it enters the phase of  negotiations on a 
new constitution. In some multi-ethnic states, the only way to reconstitute the state may 
be to recognize different ethnic communities as the basis of  political rights, forming 
complex systems of  power sharing—and giving up on the vision of  an overarching 
national identity. In Nepal, ethnic consciousness is not yet at a stage where it will not 
permit fair and reasonable solutions. There is, over most of  the country, as several 
opinion surveys have shown, a remarkable commitment to the notion of  a united Nepal. 
For most people, a Nepali identity is stronger than ethnic or regional affi liations. But it 
may not always remain so if  their legitimate concerns are not dealt with, in appropriate 
forums and through fair procedures.
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Introduction
Discrimination on the basis of  sex, ethnicity, caste, and religion has always existed 
in Nepal. This has resulted in the isolation and exclusion of  those who have been 
discriminated against. Nepali women face many problems as elsewhere, but some forms 
of  discrimination that Nepali women face are particular to Nepal (see the box). This 
chapter examines how a new Nepali constitution might help to protect the rights of  
women and ensure their full participation in the workings of  the nation.
As responsible citizens, women are surely not concerned only about the rights of  
women. They may also have a special interest in the rights of  children, the disabled 
or the disadvantaged. They may have their own perspectives on other issues too, as on 
peace (in Nepal and in the world), the environment or fairness in society. All these are 
relevant matters that need to be addressed by any constitution, but, since they are dealt 
with in other chapters of  this book, this chapter will focus solely on women's rights and 
issues.
 Discrimination against Women Particular to Nepal 
• Unlike most countries, the female life expectancy is lower than that of  men. 
The female literacy rate (average 35 per cent) is also lower than men's (63 per 
cent).
• Some laws still discriminate against women: for example, a foreign man who 
marries a Nepali woman cannot become a Nepali citizen even if  he gives up his 
other citizenship—this is unfair to both the partners involved in the marriage, 
but can often place a great burden on the wife, who cannot bring her husband 
Women and the Constitution
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to live here as a citizen; army regulations prohibit employment of  married 
women in the combatant force.
• Few women have been involved in public life: for example, only 5.8 per cent of  
the members of  the House of  Representatives elected in 1999 were women; 
not one woman was on the committee that drafted the 1990 Constitution. 
• Violence against women seems to be increasing, and women who speak out on 
the subject in public are very vulnerable; women have been particularly badly 
affected by the civil confl ict in Nepal.
• There is a serious problem of  traffi cking in women and girls. 
• Many cultural practices in Nepal discriminate against, demean and stigmatize 
women, especially widows; in some societies, women are confi ned in cowsheds 
during their menstruation periods or when they have just given birth to a child; 
child marriages still occur (more commonly for girls). Some communities 
deprive women of  food for 24 hours after they have given birth. 
The 1990 Constitution was intended to secure social, political, and economic justice 
and to establish a system of  justice with a view to making the concept of  the rule of  
law a reality. The constitution guaranteed rights against discrimination on the basis of  
religion, race, caste, tribe, ideological conviction, or sex. 
The restoration of  multiparty democracy in Nepal paved the way for civil society 
movements. In this new democratic environment, women were able to organize 
themselves and learn about their rights and became more active in claiming their rights. 
So why is inequality between men and women still an issue in the country? Does the 
unequal treatment of  women stem from merely social and cultural factors, or does 
the prevalence of  such treatment in Nepal mean that Nepalis have an inadequate 
understanding of  equality?
Problems in the 1990 Constitution and Their Remedies
Discriminatory Language 
The language used in the 1990 Constitution was sexist and excluded women: it used 
words like bhatritwa (brotherhood) for positive attributes like camaraderie, but did not 
use the Nepali equivalent for 'sisterhood.'
Hindu Nation
In light of  the attitude towards women prescribed by certain Hindu texts, Article 4 in the 
1990 Constitution, which described Nepal as a Hindu country, had serious implications: 
the article justifi ed the discrimination against women based on religion and culture 
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that had been practiced in the past, even by the Supreme Court. A constitution that 
promotes secularism would go a long way towards ensuring that discriminatory acts 
against women that are supported by certain religious traditions will not be tolerated.
Right to Property
Women's right to property, even today, is not completely secure in comparison to that of  
men. The right to property (Art. 17) was the only human right in the 1990 Constitution 
that did not affect existing laws, which meant that there was no change in property laws 
(and oddly, the Interim Constitution too has not proposed changes to property laws). 
Historically, women needed to remain unmarried and to attain the age of  35 years to be 
even entitled to a share of  parental property. The Eleventh Amendment to the Country 
Code did eliminate some of  the discriminatory property law provisions, but even after 
the laws had been eliminated, women once they got married had to return the remaining 
portion of  the parental property to their parental relatives. 
This provision regarding property rights was removed by the Act to Amend Some 
Nepal Acts for Maintaining Gender Equality, 2006, after Jana Andolan II. However, 
discrimination against married women, especially against married daughters, persists 
even today. The gains of  the 2006 Act and women's property rights could be more 
clearly secured in the new constitution.
Violence Against and Exploitation of Women
Violence against women (both in public as well as private spheres) was not clearly 
defi ned and prohibited in the 1990 Constitution. Traffi cking in human beings, slavery, 
serfdom, or forced labour (not only involving women) was prohibited by the 1990 
Constitution (Art. 20(1)) and had to be punishable by law. The Interim Constitution 
treats physical, mental, or other form of  violence against women in a similar way (Art. 
20(3)). Both constitutions also prohibit employment of  children in factories or mines or 
in any other hazardous work. But though the Supreme Court views voluntary sex work 
like any other profession, under the right to profession, in practice, the law still treats 
sex workers as criminals. For the fi rst time in Nepali constitutional history, the Interim 
Constitution has recognized social security as a right for women and others in need of  
security (though a law to address the issue still needs to be legislated); such provisions 
can be critical for helping women who are victims of  violence. 
Privacy
The right to privacy is one of  the fundamental rights that have been provided for since 
the 1990 Constitution (Art. 22), but this right can be limited by law. The Supreme Court 
made use of  this right, for example, in Annapurna Rana's case, when it overturned a 
district court order that had ruled that a girl's vagina and uterus could be examined 
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to establish whether she was married. However, until now, no law has been enacted 
to honour and protect the right to privacy, and to make it really effective (though a 
taskforce has been formed to submit drafts of  laws on the right to privacy). But this 
right can also have negative consequences: women who have been violated may invoke 
the right out of  fear of  the legal proceedings. 
Citizenship
Powerful interests and deeply entrenched cultural norms have for many years discouraged 
the strong political measures that are needed to revise discriminatory laws pertaining to 
the issue of  a person's nationality. The ideology of  patriarchy was refl ected in the 1990 
Constitution, which said that only a person whose father (but not mother) was a citizen 
of  Nepal when that person was born could become a citizen of  Nepal (Art. 9(1)). 
But on 26 November 2006, the recalled Parliament adopted the Nepal Citizenship Act 
2063, which repealed Article 9; thus any woman, whether married or not, can now pass 
on her citizenship to her child (this right is also important for a single parent and for the 
child too because until now a child found in Nepal whose father's nationality was not 
known was deemed a Nepali, but if  the father was known to be a foreigner, the child 
would not be a Nepali, even if  the mother of  the child was a Nepali). 
Still, even today, though women of  foreign nationality who marry Nepali citizens can 
acquire Nepali citizenship after starting a process to renounce their former citizenship, 
a foreign man who marries a Nepali cannot acquire Nepali citizenship by virtue of  the 
marriage. Thus a woman may be forced to choose between her marriage and her place 
of  residence; broken marriages, single parenthood, and custody battles are often the 
results of  these laws. And even though the Citizenship Act 2063 is in effect, children of  
such marriages may become Nepali only if  they settle in Nepal and have not acquired 
the citizenship of  the country their father was born in; and even then, they are only 
entitled to naturalized citizenship. These children may be at risk of  becoming stateless, 
and may, if  they are non-citizens, be denied the right to basic human rights, such as the 
rights to identity, freedom of  movement, residence, education, property, employment, 
and basic health care in their mother's country (because both the 1990 and Interim 
Constitutions give many rights to citizens only). 
A number of  countries have now adopted more fl exible rules about the nationality of  
women who marry foreigners, by allowing them to retain their own nationality; but 
in Nepal, people cannot retain dual nationalities. Citizenship in India is conferred not 
only on the basis of  the parents' nationality, but also on the basis of  a person's place 
of  birth. Many developing countries have now adopted a non-discriminatory approach 
to citizenship. In Europe, discrimination is prohibited between nationals on the basis 
of  whether they have nationality by birth or nationality through naturalization. The 
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drafters of  the new Nepali constitution could include similar provisions in the new 
constitution.
Participation in Public Life
Although the 1990 Constitution included some special measures to ensure women's 
participation in political processes, the participation of  women in Parliament, political 
parties, government, the judiciary, and all other constitutional bodies, the Planning 
Commission and other state institutions was not guaranteed. For the election of  the 
members to the House of  Representatives, each political party was required to allocate 
at least fi ve per cent of  their party tickets to women candidates (Art. 144); but this 
measure could not ensure that women were actually elected in this proportion. 
Despite declaring that women should have one-third of  the seats in the Constituent 
Assembly, the Interim Constitution seems to suffer from the same defect regarding 
proportional representation of  women. However, the Election of  the Members of  the 
Constituent Assembly Act did guarantee that nearly 50 per cent of  members elected 
under the proportional representation elections would be women.
How could women's participation in the future Parliament be guaranteed? Some countries 
have earmarked some of  the ordinary constituencies as women-only constituencies, 
though all voters vote. Some countries have introduced special, extra constituencies for 
women. Proportional representation electoral systems almost always encourage parties 
to have more women candidates. The new Nepali constitution could also require this. 
And even once there are a signifi cant number of  women legislators, it would still be 
necessary to think about improving the circumstances in which they work, to help them 
discharge their duties more effectively.
Participation in public life is a right, according to CEDAW and other human rights 
treaties. But such provisions do not benefi t just women; these provisions cut both ways: 
a country that excludes half  its population from meaningful participation in decision 
making is actually depriving itself  of  resources. Women have a contribution to make; 
sometimes it will be a different sort of  contribution from that of  men. Special measures 
for ensuring women's participation in public as well as in private spheres could be 
secured in the new constitution.
Directive Principles and Their Implementation
The 1990 Constitution provided that the state would have to pursue a policy of  making 
the female population participate in the task of  national development, by making special 
provisions for their education, health, and employment (Art 26(7)); and that the state 
would have to ensure good health, education, security, protection, and welfare of  all the 
helpless women (Art. 26(9)). However, efforts towards gender balance were piecemeal 
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and process-oriented, rather than goal-oriented. These 'directive principles' were not 
recognized as being legally enforceable. 
Though the Interim Constitution has included more rights for women, as we have seen, it 
still includes a long list of  mostly ineffective principles and policies, including ineffective 
policies relating to women from the 1990 Constitution. Although some courts in India 
and Nepal have used these principles to benefi t women when interpreting legal rights, 
none of  these principles can be used in a straightforward manner to found a claim to a 
legal right enforceable in the courts. 
The Way Forward
Ineffective Approaches to Legislating Laws Pertaining to Women Must Be 
Cast Aside
Besides changing discriminatory provisions in the old constitution, the basic philosophical 
and psychological approaches that are employed in designing laws about women need to 
be cast aside, and new models for legislating women's issues should be framed. Applying 
the framework of  the old 'protectionist model' in the extreme, which categorizes women 
as weak, subordinate, and in need of  protection, may actually do more harm than 
good. For example, in 2001, the Supreme Court accepted a ruling that said that women 
who did not have prior approval from a guardian or the government could not seek 
employment abroad. The court justifi ed its acceptance of  the ruling on the grounds that 
the court was preventing women from being traffi cked. On the other hand, legislating 
from an approach at other end of  the spectrum—for example, by using an extreme 
version of  the 'gender-blind approach'—will also not work. The gender-blind approach 
does not take into consideration the continuing impact of  past discrimination; and it 
tends to reinforce dominant standards based on male experience and interests. Another 
problem with the gender-blind approach is that other equally serious dimensions of  
discrimination that stem from a woman's marital status, a woman's being pregnant, or a 
woman's sexual orientation (lesbian women receive savage treatment from society and 
even from their families) are left unaddressed.
Nowadays, it is widely recognized that a better approach than the two mentioned 
earlier needs to be used to ensure true equality for women; for example, quite a number 
of  constitutions, as exemplifi ed by the South African Constitution, which includes 
'reproductive health care' as part of  the right to health, now recognize women's 
reproductive role. The Interim Constitution of  Nepal does so too.
It would help too if  Nepali lawmakers took cues for legislation from declarations 
on human rights treaties. Nepal is party to 20 Human Rights instruments, including 
the Convention on the Elimination of  All Forms of  Discrimination Against Women 
(CEDAW), 1979, which differentiates between non-discrimination and true equality. 
109
Article 1 of  the convention defi nes discrimination comprehensively as 'any distinction, 
exclusion, or restriction made on the basis of  sex which has the effect or purpose of  
impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective 
of  their marital status, on a basis of  equality of  men and women, of  human rights and 
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other fi eld.' 
This article recognizes even indirect discrimination, where the effect is discrimination 
against women, even if  there was no intention to discriminate. A substantive defi nition 
of  equality (as used in CEDAW) takes into account and focuses on diversity, difference, 
disadvantage, and discrimination. Such a defi nition could be referred to, to eliminate, 
through corrective and positive measures, the existing discrimination faced by 
disadvantaged groups at the individual, institutional, and systemic levels. And while it is 
true that few national constitutions explicitly mention problems faced by people who 
face multiple forms of  discrimination, (e.g., a poor, Dalit woman, or a Dalit woman 
who has a disability), there is no reason why the new constitution could not fl ag this as 
an issue. 
The Role of the Constitution and Courts in Strengthening the 
Rule of Law 
The constitution outlines the fundamental laws of  the land, but if  these laws are violated, 
it is the courts that are brought in to arbitrate. Thus the courts have a great responsibility 
in ensuring that the laws of  the land are upheld. If  fundamental rights are violated, the 
Supreme Court has the power to issue orders to enforce such rights or to settle disputes. 
For example, public interest litigation (PIL), under which some of  the technical rules 
are relaxed (see Art. 88 of  the 1990 Constitution), has become a very effective tool 
protecting the rights of  socially excluded groups. The judiciary's sensitivity towards 
gender justice and human rights is also crucial to make PIL an effective tool of  social 
reform. To its credit, the Supreme Court has ordered the government to make laws for 
the protection of  women's rights, such as the law to eliminate gender discrimination, 
the law to criminalize marital rape, and the law against sexual harassment. The Supreme 
Court has also declared parts of  the Country Code invalid because they discriminated 
against women, and were therefore, against the spirit of  the constitution. The Supreme 
Court has also recognized human rights law as binding national law (e.g., in the Lily 
Thapa case). 
The constitution can thus be used to improve the laws about women. And in line with 
these judicial decisions and the strong concluding comments given by the international 
committee responsible for monitoring the observance of  CEDAW, (and after years of  
social and political struggle by women's groups), the Country Code was amended in 2002, 
and the Gender Equality Act was passed in 2006. However, the record of  compliance 
with court orders in Nepal is mixed; sometimes, even the government has ignored the 
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orders (although the constitution says that the orders are binding). While it is true that 
constitutions often leave potentially thorny issues aside (sometimes intentionally so) for 
future legislatures and courts to decide, a major effort should be made to ensure that 
the new constitution of  Nepal clearly and concisely represents the intentions of  Nepali 
citizens, particularly those intentions relating to the provision of  human rights.
Special Measures
Compensatory discrimination, often known as positive discrimination, is aimed at 
correcting historical or social discrimination. CEDAW and some constitutions make it 
clear that this is not really a form of  'permitted discrimination,' but is, instead, important 
for achieving real equality. The 1990 Constitution did permit special measures for women 
(and other vulnerable groups): 'special provisions may be made by law for the protection 
and advancement of  the interests of  women' (Art. 11(3)). But the government did not 
make any laws based on these provisions, and the efforts of  some public institutions, 
such as Tribhuvan University, to reserve seats for women and other people from the 
disadvantaged communities were declared invalid by the Supreme Court, for want of  
such a law. Even after court directions to enact such a law, nothing was done to put the 
constitutional provision into effect.
Special measures can mean reservations—the allotting of  or the facilitating of  access 
to valued positions or resources; the most important allotments are reservation of  
seats in legislatures, reservation of  posts in government services, and reservation of  
places in academic institutions (especially in technical and professional colleges). Special 
measures should also include the granting of  scholarships, grants, loans, land allotments, 
health care, and legal aid to a benefi ciary group. And fi nally, there should be special 
protective measures in place to protect the vulnerable classes from being exploited and 
victimized.
Reservation is a popular tool for correcting historical and social deprivation. It creates 
equitable opportunities for deprived communities to mitigate the effects of  deprivation 
and to bring about equality. It ensures representation of  communities that otherwise 
would remain unrepresented or underrepresented. It creates a sense of  inclusion by 
developing a sense of  belongingness. It cultivates talents by providing opportunities 
and incentives to the unprivileged and deprived communities. Yes, it does have negative 
impacts too: those who cannot avail of  the benefi ts of  reservation may be frustrated 
by what they consider 'unfair favouritism' (on-going controversies in India, sometimes 
violent, are a good example of  the hue and cry reservations can invite); it can minimize 
competition, and poorly implemented preference policies artifi cially protect benefi ciaries 
and blunt the development of  their skills and resources; preferences may aggravate the 
dependency of  benefi ting groups and undermine their sense of  dignity, pride, and self-
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suffi ciency. However, this does not mean that 'protective discrimination' should never 
be adopted. The only caveat is that it must be just, fair, and reasonable, not benefi ting, 
for example, already wealthy women just because they are women. 
Protecting the Laws That Protect Women
Even though there have been some recent improvements in the laws that affect women, 
an ordinary law can be changed and discriminatory practices can be reintroduced; if  
women want full equality and participation, provisions for protecting the laws will have 
to be written into the new constitution. And while the Interim Constitution also refl ects 
the improvements made in securing the rights of  women and children, these gains 
need to be strengthened in the new constitution to be prepared by the Constituent 
Assembly.
In this regard, the provisions for women's rights that were made in the Ugandan 
Constitution of  1995 could be used as a reference (see the box).
Directive Principle No. VI: 
The State shall ensure gender balance and fair representation of  marginalized 
groups on all constitutional and other bodies.
Article 33: 
(1) Women shall be accorded full and equal dignity of  the person with men.
(2) The state shall provide the facilities and opportunities necessary to enhance 
the welfare of  women to enable them to realize their full potential and 
advancement.
(3) The state shall protect women and their rights, taking into account their 
unique status and natural maternal functions in society.
(4) Women shall have the right to equal treatment with men and that right shall 
include equal opportunities in political, economic and social activities.
(5) Without prejudice to article 32 of  this constitution, women shall have the right 
to affi rmative action for the purpose of  redressing the imbalances created by 
history, tradition or custom.
(6) Laws, cultures, customs or traditions which are against the dignity, welfare 
or interest of  women or which undermine their status are prohibited by this 
constitution.
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But the gender balance provision in the Ugandan Constitution is still rather vague 
and not legally binding. Various draft constitutions in Kenya (none yet adopted) have 
included more precise provisions, calling for women's taking up one-third of  the 
available positions in government, or even guaranteeing such participation. And the 
Rwandan Constitution provides:
9.   The state commits itself  to conform to the following fundamental principles 
and to promote and enforce the respect thereof: 
i) Building a state governed by the rule of  law, a pluralistic democratic 
government, equality of  all Rwandans and between women and men 
refl ected by ensuring that women are granted at least thirty per cent of  
posts in decision making organs; 
ii) Political organizations participate in the education of  citizens on politics 
based on democracy and elections and operate in such a manner as to 
ensure that women and men have equal access to elective offi ces. 
Universally recognized principles must be taken into consideration while drafting the 
new constitution. The new constitution could include statements such as the following, 
or statements to the same effect: 'everyone has the right to nationality;' 'statelessness 
should be avoided wherever possible;' and 'there should be no discrimination based on 
sex.' 
Since the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to international law in the past, the 
new constitution could clearly state the position of  Nepali law vis-à-vis international 
treaties (especially human rights treaties). It is vital that Nepal's law reform takes account 
of  comparative jurisprudence practices emerging at the international level. It is also 
important to recognize that social values and customs are not static and that there is no 
harm in changing them with the changing times. 
Strong, independent, and neutral institutions are also essential to ensure effective 
enforcement of  people's rights. For example, although some people have suggested 
that it is wise not to have too many of  such commissions, South Africa has a Gender 
Commission. Carrying out the principle of  proportional representation in public bodies 
would mean that such a commission and the Human Rights Commission, as well as the 
Dalit Commission, would also need to have a proportional representation of  women.
Questions 
Here are some questions that are worth considering by the public and members of  the 
Constituent Assembly:
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1. Apart from the general statement that women and men are equal, what special 
problems faced by women in Nepal do you think are so important that somehow 
a good constitution ought to make some mention of  them?
2. Should the foreign husband of  a Nepali woman have the same right to become 
a citizen as a foreign woman who marries a Nepali man?
3. Should the constitution say that a child has a right to a nationality?
4. Women make up just over half  the adult population; if  the constitution insists 
on 'proportional representation' of  women, should the fi gure earmarked for 
women's representation mean 33 per cent or 51 per cent?
5. Should Nepal have special seats for women in the House of  Representatives 
under the future constitution?
6. If  so, should they be voted for by women only or by both men and women?
7. Should there be special provisions in other areas of  life to ensure that women 
achieve equality, even if  some people could think that these provisions positively 
favour women?
8. If  so, should the constitution make such provisions a duty to be fulfi lled through 
law when necessary?
9. How long should such special provisions last? Ten years, twenty years, or should 
there be different time limits depending on the type of  problem?
10. Should political parties be required by the constitution to involve women, and if  
so, should the constitution say how?
11. Should discrimination against women be a crime for which offenders can be 
punished or should it be something for which compensation must be paid, or 
both?
12. How can the constitution ensure that punishment is carried out for a punishable 
act? Or must there be a separate law to enforce punishment?
13. Should there be a separate Gender Commission to represent the rights and 
interests of  women?
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CHAPTER 9
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Introduction
The earliest forms of  human rights were concerned with the liberty of  the people, to 
prevent oppression of  the people by the state. Later, as it became clear that people 
needed to protect their liberty, freedoms that enabled people to express and organize 
themselves (such as the freedoms of  speech and writing and of  association) were 
emphasized. Later still, as ideas of  democracy developed, the rights of  participation in 
public affairs came to the fore, the most important of  which was the right to vote and to 
stand for elections to the state legislature and the right to participate in other institutions 
(such as the executive and public services). Rights of  liberty, freedom, and participation 
have constantly redefi ned the relationship between the state and citizens (including the 
structure of  the state). In more recent times, the right to ultimate freedom, the right to 
self-determination, has been enunciated, and is regarded as the most fundamental and 
democratic of  human rights. Unlike other rights, which are vested in the individual, 
self-determination is a collective right, and it affects the relations of  communities with 
the state and between communities themselves. Thus today, human rights refl ect the 
changing concepts of  the role and structure of  political and state organizations—and 
the expanding notion of  the autonomy of  the individual and communities.
To some limited extent, this pattern in the elaboration of  civil and political rights is seen 
in the various constitutions of  Nepal. For the most part, the freedom of  expression and 
the press is well appreciated and recognized in Nepal. So is the right of  assembly and 
association (apart from the restrictions on the right to form political parties). The right 
to vote is also acknowledged as a fundamental right (although it was denied to many 
because of  restrictions on the entitlement to citizenship, for the most part redressed 
now). The freedom of  religion is provided (although as shown in a previous chapter, 
the provisions fall somewhat short of  internationally accepted norms). The freedom of  
Liberty, Freedom, and Participation 
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movement has been included in most Nepali constitutions (although not necessarily as 
an unqualifi ed right) and so have due process rights. This chapter will, therefore, not 
address civil and political rights, which are well-recognized in Nepal. Instead, the focus 
is on issues that have coloured political debates in Nepal since the Jana Andolan: the 
right of  self-determination, rights of  minorities, and the rights of  indigenous peoples. 
(Women's rights are dealt with in chapter 8.) These group rights are of  particular 
signifi cance in the constitution-making process. 
Self-determination
Historically, the issue of  self-determination has arisen during the collapse of  empires, 
when the rulers had to determine the future of  parts of  their territories inhabited by 
people belonging to a different cultural background. Wars toward the end of  the 19th 
century and the First World War entailed the dismemberment of  empires within Europe, 
and vanquished empire-states were forced in peace agreements to give independence 
to parts of  their empire on the basis of  cultural (in practice linguistic) homogeneity. 
This kind of  self-determination was often referred to as national self-determination, 
popularized by the US President Woodrow Wilson. At that time, this was seen to be 
more of  a political than a legal principle, and, even back then, limits on its universal 
application were apparent. 
When empires in Asia and Africa were dismembered, a different principle was employed. 
The colony became independent, but was circumscribed by its colonial borders, 
regardless of  how culturally diverse its inhabitants were or whether some communities 
had more in common with the neighbouring state. India was an exception to this rule—
and indeed the human tragedy that followed the nation's partition strengthened the 
resolve of  the international community to maintain erstwhile colonial borders. The 
UN Charter required the progressive independence of  colonies (but did not refer to 
self-determination as the foundation for this independence). The consequence was that 
most colonies became independent as multi-ethnic states, some under the dominance 
of  a majority, and this led to protest movements by minorities, many demanding 
independence in the name of  self-determination. 
Self-determination in UN Instruments
Once most colonies achieved independence, the international community relied less and 
less on self-determination as the basis for independence. The term 'self-determination' 
began to be used in the sense that the UN Charter had assigned it. Friendly relations 
among nations were to be 'based on respect for the principle of  equal rights and 
self-determination of  peoples' (Art. 1(2)). The term was used in a similar way when 
describing the nature of  co-operation among states (Art. 55).  The word 'peoples' was 
used to mean a 'state,' not cultural communities (the articles were intended to require 
states to adopt democratic and participatory political systems, and if  a state complied, 
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the UN could not interfere in the country's internal affairs). It was this meaning that was 
intended by the two principal human rights covenants (on Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights), which in 1966 prescribed self-determination as 
the overriding principle of  human rights. However, the language used to describe the 
concept of  self-determination was not without ambiguity. The full text of  Article I in 
both covenants is as follows:
1. All peoples have the right of  self-determination. By virtue of  that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, 
and cultural development. 
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of  their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of  international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of  mutual benefi t, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of  its own means of  
subsistence.
3. The State Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for 
the administration of  Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote 
the realization of  self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity 
with the provisions of  the Charter of  the United Nations.           
There is nothing (at least in parts 1 and 2) in this article that gives a part of  a state the 
right to independence or secession. This is obvious from the fact that the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights has a provision (Art. 27) dealing with the rights of  minorities, 
which falls well short of  a right to secede, being confi ned to the exercise of  cultural 
rights within the community. 
Outside the case of  colonies, self-determination is used to refer to the internal organization 
of  the state, the underlying principle being that of  democracy. The people of  each state 
are free to decide how they would wish to be governed, without external interference. 
This aspect is now often referred to as an internal aspect of  self-determination. The 
UN Human Rights Committee, which supervises the implementation of  the Covenant, 
has stated that the right of  self-determination is not restricted to the colonial situation, 
but it has not defi ned what a 'people' is nor suggested that it encompasses the right 
to secede. The Canadian Supreme Court has pronounced more clearly on the matter 
in an advisory opinion on whether Quebec has a right to secede from Canada under 
international law. The Court's general conclusion was that international law does not 
specifi cally grant components of  sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally 
from their 'parent state.' Although international law does not specifi cally prohibit 
secession, the Court's view is that international law places great importance on the 
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territorial integrity of  the state (and unless the constitution of  a state expressly allows 
secession, as some do, international law does not support secession). 
A careful study of  conventions and resolutions of  the UN or of  regional organizations 
where the right has been mentioned shows that the right is to be exercised within the 
confi nes of  the territory of  the state. This is most clearly expressed in the UN resolution 
on its 50th anniversary, which states that a people's right to self-determination does not 
authorize or encourage 'any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, 
the territorial integrity or political unity of  sovereign and independent states conducting 
themselves in compliance with the principle of  equal rights and self-determination 
of  peoples as described above and thus possessed of  a government representing the 
whole people belonging to the territory without distinction.' However, this statement 
also makes clear that a state is entitled to the integrity of  its territory only if  it respects 
the people's right to determine political, economic, social, and cultural issues. In other 
words, the principle of  self-determination requires that a state have a democratic and 
inclusive character.
The Canadian court's conclusion on this point was that self-determination is normally 
to be achieved within the framework of  the state. It said: 'There is no necessary 
incompatibility between the maintenance of  the territorial integrity of  existing states…
and the right of  a ''people'' to achieve a full measure of  self-determination. A state 
whose government represents the whole of  the people or peoples resident within its 
territory, on a basis of  equality and without discrimination, and respects the principles 
of  self-determination in its own internal arrangements, is entitled to the  protection 
under international law of  its territorial integrity.' 
The UN Human Rights Committee has emphasized that 'self-determination' is a 
fundamental right on which depend other rights; its realization is an essential condition 
for the effective guarantee and observance of  individual human rights and for the 
promotion and strengthening of  those rights' (in General Comment 12 (1984)).  The 
Committee has encouraged states to explain in their reports to it what measures 
they have taken to implement this right. In particular, it urged them to 'describe the 
constitutional and political processes which in practice allow the exercise of  this right.' 
It also stated that the obligation to ensure self-determination belonged to all states, not 
merely to those states directly involved in a self-determination issue.  
Article 25 of ICCPR—Participation Rights
The Committee has linked self-determination to other rights under the Covenant, 
most importantly, Articles 25 and 27, of  which the fi rst is a general right available to 
all citizens, while the second aims at the protection of  minorities. The Committee's 
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interpretations of  Articles 1, 25, and 27 have given great prominence and shape to the 
right of  participation.
Article 25 is the right to participate in public affairs. It reads:
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of  the distinctions 
mentioned in Article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) to take part in the conduct of  public affairs, directly or through freely chosen 
representatives; 
(b) to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing 
the free expression of  the will of  the electors; 
(c) to have access, on general terms of  equality, to public service in his country. 
The Human Rights Committee has explained the signifi cance of  Article 25 rights in 
General Comment 25 (1996). It says that Article 25 'lies at the core of  democratic 
government based on the consent of  the people and in conformity with the principles 
of  the Covenant.' No distinctions are permitted between citizens in the enjoyment of  
these rights on the grounds of  race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The conduct of  public 
affairs is a broad concept that relates to the exercise of  state power, in particular the 
exercise of  legislative, executive, and administrative powers. It covers all aspects of  public 
administration, and the formulation and implementation of  policy at the international, 
national, regional, and local levels. The allocation of  powers and the means by which 
individual citizens exercise the right to participate in the conduct of  public affairs should 
be established by the constitution and other laws. Participation in public affairs includes 
lobbying, and for this and other reasons, the freedom of  expression and of  the media 
must be secured. Equal access to public service must be ensured, if  necessary, through 
affi rmative action. 
The comment sets out at length the institutional and procedural aspects of  free and 
fair elections. Representation from constituencies should refl ect proportionality of  the 
population, which prohibits unequal sizes of  constituencies (Istvan Matyus v. Slovakia, 
Communication No. 923/2000). It sketches a broad framework, dependent on the exercise 
of  many rights and freedoms, for the right to participate in public affairs. 
The Human Rights Committee has emphasized rights of  full participation of  all 
communities in the constitution-making process. The general comment says that 
'Citizens also participate directly in the conduct of  public affairs when they choose or 
change their constitution.' In a complaint from an indigenous community in Canada 
(the Mi'kmaq), in which the community said that they had been excluded in a series 
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of  constitutional conferences, the Human Rights Committee held that constitution 
making is indeed 'a conduct of  public affairs.' But the Committee also held that the 
method chosen by the government for the representation of  indigenous peoples of  
'approximately 600 aboriginal groups' by 'four national associations,' and later by 'a panel' 
of  up to 10 aboriginal leaders, was suffi cient to satisfy the requirement of  'participation.'1 
The Committee affi rmed its basic position about the right to participation in a case 
from New Caledonia when a number of  residents complained that they were left out 
of  the roll of  voters in a referendum to determine the constitutional future of  that 
French overseas possession, although they qualifi ed for voting for elections to the 
legislature. The Committee held that the residents had been excluded because they were 
not suffi ciently closely connected to New Caledonia (most residents were of  French 
origin, some were recent arrivals) to justify their participation in decisions about the 
future status of  New Caledonia (Gillot v France [CCPR/C/75/D/932/2000]). Thus as in 
the Mi'kmaq case, the Committee deferred to the arrangements decided by the national 
regulations, but perhaps not unreasonably.  
Article 27 of ICCPR—Minority Rights
The Human Rights Committee has also read a great deal of  self-determination issues 
into Article 27 (although it has argued that the two rights are different, one belonging to 
a group and the other to individuals). The text of  Article 27 is as follows: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons 
belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the 
others members of  their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise 
their own religion, to use their own language.
This is the only direct provision dealing with minorities. Although the state's obligations 
were intended to be limited, being restricted to non-intervention, in a series of  
decisions (particularly concerning indigenous peoples), the Committee has read it as 
imposing positive obligations for the benefi t of  minorities. The Committee outlined 
its understanding of  self-determination in General Comment 23 (1994), as follows: It 
said that positive measures of  protection are required not only against the acts of  the 
state itself, but also against the acts of  other persons within the state. The enjoyment 
of  Article 27 rights does not prejudice the sovereignty and territorial integrity of  the 
state. However, one or other aspects of  these rights may consist in a way of  life that is 
closely associated with territory and the use of  its resources (and which in some cases 
 1 In Marshall v Canada (CCPR/C/43/D/205/1986), the Human Rights Committee said: 'It is for the legal and 
constitutional system of  the state party to provide for the modalities of  such participation,' and  'Article 25(a) of  the 
covenant cannot be understood as meaning that any directly affected group, large or small, has the unconditional right 
to choose the modalities of  participation in public affairs. That, in fact, would be an extrapolation of  the right to direct 
participation by the citizens, far beyond the scope of  Article 25(a).'
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may justify forms of  self-government or autonomy). As these individual rights can only 
be exercised in the context of  the community, the identity of  the minority must be 
protected. Affi rmative action may be justifi ed in favour of  the minority. Steps must be 
taken to protect its culture, which manifests itself  in many forms, including a particular 
way of  life associated with the use of  land resources. Minority members must be 
encouraged to participate in decisions that affect them. The protection of  these rights is 
directed to ensure the survival and continued development of  the cultural, religious, and 
social identity of  minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of  society as a whole. 
In its readings of  both the rights to self-determination and protection of  minorities, 
the UN has taken the view that in some special cases, when a minority group is denied 
full rights of  participation, it may be entitled to a measure of  autonomy. When the 
international community has become involved in internal disputes in a country, it 
has often promoted or advised autonomy for minorities (Sudan, Sri Lanka, Kosovo, 
Bougainville/Papua New Guinea, Cyprus, Aceh/Indonesia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina). 
Some national constitutions have provided for autonomy (China, Ethiopia). The 
Canadian Supreme Court has said that even if  there is no express constitutional 
provision, if  a minority wants to secede from the federal government, the government 
must enter into negotiations with it to resolve the problem, even if  negotiating could 
lead to secession.   
The UN General Assembly Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples (discussed 
below) has proclaimed the indigenous peoples' right to self  determination, but the 
declaration has also made it clear that the right does not entitle any group to secede 
from the state. The following articles are relevant:  
 Article 3
 Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of  that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.
 Article 4
 Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to 
autonomy or self-government in matters relating to their internal and local affairs, 
as well as ways and means for fi nancing their autonomous functions.
 Article 46
 1. Nothing in this declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, 
group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to 
the Charter of  the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any 
action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity 
or political unity of  sovereign and independent States.
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The declaration gives several examples of  self-determination within this restricted sense. 
Indigenous peoples may maintain their cultural distinctiveness and their system of  laws, 
provide education in their own languages, are entitled to have their own representative 
institutions, have to be given the right to participate or be consulted on decisions that 
affect them, and must be involved in the administration of  services like education and 
health to their communities. They have the right to manage their lands, and with that 
right can come self-government over many internal affairs (as the declaration recognizes 
the spiritual and identity-related aspects of  land among indigenous peoples).
Aspects of  self-determination also appear in the UNGA Declaration on the Rights 
of  Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities (1992), 
although in weaker forms. States are required to protect and promote the existence 
and identity of  minorities. The minority groups have the right to participate effectively 
in decisions at the national, and where appropriate, regional, level concerning the 
minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live. They are guaranteed 
equal rights with other citizens and protected against discrimination on the grounds of  
their identity. States should consider appropriate measures so that persons belonging 
to minority groups may participate fully in the economic progress and development in 
their country.
Minority Rights
Apart from developments described above, there are two important international 
instruments for the protection of  minorities. The fi rst of  these is the Convention on 
Genocide. Genocide is defi ned as 'any of  the following acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: 
(a) Killing members of  the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of  the group; 
(c) Deliberately infl icting on the group conditions of  life calculated to bring about 
its physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of  the group to another group.' 
Genocide is a crime punishable under international law; and states have to give effect to 
the Convention in domestic law, so that it would also be a crime under national law. The 
International Court of  Criminal Justice has authority to punish acts of  genocide. Any 
state can call upon the UN to take measures to prevent or suppress acts of  genocide. 
Thus the condemnation of, and the obligations to take steps against, genocide are truly 
international. 
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The Genocide Convention, which is directed at the most extreme forms of  group 
protection, was supplemented in 1965 by the Convention for the Elimination of  All 
Forms of  Racial Discrimination (CERD). Its preamble says that 'any doctrine of  
superiority based on racial differentiation is scientifi cally false, morally condemnable, 
socially unjust and dangerous.' The existence of  racial barriers is 'repugnant to the ideals 
of  any human society.' 'Racial discrimination' is defi ned broadly to mean 'any distinction, 
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin which has the purpose or effect of  nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of  human rights and fundamental freedoms 
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other fi eld of  public life.' The CERD 
would, therefore, be relevant to the protection of  Janajatis, Dalits and Madhesis. 
The CERD obliges state parties to end all forms of  racial discrimination, whether 
committed by its own agencies or 'by any person, group or organization.' However, 
special measures taken for the sole purpose of  securing adequate advancement of  
certain racial or ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be 
necessary in order to ensure such groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of  
human rights and fundamental freedoms shall not be deemed racial discrimination. But 
these measures should not lead to the maintenance of  separate rights for different racial 
groups, and they shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken 
have been achieved. Ending of  racial discrimination requires the ban on dissemination 
of  ideas of  racial superiority or incitement to racial hatred. 
The CERD emphasizes the importance of  political rights—the right to participate 
in elections, to vote, and to stand for election—on the basis of  universal and equal 
suffrage; it also emphasizes the right to take part in the government as well as in the 
conduct of  public affairs at any level and to have equal access to public service.
Despite these developments, rights of  minorities are not considered to be adequately 
protected. The UN has for long tried to reach international agreement on a new and 
more comprehensive treaty for rights of  minorities. In Europe, a number of  legal 
instruments have been adopted for the protection of  minorities, particularly language 
rights. But elsewhere, the progress has been slow (although in individual countries, there 
is now greater recognition of  minority rights). The fi rst tentative step was taken by the 
General Assembly in 1992 when it adopted the Declaration on the Rights of  Persons 
belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities. 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights
Greater progress has been made in respect of  indigenous peoples. A variety of  different 
communities are covered by the term 'indigenous people,' but four features characterize 
them: they are the original inhabitants of  a country and have enjoyed a historical 
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continuity; they have distinct cultural forms (including laws and customs that govern 
the community); they are non-dominant in the state; and the communities are based 
on self-identifi cation. They have a special, almost spiritual, relationship to land, which 
is also critical for the preservation of  their culture. In almost all these respects, they 
are different from other communities in the state, and they wish to preserve these 
differences. 
The fi rst step in the protection of  indigenous and tribal peoples was the ILO 107 
Convention (1959). However, the indigenous people did not participate in the 
Convention, and the Convention did not refl ect their priorities—the Convention was 
paternalistic, oriented towards individualism, and aimed at the assimilation of  indigenous 
people into the wider community, through market principles. 
Consequently, a new convention (169) was adopted in 1989. While ruling out secession, 
the new convention does recognize the aspirations of  indigenous peoples to 'exercise 
control over their own institutions, ways of  life and economic development and to 
maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions, within the framework of  
the States in which they live.' The spiritual elements of  land are recognized, traditional 
values and practices are to be preserved, and the minorities have the right to participate 
in, or be consulted on, decisions that affect them. Nepal ratifi ed the Convention last 
year, but so far has done little to implement it. 
Some indigenous communities found even this Convention inadequate. Consequently, 
a highly participatory process (in which any community or state could participate) to 
prepare a new legal instrument was established under the UN Human Rights Commission. 
After many years of  negotiations, the Declaration on the Rights of  Indigenous Peoples 
was approved by the UN General Assembly in 2007 (Nepal voted for it). Apart from 
the issue of  self-determination (which has been discussed above), the declaration places 
particular emphasis on the minorities' rights to traditional land and other resources, 
control over which must be vested in them. They must also be paid compensation for 
the lands that were taken away from them in the past. They must be given the right to 
determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of  their 
lands or territories and other resources. States must consult and cooperate in good faith 
with the indigenous peoples through their own representative institutions in order to 
obtain their free and informed consent before approving any project affecting their 
lands or territories and other resources, particularly mineral, water, or other resources. 
Somewhat controversially, indigenous peoples are given the right to determine the 
responsibilities of  individuals in their communities.
Conclusion
This chapter has focused on those rights (many of  which have a collective dimension) 
that are of  special signifi cance to the constitution-making process. The traditional civil 
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and political rights of  individuals are, for the most part, understood in Nepal and are 
non-controversial. Of  the rights discussed here, self-determination has aroused keen 
emotions in Nepal. 
As a principle of  international law, self-determination does not guarantee secession, 
except in the case of  a colony or occupied territory, or (more questionably) when the 
rights of  a minority have been grossly violated. There is no accepted defi nition of  
what constitutes a 'people' for the purposes of  this right. But international law and 
practice have supported constitutional rules that recognize the rights and identity of  
minorities and, most importantly, have supported autonomy as a manifestation of  the 
self-determination rights of  minorities. Thus self-determination has become a more 
signifi cant aspect of  constitutional law than of  international law. The Human Rights 
Committee sees self-determination as a framework for constitution making, requiring 
the representation and participation of  all sections of  society, and prescribing the basic 
entitlements of  communities. The corpus of  human rights establishes the benchmarks 
for many substantive provisions of  the constitution. 
But this specifi c, law-oriented meaning of  self-determination has not deprived self-
determination of  its powerful political appeal (rooted in shared culture or history of  
either glory or repression) as a basis for independence. It is in this sense that insurgent 
groups dissatisfi ed with their treatment by a state dominated by another community 
have employed this principle. However, whether they achieve independence by using 
this principle or not depends more on international politics than legal rules, especially 
as a state is free to recognize or not the independence proclaimed by a secessionist 
community (as has happened recently in the case of  Kosovo)—although attempts have 
occasionally been made to prescribe conditions under which a secessionist state would 
be recognized.
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CHAPTER 10
CHAPTER 10
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The Reality of Nepal
Social justice is a demand of  ordinary people and has a special signifi cance for 
disadvantaged groups.  In Nepal, there are many communities for whom the fundamental 
issues of  constitutional reform pertain to issues of  basic livelihood, health, and quality 
of  life, rather than to systems of  government and electoral systems, although these 
ought also to have an impact on questions of  social justice. The following fi gures from 
the UNDP Human Development Index show how dismal the situation is in Nepal: 
adult literacy rate: 48.6%; life expectancy: 61.3; under 5 mortality rate: 74 per 1000 live 
births (UK 6, USA 71); children underweight for their age: 48%; births attended by 
skilled personnel: 11%; Nepal's overall place in the human development index: 142.2 
Many people may question whether these issues have any place in a constitution, but as 
we will see later, some constitutions have included such rights.
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights as Human Rights 
Respect for human rights requires that each and every individual's dignity be respected 
simply because they are human. Some people question whether economic, social, and 
cultural rights are really 'rights,' but in fact, international law has recognized these rights 
for a long time. The fi rst global human rights institution, the International Labour 
Organization (ILO), of  which Nepal is a member, has protected workers' rights since 
Human Rights and Social Justice
1 These fi gures for Nepal have enormously improved in recent years. The UK and USA fi gures are shown to indicate 
what a country might ultimately strive for, not as a derogatory comparison. 
2 Taken from the UNDP Human Development Report 2007/2008.
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1919; its constitution recognizes that 'universal and lasting peace can be established only 
if  it is based upon social justice.' 
As a member of  the United Nations, Nepal must respect the UN's principles. The 
Universal Declaration of  Human Rights recognizes the individual's rights and duties, 
and 'the inherent dignity and … the equal and inalienable rights of  all members of  the 
human family.'3 The declaration covers economic, social, and cultural rights, and civil 
and political rights, in an integrated manner. The economic and social rights include
• the right to work, to just and fair conditions of  employment, and to protection 
against unemployment; 
• the right to a standard of  living adequate for health and well-being, including 
food, clothing, housing, medical care and social services;
• security in the event of  loss of  livelihood, whether because of  unemployment, 
sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or any other reason; 
• special care and assistance for mothers and children;
• the right to education, which shall be free and compulsory in its 'elementary and 
fundamental' stages. 
The notion of  'cultural right' is more complex. The Universal Declaration contains 
these elements: the right to take part in cultural life; the right to enjoy the benefi ts of  
scientifi c progress and its application; the right to benefi t from the protection of  the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientifi c, literary, or artistic production 
of  which the benefi ciary is the author; and the freedom indispensable for scientifi c 
research and creative activity. There is a close connection with other rights, such as the 
right to education, which could be used as a tool for creative participation in society. 
Culture is the accumulated material heritage of  humankind, and the state's respect for 
the people's culture is essential for people to achieve full human dignity. But 'culture' 
has a wider meaning too: it refers to the way of  life of  communities, which is often 
particularly important for preserving the identity of  minority groups.4 Culture in this 
sense is given protection in international treaties such as the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Rights of  the Child—
both of  which Nepal is a party to, and thus obliged to respect.  
3 Preamble of  UDHR
4 See for example Article 27 of  the International Covenant on Civil and Political Right (ICCPR) and Article 30 of  
the Convention on the Rights of  the Child (CRC). The rights of  the minorities have been further expanded: see the 
'Declaration on the Rights of  Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities' adopted 
by General Assembly resolution 47/135 of  18 December 1992. In addition, cultural rights are also referred to in 
numerous international instruments—see the Declaration of  the Principles of  International Cultural Co-operation, 
proclaimed by the General Conference of  UNESCO on 4 November 1966.
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The economic and social rights, and culture in the narrower sense, are protected in 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—again 
Nepal is a party. 
Are Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights Different from Civil 
and Political Rights? The Narrow View
The intense ideological cleavages of  the 1960s between 'West' and 'East' (or between 
capitalism and communism) led to the adoption of  two separate covenants. The ICESCR 
did not have any international body to monitor how states implemented it until 1985, 
whereas the ICCPR had one (the Human Rights Committee) at the very outset.  The 
Committee on ICESCR, even now, has no power to handle individual complaints of  
the violation of  rights, while the new Human Rights Council (dealing with civil and 
political rights) does. These differences refl ect and strengthen the idea that economic, 
social, and cultural rights are somehow less binding and less enforceable than civil and 
political rights. Some people describe civil and political rights as 'fi rst generation' rights, 
economic, social and cultural rights as 'second generation' rights, and rights such as right 
to self-determination and right to development as 'third generation' rights, with each 
later 'generation' being less enforceable and less 'real' as rights. For these people, while 
civil and political rights are rights, economic, social, and cultural rights are 'aspirations'; 
civil and political rights have enforcement mechanisms and remedies, but economic, 
social, and cultural rights do not; ICCPR's civil and political rights 'only' require states to 
desist from violating rights; economic, social, and cultural rights would require states to 
take positive steps and spend resources. Economic, social, and cultural rights are often 
described as 'non-justiciable'—meaning that they are not suitable for decision by courts. 
Refl ecting this type of  approach, and the Indian Constitution's, the 1990 Constitution 
of  Nepal placed these 'rights' in the directive principles part: they were guidelines for 
the government, but they could not be used in court.
These sorts of  arguments will be made against the introduction of  enforceable 
economic, social, and cultural rights in the new constitution for Nepal—though, as we 
shall see, some progress has been made in the Interim Constitution.
The notion that economic, social, and cultural rights can be considered 'rights' is 
sometimes mocked. The following are some of  the objections that are voiced: how can 
the state, especially a poor one, provide food and housing for all?  And with the triumph 
of  capitalism in the world, generally, economic, social, and cultural rights are subject to 
other objections: ensuring these rights requires considerable state intervention, when 
capitalism calls for the 'rolling back' of  the state; these rights remove incentives from 
citizens to be self-reliant; they promote ineffi ciency, and unlike civil and political rights, 
are not 'market friendly.' 
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Many people do not accept the ideological basis of  these criticisms—essentially the 
same as those that were raised way back in the 1960s. But, as we shall see, there are 
responses that do not assume a particular ideological perspective. 
A Broader View
Many criticisms of  economic, social, and cultural rights as 'rights' fl ow from an 
inadequate understanding of  the way those rights are framed, have been developed, 
and have been used. In truth, failure to recognize and enforce economic, social, and 
cultural rights undermines the overall protection of  human rights of  all sorts. And it 
is not possible to draw a clear line between different types of  rights. Economic, social, 
and cultural rights derive from the inherent dignity of  human beings. Freedom from 
fear and want can only be achieved if  the conditions are created for everyone to enjoy 
economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights. The right to self-
determination and the right to equality cannot be fulfi lled without enabling people to 
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development. 
These rights are framed in cautious terms in international treaties: Social security is to 
provide for lack of  livelihood in circumstances beyond a person's control; the state is not 
required to achieve full protection of  rights immediately, but progressively, though to the 
full extent of  its available resources. 
The idea that civil and political rights are 'cheaper' and require less of  the state is also 
misleading. Fulfi lling the highly political right to vote is expensive, as is respecting the 
right to a fair trial. On the other hand, many of  the social and cultural rights can be 
guaranteed without much in the way of  material resources. 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which studies reports from 
states on their performance under the Covenant, and also develops general guidelines), 
meetings of  jurists, and UN special rapporteurs on these rights have explained and 
elaborated them. The committee provides guidelines for adequate implementation 
of  economic, social, and cultural rights at the domestic level, focusing particularly on 
the enactment of  strong and effective laws and the establishment of  implementation 
mechanisms. 'Progressive realization' must be read in the light of  the overall objective, 
which is to establish clear obligations for state parties to move as expeditiously as 
possible towards the realization of  these rights (a lack of  resources must not be used as 
an excuse for doing nothing.) The principle requires effective use of  resources available. States 
are obligated, regardless of  their level of  economic development, to ensure respect for 
minimum subsistence rights for all. The term 'available resources' refers to both the resources 
within a state and those available from the international community. Furthermore, the 
Committee has made clear that it considers many of  the provisions in the Covenant to 
be capable of  immediate implementation, for example, the principle of  equality (the 
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state must not discriminate unfairly between its citizens in matters of  economic, social, 
and cultural rights).
The obligations of  the state are often summarized as involving: (i) the duty to respect 
the rights, (ii) the duty to protect them, and (iii) the duty to fulfi l them. The duty to 
'respect' the rights means the state must refrain from interfering with the rights; for 
example, the state must not evict people arbitrarily in violation of  the right to housing. 
The duty to 'protect' the rights means the state must prevent others from violating the 
rights; for example, it must prevent arbitrary evictions by others. The duty to 'fulfi l' the 
rights means that the state must ensure that it or others can provide what is necessary 
for the right to be achieved. Many of  these duties would not involve the expenditure of  
major resources—certainly no more than would civil and political rights. 
Rights-based Approach 
Going to court is not the only way to protect rights. Nor does the fact that some 
economic, social, and cultural rights are perhaps not suitable for enforcement through 
the courts affect their validity as rights, though it does affect the way they are applied. 
Full realization of  rights requires political action and the incorporation into state policies 
of  a 'rights-based approach'—it requires that rights be a fundamental guiding principle 
of  government policies. 
The rights-based approach provides a justifi cation for, indeed may require, affi rmative 
action for socio-economically marginalized sections of  the society. 
Justiciability 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has rejected the argument that 
no such rights are suitable for enforcement through the courts. And in recent years, the 
courts of  a number of  countries have shown that indeed they can enforce such rights 
in some circumstances. In South Africa, their relatively new constitution actually creates 
rights in a way that makes them justiciable. In India, the courts themselves have been 
able to turn some of  the directive principles (designed not to be justiciable) into rights 
that have legal backing. The courts in Nepal and other countries have, to some extent, 
followed the Indian courts. 
In a case about residents in a squatter area, the South African Constitutional Court 
decided that the right to access to adequate housing (which is in the constitution), 
meant that the government had a duty—in which it had failed—to take steps to provide 
housing to the most severely affected residents of  a squatter area. In response to this 
case, it is said that most municipalities now have a 'Grootboom allocation' (named after 
the case) in their budgets for those in most dire need. In another case, the court held 
that planning laws would have to be interpreted in a way that made them consistent 
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with the right to housing. The court has also held that the right to health means that 
government must provide anti-retroviral treatment to HIV-positive pregnant women to 
prevent transmission of  the virus to their children. 
The Supreme Court of  India said that after having failed for 44 years to make the directive 
principle on education effective, the government had a duty to provide basic education 
(up to age 14) free for all. It made equal pay for equal work (a directive principle) a legal 
right on the basis of  the general right to equality. It has ordered government to provide 
food for the most vulnerable groups in times of  serious shortage, and has also held that 
the right to life includes right to livelihood, right to housing, right to health, and right 
to the environment. 
There are more examples from other parts of  the world too. For example, the Latvian 
Constitutional Court relied on the ICESCR to hold that the state was in breach of  a 
duty when it failed to ensure that social insurance premiums were paid by employers, 
and the court held that affected employees could claim compensation from the state. 
And the African Court/Commission of  Human Rights held that the Government of  
Zaire was in breach of  the African Charter by failing to provide safe drinking water and 
other basic services, and by closing universities and schools.
All these cases give an indication of  the possibilities for enforcement of  economic, social, 
and cultural rights through the courts. It is true that those courts cannot substitute their 
own judgment for political decisions to be made by the state, and they cannot make the 
same detailed policy decision as a government can (they do not have the information 
or the skills or even the mandate of  the people), but they are not powerless. Accepting 
responsibility for enforcing such rights is easier if  the law or the constitution—as in 
South Africa—makes it clear that they are indeed legal rights.
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in the Nepali 
Constitutional Framework 
The various constitutions that Nepal had between 1948 and 1962 had a variety of  
provisions. Some guaranteed equality; some promised free primary education or 
affi rmative action for underprivileged groups. But none protected a wide range 
of  rights, and none gave effective remedies. The 1990 Constitution in its preamble 
promised social justice, but this promise was not transformed into economic, social, 
and cultural entitlements for a large number of  indigent and marginalized people of  
this country. Apart from the right to equality in enjoyment of  rights, which is common 
to all fundamental rights, there was no fundamental guarantee for economic and 
social rights. Although Article 18 recognized some cultural and educational rights, and 
although the constitution recognized Nepal as a 'multiethnic and multilingual' country, 
this recognition of  Nepal's diversity was contradicted by the phrase 'Hindu Kingdom' 
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and by the constitution's giving recognition only to the 'Nepali' language, spoken by 
the majority of  people belonging to 'Aryan' community (i.e. Brahmin, Chhetri), as an 
offi cial language. 
Part IV of  the 1990 Constitution incorporated the economic, social, and cultural issues 
within the directive principles, rather than creating enforceable rights; no remedy was 
available to implement these provisions as the constitution clearly states 'the principles 
and policies shall not be enforceable in any court.' The 1990 Constitution echoed the 
ICESCR when it said the principles must 'be implemented in stages through laws within 
the limits of  the resources and the means available in the country.' But the courts in 
Nepal did not go as far as the Indian courts did in deciding whether the state had 
fulfi lled its responsibilities. In a case about starvation in 1998 that was  fi led on the basis 
of  right to equality, including special provisions under the constitution, the Supreme 
Court said, 'the government had already arranged suffi cient food in the districts and 
also has expressed its commitment to fulfi l its obligation' and rejected the case—thus 
refusing to investigate what the government said it was doing or would do. 
The Interim Constitution of  2007, however, seems more progressive, as it starts with 
the fundamental guarantee of  'right to dignifi ed life.' Some economic, social, and 
cultural rights are guaranteed within the 'fundamental rights': right to the environment, 
basic health services, education, (including free education up to the secondary level), 
language and culture, employment and social security, food and property. It respects the 
mother tongues of  all communities spoken in Nepal, including the right to use them 
in offi cial business at the local level. It provides room for 'affi rmative action' with the 
provision of  right to social justice for economically, socially, and educationally backward 
or marginalized women, Dalits, indigenous and ethnic groups, Madhesis, poor farmers, 
and workers; free legal aid to the poor; rights of  women, including reproductive health; 
right against physical and mental violence against women; equal rights of  son and 
daughter to ancestral property; it also includes the rights of  children, including rights to 
subsistence, basic health, and social security; protection against exploitation as well as 
special measures for children who are parentless, mentally retarded, as well as victims 
of  confl ict; and rights for displaced, vulnerable, and street children. There is prohibition 
of  child labour, where this may be dangerous, and of  recruiting children into the army 
or police. 
Similarly, the Interim Constitution incorporates state responsibilities and directive 
principles and policies addressing political, economic, and social transformation 
through social reconstruction. The provisions regarding relief  measures to victims of  
confl ict, including rehabilitation and elimination of  discriminatory laws, are all positive 
developments. 
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Is More Needed? 
Many economic, social, and cultural rights are still not fully guaranteed in the Interim 
Constitution, as they require 'laws' that are yet to be adopted (for example, the rights 
to health services, education, and social security)—which is not so of  civil and political 
rights. In the absence of  such laws, implementation remains uncertain. If  rights are 
taken seriously, the constitution as the fundamental law of  the country should, as far as 
possible, provide, without requiring any other laws, a remedy to the 'needy.' 
Some economic, social, and cultural rights remain in the directive principles (such as the 
'policy of  establishing the rights of  all citizens to … housing,' or the special provision 
for women for 'their education, health and employment'), and these are still described as 
being non-enforceable in the courts. Though this part of  the constitution talks of  'state 
responsibility' this provision about non-enforceability weakens rights protection.
Questions
1. In Nepal, which of  the rights that could be identifi ed as economic, social, or 
cultural are most important?
2. Which such rights are most under threat?
3. Would it be suffi cient to insist simply that everyone must have equal access to 
rights?
4. Should the new constitution of  Nepal, as that of  1990, include certain social, 
economic, and cultural matters as directive principles that do not give rise to 
rights directly enforceable in court?
5. Do you believe that the role of  enforcing economic and social rights is suitable 
for the courts?
6. Are there things that the constitution could do to ensure that the courts are 
better equipped for such a task?
7. The more rights are included in the constitution, the longer it becomes. How 
would you balance these factors? Would you give high priority to having a short 
constitution or to one that includes a wide range of  rights?
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In a democracy, elections allow the people to freely choose their representatives. 
Elections may serve a number of  principal functions:
• They provide for the representation of  the people in the legislature.
• They allow the people to choose a government with a mandate to rule.
• They provide people with opportunities to make policy choices.
• They help make government accountable to the people.
• They promote and facilitate a competitive party system.
The constitution and the law must determine who the voters are, who can stand for 
elections, how the votes are counted, and who administers the elections. The detailed 
procedures for the administration of  elections are outlined in election statutes, rules, 
and regulations. One very important aspect of  elections is the electoral system.
What Do We Understand by an Electoral System? 
The electoral system is the mechanism by which the votes cast in a general election are 
converted into seats won by parties and candidates. The choosing of  an electoral system 
by a democracy is one of  its most important institutional decisions, for different systems 
can translate the same strength of  votes into different overall results. In the 2004 South 
African elections, for example, held under the proportional representation list system, 
the African National Congress won 69.75 per cent of  the seats with 69.69 per cent of  the 
popular votes: this was a highly proportional result. In Mongolia in 2000, the Mongolian 
People's Revolutionary Party won 72 seats in the 76-member Parliament with around 
52 per cent of  the popular votes (the electoral system in Mongolia was based on the 
plurality/majority system, like that in Nepal). In the 1999 elections in Nepal, the Nepali 
Elections and the Electoral System
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Congress won 113 seats (54.15 per cent) with only 36.14 per cent of  the popular votes. 
In both Mongolia and Nepal, the results were highly disproportional.
The electoral system should meet the specifi c demands and needs of  the people and 
the nation. Following the success of  Jana Andolan II, Nepal has elected a Constituent 
Assembly in order to frame a new constitution best suited to the aspirations of  its 
people. Therefore, the electoral system chosen was important for the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly and will be so for the future constitution, as well.
The electoral system affects the behaviour of  voters and the parties. It also determines 
the type of  relationship between the electors and their elected representatives. The 
choice of  electoral system is, therefore, related to the type of  politics and party system we 
expect. We can evaluate an electoral system by asking questions such as the following:
• Does it convert votes into seats in a way that refl ects the popular choice? 
• Does it respect the principle of  one person, one vote, and one value?
• Does it ensure the proportional representation of  minorities?
• How far does it provide for or is likely to lead to the proportional representation 
of  women?
• Does it lead to a clear and close relationship between the elected offi cials and 
their constituency?
• Particularly in the parliamentary system, does it lead to a stable and fi rm 
government, as, for example, by producing two major parties, with one among 
them gaining a clear majority? Or does it lead to a fragmented Parliament with 
a proliferation of  small political parties, thereby requiring the formation of  a 
coalition government?
• Does it lead to ethnic harmony or to ethnic confl ict? 
These were some of  the major complaints against the previous electoral system in 
Nepal:
• It favoured the representation of  high-caste hill Hindus: Brahmins and 
Chhetris.
• Dalits remained unrepresented. Even major political parties did not put 
forward Dalit candidates.
• Women were very under-represented.
• Janajatis and Madhesis could not get their due and fair representation.
• Minority parties did not receive due representation in proportion to their 
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popular vote and were compelled to remain outside the political mainstream.
• In multi-cornered contests among the political parties, candidates who had 
garnered as little as 20 per cent of  the total number of  votes were elected.
• Elections had become very expensive.
•  Electoral malpractices undermined the legitimacy of  election results.
Types of Electoral Systems
Electoral systems may be broadly classifi ed as plurality/majority systems, proportional 
systems, and mixed systems. Each of  them has a number of  variations to suit the 
practical needs of  the country concerned. 
Some countries may desire a strong government, even if  this result is achieved by a 
less than fair representation, while others may value an accurate refl ection of  popular 
opinion in the legislature, even if  that leads to a proliferation of  political parties or 
to ethnically based parties and to a weak or unstable executive. Some countries value 
electoral systems where the make up of  the legislature refl ects the ethnic make-up of  its 
society, while others aim for systems that ensure a measure of  ethnic integration. 
Plurality/Majoritarian Systems
In a plurality system, the person or group that garners the highest number of  votes is 
elected, even if  they do not receive the votes of  more than half  the electors. The most 
common plurality system (often called the 'fi rst past the post' (FPTP) system) is based 
on single-member constituencies. This system is practised in the United Kingdom, the 
United States of  America, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan, among others. Nepal has 
also practised this system until now. In a majoritarian system, a party must acquire over 
half  the votes (50 per cent plus 1) to get elected. This majority may be achieved by 
a second round of  elections between the two top candidates (as sometimes happens 
in the presidential elections in France, a number of  Francophone African states, and 
Uganda). 
These are some of  the implications of  the plurality or majoritarian systems:
• There are usually a small number of  political parties in the legislature.
• The government may be elected on a minority national vote (as in the 1999 
election in Nepal).
• In a plurality system, it is possible that an elected member may not enjoy the 
support of  the majority of  voters in the constituency.
• Minorities tend to be under-represented; minorities do not have their own parties, 
but join mainstream parties.
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• Many votes are wasted, in the sense that they have no impact on the outcome of  
the election. This is true of  all the votes cast in a constituency against the person 
who won, as well as of  all the votes cast that were in excess of  what was needed 
to win the election in that constituency.
• Since each member has a small constituency, a close relationship between the 
member and the constituents is possible.
• The government tends to be more stable.
• The government tends to be made up of  a single party.
Why do plurality and majoritarian systems usually produce very disproportionate results? 
One reason for the disproportion may be attributed to unevenly sized constituencies: 
a group concentrated in a constituency with many voters will be able to elect fewer of  
the representatives it wants than another group of  the same size which constitutes a 
majority in sparsely populated constituencies. Another reason is the way that support 
for particular parties or policies is geographically distributed. Suppose, for example, a 
particular party had about 500,000 voting supporters; if  the supporters were spread 
over fi ve constituencies where they constituted overwhelming majorities, they could 
elect only fi ve members. If  they were found in 10 constituencies in each of  which they 
were the largest single group, they could elect 10 members. If  they were spread over 
many constituencies and never constituted the largest group, they might never be able 
to elect a single member. Both these situations apply in Nepal: Dalits and some ethnic 
groups are very scattered, while others are more compact; and hill constituencies have 
far fewer voters than constituencies in Kathmandu or in the plains. 
Proportional Representation Systems
In a proportional representation (PR) system, each of  the contesting parties wins seats 
in proportion to the number of  votes it has obtained. If  a party wins 40 per cent of  the 
votes, it will get 40 per cent of  the seats, and the geographical distribution of  voters has 
no impact on the number of  seats won. There are many types of  PR systems. About 
70 countries in the world practise some form of  a PR system. The most common PR 
systems are the list system (LS) and the single transferable vote system (STV). In the list 
system, each contesting party makes a list of  its candidates. If  it receives 40 per cent of  
votes, it will be entitled to 40 per cent of  the seats, and enough candidates will be taken 
from its list to fi ll those seats. In the single transferable vote system, each constituency 
has a number of  members of  the legislature, and voters number the candidates they 
prefer, beginning with their fi rst choice, up to a maximum of  as many seats as the 
constituency has representatives. In countries where there are many illiterate voters, this 
system is diffi cult to practise. These are some implications of  PR systems:
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• They are more representative than the plurality/majority system.
• They are good for minorities since even a small minority (say no more than 10 
per cent of  the population) will secure 10 percent of  the seats if  all its members 
vote for its party; this is, however, true only if  the minorities have their 'own 
parties' or if  they tend to vote for specifi c parties, rather than splitting their votes 
among various parties. 
• They are also good for women and other 'non-traditional' candidates because 
they offer an incentive to parties to widen their range of  candidates to appeal to 
all the electorate (see the following box).
 
 Inclusion and Proportional Representation: The South African Experience
The population of  South Africa is approximately 73 per cent black, 15 per 
cent white, 9 per cent coloured (mixed race) and 3 per cent Indian. Under the 
apartheid system there were separate legislative houses for whites, coloureds 
and Indians, and none for blacks. Because of  its history with apartheid, 
the new South Africa rejected any system that categorized people by race. 
It adopted proportional representation as its electoral system: the whole 
country was one constituency, on a party list basis. 
In 1994, the fi rst post-apartheid legislature was elected under this system. It 
comprised 52 per cent blacks, 32 per cent whites, 8 per cent Indians and 7 
per cent coloureds. In 1999 there were 58 per cent blacks, 26 per cent whites, 
10 per cent coloureds and 5 per cent Indians in the legislature. In 2004, the 
fi gures were: 65 per cent blacks, 22 per cent whites, and fi gures for Indians 
and coloureds were about the same as in 1999. In 2004, there were 33 per 
cent women members. The black members were drawn from virtually all the 
main language groups. 
None of  this was achieved by using any sort of  quota system. 
• They encourage proliferation of  parties, since even small parties are likely to get 
some seats.
• They may encourage ethnically based parties, if  these are allowed, and thus may 
tend to perpetuate ethnic/religious distinctions.
• Elected members do not have strong links to their constituencies since several 
members represent one constituency: in some exceptional cases, the entire 
country is treated as one constituency (e.g., Israel and South Africa).
• Party leaders usually have greater control over the choice of  candidates in list 
systems than in single-member constituencies since they decide who is on the list 
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and in what order their names appear on the list, whereas in small constituencies 
the choice is often made by a local committee. 
• Due to the proliferation of  parties, governments tend to be coalitions of  parties 
and consequently may be weak and unstable.
Mixed Systems
Some systems try to combine the advantages of  both the plurality system (in terms 
of  clear results and stable government and stronger links of  members with their 
constituencies) and the proportional system (ensuring representation of  minorities; fair 
representation, in terms of  a better ratio of  votes to seats). 
In the mixed member proportional system (MMP), which was pioneered in Germany, 
some of  the seats are allocated to single-member constituencies and the rest are based 
on party lists. Voters cast their votes for a candidate in single-member constituencies as 
in the plurality system, but they also vote for a party. The number of  seats allocated on 
the basis of  the lists takes account of  the number of  seats each party received in the 
single-member constituencies. Even if  a party fails to win any seat in single-member 
constituencies, it is compensated for by the seats from the party list, in proportion to 
the votes it receives at the national or regional levels. In recent years, the system has 
been copied in several countries, including New Zealand, Italy, and Mexico. A somewhat 
similar mixed system was agreed upon for the election of  the Constituent Assembly in 
Nepal. But unlike in Germany, the system chosen is the parallel system, under which, 
although the second group of  members is allocated on the basis of  proportional 
representation, no account is taken of  the number of  seats each party would obtain 
in the geographical constituencies; it is, therefore, likely to be less proportional than 
the mixed member proportional system. The parallel system is used in a number of  
countries.
Elections in Nepal
Elections were introduced in Nepal in the late 1940s, when the Rana regime promulgated 
the Nepal Government Act 1948, the fi rst constitution of  the country. This provided 
for elected village and town Panchayats. However, the Nepali people exercised universal 
adult franchise only after the end of  the Rana regime in 1951; the fi rst ever parliamentary 
elections were held in 1959. 
The Parliament under the 1990 Constitution consisted of  two houses—the House of  
Representatives (HOR), with 205 members, and the National Assembly (NA), with 
60 members. Members of  the HOR were elected directly by the people, based on 
the plurality system, from 205 single-member constituencies. Thirty-fi ve members, 
including three women, of  the NA were all elected by the members of  the HOR, based 
on the single transferable vote system. Fifteen members, three from each of  the fi ve 
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development regions, were elected by the elected members of  local bodies (e.g., VDCs, 
municipalities, and DDCs), on the basis of  the plurality model. The remaining members 
were nominated, not elected. Local elections for VDCs and municipalities were also 
based on the FPTP/plurality model with universal franchise. But the elections for 
DDCs were indirect, and the members of  VDCs and municipalities within the district 
had voting rights.
Nepali citizens aged eighteen or above are entitled to vote. The Election Commission 
(EC), which is an independent constitutional body, is responsible for the elections. It 
registers voters and publishes the lists of  names and election schedules, administers the 
elections, enforces the code of  conduct, counts the votes, and declares the results. Any 
complaints related to the elections are entertained by special courts.
Disproportionality and Exclusion
There were three parliamentary elections and two local elections between 1991 and 
1999. However, the system lacked fair representation of  the people, in terms of  the 
country's caste/ethnic and social composition. In particular, Dalits, women, and 
other minorities were at a great disadvantage. Other than one representative in the 
1991 elections, no Dalit has been elected to the House of  Representatives. Women's 
representation remained below 6 per cent. 
The election results for the House of  Representatives, as shown in table 1, illustrate the 
disparity of  representation in the national legislature. The hill high-caste groups had 
a clear domination over other groups, with members from these groups controlling 
almost 60 per cent of  the seats (Brahmins and Chhetris make up about 30 per cent of  
the population in Nepal). 
Table 1 Representation in the HOR by Caste/Ethnicity and Gender (Total Members: 205)
Caste/Ethnicity
Percentage of the 
Population
Number of seats held (%) 
1991 Election 1994 Election 1999 Election
Hill High-Caste
Hill Dalit
Hill Ethnic
Newar
Inner-Tarai Ethnic
Madhesi Caste
Madhesi Dalit
Madhesi Ethnic
Muslim
7023220 (30.9)
1615577 (7.1)
4988298 (22)
1245232 (5.5)
251117 (1.1)
3381852 (14.9) 
1031292 (4.5)
1800452 (8.)
971056 (4.3)
114 (55.6)
1 (0.5)
34 (16.6)
14 (6.8)
1 (0.5)
18 (8.8)
-
18 (8.8)
5 (2.4)
129 (62.9)
-
24 (11.7)
12 (5.8)
-
22 (10.7)
-
14 (6.8)
4 (1.95)
122 (59.5)
-
28 (13.7)
14 (6.8)
-
29 (14.2)
-
10 (4.9)
2 (1.)
Women
Men
11377556 (50.04)
11359378 (49.96)
7 (3.4)
198 (96.6)
7 (3.4)
198 (96.6)
12 (5.8)
193 (94.2)
Source: CBS 2002 and Election Commission, 1991, 1994, and 1999.
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Similarly, political parties' representation in the HOR also did not accurately refl ect the 
voters' choices; for example, in 1991 and 1999, the Nepali Congress won the majority 
of  the seats, with less than 38 per cent of  the popular votes. In 1994, the CPN (UML) 
emerged as the largest party in the house, with even fewer votes. In the 1999 elections, 
the CPN (ML) could not win a single seat even though it got more than 6 per cent of  
the popular votes, while another party with a little more than one percent of  the votes 
was able to get fi ve seats. These fi gures are shown in table 2.
Table 2  Parties' Popular Vote and Seats in the HOR
Political party
1991 1994 1999
Popular vote 
in  %
Seats  won ( %) Popular vote in  % Seats won ( %) Popular vote in  % Seats won 
( %)
NC 37.75 110 (53.65) 33.38 83 (40.49) 36.14 111 (54.15)
CPN (UML) 27.98 69 (33.65) 30.85 88 (42.93) 30.74 68 (34.63)
RPP - - 17.93 20 (9.76) 10.14 11 (5.37)
RPP (C) 6.56 3 (1.46) - - 3.33 0
RPP (T) 5.38 1 (0.48) - - - -
SJMN 4.83 9 (4.39) 1.32 0 0.84 1 (0.49)
NSP 4,10 6 (2.92) 3.49 3 (1.46) 3.13 5 (2.44)
NWPP 1.25 2 (0.97) 0.98 4 (1.95) 0.55 1 (0.49)
RJM - - - - 1.37 5 (2.44)
CPN (D) 2.43 2 (0.97) - - - -
CPN (ML) - - - - 6.38 0
RJMP 0.47 0 1.05 0 1.07 0
Source: Election Commission (compiled from Election Results 1991, 1994, 1999).
Demands for Proportional Representation
Nepal's experiments over the years with the plurality model of  elections have exposed 
the model's inherent inability to provide for fair representation of  the Nepali nation, 
especially in the context of  the country's multicultural and multiethnic composition. 
For a long time, proportional representation in Nepal was confi ned to academic debate. 
In recent years, however, support for proportional representation has been gaining 
strength in political circles, particularly among the smaller political parties and the 
ethnic communities. Even the mainstream political parties have now shown support for 
proportional representation. 
The plurality election method is simple and it is believed that it provides stability to the 
government. In Nepal, however, it could not provide even this stability. In the 1991 
and 1999 parliamentary elections, the Nepali Congress secured a comfortable majority 
in the House, but on both occasions, it failed to complete its tenure. After the 1999 
election, the prime ministership changed three times in less than a year. Thus Nepal 
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has not seen the supposed benefi ts of  the system, and furthermore, it has proved to be 
highly exclusive.
Electoral System for the Constituent Assembly
The seven-party alliance (SPA) and the Maoists decided that the election to the 
Constituent Assembly was to be based on the mixed (parallel) system, involving two 
elections. Each voter had two votes—one for a constituency member and one for a 
party. After the government conducted negotiations with Madhesi and Janajati groups, 
the Interim Constitution was amended to make the system more proportional. This 
involved some changes in geographical constituencies, with an emphasis on having 
seats in the Tarai refl ecting the proportion of  the population that lives there. Secondly, 
the Election Law for the Constituent Assembly had detailed requirements for the lists 
of  candidates and for the allocation of  PR seats to candidates that were intended to 
ensure that Janajati groups, Dalits, Madhesis, people from backward regions, and women 
were represented in proportion to their presence in the population. 
Devising an Electoral System for the Future—with a Focus on 
Inclusivity
It is not necessary that the election system used for the election of  the Constituent 
Assembly be used for the elections of  future legislatures. Nor is it essential for the same 
system to be adopted at all levels—at the national level and at the lower-level units, if  
Nepal becomes a federation, and at the level of  local government. The adoption of  
some form of  proportional representation system seems likely. On the national level, 
it would be possible to either retain the plurality system now in place or to adopt a 
wholly proportional representation system; a mixed system, similar to that used for 
the Constituent Assembly could also be adopted. Any of  these systems might include 
adaptations designed to ensure greater inclusivity.
A Modified Plurality System
A plurality system could be retained if  some of  the defects of  the system were to 
be removed. If  constituency sizes were much more comparable, the make-up of  the 
legislature would be more refl ective of  the voters' preferences. Although such a system 
can never be truly proportional, greater inclusiveness could be achieved by having, 
for example, certain seats reserved for certain groups. Seats for women have been 
created in some countries (Bangladesh and Rwanda are examples), and a similar model 
could be adopted in Nepal, whereby certain seats could be reserved for members of  
ethnic communities. Some states have also modifi ed the plurality system to ensure the 
representation of  minorities by reserving seats for them that are either voted on by the 
members of  the minority (as in Hungary, Romania, and colonial Kenya) or by everyone 
(as in India, for scheduled caste and tribes). In Fiji, ethnic seats were originally designed 
to protect the indigenous people when they were a minority, and have been retained, 
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although indigenous Fijians are no longer a minority; and all major groups have ethnic 
seats, amounting to 46 out of  the 71 members. Similarly, in Nepal, it would be possible 
to reserve seats for Dalits, for example. Any such device, however, would be complex, 
perhaps leading to the overlapping of  constituencies, with people having more than one 
vote—or choosing whether to register as voters in a general or an ethnic constituency. 
Otherwise, it would be necessary to rely on provisions in the law and the constitution 
designed to require or encourage parties to have a wider range of  candidates 
Proportional Representation
Before a country decides to adopt any PR system, it should be made clear to the 
people why the country is opting for the PR system: whether the problem of  
representation is related more to the representation of  smaller political parties or to 
ensure the representation of  the social, ethnic, and cultural groups in proportion to 
their population size. If  the system does not address socio-cultural proportionality, but 
only the representation of  smaller parties, then it may have little relevance for Nepal. 
However, as seen from the example of  South Africa, proportional representation 
(especially the list system) tends to be more inclusive. But the effectiveness of  the system 
varies according to the situation; in Sri Lanka, for example, women remain reluctant to 
enter politics, partly because of  electoral violence, and thus the system has not had the 
usual effect on the gender balance  
In Nepal, ethnic parties' electoral appeal has been weak, and ethnic groups have needed 
to rely on major parties for representation. Indeed, parties that are restricted to members 
of  certain communities are unconstitutional (see the next chapter). The focus of  the 
debate here is how the proportional representation of  the diverse socio-cultural groups 
can be ensured through elections, while maintaining the party proportionality. The 
range of  possibilities discussed here exclude various systems used elsewhere, including 
multi-member constituencies in which voters express ranked preferences by writing in 
numbers—excluded because of  the high proportion of  illiterate voters in Nepal. For 
a similar reason, it is assumed that all list systems would involve closed lists—meaning 
that voters would be able to know the names on the party lists and the order in which 
the names appear on those lists, but they would not be able to alter the lists.
List PR System
As mentioned earlier, a list system does encourage parties to include a wider range of  
candidates. To what extent the adoption of  such system has this effect depends on 
many factors within the society. Parties can be encouraged to include a wider range 
of  candidates by providing parties with incentives (for example, the use of  public 
funding) for doing so (see again the chapter on political parties), rather than, or as well 
as, adopting a new electoral system. A decision would have to be made as to whether 
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the whole country should be one national constituency or should be divided into several 
multi-member constituencies, for each of  which each party would produce a list of  
candidates. Most of  the countries using the list PR system follow the regional/provincial 
list systems. 
It is technically possible to allocate a fi xed quota for each of  the ethnic or other groups, 
in proportion to their population. When this is done in a system with one national 
constituency, it tends to undermine the national political parties and encourages the 
fragmentation of  politics along ethnic and sectarian lines. Allocating such quotas, 
however, is less of  a problem in a list system based on large multi-member constituencies, 
because there would be fewer groups to provide for than in a state with one national 
constituency. There are, however, risks in fi xing a quota for disadvantaged groups: it 
might be impossible to draw up a system that would satisfy everyone; it might require 
voters to identify themselves along ethnic lines, thus underlining ethnic differences; and 
the working out of  the details could be very complex. The Constituent Assembly will 
have the experience of  the elections to that body itself, which involved the use of  very 
complex quotas, to study, before deciding on a system for the new constitution. 
Usually, to win a seat in a given constituency, contesting parties must obtain a certain 
percentage of  valid votes (known as the threshold). There are wide variations of  
thresholds, ranging from the most liberal in the Netherlands (0.67 per cent) to the most 
conservative in Seychelles (10 per cent).  A low threshold allows more parties to get a 
seat in proportion to their popular vote, but it tends to produce more small parties in 
Parliament (and if  their lists are headed by men, such small parties may tilt the gender 
balance further in favour of  men).
In list systems with one national constituency, independent candidates generally have 
no chance to contest for elections and only political parties can do so; in multi-member 
constituencies, a provision for independent candidates can be made. However, it must 
be said here that independent candidates fared very poorly in the most recent election in 
Nepal (though two candidates have been elected to the Constituent Assembly).
Different Electoral Systems: Pros and Cons
System Advantages Disadvantages Ethnic 
Proportionality
Representation 
of Women
System 
under 1990 
Constitution 
(fi rst past the 
post)
Familiar system; easy for voters 
to understand; voters can vote 
for one person (probably a party 
person) Voters can identify their 
members
May produce small number 
of parties and clear majorities 
needed; stable government
May produce a legislature 
that does not refl ect people's 
wishes
May produce a government 
that most people voted against
Individual members may have 
minority support
Low Few women
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Plurality system 
with quotas
Easy for voters to understand; 
can be more proportional, in 
terms of gender and ethnicity, 
etc.
Voters can identify their 
members
May produce a small number 
of parties; and clear majorities 
needed for a stable government
Has the same disadvantages 
that the existing system has
Could be complex if special 
seats lead to overlapping 
constituencies and voters 
having more than one vote
Quotas may strengthen and 
perpetuate ethnic divisions
Could be high Could be high
List PR with 
national 
constituency
Parties get seats in proportion to 
the votes they get 
Incentive to parties to broaden 
appeal, so is likely to be more 
inclusive
Simple for voters—voters need 
to vote only for a party
Gives a lot of power to the 
party secretariats
Voters have no sense of a 
connection with individual 
members
No independent members
Tends to produce many 
small parties and unstable 
governments
Higher than 
in a plurality 
system—how 
high depends 
on whether 
voters’ 
behaviour will 
be affected by 
ethnicity of 
the candidates 
included on 
the lists, and 
whether parties 
will respond 
by choosing a 
wide range of 
candidates
Higher than 
in a plurality 
system—how 
high depends on 
whether voters’ 
behaviour will 
be affected by  
the gender of 
candidates on 
the lists, and 
whether parties 
will respond by 
choosing women 
candidates
List PR with 
regional, 
multi-member 
constituencies
Proportional in party terms
Incentive to parties to broaden 
appeal
Easier to fi eld independent 
candidates
There may be some connection 
between members and their 
constituencies
Simple for voters
Gives a lot of power to the 
party secretariats
Tends to produce many 
small parties and unstable 
governments
May be easier 
for regional 
parties 
identifi ed with 
particular 
groups to get 
representation
Similar to 
national 
constituency 
system
List PR with 
regional, 
multi-member 
constituencies 
and quotas for 
minority groups 
and women
Same advantages as the system 
mentioned above, with greater 
ethnic/group proportionality 
Same disadvantages as the 
system mentioned above
Complex—hard for voters 
to understand, especially for 
illiterate voters
Quotas may strengthen and 
perpetuate ethnic divisions
Quotas could 
produce very 
proportional 
results
Quotas could 
produce very 
proportional 
results
Mixed Member 
(MMP)
Parties get seats in proportion to 
the votes they get
Could have quotas
Connection between constituency 
members and constituencies
Voting system may be hard 
to understand, especially for 
illiterate voters
With quota, would be very 
complex
For half of the 
seats, there 
would be an 
incentive for 
the parties to 
broaden range 
of candidates
Quota system 
could be 
used— but 
would be very 
complex
For half of seats, 
there would be 
an incentive for 
the parties to 
broaden range 
of candidates 
to include more 
women
System Advantages Disadvantages Ethnic 
Proportionality
Representation 
of Women
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What Should the New Constitution Say?
On the Electoral Systems
It is not necessary, indeed it is not even common, for constitutions to specify the 
electoral system, although there are exceptions. The Constitution of  Fiji, for example, 
goes into great detail about the nation's electoral system because it was a major issue 
in their constitution review. The Constitution of  South Africa says that the legislature 
must be elected under a system that 'results, in general, in proportional representation.' 
It would be possible for the new Nepali constitution to provide that the system must be 
(i) proportional in terms of  party and (ii) inclusive in terms of  ethnicity, and so on. It 
could go further and be more detailed. The disadvantage of  having greater detail is that 
if  the implementation of  the provisions leads to a serious problem in the make-up of  
the legislature, it would need a constitutional amendment to change the provisions—
and such a change might not have the support of  the party or parties who may have 
benefi ted from the problem. The advantage of  having greater detail is that a more 
detailed constitution would be more effective in achieving inclusiveness. 
On Other Matters
It is normal for a constitution to provide for an independent election commission to 
be in charge of  elections. As with other commissions, a decision has to be made about 
whether the constitution should provide full details about the composition of  the 
commission. The constitution could also provide some criteria for fair elections; if  so, 
these should not be too detailed. Both voters and candidates might need to meet certain 
qualifi cations. A right to vote could be included in the human rights chapter, as in the 
South African Constitution: 
19 (2) Every citizen has the right to free, fair, and regular elections for any legislative 
body established in terms of  the Constitution.
 (3)  Every adult citizen has the right –
1. to vote in elections for any legislative body established in terms of  the 
Constitution, and to do so in secret; and
2. to stand for public offi ce and, if  elected, to hold offi ce. 
This provision led to some interesting cases before the Constitutional Court in South 
Africa—such as whether prisoners had the right to vote. The court fi rst decided that the 
government could not exclude all prisoners from the right to vote, though it left it to a 
new law to decide the exact rules. But when the government passed a new law excluding 
from the right to vote all those imprisoned without the option of  paying a fi ne, the issue 
went back to the Constitutional Court, which then struck out the new law because it was 
deemed too broad an exclusion.
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A few countries (including Australia, Thailand, and Fiji) make it a duty to vote, as well 
as a right (though not necessarily in their constitutions).
Questions
1. Is it important to have members of  the legislature who represent particular 
geographical constituencies? Does this take precedence over the issue presented 
in the next question?
2. Is it important that membership of  the legislature be roughly proportional to the 
preference for parties expressed by voters?
3. Is it important to have a legislature that refl ects in detail the ethnic, caste, gender, 
and other demographic characteristics that make up the nation as a whole?
4. Would you consider stability of  governments to be more important than 
proportionality and inclusiveness?
5. Would it be acceptable or desirable for candidates and/or voters to be required 
to identify themselves by ethnic group?
6. Would voters be able to cope with a system that required them to vote twice— 
once for a candidate and once for a party? (Experience in elections to the 
Constituent Assembly should provide some answers to this question.)
7. Who should have the right to vote?
8. Who should have the right to stand for elections?
9. Are the requirements for fair elections so important in Nepal that they should 
be specifi cally mentioned in the constitution, or would it be suffi cient for the 
constitution to say that elections must be free and fair?
10. Should there be a legal duty to vote?
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Following the successful popular uprising of  April 2006, political parties have come 
back to power in Nepal. The Communist Party of  Nepal or CPN (Maoist), against the 
backdrop of  a decade-long armed insurgency and in contrast to its original ideological 
goal of  establishing a one-party people's democracy, has accepted a role in a new type 
of  Nepali politics. In making a new, inclusive Nepali democracy through the abolition 
of  monarchical rule and transformation of  armed confl ict into peaceful competitive 
politics, political parties have a pivotal role. 
    What have been the main problems with political parties in Nepal?
They are highly centralized and, consequently, the party units at the grassroots level 
have remained non-functional except during election times.
The party leadership is elitist and oligarchic, and there is no broad participation in 
the party's decision-making process.
The parties' central leadership features mostly dominant groups—hill Brahmins 
and Chhetris. 
Factions and splits have been a dominant characteristic; these have been, by and 
large, a product of  a clash of  interests and egos and hunger for power among 
party leaders. Seven of  the 11 governments between May 1991 and October 2002 
collapsed due to the internal confl icts within the ruling party. 
Party functionaries have been motivated to promote their self-interest, widening 
the gap between parties' promises and their performances. 
Party funding has not been transparent. 
Political Parties
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Role of Political Parties
Political parties play a fundamental role in the development and operation of  the 
constitution and the political system: 
• They mobilize opinion, as they did, for example, in the struggle against 
colonialism, or in the case of  Nepal, against the hegemonic power wielded by 
the palace and the Ranas. Nepali parties played a role as a catalyst in all the 
big democracy movements/revolutions—the 1950-51 armed revolution against 
the Rana oligarchy, the 1990 mass movement against the authoritarian party-less 
Panchayat regime, and the April 2006 popular uprising against monarchical rule.
• They bring together opinions and resources, enabling people with similar views 
or interests, whether they are economic, social, religious, and so on, to organize 
their activities and lobby on behalf  of  the people.
• They are the principal means through which the ordinary people participate in 
political and constitutional processes and exercise many of  their civil and political 
rights.
• They mediate in several ways between civil society and state institutions (in rather 
different ways from other intermediary agencies between the state and society, 
such as NGOs, the media, etc.)
• They secure the representation of  the people in state institutions, particularly 
the legislature; they offer the people political, social, and economic choices, 
particularly through the electoral process; and they bring public opinion to bear 
on government policies—this is a role they play when in opposition as well 
as when they are in government. They usually have a special position as the 
only organizations able to put forward candidates to represent the people in 
government. 
• The competitive party system offers citizens a choice of  policies on social reform, 
economic development, and political ideology.
• They bring cohesion and discipline to the government and to the opposition, for 
they help to organize and coordinate ministries and parliamentarians, and enable 
the opposition to scrutinize and challenge the government. 
• They play a key role in national integration, bringing together people from 
different parts of  the country or from different linguistic or religious affi liations, 
in common organization and with common purposes, and they help develop the 
national outlook and values.
Parties, of  course, serve these purposes as part of  or as a result of  their efforts to 
capture state power through elections. 
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The health of  the political process depends fundamentally on the state and the health 
of  political parties. Democracy has a chance to fl ourish if  parties are properly and 
democratically organized, offer the people clear choices of  policy and goals, uphold 
constitutional values, pursue their objectives with dedication and professionalism, and 
seek honestly to refl ect public interest and public opinion. 
It is clear from the experience of  many countries that parties that are not motivated 
to perform in the ways listed in the preceding paragraph can subvert the fundamental 
principles of  the constitution and become an instrument of  manipulation and control. 
For example, if  parties are themselves not run democratically, the larger constitutional 
system will refl ect this lack of  democracy, and the political system will become corrupt 
and criminal, under the dominance of  mafi as, thugs, and private armies. If  parties see 
their primary role to be that of  aggregating and articulating narrow sectional interests, 
like ethnicity or tribalism, they will divide society rather than integrate it. If  they see 
their main objectives as gaining access to power rather than the safeguarding of  moral 
values or national interests, they will engage in intimidation and violence and thus 
make fundamental compromises with democratic practices. In these circumstances, 
individual politicians also become self-serving and lose their personal integrity or sense 
of  commitment to their constituents, and they may frequently change parties to suit 
their personal conveniences and ambitions. When such things happen, politics and 
politicians become discredited, and people lose confi dence in democracy, which they 
come to associate with parties and politicians. Many people may also become alienated 
from and withdraw from politics. In these conditions, a coup d'état becomes likely and is 
often welcomed.
An Overview of the History of Nepali Political Parties
Nepali political parties came into being with the birth of  the democratic movement, 
which originated in the 1930s and 1940s in opposition to the oligarchic Rana regime 
(1846–1951). The history of  the origin of  Nepali political parties is markedly different 
from the history of  political parties in the West, where parties evolved within Parliament 
as a consequence of  the extension of  popular suffrage; the history of  Nepali political 
parties is also different from that of  political parties in other Third World countries 
where parties fi rst appeared as part of  the nationalist movement against colonial rule.
The Praja Parishad, formed in 1935, was the pioneer political party in Nepal, but it could 
not survive Rana repression. The Nepali Congress party (NC) and the Communist 
Party of  Nepal (CPN) were founded in exile in India, in 1947 and 1949, respectively. 
The mission of  the NC, at the time of  its inception, was to overthrow the Rana regime, 
a goal later directed against the partyless Panchayat regime. It was only in 1956 that the 
NC proclaimed its ideology of  democratic socialism. Unlike the NC, the CPN adhered 
to Marxist ideology, that is, class struggle, armed revolution, and dictatorship of  the 
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proletariat. The NC was instrumental in launching a successful armed movement against 
the Rana regime in 1950-51.
In 1951 when democracy was ushered in, a promise was made that elections to a 
constituent assembly would be held, but this promise was never fulfi lled. When 
parliamentary elections were fi nally held in 1959, the NC won a two-thirds majority 
and formed a government under the leadership of  B. P. Koirala. The Gorkha Parishad, 
created by the former Rana rulers and their cohorts, became the major opposition 
party in Parliament. But before and after the 1959 election, the CPN was the dominant 
actor in oppositional politics outside Parliament; despite its participation in the political 
process, it took the oppositional role, politically as well as ideologically, against the 
parliamentary system (1951-60).
The evolution of  the party system was, however, cut short when King Mahendra, through 
a royal coup in December 1960, banned all political parties. During the authoritarian 
Panchayat regime (1960-90), political parties were forced to recast themselves in their 
original format, as movement organizations working in exile or underground. Eventually 
the NC and the United Left Front (of  seven splinter left groups) jointly launched a 
mass movement in 1990, which restored the multiparty system. A new constitution was 
promulgated in November 1990. 
Between 1991 and 1999, three parliamentary elections and two local elections were 
conducted. The number of  parties registered in the Election Commission increased 
from 44 in 1991 to 65 in 1994 and to 100 in 1999, but fewer than half  of  the offi cially 
registered parties actually contested the elections, and fewer still succeeded in gaining 
seats in Parliament. The last three general elections and the two local elections produced 
a two-party dominant system, which is conventionally seen as being ideal for political 
stability and for the institutionalization of  democracy. The NC and the Communist 
Party of  Nepal United Marxist (CPN-UML) appeared as political alternatives to each 
other, and about six small parties succeeded in gaining a few parliamentary seats in one 
or all of  the last three general elections.
With the reinstatement of  multiparty democracy in 1990, political parties also 
transformed themselves from illegal organizations to legitimate contenders for power, 
and their functions and responsibilities, as related to governance, also increased. How 
well did parties perform in this new situation? 
The situation of  parties after 1990 was conditioned by three major interconnected, 
paradoxical situations. One, the 1990 Constitution guaranteed the stability of  the 
constitutional monarchy and parliamentary system, but the escalation of  the Maoists' 
armed insurgency all over the country, on the one hand, and King Gyanendra's 
ambition and acts of  taking power back, on the other, posed a real threat to the survival 
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of  democracy and the constitution. Secondly, political parties enjoyed continuous 
electoral support, but they largely failed to acquire support for their performance, and 
consequently, the popularity of  parties and their leaders declined considerably. This 
second paradox was itself  a product of  a third: political parties were formed for the 
pursuit of  their own ideological goals, but once they were in a position to translate 
their ideology into public policy and governance, rather than working for the good 
of  the nation, the party leadership appeared to be largely self-centred and power-
seeking. Internal party confl icts, factions, and splits prolonged political instability, led 
to a decline in political ideology, eroded democratic norms and values, and made the 
institutionalization of  parties and the party system problematic. 
Party Ideology
Each political party in Nepal has a distinct ideological identity that is largely shaped by 
its own history and philosophy. The NC, because of  its long struggle for parliamentary 
democracy since its formation in 1947, is a democratic and centrist party. The Rashtriya 
Prajatantra Party (RPP), being a party of  former Panchas, is relatively conservative and 
rightist; the National Sadbhawana Party is a conformist but regional based party that 
champions the cause of  Madhesis, the people of  the Tarai region; the CPN (UML) is 
a moderate left party that has given up its earlier faith in a one-party system, despite 
retaining some communist rhetoric; the People's Front and the Nepal Workers' and 
Peasants' Party are relatively radical communist parties, despite their participation in 
the parliamentary process; and the CPN (Maoist) is seen as an ultra-left party, which 
launched an armed insurgency against  parliamentary democracy. The CPN (Maoist) 
has, however, abandoned its one-party doctrine and is participating in 'competitive 
multiparty politics.' Some new parties, especially Madhesi parties, emerged to fi ght the 
Constituent Assembly elections.
How Political Parties are Organized in Nepal
Nepali political parties have complex structures comprising four types of  organizational 
units, briefl y described here: 
1. The core governing body, a central committee, exists at the apex of  the structure. 
Below it, committees down to the ward level at the bottom are entrusted with 
diverse functions, like recruiting, training, and mobilizing party workers, and so 
on.
2. The party in public offi ce is a forum consisting of  the party's representatives 
in state bodies. Separate formal structures exist for elected representatives at 
central and local levels. At the centre is the parliamentary party. The party in 
public offi ce is expected to carry out two major functions: translate the party's 
P
o
litical P
arties
158
principles and goals into state policies and programmes and develop a common 
action plan and strategy vis-à-vis other parties to infl uence decisions made by the 
government and Parliament.
3. Specifi c departments/committees have been set up by the major political parties 
at both the central and district levels since 1990. Their responsibilities can broadly 
be categorized into three spheres: a) management of  the party's internal affairs; 
b) overseeing business relating to the elected wing of  the party, and c) public-
policy formulation.
4.  Ancillary and affi liate organizations have been formed by all political parties. Some 
of  these organizations were formed in the pre-democratic period and others 
were formed following the restoration of  democracy in 1990. As the sphere 
of  parties' infl uence expanded to new avenues and platforms, party affi liates 
mushroomed in all segments of  society, including caste, ethnic, and professional 
groups, such as teachers, doctors, civil servants, etc. Most of  these ancillary and 
affi liate organizations have their own structural networks at the district level. 
Constitutional and Legal Provisions Regarding Parties
Parties were recognized in the 1990 Constitution for the fi rst time:
1. Persons committed to common political objectives and programmes were entitled 
to form and operate political organizations or parties. 
2. Political parties were free to secure support and cooperation from the general 
public for their objectives and programmes.
3. Any law or decision restricting participation in elections or in the political system 
to one party or one ideology was unconstitutional.
4. Registration of  parties with the Election Commission was required for the 
purpose of  elections.
5. To qualify for registration, a party would have to have a democratic party 
constitution and rules, and would have to have secured at least three per cent of  
the total votes cast in the previous election to the House of  Representatives.
6. Parties could not be formed on the basis of  religion, community, caste, tribe, and 
region. 
7. The Election Commission was not to register any party that restricted membership 
on the basis of  religion, caste, tribe, language, or sex.
8. A party could not be registered if  its name, objectives, insignia, or fl ag was 
religious or communal or tended to fragment the country. 
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The Interim Constitution retains these restrictions. The Regulation of  Political Parties 
Act 2001 refl ects the provisions of  the 1990 Constitution, and among other things, 
prohibits parties from undertaking the following activities:
1) interfering with the  sovereignty and integrity of  the country;
2) threatening harmony in relations among caste, ethnic, and other communities;
3) encouraging violence;
4) owning arms or ammunitions;
5) undermining public morale;
6) receiving grants from foreign nationals, agencies, and government; 
7) violating codes of  conduct, etc.
Some of  these rather vague statements may create the risk of  imposing excessive 
restrictions on parties. There is also the question of  who is to decide, for example, 
whether a party is 'undermining public morale.' 
The Electoral Commission has also developed elaborate codes of  conduct for candidates 
and parties. 
A Reformed Party System
So what would be needed for the Nepali party system to operate well and to perform 
the roles that we outlined earlier, and how would a new constitution be relevant in these 
matters?
Parties in the New Nepal Must Be Inclusive 
The Interim Constitution 2007 has already provided that parties must show that 
they have a provision for the inclusion of  members from 'neglected and oppressed 
groups including women and Dalits' in their executive committees at all levels. Besides, 
selection of  candidates for the Constituent Assembly must ensure due representation 
from the ethnic groups, Dalits, other oppressed groups, and women (see the chapter 
on the electoral systems). But there are weaknesses in the provisions: the provisions 
are not very clear; they may be hard to implement in practice; and, in the case of  the 
provision about executive committees, the provision does not say that parties cannot 
be registered unless they actually have such members, but that they must only 'provide 
for' such membership. 
In fact, some parties were already trying to be more inclusive in their structure, prior to the 
promulgation of  the Interim Constitution. The NC's constitution was amended in 1995 
to require at least 10 per cent representation from excluded groups, including women 
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and Dalits, in the party committees at all levels. Similarly, the RPP 's constitution required 
priority to be given to minority and underprivileged groups in nominating committee 
members. But the impact of  these changes on actual representation in Parliament in the 
1999 election was limited: the House elected then had no Dalit members, for example. 
However, parties' awareness of  minority interests has been increasing gradually and is 
refl ected also in the amplifi cation of  their policy platforms related to caste, ethnicity, 
language, religion, and other issues of  exclusion in each succeeding election to the 
House of  Representatives. The changed political landscape since April 2006 will also 
presumably have an impact on those platforms in the future.
What more can a new constitution do? We have seen the restrictions placed on sectarian 
parties. Arguably, this has had a tendency to reinforce existing power distribution: 
parties tend to be dominated by Brahmins/Chhetris and thus favour their interests, 
but parties formed to fi ght explicitly for the interests of  Dalits, Muslims, Janajatis, or 
Madhesis cannot be registered (though one formed for the rights of  women could, 
so long as it did not restrict membership to women). Many constitutions have rather 
similar provisions, but by no means all. In fact, although the old rules still exist in the 
Interim Constitution, a number of  parties representing sectional interests were allowed 
to participate in the Constituent Assembly elections and some won seats—especially 
the Madhesi parties. It seems that the Election Commission was taking a more 'inclusive' 
view of  Nepali politics.
Parties Must Be Democratic
How can parties claim to represent the people in a democratic polity unless they are 
themselves democratic? Again the 1990 Constitution did require this, and the Regulation 
of  Political Parties Act 2001 makes it mandatory to have periodic elections within the 
party, and it requires that at least half  of  the party offi ce bearers should be elected. Parties 
have been becoming more democratic—against the old practices of  nominating posts 
in the party in the pre-1990 period, almost all political parties have actually conducted 
internal elections.  The NC and RPP have introduced a rule that a person cannot hold 
the position of  party president or chairman for more than two terms.
Parties Must Respect Human Rights
However, the constitution should not be too restrictive. Freedom of  thought is a 
key ingredient of  democracy. True, illegal acts can and should be punished, whether 
committed by political parties, their members, or by others, but advance censorship of  
political ideas held by parties is generally no more acceptable than advance censorship 
of  ideas expressed by the press or individuals. It is important to ensure that provisions 
on political parties are compatible with the human rights provisions. 
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Parties Should Be Effective
In the end, it is the voters who must decide how effective parties are, but some specifi c 
issues can be addressed in the constitution. Very small parties are unlikely to be 
effective. Certain electoral systems tend to produce larger numbers of  parties (see the 
chapter on the electoral systems), and if  this is the situation that Nepal should face, 
electoral rules can try to reduce the number of  small parties, by saying, for example, 
that in a list system no party that obtains less than a certain percentage of  the total vote 
(maybe 1 per cent, 3 per cent, or 5 per cent) cannot get any seat. The 1990 Constitution 
had a provision designed to ensure that parties that had very little support in the past 
could not be registered. But the provision was interpreted to allow the registration 
of  new parties; such interpretations are important, because otherwise, new ideas and 
new groups may be permanently shut out of  the system. The Interim Constitution 
requires that new parties (those not present in the current Legislature-Parliament) must 
produce the signatures of  at least 10,000 voters before they can be registered to contest 
the Constituent Assembly elections. This is a discriminatory provision. As a general 
principle, however, there may be some virtue in requiring a party to show some degree 
of  support before it is registered.
Parties Need Resources
In many countries, parties' needs for resources, especially to contest elections, have 
led to massive corruption. Now a number of  countries provide for some fi nancial 
resources for parties to contest elections or for other purposes; the Nepal government 
budget for 2003-4 had provisions for fi nancial grants to be awarded to political parties 
at the annual rate of  NRs 20 per vote received by them in the last general election. 
Such a system has other possibilities: it can be used to provide incentives—parties get 
more money if  they have more women members or members from other historically 
disadvantaged groups. Some constitutions have rather general provisions requiring or 
permitting public funding; Brazil's Constitution, for example, says 'Political parties are 
entitled to funds from the party fund.' The South African Constitution says, 'The rules 
and orders of  the National Assembly must provide for …fi nancial and administrative 
assistance to each party represented in the Assembly in proportion to its representation, 
to enable the party and its leader to perform their functions in the Assembly effectively,' 
and more generally, 'To enhance multiparty democracy, national legislation must provide 
for the funding of  political parties participating in national and provincial legislatures 
on an equitable and proportional basis.' The 2004 draft of  a new constitution for Kenya 
specifi ed a percentage of  the national budget to be allocated to the fund for parties 
(this may be too detailed), imposed restrictions on how the money could be used, and 
specifi ed that the distribution of  the fund should be related to the support shown for 
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the party at the last election and the 'number of  women candidates and marginalized 
groups elected through the party.'
Parties Must Be Financially Well-run and Accountable
Parties must be transparent, so that their sources of  income and the ways in which their 
money is spent are known. In the UK, recently, a police investigation was conducted to 
investigate the granting of  public honours by parties in return for donations and loans 
to parties. In Nepal, the Election Code of  Conduct contains three general provisions: 
prohibition of  vote buying, ceiling on election expenditures for each candidate, and 
submission of  statement of  election expenditures. The Party Regulation Act 2001 
provides that a party should submit its annual budget of  income and expenditure to 
the Election Commission, that its accounts should conform to the law and be audited 
by recognized auditors, and that the names of  persons or organizations donating more 
than NRs. 25,000 to the party should be recorded. A constitution would probably not 
include detailed provisions about amounts and procedures, but it could provide general 
principles on transparency and accounting, etc. Some constitutions require that parties 
are open about who their members are; Poland, for example, says that parties that keep 
their structure or membership secret are prohibited.
Parties Must Be Disciplined
Disciplining a party can be a diffi cult issue. One of  the biggest problems undermining 
democracy in Nepal has been party factionalism. The provisions in many countries 
requiring members who 'cross the fl oor' from the party they were elected to, to stand 
for re-election are designed partly to prevent this from happening. But if  a party splits 
into more than one party, such a rule does not usually apply. Some people wonder 
whether such a rule is fair: Is it compatible with the members' freedom of  association? 
Should it apply if  a member crosses the fl oor to the party in government and also in 
the opposite direction? Should it apply if  the member is dismissed from the party? 
There are issues on which, in many countries, individual members are allowed to vote 
and speak according to their consciences. And it is rather incompatible with democratic 
ideals, which include tolerance of  dissent, that political parties should tolerate none. 
The right balance is not easy to achieve.
Parties Must Not Use Violence
The use of  violence is almost certainly a criminal offence. But violence by or on behalf  
of  political causes is a particular problem in many countries. Some constitutions, like 
that of  Brazil, address this problem by saying: 'Political parties are forbidden to use 
paramilitary organizations'; some constitutions, like that of  Poland, say that any party 
that approves of  'the application of  violence for the purpose of  obtaining power or to 
infl uence state policy' will be prohibited. 
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Parties Must Be Accountable to Their Members
A truly democratic internal structure should ensure that parties are accountable to their 
members, and the law and constitution may be able to do little more. 
The System of Regulation of Parties Must Be Fair
Some constitutions require that a party must be registered before it can behave like a 
political party at all. Others require that parties must be registered before they contest 
elections. Other systems do not require registration of  parties at all, though this is 
rare now. Some systems give the Election Commission the power to register parties; 
others create a separate offi ce of  registrar of  political parties. Either way, it is obviously 
important that the body that registers parties must be independent of  government 
pressure. In many countries, opposition parties have been denied the right to participate 
in elections by having their registration refused or delayed.
Party Campaigns Must Be Fair
Some constitutions have provisions about fair access to public media and limits on 
election expenses by parties and candidates. 
Parties Should Serve the National Interest
Some constitutions have provisions about foreign funding or linkages. In Angola, 
parties are under a 'prohibition to receive contributions of  monetary or economic 
value from foreign governments or governmental institutions.' In Brazil, parties have 
to abide by a 'prohibition from receiving fi nancial assistance from a foreign entity or 
government or from subordination to the same,' and the Algerian Constitution says 
that 'Any obedience, in any form, of  the political parties to foreign interests or parties 
is forbidden.' The last prohibition must be diffi cult to monitor. Forbidding any foreign 
funding may make it diffi cult for parties to receive assistance from any of  the several 
foreign bodies formed to provide training, etc., for parties; however, a local NGO can 
sometimes receive such funding and organize training programmes.
In light of  the mass uprising of  April 2006 and the challenges of  making a new 
constitution, there are some other changes that parties might consider. Most of  
these changes are issues that a constitution could not deal with expressly, though the 
constitution could help to create an environment that encourages such changes: 
• Parties should reorient themselves towards making policies and toward seeking 
offi ce to implement those policies, rather than being mainly concerned with 
capturing power. 
• Decentralization of  party structures would help in making local party functionaries 
active outside election times and contribute to the party's capacity to work as 
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linkage institutions between the state and society. A certain degree of  autonomy 
and independence would enhance the potential of  the local units of  the party to 
structure public opinion in the process of  formulating and promulgating party 
policy. 
• Decision making in the party should be broad based so that the party rank and 
fi le will be more committed to carry out the party's policies, programmes, and 
plans. 
• Parties should have their own policy committees, with good documentation and 
research cells. Such committees will enhance the party's ability to understand the 
emerging complex problems of  society and in formulating realistic policy and 
making prompt responses to changing issues and visions.
• Drawing on lessons from the past, it can be argued that professional organizations 
should not be politicized along party lines. A reduction in politicization and 
excessive party-run clientelism would have various positive effects, including the 
development of  professionalism in non-political sectors and the growth of  a 
meaningful civil society.
Some Questions     
1. Apart from the provision of  internal elections, what would be the key issues of  
internal democracy within the party?
2. How could parties become inclusive in terms of  ensuring representation in state 
apparatus and in the content of  their policies? 
3. Should we have a provision for reservations (quotas) for the poor, women, and 
marginalized groups in party management structures and in the selection of  party 
candidates for elections?
4. Would provisions of  state funding help reduce parties' reliance on big business 
houses and reduce corruption? What other measures could be taken to make 
party funding accountable and transparent? 
5. Should there be limits on campaign expenditure?
6. Should there be limits on parties' receiving contributions from certain sources, 
and if  so, what sources?
7. Should members who leave a political party on the ticket of  which they were 
elected lose their seats? If  so, should the same apply to an independent member 
who joins a party? 
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8. If  you believe that the answers to any of  these questions is 'Yes,' would you wish 
each point to be included in the constitution or would some of  them be best left 
to ordinary law and codes of  practice?
9. Given the pluralistic nature of  Nepali society and the emergence of  ethnic 
movements, is it (i) practicable and (ii) desirable to retain the previous 
constitutional provision of  prohibiting parties from being formed on the basis 
of  caste, ethnicity, region, or religion?
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The most important factor that guides the designing of  a constitution is the system of  
government chosen by a country, that is, the systems of  law and administration under 
which a country is governed. The system of  government determines the composition 
and powers of  the institutions of  the state and the manner in which these powers are 
allocated. The system chosen also determines the relationships among the organs of  the 
state and between the organs of  state and the people. 
Designing a System of Government
Identifying the Tasks of the State
When deciding how the powers of  the state are to be allocated and exercised, it is useful 
to identity the most important of  these powers:
• One of  the state's most signifi cant powers is to make laws. In older societies, the 
making of  laws was not very important because tradition was strong and change 
slow, and the role of  the law was limited to maintaining stability. In the modern 
state, on the other hand, where economic development and social change are 
emphasized, the role of  the law is to establish the framework for policies and 
institutions to promote change and development. 
• Another key function of  the state is the management of  the economy: the modern 
economy, whether centrally planned or determined by the market, is infi nitely 
more complex than the economies of  earlier periods. Many factors determine 
the nature of  a modern state's economy—the production of  goods, the capital 
and labour necessary to generate production, the relations between employers 
and employees, the management of  resources and marketing, the provisions and 
guarantees for a sound currency, the banking and insurance services, the nation's 
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infrastructure, the legal system, the level of  the people's education and training, 
the state's economic relations with other economies and international economic 
institutions, etc. In a market economy, many of  these activities are performed by 
individuals and companies, but the state has to provide the constitutional, legal, 
and institutional framework for the market to function and to ensure the proper 
co-ordination of  the various components of  the economy.
• A primary responsibility of  the state is to guarantee law and order, the security of  
its residents, and to defend the country against external attacks. The state has to 
ensure the recruitment, training, and disciplining of  the police and armed forces 
to assist in these tasks. The state has to create and enforce laws that protect 
people's lives, families, and property. It must safeguard national resources, not 
only for the present generation, but also for future generations.  
• The modern state is responsible for putting in place mechanisms and procedures 
to resolve disputes that occur in society. In a modern state, there will be many 
disputes over a variety of  matters among members of  families, between 
manufacturers and consumers, among trading partners, between employers and 
employees, between citizens and public authorities, between landlords and tenants, 
and so on. A mechanism for satisfactorily resolving these disputes is essential to 
the security, stability, and economic and social development of  society.
• The state also has the responsibility of  ensuring national unity and social 
cohesion and fostering a sense of  public responsibility and commitment to the 
public good. Many states fulfi l this responsibility by ensuring fair distribution 
of  resources across the country and across social classes, by creating symbols 
of  national unity, by providing civic education in schools and other institutions, 
and by providing an honest government that is responsive to the needs of  all 
its citizens and communities. In a multiethnic, multilingual, and multi-religious 
society like Nepal, the state should also ensure that all communities are treated 
fairly and that all communities benefi t equally from the state's laws and policies.
Allocating the Tasks: Division of Responsibilities between Different Levels of 
Government
One of  the most important decisions to be taken when determining the design of  the 
state is whether the system of  government is to be unitary or federal (or some other 
form of  devolution). Both unitary and federal systems can include different systems 
of  government (such as presidential or parliamentary systems), but the powers of  the 
authorities, and to some extent, the structure that the bodies of  governance will have 
depend on this decision. 
The Division of Responsibility between the State and Civil Society 
Constitutions generally restrict themselves to allocating tasks among organs of  the 
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state. When allocating these tasks, it is can be useful for us to imagine the state as a 
political community, rather than as an all-powerful political entity ruling over society. If  
we do so, it will make it easier for us to address the question of  whether all these tasks 
should be given to the state or whether they can and should be divided between the state 
and non-state institutions. In a market economy, many tasks—the providing of  health 
and education, the production and exchange of  goods, for example—are performed 
by non-state actors. By undertaking many tasks vital to the running of  the state, civil 
society supplements the efforts of  the state: civil society institutions inculcate values of  
moral and civic responsibility, create opportunities for people to get involved in policy 
making and to participate in public affairs, play a formal or informal consultative role 
in the making and implementation of  laws and policies, and settle disputes. And most 
importantly, civil society provides a check and balance to the power of  the state and 
makes sure that public authorities are accountable to the people. We can, therefore, think 
of  the relationship between the state and civil society as being partly complementary 
and partly 'competitive.' But the competition is conducted between actors who have the 
same goal—to foster the values of  the political community.
Many constitutions assume, but do not expressly provide for, the relationship between 
the state and civil society, although specifi c laws promulgated by many states are 
increasingly recognizing the roles of  civil society institutions. It is important to consider 
whether the new Nepali constitution should have provisions for the role of  civil society 
and if  so, what they should be. 
Allocating Powers among State Organs   
In modern democracies, powers are usually vested in different organs of  the state, 
unlike in political communities of  the past, where they were concentrated in a single 
body such as the monarch, the chief, or the council of  elders. Modern parliamentary 
democracies usually divide the tasks of  governing mentioned earlier into three broad 
categories—legislative, executive, and judiciary (or the making of  laws, the execution of  
laws, and the interpretation and application of  laws), and vest them in three separate 
institutions—Parliament, the executive, and the courts, respectively (the fact that all 
three functions are described in terms of  laws shows how important law is to and in the 
modern state). Although these broad categories do not fully capture the diverse tasks 
that a modern state has to perform, by classifying the powers of  the governing bodies 
within these categories, we will be better able to design fair and effective institutions. 
Let us fi rst examine why the modern state divides powers in these ways and why they 
are assigned to different organs of  state. 
Modern states divide powers and allocate them to different institutions for the following 
reasons:
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• to reduce the burden on a particular institution; 
• because different powers need different expertise: for example, the skills required 
to make laws are different from those necessary to interpret the law;
• because the separation of  institutions ensures that each institution is qualifi ed 
for its functions: thus policy making, which is pre-eminently a political task, is 
best carried out by representatives of  the people (hence an elected assembly); 
the implementation of  laws and policies requires technical and administrative 
expertise, for which qualifi ed ministers and public servants are necessary; and the 
interpretation of  law and its  impartial administration requires people educated in 
the practice of  law;
• because the separation of  powers and institutions limits the power of  any one 
institution and reduces the possibility of  the dominance of  one institution over 
other institutions and the people; 
• because the separation of  institutions facilitates checks and balances, so that each 
institution can keep a check on the other (e.g., in the United States of  America, the 
president nominates senior offi cials and judges, but their appointment requires 
the consent of  the Senate);
• to ensure that certain key state-functions that are necessary for a democratic 
and accountable government are discharged fairly and without political bias; 
in many modern states, these functions are the responsibilities of  experts and 
independent bodies, which are separate from other main organs of  the state. 
Nowadays, bodies such as independent electoral commissions, public service 
commissions, auditor general, attorney general, etc are usually assigned some of  
the tasks that used to be performed by courts of  law (these bodies are discussed 
in chapter 19).
However, it is important that the concern with the separation, limitation, and 
accountability of  powers should not undermine the effectiveness of  state organs. 
The model of  separation and limitation is based on the concept that the state should 
perform a strictly small number of  tasks and leave most decision making to private 
actors, especially in a private and decentralized economy. Such a model is, however, 
diffi cult to work with, even in the West, and state organs need to have suffi cient powers 
allocated to them for them to be effective. They need to have these powers for the 
following reasons:
• to promote economic, social, and cultural development;
• to equalize or redistribute economic wealth and opportunities so that every 
citizen has access to basic needs;
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• to manage and coordinate the framework of  the economy, an urgent task in 
a globalizing economy when the frontiers of  all national economies are being 
dismantled;
• to protect the environment without jeopardizing industrial development;
• to manage and resolve ethnic and other confl icts;
• to provide relief  during natural and man-made disasters.
It can be extremely challenging to create a mechanism for separating and limiting the 
powers of  the state organs without at the same time undermining the effectiveness of  
these organs. Fortunately, if  state organs exercise power responsibly, transparently, and 
in accordance with legal and administrative procedures, these organs will not be able to 
abuse the wide powers given to them—the greater the power an organ has, the greater 
the need for safeguards and accountability. 
Criteria for Assessing Systems of Government and Institutions
There are no simple or clear criteria for assessing the effi cacy of  systems or institutions; 
when making such assessments, it is necessary to be familiar with the values the state 
wants to uphold and the goals it wants to attain. One can divide these values and goals 
into three clusters. The fi rst cluster has to do with democracy and rights. The kind of  
issues to look for in this cluster are the extent and mode of  representation, whether 
all groups and regions are represented fairly, how democratic and participatory is the 
decision making process, and how responsive are state institutions to the needs and 
aspirations of  the people. The second cluster forms around the concept of  accountability, 
transparency, and integrity—mechanisms for disclosure of  government information, 
rules about good conduct of  offi cials, safeguards against abuse of  power, complaints 
mechanisms, and so on. The third cluster revolves around stability, effi ciency, and 
effectiveness. Does the government enjoy a reasonable period of  offi ce? Is it able to 
develop and implement clear and fi rm policies? Does it perform its functions with a 
degree of  professionalism?  
Some commentators say that these values and goals confl ict and that no one system 
can deliver them all, or in equal measure. So one must establish priorities or agree on 
trade-offs before proceeding to design the system of  government. The designers of  
the system of  government may, for example, see a confl ict between the goal of  having 
an executive that is more accountable to the legislature and having an executive that is 
more effi cient and stable: they may consider the executive in the parliamentary system, 
which does not have a fi xed period of  offi ce for the executive, to be more accountable 
to the legislature, and they may consider the executive in the presidential system, where 
the executive has a fi xed period of  offi ce, to provide more stability at the executive 
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level. Others may consider this analysis too simplistic and say that the stability of  the 
executive depends not so much on the formal powers vested in the executive as on 
the executive's ability to forge a consensus on various issues pertaining to governance 
and would counter with the claim that executives in parliamentary systems are better 
able to mobilize consent than are executives in presidential systems. But such debates 
are benefi cial in helping designers of  the system of  government think through their 
proposed designs. Furthermore, such lists of  criteria will at least provide designers of  
the system of  government with a means to compare systems and help them decide 
which system would be suitable for the country.
Choice between Systems of Government
There are three or four systems of  government (parliamentary, presidential, mixed, and 
monarchical). But there are differences even within each principal type, producing a 
great variety of  systems. Each of  these systems has worked well in different contexts. 
So it is hard to say which system works the best. Much depends on the overall context 
in the country, which is determined by a society's traditions and history, how a society 
has been governed over a long period of  time (and therefore, people's and offi cials' 
familiarity with them), the infl uence of  colonization or a similar experience, and so on. 
The context is also infl uenced by a country's socio-economic situation, ethnic diversity, 
demography, and even geography. A powerful infl uence in recent decades has been the 
global context, in which the paradigm of  the modern state is replacing traditional modes 
of  governance. Modern states have their own logic, dynamics (e.g., the concentration of  
power and force, the consequent need for safeguards, the hardening of  state borders, the 
marketization of  the economy, and new modes of  decision-making and participation 
across communities and vast geographical distances, etc), and ways of  working, and 
these mechanisms are also infl uenced by the states' being members of  international and 
regional organizations, which pressure states to conform to global norms.       
Although the last point suggests a growing similarity of  systems and institutions, it is 
unwise to overlook the national context. For example, similar systems of  government 
in different countries will operate differently due to differences in the context. Thus, 
the parliamentary system in the United Kingdom works differently from that in India 
or in the small island states of  the South Pacifi c. Another variable is the electoral 
system—some systems tend to produce a predominantly two-party system (as in the 
United Kingdom, which has single-member constituencies) and others facilitate the 
proliferation of  parties, as in many European countries with proportional representation 
systems. Whether a country has two parties or a multiplicity of  parties will determine 
how the parliamentary system works (this explains the different experiences of  the 
United Kingdom and European nations). Similarly, the presidential system in the United 
States of  America works quite differently from presidential systems in Latin America; 
the president in the United States of  America has to cope with essentially two parties in 
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the legislature, but the presidents of  Latin American countries, which have proportional 
representation systems (at least for the legislatures), have to work with several small and 
fl uid parties. The United States of  America, therefore, has a relatively stable government, 
unlike Latin American nations. There are other variables to be considered too, such as 
the homogeneity or diversity of  the population, the size of  the country, and so on. It is 
thus hard to predict how a system that has been developed in one country will work in 
another country. What this suggests is that it is necessary for designers of  systems of  
government to constantly keep in mind local traditions and contexts, without giving up 
the willingness to learn from the experience of  other states.  
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Introduction 
Many people see federalism as a way to empower communities and regions marginalized 
by the centralization of  power in Nepal and to help promote the religious, linguistic, and 
ethnic diversity of  the Nepali people. The drafters of  the 1990 Constitution understood 
the problems arising from centralization and thus inserted a directive principle requiring 
the state to 'bring about conditions for the enjoyment of  fruits of  democracy by 
providing opportunities for the maximum participation of  the people in the governance 
of  the country by the means of  decentralization of  administration' (Art. 25(4)). But 
little effective action was undertaken to decentralize power, even to the limited extent 
as was recommended by the constitution; and what little effort was made to do so was 
undermined by the Maoist insurgency. 
Restructuring the state has thus become the major objective of  the Constituent 
Assembly. The Interim Constitution gives great importance to restructuring the state 
in order to strengthen democracy, increase inclusiveness, and foster social justice. The 
preamble to the Interim Constitution envisages that restructuring the state will resolve 
'the existing problems of  the country based on class, caste, region, and gender.' Article 
34(2) of  the Interim Constitution calls for self-governance based on ethnicity, language, 
culture or religion. The Interim Constitution also encourages the state to promote 
the co-existence of  various communities and to help 'in the equal promotion of  their 
languages, literature, scripts, and arts and culture' (Art. 35(3)). Perhaps the most explicit 
provision regarding decentralization is Article 138, which commits the Constituent 
Assembly to eliminating the 'centralized and unitary form of  the state' as a means to 
end discrimination based on 'class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion, and region.' An 
amendment made on 9 March 2007, following riots in the Tarai, in support of  regional 
government, specifi es that the restructuring will be along the lines of  federalism. A 
Federalism, Devolution, and Local Government
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High Level Commission is to be set up to make recommendations on the restructuring, 
leaving the fi nal decision to the Constituent Assembly.
The Origin of Federations 
In order to locate the debate on federalism in the Nepali context, it is useful to identify 
two variables: First, we need to examine how federations are formed. A federation 
can be formed by independent, sovereign entities coming together, a process that may 
be called 'federation by aggregation' (the USA, Switzerland, and Australia), or by the 
restructuring of  a single unitary and centralized state, which may be called 'federation 
by disaggregation' (Nigeria, Spain, India, South Africa).  
In previously centralized systems that have disaggregated to become federations, the 
powers of  the units are clearly defi ned and the residual powers are taken up by the 
centre. Countries that have seen processes of  aggregation and disaggregation (such as 
Malaysia, India, and Canada) have detailed lists of  federal powers exclusively exercised 
by the centre, state powers exclusively exercised by the states and concurrent powers 
exercised by  both the centre and the states. 
Second, we need to examine why federations are formed. One type of  federation, called 
'territorial federation,' is created for the following reasons: (a) managing space and 
distance in countries with large territories; (b) creating greater capacity for self-defence 
and national integrity; (c) promoting economic development by creating a larger unit for 
market and trade; and (d) enhancing democracy by fostering greater participation and 
responsiveness. A second type of  federation, called 'ethnic federation,' is determined 
by a state's cultural diversity (particularly differences of  language and religion). Ethnic 
federalism is usually chosen to confer forms of  self-government on distinct cultural 
communities that are dominant in different parts of  the country. This type of  a federal 
system provides protection for the culture, language or religion of  minorities and 
responds better to the special circumstances and needs of  these communities. 
It is easier to form federations by aggregation because the entities that become 
federal units were previously independent states, which already possessed established 
constitutional and political systems; thus only some new forms of  power and a small 
number of  new institutions at the centre have to be created. Furthermore, this kind of  
federation is generally based on the consent of  entities that recognize the advantages of  
coming together. Establishing a federation by disaggregation, on the other hand, is often 
not as easy because groups with a vested interest in maintaining centralized state power 
may resist federalization, while the supporters of  federalism may be prepared to wage 
war in order to achieve their aims. Such a federation is also technically more diffi cult 
to establish for two reasons: one, many decisions have to be taken while designing the 
system (each of  which can be controversial); and two, several governments have to be 
177
created, often from scratch, in the new federal units, regions which may have previously 
not had the capacities to make decisions or implement policies.
Likewise, the dynamics of  'territorial' and 'ethnic federations' are different. In 
territorial federations, often the result of  aggregation, the boundaries of  federal units 
are predetermined (these boundaries are not demarcated according to any particular 
logic, and are usually the products of  history); in ethnic federations, on the other hand, 
creating new boundaries or respecting existing boundaries are of  the essence, as one 
of  the purposes of  federating is the need to recognize cultural diversity. An ethnic 
federation is prone to periodic adjustments of  boundaries (possibly following bitter 
controversies) and to the creation of  new federal units, as fresh claims of  ethnic or 
cultural distinctiveness are advanced. Some major issues in the operation of  ethnic 
federations concern relations between ethnic communities, calling for frequent 
negotiations (and possibly, different methods of  confl ict resolution than the methods 
used to resolve confl icts in territorial federations).
This discussion leads us to questions such as the following: (a) are some kinds of  
purposes more easily achieved through federalism than others? (b) does federalism give 
rise to new problems—what might they be, and can they be managed? (c) are some 
federations more manageable than others? (d) in which federations are human rights 
better protected? (e) are some forms of  federation more conducive to national unity 
than others? 
The Interim Constitution of  Nepal has opted for federalism to promote inclusiveness 
and social justice. Article 138 of  the Interim Constitution calls for the elimination of  
the centralized and unitary state in order to end discrimination based on class, caste, 
language, sex, culture, religion, and region. But will defi ning the central reasons for 
federating as has been done place too much of  a burden on federalism? And will other 
complementary remedies and policies also have to be put in place to achieve the outlined 
objectives? How can it be ensured that the federalism that will be instituted in Nepal is 
truly 'inclusive, democratic, and progressive,' as demanded by Article 138? And how can 
it be ensured that the structures of  power that operate at the national level (and which 
are deemed to be the cause of  Nepal's problems) will not be reproduced at the level of  
federal units (led by the same parties and social interests)? 
Designing the Federal Units
The people of  Nepal will soon have to make a fundamental choice regarding the primary 
function of  the federation. Should the federation be territorially based, with boundaries 
drawn on the basis of  the units' geographical features, capacity for governance, 
availability and access to resources, and potential for development? An important 
feature of  territorial federations—that all persons and communities in a sub-national 
unit of  such federations shall be treated equally—bolsters the argument for opting 
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for this system. Or should the Nepali federation be based on ethnicity, where persons 
of  the same ethnicity or caste or language constitute the sub-national unit and enjoy 
benefi ts that others do not, such as the use of  their language and control of  resources? 
The main reason for opting for ethnic federation is that such a system helps to protect 
and promote the economic and social well-being of  minority groups and helps them 
maintain their distinct identities. The debate in Nepal has revolved around this polarity. 
The extreme caste and ethnic diversity of  Nepal throws into sharp relief  the differences 
of  the two approaches, for the ethnic approach could lead to a large number of  small 
units, while the territorial approach would lead to a small number of  large units, with 
somewhat contradictory consequences for administration, 'effi ciency,' and identity. And 
although the amendment of  the Interim Constitution on 9 March 2007 may seem to 
favour the communal rather than the geographical/developmental approach (removing 
discrimination based on 'class, caste, language, sex, culture, religion, and region'), the 
amendment is certainly not unambiguous. 
Criteria for the Establishment of Sub-national Units
Before we consider the issues that Nepal will face when designing its federal system, 
it would be useful to briefl y consider the arguments for and against ethnic federalism. 
The main argument for ethnic federalism is that where ethnic consciousness is strong, 
unitary states or federations based primarily on geographical or administrative grounds 
may fail to satisfy a community's need to protect its identity, its desire for a measure 
of  self-government and the recognition it seeks for the value or importance of  its 
culture. An ethnic federation gives cultural communities the means to develop their 
language, protect their religion, take affi rmative action in favour of  disadvantaged 
members, promote regional parties, and build the political standing they will need to 
negotiate with the centre (and other federal units) for ensuring equitable distribution of  
resources. On these grounds, the ethnic community can be integrated in the national 
political system, and national unity is strengthened. The international community usually 
advances ethnic federalism or autonomy as a solution for countries that are threatened 
with the possibility of  ethnic confl ict and to pre-empt units from seceding from the 
larger state.
The opponents of  ethnic federalism argue that ethnic federalism would not work so 
well for Nepal. Ethnic federalism weakens the sense that people have of  belonging to 
a single nation because, often, people's primary (and sometimes exclusive) loyalty turns 
out to be loyalty to the ethnic community to which they belong. Their dependence on 
central institutions is thereby reduced and the ability of  ethnic units to secede is thus 
enhanced. It may be argued that, at the least, a great deal of  time and energy of  the 
national authorities is taken up in constantly negotiating ethnic claims. National unity 
may also be threatened because minorities within a state or province dominated by one 
ethnic group may be vulnerable to discrimination, even oppression. In such cases, central 
authorities may be forced to intervene in the affairs of  the state or province, producing 
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further tensions. In ethnic federations, measures directed at maintaining national unity 
(through effective and legitimate dispute-resolving mechanisms, consultation and co-
operation, and power-sharing mechanisms, where relevant) become critical. The all-
important ability of  the centre to ensure equitable distribution of  resources and the fair 
development of  all regions may also be reduced if  resources are unevenly located in the 
different states. 
Discussions in Nepal
Determining the criteria for federating is a useful starting point for discussions on 
the nature of  the federation that needs to be adopted in Nepal, for the design of  the 
federation will depend fundamentally on which approach is adopted. Dr. Pitamber 
Sharma, a prominent Nepali intellectual, has collated data on the size and distribution of  
ethnic, linguistic, and caste groups, by Districts and Village Development Committees, 
as well as data on the distribution of  resources, all of  which could prove invaluable in 
informing any discussion related to federalism. Sharma has also analyzed the proposals 
of  others intellectuals such as Dr. Govinda Neupane, Dr. Mahendra Lawoti, and Dr. 
Harka Gurung, and has usefully summarized their views. 
Among those who favour an ethnic federation, Govinda Neupane proposes 11 units, 
based, as Sharma says, on 'the historical-cultural background, language, and the areas 
of  historical occupation of  particular population groups… reminiscent of  the situation 
existing at the beginning of  the 18th century,' while ignoring geographical or economic 
feasibility.
Sharma states that 'most of  the major ethnic groups such as the Limbus, Rais, Tamangs, 
Gurungs, and Magars in the hills and Tharus in the Tarai have demanded the creation 
of  states based on their 'historic areas of  occupation.' The Madhesi groups have tended 
to equate ethnicity with language groups and have demanded the creation of  states 
based on language groups. While some Madhesi groups (including the Nepal Sadbhavana 
Party) see the need to create one single Madhesi state along the southern border, others 
are for two or three separate states, including one for the Tharus in the west. Some 
of  the Janajati groups, such as the Tamangs, have demanded that the areas of  Tamang 
occupation be given a state status in their historic territory. Most of  the Janajati groups 
have articulated their demands for ethnic states in a general way and are in the process 
of  formulating more concrete proposals. The federation of  the Janajatis, Nepal Janajati 
Mahasangh, for example, has called for autonomous ethnic states, but has not specifi ed 
the number and extent of  such ethnic states. 
The Maoists have proposed 11 autonomous regions. According to Sharma, 'These 
groupings represent areas of  ethnic occupation and historical neglect, geographical 
marginalization and remoteness.' The principal criteria are derived from Stalin, namely 
'common territory, common language, common economic life, and common psychology.' 
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Sharma says that 'Other than ethnicity, the Maoists have not explained adequately the 
basis for the formation of  these autonomous regions.' 
The CPN (UML) supports autonomy based on ethnicity, language, culture, and region (as 
aspects of  the right of  indigenous nationalities and ethnic groups to self-determination). 
Sharma comments that the criteria 'seem to be comprehensive and confusing, and the 
CPN (UML) has yet to come up with concrete proposals for designating federal regions 
or states and explain the meaning and context of  self-determination and the extent of  
autonomy and how it is to be exercised.' The Nepali Congress has long been opposed to 
federalism, although it was among the parties that favoured the insertion of  federalism 
as a goal in the Interim Constitution.
Mahendra Lawoti proposes that ethnic affi liations, where feasible, should be the basis 
for federating. Citing the case of  Limbus, he writes that 'since many of  the marginalized 
socio-cultural groups are concentrated in different regions, different groups might 
be able to form majority governments in those regions.' He believes that even if  a 
marginalized group is not a majority, it would still have considerable infl uence at the 
regional level. Lawoti's strong advocacy of  ethnic federalism is based on his belief  that 
only through ethnic federalism can the marginalized groups escape their oppression by 
the ruling communities.
The late Dr. Harka Gurung, a proponent of  federalism based on the logic of  geography, 
viability, and the imperative of  development, had proposed making the district as the 
federal unit, with a reduction of  their numbers from the present 75 to 25. Gurung 
believed that district autonomy would be possible only if  the districts had adequate 
resources, if  the district governments were given more authority to collect taxes and if  
the district governments could collect revenue generated by the local resource base.
Sharma himself  uses criteria composed of  economic geography, and to a lesser extent, 
of  ethnicity. First he demonstrates why the ethnic, caste, linguistic, and historic homeland 
criteria are neither realistic nor viable: there are only 14 districts in which a single group 
is the majority (nine of  them dominated by Chhetris); groups, particularly the caste 
groups, which are dominant in one or more districts, are also the most dispersed, the 
result of  the mobility of  the people. He concludes, 'As a result there is considerable 
ethnic/caste diversity even in areas that have a dominant ethnic/caste population…
Even among Janajatis there are dominant/majority and minority Janajatis in the same 
geographical area…Dalits do not have a territorial enclave.' 
There will likely be serious diffi culties in getting everyone to agree on the fundamental 
basis of  Nepali federalism. It is clear that if  each or most of  the ethnic, caste or language 
groups were to have their own region or even district, Nepal would end up with a very 
large number of  very small units. The dilemma is obvious: if  ethnicity or identity were 
to be the main determining criteria, the regions would not be able to take on many 
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functions and responsibilities, given their lack of  resources and capacities; if  on the 
other hand, the size of  the units were to be increased by reducing the number of  
regions or districts, ethnic self-rule would be diminished and many groups would feel 
quite distanced from the centres of  power. Organizing the state on the basis of  three or 
so tiers of  administration may resolve the dilemma to some extent, as the region would 
be the focus of  policy and legislative initiatives, and region-wide development projects, 
while districts would deal with matters of  greater local signifi cance, including culture. Of  
course, the more the tiers, the more complex, and perhaps more expensive, the federal 
system will become. A model that could be studied to understand the ramifi cations 
of  federalizing would be the Indian federation, which has adopted the approach of  
organizing states on the basis of  language and has invested in local self-government 
(Panchayats) to provide for more responsive administration.
The debate about the basis for, size, and number of  units would be more fruitful if  
the powers and structures at each level were specifi ed. How many tiers of  government 
should there be? How are powers to be divided between them? How will regional/
district governments be fi nanced? How will relations between different levels be 
managed? Will there be one public-service institution or many, one judiciary or many? 
Does the country have enough resources for and the capacity to manage a complex 
federal system? How will disputes between different levels of  government be resolved? 
What impact will federal relations have on inter-community relations? Besides these 
fundamental issues, there are many other issues that will have to be taken into account 
when designing the details of  the federal system. Examining their implications may help 
to resolve differences among the different proponents of  federalism.
Understanding the implications of  federalism may also help Nepalis decide on the kind 
of  federation they should pursue and prompt them to refl ect on the kinds of  issues 
and problems that could best be dealt with through federalism; if  the public feel that 
federalism is not a viable option, that revelation may allow the public to focus their 
attention on other kinds of  constitutional devices that may be better suited to dealing 
with at least some of  the problems that, currently, are expected to be resolved through 
federalism.     
Structuring Federalism: Issues and Choices That Nepal Faces
This section discusses a number of  issues that need to be considered while designing 
the federal arrangement in Nepal. Because the purposes of  federalizing are different, 
the criteria for defi ning sub-national units, the balance between self-rule and shared 
rule, the salience of  culture, the politics of  internal mobility, the allocation of  resources, 
and the modes of  dispute settlement are also often different in the two primary types 
of  federal systems—the ethnic or the geographic. And although the emphasis would 
vary according to the primary objectives of  the federal system chosen and according to 
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the national context, there are certain features that need to be incorporated into every 
federal design. 
Division of Powers Between the Centre and the Units
A key element of  a federal system is the combination of  'shared-rule' (that is, the 
powers and structures of  authority at the centre in which all the different sub-national 
communities participate at the national level) and 'self-rule' (that is, the autonomous 
powers that each sub-national unit can exercise). For federal relationships to be viable 
it is important that the powers of  shared-rule and self-rule be balanced and that there 
be effective institutions and mechanisms for consultation and co-operation among the 
units and between them and the centre.
Levels of Government
As is obvious from the preceding section, there has been relatively little discussion 
in Nepal of  the number of  levels of  government that would be needed. Pitamber 
Sharma's four-level proposal (centre, region, district, and village/township) shows 
that fl exibility can be achieved by creating a multi-level structure to deal with issues 
of  policy, resources and capacity, and by making provisions for units to deal with the 
national government at the regional level, and issues related to identity and participation 
at the district level. Frequently, the adoption of  a federation turns previously dominant 
groups into minorities in some federal units. One way to deal with the concerns of  the 
minority groups is to grant these groups a limited autonomy in areas where they might 
constitute a signifi cant proportion of  the population. In 2000, this solution was widely 
canvassed in Sri Lanka to protect Sinhala and Muslims in the north-east and Tamils in 
the south. In Switzerland, there are three levels of  government (national, cantonal, and 
communal), which are constitutionally protected. Many federations, such as Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and recently, India, have moved to three tiers, in which local councils and 
municipalities are constitutionally protected. 
Number of Units
The number of  units can be a critical factor that will determine whether a federation 
will survive or not. A federation that is composed of  a small number of  units may be 
burdened with too many responsibilities. If  there are only two units (as in East and West 
Pakistan, Czechoslovakia, and the non-territorial federation of  Cyprus), each dominated 
by different cultural communities, the larger community would want as much power as 
possible to be handed to the national government, which it would expect to control, and 
the minority would want as much power as possible to be delegated to the sub-national 
level. A federation would likely be unbalanced if  there were a big discrepancy in size 
and resources among sub-national units. In a federation with a larger number of  units, 
who the disputants are may change with which issue is being contended. But different 
183
kinds of  balances can be struck, and provisions could be made for other units to act 
as mediators to resolve disputes. On the other hand, with a large number of  units, co-
ordination may be diffi cult; and if  a relatively small country has a large number of  units, 
the units would have limited capacity for governance and would be unable to resist the 
infl uence of  the national government.  
Boundaries, Merger of Units, and Creation of New Units 
In ethnic federations, the number of  units is usually increased by the fragmentation of  
existing units (as in India, Nigeria, and Spain). In some cases, there may be disputes 
about the boundaries of  neighbouring units, and sometimes there may be pressure to 
merge some units (as happened in the Indian exercise of  the integration of  princely 
states). All of  these developments could possibly take place in Nepal as the process 
of  federalization unfolds. It is, therefore, important that the constitution provide 
procedures for the splitting or merging of  units and the adjustment of  boundaries. The 
provisions should make it neither too easy nor too diffi cult to change the sizes of  and 
the number of  the units. If  the procedure is too easy, many demands for new units could 
be made, and if  it too diffi cult, the failure to make necessary adjustments when required 
could lead to confl ict. The procedures for making the change should ensure that before 
the changes are made, people living in the areas that will be affected by change are 
consulted; in most cases, the people's approval should be necessary. Adequate time 
should also be allotted for conducting proper debates on the desirability of  change. In 
some constitutions, such as in Spain, some criteria are specifi ed before the process for 
change can begin. 
One or More Constitutions?  
It is essential that a single national constitution prescribe the parameters of  the 
federation, including the division of  powers, relations between governments at different 
levels, methods for resolving disputes, and methods for interpreting and amending 
the constitution. It is customary for the national constitution to specify the nature of  
government at the national level (i.e., of  the federal government). The structures of  
government at the sub-national levels are generally dealt with in the constitution of  the 
sub-national unit. Sub-national constitutions have to be consistent with the national 
constitution, but otherwise are free to establish the institutions of  the unit and its 
system of  government within a broad range. There can be considerable differences 
between constitutions of  sub-national units (e.g., some are unicameral and others 
bicameral, some may have their own bills of  rights, while others may rely on the national 
constitution; and in Malaysia, some are monarchical but others are 'republican'). The 
scope and importance of  state constitutions, therefore, varies, depending on how 
centralized power and institutions are.  In some countries, sub-national constitutions 
may only be drafted on the approval of  the central executive or legislature. 
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In a few countries, the national constitution also deals with the structures of  government 
in the sub-national units (India, Nigeria, and Pakistan). This is, perhaps, administratively 
more convenient and is employed in federations that are centrally oriented; some 
units, for example, may not have the capacity to make their own constitutions (it is 
interesting that when sub-national units are allowed to create their own constitutions, 
there is remarkable similarity between their constitutions); but it leaves less scope for 
accommodating traditional structures when they vary across the country (as may be the 
case in Nepal).   
The Second Chamber
Federal legislatures are generally bicameral. One chamber is based on the principle of  
the representation of  the people, so that membership is based on the population in 
each of  the units. The other chamber usually represents the units at the national level, 
protects their interests, and enables them to participate in the governance of  the whole 
country (as an aspect of  shared rule). The basis of  the memberships is sometimes equal 
representation of  the units, and sometimes it is the size of  the population (provided 
that every unit has at least one member). 
In some countries, the second chamber represents not sub-national units, but ethnic 
communities (as in Ethiopia), providing a different kind of  balance between the national 
government and communities. In Nepal, there have been suggestions for the creation 
of  such a legislative chamber (in contrast to the National Assembly under the 1990 
Constitution, which was based essentially on party representation). 
The powers and responsibilities of  the second chamber also vary. Some, as in Germany 
and South Africa, are used as a framework for negotiations between the national and 
sub-national governments (in which case, there is representation of  sub-national 
governments, rather than of  people directly). In Ethiopia, the second house, the House 
of  Federation, has the explicit responsibility of  protecting the rights and interests of  
sub-national units and ethnic communities, ensuring adequate budgetary allocations 
and interpreting the constitution. 
The work of  the second chamber can be supplemented by other institutions and 
procedures for inter-governmental relations (such as premiers' conferences). In short, 
there is considerable room for creativity regarding the designing of  the second chamber, 
including allowing the provision for meshing the interests of  the national and other 
governments, as part of  the strategy of  'bonding,' and to give the chamber the power to 
represent non-state communities and groups. 
Institutional Arrangements: The Role of Independent Institutions   
This section considers a special aspect of  how institutions at the national and sub-
national levels could be organized. Normally, each level of  government has its own 
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institutions (legislature, executive, etc), but in some cases, it might be more appropriate, 
as well as cheaper, for the different levels to share institutions. The most obvious, and 
less controversial, are the Electoral Commission, the Audit Commission, the Human 
Rights Commission, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Ombudsman type of  
body. These bodies are meant to be independent, not subject to any politician or offi cial; 
they have to maintain national standards uniformly throughout the country; and some 
of  them need to be present in all zones or districts. These bodies are best described not 
as institutions of  the central government, but as national institutions. Their national 
character would become even more evident, and increase their legitimacy as such, if  
the appointment of  their members could be made through a process in which the sub-
national units had some participation, for example, through a national appointments 
board consisting of  persons appointed by both levels of  government. 
Other institutions that could be shared are the judiciary and bodies that provide legal 
services. Judges are, after all, supposed to be independent, sworn to obey and enforce 
the constitution and the laws. Also, having a common judiciary would eliminate complex 
legal issues that arise from having multiple jurisdictions, such as giving recognition to 
decisions of  separate judiciaries, enforcing the laws of  different jurisdictions, matters 
related to extradition, taking evidence in another jurisdiction, etc. Again, it would be 
necessary to ensure that a truly independent process is established for the appointment, 
and where appropriate, dismissal of  judges. It is of  course not uncommon for each 
unit in a federation to have its own judiciary, but it is doubtful if  Nepal can afford the 
resources for a multiplicity of  judiciaries. The world's largest federation, India, is able 
to operate with only one judiciary. The same type of  approach could be adopted in 
Nepal for the provision of  legal advice and the conduct of  prosecutions. An added 
benefi t of  adopting the Indian system would be the enhancement of  these independent 
institutions, as they could be de-linked from any particular government. 
The subject of  a shared public service raises different kinds of  issues (including that of  
loyalty), but certainly some sharing of  services would be sensible and should be feasible. 
The new sub-national units will need considerable support as they begin to establish 
their governments, so a pool of  senior or retired public servants could assist them with 
this task. More broadly, a national commission could be established to provide expert 
advice on fi nance and taxation, law drafting, and the setting up of  management systems, 
and so on. This point is discussed later in this chapter.        
Division of Powers: Contents and Methodology 
One of  the most important decisions to be taken is that regarding the division of  powers 
among governments at different levels. Certain powers are almost always reserved for 
the national government: powers over foreign affairs, defence, citizenship, currency, 
and international trade; in practice, there are many more (as in India and Malaysia). 
In principle, the central government should have those powers that are essential for 
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preserving the independence of  the state, and matters pertaining to national security, 
interactions at the international level with other states and international organizations, 
the maintenance of  integrated domestic economy, regulation of  large natural resources, 
and national infrastructure. Typical powers for the sub-national units include powers 
over primary and secondary education, local markets, co-operatives, health clinics, 
agriculture, irrigation, land taxes, culture (including libraries), sanitation, and local roads. 
In principle, sub-national units should have powers that are of  particular regional interest: 
local transportation, education, primary health, marketing of  agricultural products, local 
languages, co-operatives, micro-credit, and local taxes. 
But in fact, there is no standard formula for dividing powers, and in the newer 
federations, the central government is given many powers that have a direct impact 
on the  daily lives of  the people in the sub-national units (areas from which the central 
government in older federations were carefully excluded). The division is also determined 
by the capacities of  governments at different levels. Under international norms and 
agreements, countries have assumed responsibilities in many areas of  life; these bind 
the national government and have to be discharged by the central authorities. There is 
also increasing co-operation between the national and sub-national units, which makes 
the older type of  division unrealistic.
The fi nal point to be considered is also concerned with the method of  division of  
responsibilities. At one time, it was common to have two lists of  powers: one which 
belonged to the centre, the other to the sub-national units (and the un-prescribed powers, 
the residue, falling to the centre). Each level of  government had to stay within its own 
prescribed area. Today, this kind of  separation of  functions is giving way to a more 
collaborative form, in which the centre and the units work together or in which both 
have the responsibility for several areas ('concurrent powers'), such as over agriculture, 
education, irrigation, transport, energy, airports, housing, and the environment. This 
approach generally leads to three lists—for the centre, for the units, and one of  
concurrent powers shared by both the centre and the units. In such collaborative setups, 
it is necessary to have a rule as to whether the law of  the centre or the unit would prevail 
in case of  confl ict. The traditional answer is that the centre should prevail in the case of  
a federation by disaggregation (as would be the case in Nepal). However, consideration 
should be given to the rule of  the paramountcy of  the unit, since, when the federation 
is established, all laws would be of  the central legislature, leaving very limited scope to 
units. A modifi cation of  this proposal would be to divide the concurrent list into two 
parts, one where unit laws would prevail, and the other where the national law would 
prevail.
In deciding both on the substance and the methodology of  the division of  powers, 
it would do well to remember that a scheme for the most appropriate division would 
emerge after trial and error, and powers may need to be phased over time, which 
suggests that the system should be fl exible. A concurrent list provides fl exibility. Three 
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other devices are useful: one is a general provision for the transfer by the government 
of  its powers to another unit; the second is the South African rule that the national 
law would prevail over unit laws if  a national law is necessary on that matter; third, the 
power to make laws and the power to implement those laws can be given to different 
governments.     
Resource Allocation
A critical function of  a federal constitution is to allocate resources among the different 
levels of  government, as no government can act without adequate resources even if  
many powers are given to it. We can think of  resources as including public service, money, 
taxing power, and natural resources. Resources should be matched to responsibilities. 
Equally, the responsibility for raising resources should be given to the government that 
has to spend or use them, to induce a sense of  responsibility. This rule is subject to the 
economies of  raising resources, for sometimes a government may be better at raising 
resources, but may not need the resources for itself. This issue arises most clearly in the 
area of  taxation. The most productive type of  taxes (corporate tax, customs duties) are 
most effi ciently raised and collected by the centre, yet a part of  that revenue may be 
best spent in the sub-national units. To resolve such issues, and to uphold the general 
principle of  equalization of  resources and development, a complex scheme of  taxation 
and revenue distribution would be required.  
The Cultural Question
The chief  justifi cation for ethnic federalism is that this kind of  federation ensures the 
protection of  minority cultures. A national minority that is dominant in a sub-national 
unit would be able to promote its culture, which would normally be marginalized in a 
unitary state. It is thus common to give responsibility for cultural matters (including 
for customary laws or practices) to sub-national units. Such arrangements also 
open up possibilities regarding language policy and use. The unit could prescribe a 
local language, perhaps of  the majority or dominant people, as an offi cial language, 
and require that public servants learn that language so that the people can deal with 
offi cial business in that language. Even if  the minority language is not made an offi cial 
language, the government is likely to take measures to develop the language. Such an 
approach is also possible in a unitary state, but it is less likely (as Nepal's experience 
itself  demonstrates).   
It is unusual to have different offi cial religions in a country, even in federations. But an 
exception is Switzerland, where each canton can decide on its religion. However, this 
may not apply in Nepal, as the Interim Constitution commits Nepal to being a secular 
state, with full equality of  all religions.  
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The Rights of Minorities
A paradox of  federalisms established for the protection of  a national minority is 
that such federalisms can put other groups in the autonomous area (some previously 
dominant) at risk. In order to prevent endless ethnic confl icts at local levels and to 
protect these 'new' minorities, special provisions must be devised, in addition to a 
strong bill of  individual and citizen rights. Where a minority is concentrated in a cluster 
of  villages or in small towns, they should be given local autonomy. District or regional 
governments should be required to include representatives from minority communities, 
and the central government might be given the responsibility of  protecting minority 
rights throughout the country. 
Dispute Settlement and Inter-governmental Relations
It is inevitable that disputes will arise to a greater extent in a federation than they 
would in a unitary system—between different governments, between individuals and 
corporations about matters like the allocation of  resources and exercise of  powers. 
Many of  these disputes concern interpretations of  the law—as to who has what powers, 
or whether a law or act exceeds the authority of  the government, or about confl icts of  
laws (which system or rule of  law applies in particular situation). A federal system is 
essentially legalistic, even when the system emphasises the principles of  co-operation 
and consultation. These disputes have to be ultimately resolved by the courts. And this 
means that all governments and non-government groups require good legal expertise 
and advice. 
But there are also disputes about policy, and ironically, these disputes can be more acute 
in a federation oriented towards co-operation than when the divisions of  responsibilities 
are clearly separate. These disputes can be settled through negotiations, and perhaps 
only in this way. Therefore, systems which emphasize co-operation also need a host of  
committees and commissions for settling claims to rivers and so on, the equalization 
of  development, the allocation of  money, co-ordination of  planning, etc. The people 
must be prepared to accept that decision making will become complex and more time 
consuming.
In ethnically based federations, there are very specifi c (and diffi cult to resolve) 
disputes about inter-community relations, boundaries, defi nitions of  identity, and issues 
regarding membership of  a community or a region, which can lead to violence, and 
which can only be resolved through negotiations and fairly constant intervention or 
mediation by the centre. In designing an ethnic federation, one should not disregard 
the dynamics of  ethnicity, which under a new framework may achieve new impetus. It 
must be remembered that while ethnicity can infl uence federalism, federalism can also 
infl uence ethnicity. 
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Entrenchment in the Constitution    
One crucial factor that distinguishes federalism from other methods of  decentralization 
is its protection in the constitution. Many see this as a virtue, for it means that the centre 
cannot take away the powers of  the sub-national unit or disband its institutions. And 
it also means that legal disputes between the federal entities are fi nally resolved by an 
independent supreme or constitutional court. Others, however, see this constitutional 
protection as the problem with federalism—that the federation can be confl ict prone 
and rigid. Even when there is very wide acceptance of  the need for change, convoluted 
amendment procedures may make it impossible to implement changes. When fl exibility is 
needed for a fundamental transformation of  political power and institutions, federalism 
locks the parties and the system into a rigid framework. 
Flexibility can, however, be achieved with guarantees of  protection. This chapter has 
suggested that one way to do this is to have a long list of  concurrent powers, over some 
of  which the units have the fi nal say, and others over which the national government 
has the fi nal say. Another solution is to use the second chamber as a negotiating forum 
for national legislation, which would be enforced by the units. A third method may be 
to confi ne the constitution to the principles and parameters of  federalism and leave 
the details to a law that itself  will enjoy some degree of  protection from amendment 
(but not as highly protected as the constitution). And yet another method might be to 
require a review of  the working of  the federal arrangements after, say, seven years.     
Implementing Federal Arrangements
The experience with the 1990 Constitution, despite its having a requirement for 
decentralization, shows that decentralization does not come about unless there is 
the political will. The history of  the demise of  the federal provisions in several 
independence constitutions in Africa and Asia reinforces this lesson. This chapter has 
demonstrated the political and administrative diffi culties of  instituting federalism of  
the disaggregation type, when a unitary state has to be transformed into a federation. It 
has also shown the complexity of  the federal system and the many legal and technical 
details that have to be got right if  federalism is to work. Decisions on these details 
must be informed by a great deal of  knowledge—of  geography, demography, taxation, 
sources of  revenue, administrative capacity, transportation facilities, and other forms of  
infrastructure, historical affi liations, political attitudes, and so on. It is also obvious that 
a full-blown federation cannot come into existence overnight; of  necessity, the process 
has to be gradual and phased, and a great deal of  new legislation and administrative re-
arrangements will have to be made to lay the foundations for creating a federal state. 
The implication of  the analysis outlined above is that a body must be given the 
responsibility to begin the research and accumulate the knowledge that must inform the 
deliberations of  the Constituent Assembly when it begins its review of  this topic (which 
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now it is required to do after the constitutional amendment of  9 March 2007). The 
Interim Constitution will require a High Level Commission to facilitate the decisions of  
the Constituent Assembly (although it does not specify its precise tasks). 
It is also clear that sustained efforts must be made to implement the federal provisions 
of  the new constitution. An independent, expert commission (perhaps drawing on the 
personnel, experience and documentation of  the High Level Commission set up for 
the Constituent Assembly) should be established to work with the various departments 
of  the government and of  the new governments of  the sub-national units, to enhance 
capacities for governance, prepare the necessary legislation, build new fi scal mechanisms, 
and assist in the gradual transfer of  functions and resources to the sub-national units. 
The transfer of  power must be gradual, as each unit demonstrates the willingness and 
the capacity to take on more functions (while taking care to ensure that this system of  
gradual transfer does not become an excuse for doing nothing). 
Supplementing Federalism
One can say with some confi dence that federalism alone will not by itself  solve the 
problems of  gender, class, inequitable social structure, and exclusion. To solve the 
problems of  disadvantage, discrimination, and exploitation, at least two things are 
necessary. The fi rst is the very careful design of  the federation—it must be remembered 
that not all federations are alike; each has its own approach and orientation. If  social 
justice, inclusion, and diversity are the objectives in Nepal, this must be refl ected in the 
details of  the division of  powers, the allocation of  resources, and the democratization 
of  institutions at all levels. Secondly, other methods of  promoting social justice must 
be pursued along with federalism, such as the creation of  national policies of  fair 
representation and proportionality, affi rmative action, provisions to promote linguistic 
and cultural diversity, and plans to ensure regional development and equalization—the 
aim would be to restructure the entire state. The state should promote the economic 
development of  depressed areas and encourage the opening up of  opportunities in the 
economy and professions for the marginalized communities. More attention will need 
to be given to group or community and minority rights. The state should respect and 
promote the languages and cultures of  the marginalized communities (see the 'Diversity, 
Rights, and Unity' and 'Women and the Constitution' chapters). 
Conclusion
Most people in Nepal accept the need for decentralization because outside of  a few 
centres, the centralized state has limited economic growth. The national government 
has a poor understanding of  the situation and problems of  the hinterland and is 
largely unable to make any positive contribution to their development. People have few 
opportunities to participate in the affairs of  the state, which is a major obstacle to the 
development of  democracy. There also seems to be few effective mechanisms for the 
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equalization of  resources, benefi ts, and development across the country.  
As federalism is seen to be the way out of  these predicaments, it is important that the 
Constituent Assembly be able to make informed decisions to bring about change. More 
research focused on the legal and other technical issues identifi ed in this paper needs 
to be conducted. There is also a need for a more focused debate on the merits and 
demerits of  federations and the ways in which federalism can be designed to achieve 
the objectives of  inclusiveness and social justice. And it would be desirable while this 
exercise is undertaken, to consider supplements to federalism and alternatives to ethnic 
federalism. 
But it must also be borne in mind that federalism requires a minimum degree of  trust—
the more trust there is between the centre and the units and among the people, the more 
robust the federation will be. The way choices are made, how early accommodations are 
made to create a good momentum in negotiations and the ability to see problems from 
the different perspectives of  the centre and each of  the units are important factors in 
trust building. 
Questions: 
1. Are some kinds of  purposes, for example, managing space and distance in 
countries with large territories, more easily achieved through federalism than 
through other systems? 
2. Will federalism give rise to new problems?  What might they be, and can they be 
managed? 
3. Will federalism be able to achieve the following goals?
(a) creating greater capacity for self-defence and national integrity; 
(b) promoting economic development by creating a larger unit for market and 
trade; and 
(c) enhancement of  democracy through greater participation and 
responsiveness.
4. Are some forms of  federation more manageable than others? 
5. Are some forms of  federation more conducive to national unity than others?
6. How can human rights best be protected in a federal system? 
7. What powers should be centralized and what powers should be non-centralized, 
and to what degree or extent? 
8. What mechanisms would best deal with these issues? 
 (a) Financial equalization between the regions 
 (b) Confl ict resolution
 (c) Management of  natural resources 
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CHAPTER 15
CHAPTER 15
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The Importance of the Executive
The most important element in the operation of  the state and the governance of  the 
country is the executive. Among other powers and responsibilities, the executive decides 
on the key policies of  the state, formulates laws for the approval of  the legislature, 
determines the rates of  taxation and other revenue-raising measures and the expenditure 
of  public money, allocates state resources, handles foreign policy and relations, exercises 
powers of  prosecution, and appoints people to key offi ces in the public service. While 
the legislature can exercise some control over the executive, and while the judiciary may 
be able to restrict the executive to its lawful powers, it is clear that only the executive 
has the powers to initiate major changes in the policies and to govern the country. 
Consequently, the nature and structure of  the executive is important for at least two 
reasons: (a) the effective running of  the country depends on it; and (b) it is necessary to 
regulate and make accountable the exercise of  executive powers. 
The Question of the Monarchy
Under an amendment to the Interim Constitution, Nepal is already committed to being 
a republic—that is, to having no monarchy. This decision was implemented by the fi rst 
meeting of  the Constituent Assembly. But this decision leaves many issues still to be 
decided about the structure of  the executive. What the Constituent Assembly did at 
its fi rst meeting was a temporary measure, leaving the fi nal decision on this important 
matter to full deliberation at a later stage. The abolition of  the monarchy opens up 
possibility for various options for the system of  the executive. Nepal has experienced 
several executive systems (as shown in the preceding chapters). We turn to a brief  
discussion of  some contemporary options.         
The National Executive
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Systems of the Executive 
Most modern systems of  government in the world can be classifi ed into parliamentary, 
presidential, and mixed systems.  
Sometimes reference is also made to power-sharing as another form of  the executive. 
Power-sharing arrangements can be organized in any of  the three systems mentioned. 
But since there are often special rules about the composition of  and decision-making 
rules in power-sharing executives, which are different from these three varieties, it is 
better to treat power-sharing as a distinct type of  executive. 
The Parliamentary System
In a parliamentary system, the head of  state is usually separate from the head of  
government. The head of  state in a parliamentary system is either a monarch, as in 
Britain, or a president, as in India, the latter normally elected by the legislature or an 
electoral college of  national and regional legislatures. The head of  government is the 
prime minister. The prime minister and the cabinet have to be appointed from among 
the members of  Parliament. 
In most parliamentary systems, the president appoints the prime minister, but must 
choose as the prime minister that member of  Parliament who has the support of  the 
majority of  parliamentarians, which usually means the leader of  the majority party or 
the leader of  a coalition of  parties, which together have the support of  the majority. 
Sometimes, the prime minister is appointed by or on the advice of  the speaker of  
the legislature (as in Sweden), following the same principle of  majority support; and 
occasionally, the prime minister is directly elected by the legislature (as in Papua New 
Guinea or the Solomon Islands). The prime minister appoints the members of  the 
cabinet. 
The president may also, in some circumstances, have the power to remove a government, 
but otherwise, his or her role is mainly ceremonial. The real power of  government is 
vested in the cabinet, acting under the prime minister. The cabinet operates on the 
principle of  collective responsibility, which means that decisions on policy must be 
made by the entire cabinet and defended by all ministers. 
The government is at all times responsible to Parliament and must explain and defend 
its policy to its members. Parliament can at any time remove the government by passing 
a vote of  no confi dence. In many parliamentary systems, the prime minister can also ask 
for and secure the dissolution of  Parliament, subject to certain restrictions; the confl ict 
between the prime minister and Parliament is then resolved in the resulting general 
election. 
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There is a set of  variants of  the parliamentary system under which the head of  
government is the president, who is also the head of  state. As well as being a member of  
Parliament, the president is elected president directly by the people. There are, maybe, 
three countries with such systems: Kiribati, in the Pacifi c, Kenya, and South Africa; and 
all are somewhat different. The Kenyan system is very weak in terms of  checks and 
balances: the president is too powerful. In South Africa, the president leaves Parliament 
once elected as president. They are all parliamentary systems, in that the president can 
be removed by a vote of  no confi dence. Interestingly, Nepal's system under the Interim 
Constitution was rather similar: the prime minister was the head of  state until mid-
2008.
The Presidential System
In the presidential system, the executive power is vested in the president. There is total 
separation between the executive, that is, the president and the legislature. The president 
is elected directly by the people, as is the legislature. Neither the president nor any 
member of  his or her cabinet can be a member of  the legislature, and the life of  the 
president and of  the legislature are fi xed. The president cannot be removed by the 
legislature through a vote of  no confi dence (but may be removed for serious misconduct 
by a formal process known as impeachment), and the president cannot dissolve the 
legislature. The president appoints his ministers and senior administrators, although their 
appointment requires the approval of  the legislature. Normally, all executive functions 
are vested in the president, and the role of  the cabinet is merely to advise the president. 
The president and the majority of  the legislature do not necessarily have to be from 
the same political party, and the president has far less control over the legislature than 
is usually the case in a parliamentary system. But since all laws, including the adoption 
of  the budget, have to be passed by the legislature, the president has to work with the 
legislature to ensure that his or her policies and plans can be carried out. 
Parliamentary and Presidential Systems Compared
We can summarize the major differences between parliamentary and presidential 
systems, as follows:
• In the parliamentary system, there is no sharp separation between the composition 
of  the executive and the legislature, as there is in the presidential system. 
• There are more checks and balances in a presidential system, but there is continuing 
accountability of  government to the legislature in the parliamentary system, as 
the prime minister and ministers sitting in Parliament have to constantly defend 
their policies and as they are subject to a vote of  no confi dence.
• Ministers have to be members of  Parliament in most parliamentary systems 
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(but not in France), but in a presidential system, members of  the legislature 
cannot become ministers unless they resign from Parliament; apart from this, the 
president also has a greater choice of  ministers.
• There will usually be a fi xed term for both the executive and the legislature in 
a presidential system, producing a kind of  stability. But unless there is an acute 
fragmentation of  parties, the parliamentary system works more smoothly because 
the government has a majority in the legislature.
• In the parliamentary system, the head of  state is separate from the head of  
government; in the presidential system, the head of  state is the president.
• The head of  government is directly elected in the presidential system, but the 
head of  government is appointed or elected by a small electoral college in the 
parliamentary system.
• The head of  government in the parliamentary system shares responsibility with 
the rest of  the cabinet, but the head of  government is the sole authority in the 
presidential system.
• The principal form of  control and accountability in the parliamentary system 
is political, although the courts could declare laws and policies that violate the 
constitution, which is the supreme law of  the land, unconstitutional and void. In 
the presidential system, there may be more use of  the law to deal with political 
issues.
• The parliamentary system is in some ways more suited for accommodating diverse 
interests and groups; for example, the position of  head of  state can be used to 
recognize minorities (perhaps by rotating the headship among groups that can 
never hope to control the government) and by the distribution of  ministries 
among different groups. On the other hand, in the presidential system, where the 
president is not restricted in his choice of  ministers, he can distribute portfolios 
among political and ethnic groups. 
Mixed Systems 
Some countries have tried to combine the strong and stable system of  government that is 
often associated with the presidential system with the more democratic and accountable 
system of  the parliamentary system. The best known example of  this comes from 
France, which has been copied in its original form, as in Sri Lanka and many African 
Francophone states, or in a modifi ed form, as in Portugal and Finland. 
The French system was established in 1958 to stabilize its political system, which had 
been previously parliamentary, because France had experienced frequent changes of  
government. The powers of  the executive are divided between the president, who is not 
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responsible or accountable to the legislature and cannot be removed by it, and the prime 
minister and his or her cabinet, who are responsible to the legislature. The president 
can dissolve the legislature, but only after consultation with the prime minister and the 
presiding offi cers of  the National Assembly and the Senate, and that also only once a 
year. Parliament controls its own time table, but the president can convene extraordinary 
meetings. Most powers of  government belong to the prime minister and the Council 
of  Ministers, but the president has important (and somewhat vague) powers to defend 
the integrity of  the republic and to safeguard the constitution. The president is elected 
directly by universal suffrage. The president appoints the prime minister, but effectively, 
the prime minister has to command majority support in the Lower House, the National 
Assembly. The normal rules of  the parliamentary system apply in relation to the cabinet 
and the legislature, including the powers of  the National Assembly to dismiss the 
government by a vote of  no confi dence. When the president and the prime minister 
come from the same party, the system works largely as a presidential system, and when 
they come from different parties, they may frequently quarrel and the system may not 
work well. Whether a mixed system operates more like a presidential or parliamentary 
system depends on the relative political strength of  the president or prime minister, but 
the bias is towards the parliamentary system, for despite the intention to create a strong 
executive, the powers of  the president are regarded as appropriate for times of  acute 
national crisis, while the normal working of  government depends on continued support 
from the legislature. Nevertheless, presidents may try to expand their powers and may 
succeed when their party has a majority in the legislature. Thus the mixed system does 
not preclude tensions between the president and the prime minister and can lead to 
politics of  intrigue and disunity in government, as is amply illustrated by the experience 
of  the mixed system in Sri Lanka.
Systems of Power Sharing
In both the presidential and parliamentary systems, all the powers of  the executive 
go to the side that wins the elections (‘winner takes all’ systems). The losing party 
has, at best, the role of  the offi cial opposition, its task being to criticize government 
policies and activities. Both systems are adversarial, that is to say, the winning and losing 
parties are locked into a confl ict. Sometimes these systems are criticized for creating 
or reinforcing political divisions and excluding one group completely from access to 
power. It is said that such systems may be acceptable in states that are homogeneous, 
for it is likely that election victories will periodically swing from one party to another, so 
that the loser has merely to await its turn. However, in a state where people are divided 
by ethnicity or religion, the minority communities may be perpetually in opposition and 
will, therefore, become dissatisfi ed and reject the system. In such situations, ways must 
be found to include all groups in the legislature and the executive so that no group is 
left out. Various electoral systems have been proposed to ensure fair representation of  
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minorities (see  chapter 11). The typical way to ensure the inclusion of  all groups in the 
executive is through power sharing in the cabinet. 
Power sharing is often practised to manage future relations between the 'warring' parties 
when a civil confl ict has ended (as is anticipated in the Interim Constitution in Nepal, 
at least until after the general elections following the adoption of  the new constitution 
by the Constituent Assembly). The fi rst government after the end of  apartheid in South 
Africa, as established in its interim constitution, brought into the cabinet all parties 
that had at least 20 per cent of  the membership in the legislature. The Constitution 
of  Bosnia-Herzegovina, a country with different major ethnic communities, is 
based on power sharing in all state institutions, including the judiciary. The current 
scheme for the restoration of  democracy and normality in Burundi is based on power 
sharing, as is the Good Friday agreement for peace in Northern Ireland. The 1997 Fiji 
Constitution provides for power sharing by all parties that have 10 per cent or more of  
the parliamentary seats. 
For obvious reasons, power sharing is easier in a parliamentary system than in a 
presidential system, for in the latter power is vested in one person, ministers being 
advisory. There is much greater scope for negotiations and alliances among political 
parties in a parliamentary system. However, power-sharing governments are not easy to 
operate, and may lead to the loss of  accountability of  the executive, as all leading parties 
are part of  the executive. Nepal's own experience under the Interim Constitution shows 
the diffi culties of  running a Parliament that operates on the principle of  power sharing, 
a principle that is mandated by the constitution, rather than by a Parliament, where 
willing partners form a coalition. South Africa decided not to continue with power 
sharing when it adopted the fi nal constitution, and serious diffi culties have arisen in 
the operating of  governments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Northern Ireland and Fiji, all 
of  which use the power-sharing format. It is, therefore, being suggested that while 
power sharing is useful, even necessary sometimes, to consolidate peace after the end 
of  confl ict, power sharing should be a transitional rather than a permanent feature of  
the constitution. 
The examples of  power sharing mentioned above are required by the constitution. This 
form of  power sharing has to be distinguished from the situation when no party has a 
majority and has to team up with one or more parties to secure enough votes to form 
a government. This type of  coalition government is quite common in parliamentary 
systems in which elections are held by proportional representation. However, India is 
an example of  even a 'first past the post' electoral system necessitating national coalition 
governments due to the rise of  regional parties (in 2007 the Indian government had 
some 30 parties). 
The above examples should also be distinguished from a federal system, where power 
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sharing takes the form of  distribution of  powers, some to the national government 
and some to the regional government. In general, federal systems do not raise specifi c 
issues for the structure of  the executive (and are compatible with both presidential and 
parliamentary systems), but they do raise issues about the national executive's powers 
and about the structure of  the executives at the regional level (as discussed in the chapter 
on federalism). But in some ethnically based federations there is power sharing in the 
sense used in this section, at one or both levels of  government.         
Principles for the Executive in Nepal
It is possible, by examining the logic or dynamics of  different executive systems, to 
assess their usefulness and effectiveness for specifi ed objectives. Thus one could say 
that Nepal is engaged in a three-pronged transition: from a mixed monarchical-multi-
party democratic system to full democracy based on the sovereignty of  the people, from 
insurgency and confl ict to peaceful and stable politics, and from a rather exclusive to an 
all inclusive system of  representation and participation that recognizes the diversities of  
its people. Each of  these transitions has implications for the system of  the executive. Full 
democracy requires the accountability of  the executive to elected bodies; peaceful and 
stable politics necessitates power sharing (at least for a period), and inclusion depends 
on both wide participation and a dispersal of  power. For most of  these objectives, a 
parliamentary system, with its collective nature, responsibility, and accountability of  the 
cabinet, seems better fi tted than a presidential system, with its concentration of  power 
and authority in one person. 
However, the seemingly neat and clear logic of  institutions is affected by a number of  
political and cultural factors. Mention has been made, in this and other chapters, of  
the importance of  political parties, the principal vehicles through which a system of  
government works. This is evident from Nepal's experience since the fi rst stirrings of  
democracy in the 1950s, and particularly in the operation of  the 1990 Constitution. 
The nature and role of  parties, in turn, depend on the electoral system; the 'first past 
the post' system produces a very different result and consequences from a proportional 
representation system. The people's and the leaders' experience with and understanding 
of  the system are also critical—this consideration might lead to the strategy of  removing 
defi ciencies of  the existing system, rather than that of  introducing a really new system. 
There are other factors too, among which we must include the willingness or capacity 
of  the people to take advantage of  the opportunities for infl uence and participation 
opened up by a new constitution. 
The purpose of  this chapter is to highlight these considerations, not to elaborate them 
or to advocate a particular approach. This chapter thus concludes by examining some 
of  the potential pitfalls of  adopting a parliamentary system in Nepal, as shown by 
Nepal's experience with the 1990 Constitution, and by making some suggestions as 
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to how they might be mitigated. Major problems in the 1990 Constitution included 
the exclusion of  the marginalized communities, the frequent fragmentation of  political 
parties, the instability of  the executive, the failure of  Parliament to exact accountability 
of  the executive, particularly in matters of  security and civil-military relations, and the 
failure of  the executive to fully implement the constitution. The possible remedies for 
these defi ciencies are addressed in other chapters. 
How to Reduce Instability of the Executive 
Here we refer to the instability of  the executive, which means that short-lived 
governments are unable to take a long view of  reforms and policies, are unable to take 
effective steps to implement the constitution and laws, and are bogged down in intrigue 
and the politics of  survival. With the changing position and popularity of  political 
parties and the greater mobilization of  marginalized communities, there may be greater 
instability of  the executive.  
Instability arises, among others, from the following factors: quarrels among the leaders 
of  a party leading to splits, the changing of  party loyalty among parliamentarians, and 
the absence of  restrictions placed on the number of  times a vote of  no confi dence in 
the executive can be proposed.
The Constituent Assembly may wish to consider the following provisions to reduce 
instability:
• Constructive vote of  no confi dence: This method of  removing a government, 
which was fi rst introduced in the German Constitution in 1949, requires that a 
motion for the removal of  the government should also nominate a person who 
would become prime minister if  the motion were to be successful. One result 
of  this rule is that the offi ce of  the executive is never left vacant; as soon as a 
government is removed, a new prime minister is appointed. Another is that it 
is hard to win support for the motion to remove the prime minister, for while 
many parties and their leaders may want to remove the prime minister, it is less 
easy for them to agree on a successor (most party leaders probably want the job!). 
A limited number of  countries have adopted this rule, including Papua New 
Guinea, where the rule has introduced an element of  stability in an otherwise 
volatile political situation. It has also been adopted in the Thai Constitution of  
2007. The other side of  the coin is that a government which ought to be removed 
because it no longer has the support of  Parliament, or because it is ineffective, 
may survive for long periods (as indeed has been the case in Germany).
•  Restrictions on motions of  no confi dence: Would it be a good idea to specify 
periods of  'no motions of  no confi dence,' in order to give a newly elected 
executive time to establish itself ? If  so, there could be a rule that no motion 
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can be moved in the fi rst year of  a new government. Restrictions can also be 
placed on the introduction of  additional motions for a period of  one year after 
an unsuccessful motion. And some countries have a rule that no motion can be 
moved in the last year of  the life of  a government. The Interim Constitution 
does say that no more than one motion may be moved within six months, but 
this, though probably desirable, is only a limited restriction.
• Special majorities for removal of  government: Another way to introduce stability 
could be to require that the motion of  no confi dence can be passed only by 
a two-thirds vote of  all parliamentarians, which would in practice be hard to 
obtain (this is, in fact, what the Interim Constitution of  Nepal provides). But this 
may not necessarily be a good idea, as it would mean that a government which 
does not have enough support to secure the passing of  its legislative bills or the 
budget can stay in offi ce even though it cannot effectively perform the tasks of  
government.
• Restrictions on 'crossing the fl oor': The 1990 Constitution restricted crossing 
of  the fl oor, as it enabled the party on whose ticket a member was elected to 
notify the speaker if  he or she left the party, leading to the member losing his 
or her seat (Art. 49(1) (f)). The Interim Legislature (Art. 48 (c)) has a similar 
rule and the rule has been modifi ed for members of  the Constituent Assembly 
(expressly referring to involuntary as well as voluntary leaving of  the party, Art. 
67(d)). If  this is seen as too drastic a limitation on parliamentarians' freedom of  
association, it could be modifi ed to say that no member may cross the fl oor to 
accept a ministerial offi ce.
• Restrictions on splitting of  parties: Splitting of  parties has been a characteristic 
of  Nepali politics. The 1990 Constitution itself  made no provision on this, but 
the House of  Representative Members Election Act (2047; 1991) enabled the 
registration of  a splinter group if  40 per cent of  the members of  the central 
committee petitioned for registration (Art. 19). And, under the Anti-defection Act 
of  1997 members could retain their parliamentary seats in such circumstances. 
Perhaps this rule could be reviewed.
• Dissolution of  Parliament by a vote of  no confi dence:  Members of  Parliament 
may be inclined to vote for a motion of  no confi dence if  their own status as 
members is not affected. However, if  Parliament itself  is dissolved through a 
vote of  no confi dence, they are unlikely to support the motion of  no confi dence. 
In some countries, a prime minister who has lost the vote of  confi dence can ask 
for the dissolution of  Parliament, or in some countries, dissolution takes place 
automatically on the vote. The virtue of  this rule is that in case of  a confl ict, the 
matter would be resolved by the people themselves in an election. However, the 
rule on dissolution is not necessarily always a good thing, for it would greatly 
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reduce the willingness of  parliamentarians to exercise proper scrutiny of  the 
executive and to impose appropriate sanctions, the most effective of  which is the 
executive's removal. 
The above discussion shows that while too frequent a use of  the vote of  no confi dence 
is undesirable, the ability to remove the executive that has lost the support of  Parliament 
is an essential aspect of  parliamentary government, and this provision is often cited 
by supporters of  the parliamentary system to show the system's superiority to the 
presidential system. But the lesson is that the provision must be used responsibly and 
legitimately.  
Questions
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of  the parliamentary and presidential 
systems of  government? Which system would be better for Nepal?
2. If  the Constituent Assembly decides to maintain the parliamentary system, what 
improvements to the system under the 1990 Constitution would you propose?
3. What restrictions should there be on parliamentarians' crossing the fl oor (i.e. 
leaving their party to join another)?
4. Should a member of  Parliament be removed from Parliament if  the party that 
nominated the member expels her or him from party membership?
5. How can the participation of  the people in the affairs of  the state, and particularly 
the work of  the executive, be promoted?
6. What are the different ways in which the executive can be held accountable? How 
can the accountability of  the executive be increased?
7. Whether one looks at the membership of  the legislature, the executive, the 
judiciary or the public service, one fi nds few women, Janajatis, Madheshis and, least 
of  all, Dalits. The constitution did not prohibit the participation of  these groups. 
Their exclusion was due to the practices of  political parties that dominated the 
political process. What provisions would you recommend for promoting greater 
inclusion in the executive?
203
204
CHAPTER 16
CHAPTER 16
205
Introduction
The name given to the national legislature varies from country to country. 'Parliament,' 
is used in the United Kingdom, India, Canada, Australia, and most countries that have 
parliamentary systems. The United States of  America calls its entire legislative body 
'Congress.' Some countries call either the entire legislative body or one of  the Houses 
'National Assembly.' The Indian Parliament comprises the House of  the People and 
the Council of  States; the US Congress comprises the House of  Representatives and 
the Senate. In this paper, we will use 'legislature' to refer to the national legislature, and 
'members' to refer to 'members of  Parliament.'
Under the 1990 Constitution, the national legislature comprised the House of  
Representatives and the National Assembly, as well as the king (who was considered 
a part of  Parliament because of  his role in signing laws). The House was made up of  
205 members from geographical constituencies, and the members were elected to the 
House in general elections that all Nepali citizens over the age of  18 had a right to vote 
in.
Some members of  the National Assembly were chosen by the king, some were elected 
by the House, and some were elected by members of  the local authorities. The National 
Assembly was intended to bring into Parliament a variety of  opinions and experience, 
and to represent the interests of  local areas and authorities. 
The word 'legislature' implies that the function of  this body is to make laws, but in 
a representative democracy, the legislature has functions other than those implied 
by its name. In a parliamentary system—like the Nepali Parliament under the 1990 
Constitution—the relationship of  the legislature with the government is rather different 
from that in a presidential system (see the chapter on systems of  government), but in all 
The National Legislature
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democratic systems, the legislature has essentially the same four main functions: 
• to represent the people  
• to make laws
• to authorize and supervise the raising and expenditure of  public revenue
• to oversee and hold the executive accountable
Parliamentary and presidential systems may differ in the ways that powers are allocated 
and exercised, and mixed systems may include features of  both these systems. Perhaps 
it will be easier to see these differences if  we compare in broad terms the legislatures in 
typical parliamentary and presidential systems:
Power to In a Parliamentary System In a Presidential System
Pass laws Laws are passed by the legislature—must 
usually also be signed by the head of state 
(monarch or president).
Laws are passed by the legislature—must 
usually also be signed by the head of 
state (president), who is also head of 
government.
Approve the budget In theory, the legislature has the power to 
approve or reject the budget.
In theory, the legislature has the power to 
approve or reject the budget.
Appoint the head of government The head of government (prime minister) 
must have support of the legislature (or of 
the Lower House).
The legislature has no role in appointing 
the head of government.
Dismiss the head of government The legislature may remove the head 
of government by votes in the Lower 
House—such removal usually requires a 
simple majority.
The legislature may not remove the head of 
government through this process.
Question the prime minister and 
ministers
There is usually a formal procedure for this. There may be a formal requirement that 
the president (and ministers) attend and 
respond to questions.
Debate national issues Important function. Important function.
Set up committees of inquiry 
into the conduct of the executive 
and other issues
Important function. Important function.
Dismiss the head of state by vote 
of no confi dence
If the head of state is the president, the 
legislature may have the power to remove 
the president, or play a part in the removal, 
by a form of trial (impeachment).
The legislature usually has the power to 
remove the head of state by a form of trial 
(impeachment).
Approve the appointment of 
ministers
The legislature may have no role—except 
that the prime minister would have to retain 
support of the legislature.
The legislature often has the power to 
approve or reject the president's nominees.
Approve treaties entered into by 
the state
Practice varies. Practice varies.
Approve other appointees (like 
judges, ambassadors, etc.)
Rarely has any role. Often has a role.
Dismiss judges Traditionally, the legislature could remove 
the highest judges through impeachment.
Sometimes the legislature could remove 
the highest judges through impeachment.
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Issues Under the 1990 Constitution
Representation
One central problem with the legislature under the 1990 Constitution of  Nepal was 
that it wasn't inclusive enough: the make-up of  the legislature did not mirror the social 
make-up of  the country. When making the new Nepali constitution, it will be necessary 
to think creatively about how a more inclusive democracy, as mandated by Jana Andolan 
II, can be created. To read about possible solutions in detail, please refer to the chapters 
on political parties and electoral systems. 
Making and Changing Laws
Most laws are drafted by government departments and introduced into the legislature 
by ministers. Under the 1990 Constitution, all laws had to be passed by both chambers, 
and there was a procedure for resolving disagreements between the two chambers. A 
law so passed would then go to the king for his signature of  approval (he could refer it 
back to the legislature only once for reconsideration, if  he had suffi cient reason to do 
so). 
However, there was a provision, modelled on the Constitution of  India, under which, 
the king could pass a law, known as an ordinance, when Parliament was not sitting. 
The king could pass such ordinances without his fi rst being requested to do so by the 
members of  the government; such ordinances were effective for only a limited time, 
and the ordinances could continue to stay in effect only if  they were then approved 
by Parliament. This procedure has been used in controversial circumstances by the 
executive in Nepal; and in India too, this procedure has been much abused, especially 
at the state level. Many people think that this practice undermines the power of  the 
legislature to pass laws, and that if  a new law is really urgently required, the legislature 
should be recalled, instead.
The legislature often gives executive departments the power to make rules and 
regulations for implementing the objectives of  the parent law. There is concern about 
this method of  making laws, which is conducted almost in secret, by people (in reality 
by civil servants) who have not been elected for the task of  law making.  Even if  
consultations are carried out, they are usually conducted only with experts involved in 
the subject matter of  the detailed regulations, not with the public at large. Thus public 
participation is undermined, as is the role of  the elected members. A constitution could 
have provisions that would place some limit on the law-making power of  the executive 
and that would also set up a mechanism under which such 'delegated legislation' would 
have to be scrutinized by the elected legislature. 
Problems with Public Finance
In principle, no public expenditure can be incurred, and no taxes imposed, without 
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legislative approval. Although in principle expenditure must be approved in advance, 
under the 1990 Constitution, once the budget had been presented, the government 
could present a Vote on Account Bill to get approval of  expenditure for up to one-
third of  the estimated annual expenditure, without a thorough discussion being held 
on the matter (the provision is unclear). The 1990 Constitution included a provision 
for a 'Contingency Fund' for emergencies, under which the government could incur 
expenditure without approval, though then, the amount incurred had to be repaid 
as soon as possible. The constitution was not clear about how the approval for this 
expenditure was to be obtained. Finally, there was the possibility of  a Vote of  Credit 
Bill, for which parliamentary approval could be sought for certain expenses without 
the government's having to explain in detail to the House how the money would be 
spent. The circumstances under which such a bill could be tabled was specifi ed in 
the constitution as 'local or national emergency due to either natural cause, a threat 
of  external aggression or internal disturbances, or other reasons.' This is a very wide 
provision (especially 'or other causes'), more so than in other constitutions, which  gives 
greater discretion to the executive than is common. 
In some countries, the auditor general is appointed by the legislature and reports to the 
legislature, but under the 1990 Constitution of  Nepal, the auditor general was appointed 
by the king on the recommendation of  the Constitutional Council, and reported to the 
king, who laid the report before Parliament. Now, under the Interim Constitution, the 
president has the functions once exercised by the king. 
Holding the Government Accountable
The government can be held accountable for its actions in various ways, including 
through the questioning of  ministers in the House and in committees. In the Nepali 
Parliament, there were nine committees in the House of  Representatives looking at 
different substantive areas of  government activity. Committees can be a very effective 
aspect of  the work of  the legislature, partly because members in such committees are 
often knowledgeable about the subject matter that has been delegated to them. Although 
such committees do not work in secret, their work is performed away from the eyes of  
the public, enabling them to concentrate better on the matter at hand.
One House or Two?  The Need for a Second Chamber
Out of  the past fi ve constitutions in Nepal, three (1948, 1958 and 1990) provided for 
legislatures with two Houses. The 1990 Constitution provided a second chamber, of  
which 10 per cent of  the members were nominated, 25 per cent were elected by the 
representatives of  local governments, and 65 per cent (including at least three women) 
were to be elected by the fi rst chamber of  the legislature. 
It is sometimes argued that two chambers in the legislature are not necessary in a unitary 
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(non-federal) state, but many unitary countries do have two chambers. In the federal 
system of  government, the universal practice is to have two separate chambers: an 
important function of  the second chamber is to provide representation for the regions 
at the centre and to safeguard regional interests. The second chamber can be used to 
secure regional/territorial representation even if  there is no devolution, and this was 
one of  the functions of  the National Assembly under the 1990 Constitution.
The second chambers in Germany and South Africa play a key role in making laws 
and policies at the centre, especially in relation to matters that affect the regions. In 
Germany, each regional government has a certain number of  votes in the second 
chamber, determined by the region's population, and the regional governments may 
choose as many member as they have votes; in South Africa, each province has ten 
members: four who are members of  the provincial legislature and six non-members of  
the provincial legislature nominated by the parties at the province level. The US Senate 
has an equal number of  members from each state, while the House of  Representatives 
has representatives from each state, determined by the population of  the state.  The 
Senate also has a higher minimum age-requirement for its senators than the House of  
Representatives has for its representatives. 
In the United Kingdom, as in some other countries, there is a second chamber, which 
came about as a result of  history—different classes of  society had different Houses. 
Some constitutions in African countries and countries in the South Pacifi c use second 
chambers as a legislative or consultative forum for chiefs. A variation of  this approach 
is the nominated second chamber, where persons who are not politicians—retired 
public servants or those citizens who are eminent in their professions or in social and 
religious groups, and who bring important perspectives to bear on legislative and policy 
decisions—are included in the chamber. This type of  a chamber is in place in Canada, 
and in the British House of  Lords too, nominated life peers (nobles) are replacing 
hereditary peers (but eventually all or some of  the members will be elected, which may 
make the House of  Lords more like the House of  Commons).
In Burkina Faso, the Upper House is composed of  representatives of  social and 
economic groups, and in Malawi, the Upper House includes distinguished citizens 
and representatives of  various districts and religious denominations. Such forms of  
representation may be criticized for being undemocratic, but in countries where there 
is much widespread disillusionment with the ethics, commitment, and competence of  
professional politicians, there may be justifi cation for considering these supplementary 
forms of  participation.
Tenures and Functions of Chambers  
In some countries, while the fi rst, popularly elected chamber has a limited life, the 
second chamber is never dissolved (though certain sections of  its members may have 
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to retire at different times). Thus the second chamber can enjoy a continuity of  tenure 
that the Lower House may lack. 
The powers of  these second chambers vary. In most countries, the elected chamber 
is given more powers, and the legislative power of  the second chamber is limited to a 
power to delay motions in the House, the passage of  bills, and so on. Furthermore, the 
different make-up of  the second chamber can give rise to thorough debates on issues 
on which that chamber's members have special interest or expertise.
In some countries without second chambers, advisory councils may be established, 
either to advise the head of  state (as in Portugal), or to provide a forum through which 
minorities can, or must, be consulted by the legislature on specifi ed kinds of  laws 
and policies (as in Finland and under the new constitutions of  many East European 
states). 
Second Chambers in Nepal   
Nepal's experience with the second chamber has not been very satisfactory: the second 
chamber under the 1958 Constitution blocked several reform measures passed by the 
fi rst chamber; and the second chamber under the 1990 Constitution was not effective in 
representing the interests of  local governments because the members of  the chamber 
were infl uenced by party politics. Despite the second chamber's shortcomings, it does 
not mean that Nepal should not have a second House.
As the new system in Nepal is expected to be federal, there will also be legislatures at 
the regional or provincial levels. 
Life of the Legislature
In parliamentary systems, it is normal for the life of  the legislature (or the lower/elected 
house, if  there is more than one) to be fi xed at fi ve years (more rarely at four or even 
three years), but there are usually provisions in the law that make it possible for the 
House to be dissolved, and for a general election to be called before the mandated 
date. Often, the prime minister effectively has the power to determine the date of  
elections; giving this power to the prime minister means that he or she can choose a 
favourable moment that would increase his or her chances of  winning the election. Of  
course, if  such a call for an election seems too blatantly manipulative, the electorate may 
rebel and vote instead for the previous opposition. In some systems, the House itself  
decides on its dissolution; but if  the prime minister has a majority and his or her party 
is well-disciplined, this amounts to the same thing as the prime minister's calling for the 
dissolution. It is possible to restrict the possibility for an early dissolution—restricting it 
to a situation where a deadlock in the House makes it impossible to form a government, 
or to pass a budget, for example. It would be perfectly possible for the constitution to 
provide a fi xed life for the legislature, though this is rare. In a few constitutions, the date 
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for the fi rst annual sitting of  the legislature is fi xed. All Parliaments in Nepal under the 
1990 Constitution were dissolved prematurely, though the Supreme Court held that in 
some cases the power to dissolve Parliament had been misused. An early dissolution of  
the House can give rise to many problems, including the added cost of  elections and the 
fact that the government's work will be interrupted.
Presidential systems normally have a fi xed life for their legislatures. The dates for 
US congressional elections are absolutely fi xed; if  there is disagreement between the 
president and the Congress, they must try to work out their differences. 
Role of the Opposition
In a parliamentary system, the party or parties in government control most of  the 
legislature's time and largely determine the business to be undertaken. The word 
'opposition' is used to describe the members who are not in the parties in government. 
In a presidential system, as in the United States of  America, the opposition to the 
president might comprise the majority of  the members, as is the case at present (mid-
2008). The constitutional role of  the opposition is to constantly question, probe, and 
call the government to account. Its function is almost as important as that of  the 
government. Criticism from the opposition is partly intended to infl uence government 
policy, through force of  argument or the pressure of  public opinion, and is partly 
directed by the opposition towards the public, with a view to wooing the electorate 
during the next election. 
In the United Kingdom, the leader of  the opposition and some of  his or her principal 
colleagues in both Houses form a group called 'the Shadow Cabinet.' Each member 
of  this group 'shadows' the work of  a minister or department, in order to be able to 
make informed criticism of  the government's policies and administration and to outline 
alternative policies. The opposition is expected to behave as though it may be called to 
form the government at any time, and thus it should not make false promises or impede 
and obstruct the work of  Parliament.
The 1990 Constitution of  Nepal, for the fi rst time, mentioned the leader of  the 
opposition, but otherwise, as in most constitutions, said nothing about the role of  the 
opposition. The leader of  the opposition was one of  the fi ve members of  the powerful 
Constitutional Council headed by the prime minister that selected the chief  justice, the 
auditor general, and all members of  the Election Commission, the Commission for the 
Investigation of  Abuse of  Authority, and the Public Service Commission. 
The record of  the performance of  the leaders of  the opposition in Nepal was not entirely 
satisfactory, but with experience, they were beginning to improve their performance. 
Under the Interim Constitution, however, there was originally no provision for a formal 
opposition, and no leader of  the opposition; this is because the Interim Constitution 
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is intended to be a temporary set-up while the nation focuses on creating the new 
constitution. However, the Interim Constitution was amended to provide for the 
opposition.  In drafting the new constitution, it will be important to consider whether 
the previous provisions, or even more detailed provisions, should be introduced. Some 
constitutions do say rather more about the role of  the opposition and the role of  its 
leader: these constitutions may require that the ruling party get involved with, or at least 
consult with, the leader of  the opposition, on certain issues that need to be decided 
on a cross-party basis, like issues related to national security or election procedures or 
appointments of  certain government offi cials, especially to posts that should be non-
political.
Making the Legislature More Effective 
As the revenue that passes through the government and the bureaucracy that serves the 
government grows, the trend worldwide is for the executive to dominate the legislature. 
The executive's dominating of  the legislature can, however, create situations in which 
elected legislative bodies are less and less able to take their own legislative and policy 
initiatives, or in which the legislative bodies are unable to scrutinize and control the 
executive. In many countries, most politicians do not see themselves as professional 
politicians committed to their party manifesto or to the good of  the constituency or 
country, but regard their stint in the legislature as a stepping stone to ministerial or other 
high offi ce, especially in parliamentary systems. Consequently, they do not take enough 
interest in the work of  the legislature. 
In many parts of  the world, a number of  proposals have been made to strengthen the 
role and capacity of  the legislature. They include the following:
• Training and further education for members, particularly instructions in reading 
and understanding accounts and other fi nancial statements; providing proper 
grounding in the constitutional and parliamentary procedures;
• Adopting a rule that demands minimum educational qualifi cations of  the 
members; this, of  course, may mean that the legislature is less truly representative 
of  the people, and it is true that many effective members in many countries have 
not had the highest of  formal educational qualifi cations. But members must be 
able to at least understand the business of  the legislature;
• Instituting a retirement age for members: public servants in many countries have a 
compulsory retirement age (unless there are concerns about 'age discrimination'). 
Should members be treated any differently? Some people might argue that if  the 
voters want a person who is old, the public should be allowed to have him or her 
as their representative, but it may be diffi cult for the voters to know whether a 
candidate is really still up to the job or is being sustained by drugs or is skilled at 
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putting on a front of  being active, in order to conceal their declining powers, as 
seems to be the case in several African and Asian countries. Also, the reality may 
be that the electorate vote for a party and not for individuals.
• Anti-defection provisions, under which members who defect from their party 
to another lose their seats in the assembly. There is some controversy over such 
provisions, discussed briefl y in the chapter on the executive. 
• A provision whereby members who are absent from the assembly or committees 
for more than the prescribed minimum number of  days lose their seats in the 
assembly. There was such a rule in the 1990 Constitution—members could 
lose their seats if  they were absent without permission (of  the speaker) for 30 
consecutive sittings of  the chamber; if  Parliament sat for only three or four days 
a week, and broke for periods of  some weeks quite often, 30 sittings might be 
spread over several months. Under the Interim Constitution, members could 
lose their seats if  they missed 10 consecutive meetings. But if  they give notice of  
absence they don't lose their seats. Some constitutions are more demanding than 
this: according to the Kenyan Constitution, members who are absent for eight 
consecutive assembly sittings can lose their seats, and the proposed drafts of  the 
new Kenyan Constitution have included stricter provisions still.
• Increasing the quorum. Many legislatures can sit, and even vote, even if  quite 
a small number of  members are present at the time of  voting. Under the 1990 
Constitution in Nepal, the quorum for the House of  Representatives was 25 
per cent of  the members of  the House. This is perhaps a little low, although 
it is unrealistic to require more than half  of  the members to be present. Very 
low quorums were fi xed in various systems, under the assumption that members 
were only part-time employees. If  the legislature is to become more effective, the 
members should perhaps take their jobs as seriously as (if  not more than) people 
would in any other profession.
• Restricting the size of  the cabinet: in some countries, nearly half  of  the members 
are appointed to the cabinet or to other executive positions to eliminate or 
minimize the dangers of  a vote of  no confi dence. Indeed in Nepal, with a chamber 
of  205 members under the 1990 Constitution, ministers, ministers of  state and 
assistant ministers could constitute quite a large proportion of  the House. The 
constitutions of  some countries do specify the size for the Council of  Ministers; 
in Vanuatu, the  cabinet must not exceed 25 per cent of  the Parliament, while 
Samoa fi xes the number of  ministers at no fewer than eight and no more than 12. 
These are tiny countries with small legislatures, and a larger country would have 
a lower percentage limit, or an appropriate number.
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• Strengthening the research capacity of  the legislature and individual members, 
by appointing researchers, including legislative drafters, for the legislature and 
facilitating the appointment of  researchers for political parties.
• Providing a reasonable salary and pension for members. However, many countries 
also provide that the members themselves may not fi x their pay; an example is 
the Constitution of  Fiji, under which the salaries of  members and other public 
offi cers are fi xed by an independent commission. Over-generous salaries fi xed 
by the members themselves may lead to public disillusionment and anger with 
politicians.
• Creating an independent administrative service and support bodies, such as a 
secretariat, was provided for in the 1990 Constitution of  Nepal. However, this 
requires that the government must provide the necessary staff. In some countries, 
Parliament has its own separate staff, so that the government cannot starve the 
legislature of  resources.
• Specifying a minimum number of  sitting days. The 1990 Constitution said that 
not more than six months would have to elapse between the end of  one (annual) 
session and the beginning of  the next. This provision said nothing about how 
many days the legislature would have to sit for. The Constitution of  Papua New 
Guinea says the legislature must 'meet not less frequently than three times in 
each period of  12 months, and, in principle, for not less than nine weeks in each 
such period,' which should ensure that the legislature sits for over half  the weeks 
of  the year, and without having excessively long periods of  recess (though the 
phrase 'in principle' weakens the provision). Such a requirement is relevant not 
just to ensure that the members work reasonably hard, but to make it unnecessary 
to provide for the executive to pass major laws when the legislature is not sitting, 
and also to reduce the risk of  the government's adjourning the legislature to 
prevent a vote of  no confi dence (something which does actually happen in Papua 
New Guinea). The second risk can be reduced by permitting a certain number of  
legislators to require the calling of  the House even when it is in recess.
• Strengthening the committee system, with one committee for each major 
sector of  the executive, with research and other administrative staff; giving 
the committee the power to summon ministers, civil servants, stakeholders, 
and experts to supply information; encouraging the committee to use outside 
experts, if  need be—for example, by recruiting advisers for major inquiries, etc.; 
making committees alternative sites of  expertise where policies can be debated 
and formulated and whose proceedings can be open to the public; encouraging 
public hearings in the capital city and other parts of  the country. 
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• Strengthening the capacity of  the auditor general so that his or her offi ce can 
assist parliamentarians in scrutinizing government expenditures and budget 
proposals. 
• Creating better library and internet facilities for members of  the legislature.
Should the legislature also have the power to reject or approve appointments to certain 
positions? Under the US Constitution, Supreme Court judges, ambassadors, members 
of  the cabinet, and certain offi cers must be appointed with the approval of  the Senate. 
One reason for this is to involve the states of  the federation; another is to provide a 
check on the exercise of  patronage by the president. In a parliamentary system, where 
the political balance in the House necessarily favours the prime minister, but where the 
prime minister could be removed by a simple majority, a process such as the one in use 
in the United States of  America is not as necessary, and is less effective as a check on 
the executive. And if  appointments are made by an independent body—as is becoming 
increasingly common in the appointment of  judges (see chapter on the judiciary)—it 
may not be wise to politicize the matter by involving the legislature. It might be wise to 
re-think the provision introduced into the Interim Constitution that requires legislative 
approval for the appointment of  ambassadors, members of  independent commissions, 
and certain judges.
The Public and the Legislature
Public participation in government should go beyond the people's periodically voting 
for their representatives. Legislative sittings are normally open to the public, but this 
does not mean that the public feel encouraged to attend these sittings. Effective public 
participation is not achieved simply by making such opportunities available, but by 
instituting processes that encourage, aid, and promote the fullest possible participation 
by the public. This is especially so if  those who exist on the margins and periphery 
of  society are to be brought into the mainstream political process, through a system 
of  governance that is inclusive, responsive, and transparent. What is needed is a 
comprehensive education, information, and outreach strategy that is aimed at providing 
the public with the knowledge and the means to access what may otherwise appear to 
them to be remote and incomprehensible institutions.
Some legislatures actively encourage the public to participate in the law-making process 
and to attend the sittings of  the legislature, committee meetings, and public hearings, 
and have a programme of  public information about the legislature's work—civic 
education campaigns, public hearings, community events, open weeks, and publications, 
advertising, and media coverage are examples. A constitution would normally not specify 
such outreach programmes in great detail, but it could require the legislature to be more 
open to the public in general terms, or even require that a legislature have a committee 
with the special responsibility of  promoting public participation.
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Political parties may facilitate public participation too. The wider party structure may 
provide a valuable network, linking individual constituents and communities with their 
elected representatives. Party structures can be used to ensure that local views and 
grievances fi lter up through the system, and the structures can be designed to provide 
channels for the distribution of  information on the ground. Unfortunately, all too many 
parties are happy for the people to vote for them at election time, but do not provide 
much of  a link between people and the legislature the rest of  the time. More democratic 
and accountable party structures could remedy this situation.
For centuries, citizens have petitioned legislatures in the hope that they would pass 
laws on, or investigate, matters the citizens were concerned about. This old idea has 
been given a new lease of  life in some countries. In Scotland, for example, a largely 
autonomous part of  the UK, there are rules to ensure that petitions from the public are 
given adequate consideration. 
In some countries (and in the state of  California), it is possible for a certain number of  
voters to propose a change in the law and require a vote of  the electors on the topic 
of  their choice (perhaps during the same time that a regular election takes place). If  
the proposed idea is accepted by a prescribed majority of  the voters, the legislature is 
bound to pass the law. In other countries, it is possible for a change in the law proposed 
by government to go to the people for a vote. But such provisions, while they sound 
very democratic, can be controversial; for example, conducting such voting is expensive. 
There is also the risk that the people will be swayed by some particular event into 
passing an unwise law. The public could probably have neither the interest nor the 
resources to give full consideration to proposed changes in the law. There is also a risk 
that laws that are unfair to minorities will be passed (though human rights provisions 
should make this less likely). 
Questions 
1. Should the legislature retain the power to pass a vote of  no confi dence in the 
government?
2. Should the legislature be given a role in the appointment of  judges, senior public 
servants, ambassadors, etc?
3. Should the constitution restrict the powers of  the government to dissolve or 
prorogue (adjourn) the legislature? If  so, should there be any circumstances in 
which it can be dissolved prematurely, or should its term be fi xed? How long 
should that term be?
4. Should there be an upper age-limit or a maximum tenure for the members of  the 
legislature to be fi xed in the constitution? Should there be a minimum age for 
members?
217
5. What constitutional provisions would be needed to enhance the honesty and 
integrity of  the members of  the legislature?  Would these include the possibility 
of  the electors of  a constituency (if  geographical constituencies are retained) 
being able to recall their member? Or automatic loss of  seat for a member who 
misses a certain number of  sitting days? 
6. Should members be able to fi x their own salaries?
7. Should Nepal have two houses of  the legislature even if  the country does not have 
a federal system? If  so, what would you see as the role of  the second house?
8. What measures would you like to see in the constitution to enhance the 
effectiveness of  the legislature? A larger quorum? A requirement to sit for a 
minimum number of  days in a year? Provisions on the role of  committees?
9. Do you believe that members of  the public should be more actively involved in 
law making and other activities of  the legislature? If  so, do you have suggestions 
about how this can be achieved?
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The Role of the Judiciary
The judiciary is the bedrock of  any democratic constitution. The principal role of  the 
courts is to decide disputes by application of  the constitution or the law. These disputes 
can be between individuals, companies, and associations, between these and the state, 
and occasionally disputes between different state bodies. In applying the constitution 
or the law, the courts have to interpret them, for frequently the parties to a dispute 
will advance interpretations. By interpreting the constitution or the law, the courts also 
develop the constitution or the law. Another task of  a court, in deciding a dispute, is to 
make fi ndings of  facts from the evidence presented to it by the parties. Courts are not the 
only bodies that settle disputes (all kinds of  bodies settle disputes in a society—elders, 
professional organizations, communities, mediators and arbitrators, head of  clans, etc.) 
What is distinctive about a court is that it has to follow prescribed features that give the 
parties to a dispute opportunities to present their case, including the evidence, require 
observance of  various formalities, give parties the right to be represented by advocates, 
and to decide the case by applying the law. An even more important distinction is that 
the decisions of  the courts are binding on all parties, and the state is obliged to assist in 
the enforcement of  the decisions. 
Our interest here is in the role of  the courts in relation to the constitution. A constitution 
is the supreme law of  the land. One of  the principal functions of  the courts is to 
uphold the supremacy of  the law by declaring void laws or administrative acts which are 
inconsistent with it. In most states today, a fundamental role of  the courts is to protect 
the constitutional rights of  citizens and other persons. 
The legislature and the executive will be infl uenced by electoral politics, and there may 
be attempts to apply and interpret the constitution according to party interests. It has 
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been repeatedly said that it is crucial to have an independent and competent judiciary to 
protect rule of  law and supremacy of  the constitution. The judiciary, particularly of  the 
Supreme Court, is the fi nal arbiter of  any constitutional and legal dispute between state 
and citizens and among the institutions of  the state. 
The Concept of an Independent Judiciary
Two UN General Assembly Resolutions (40/32 of  29 November 1985 and 40/146 
of  13 December 1985) laid down some 'Basic Principles of  the Independence of  the 
Judiciary' that provide some international standards and guidance for Member States. 
The principles emphasize the following:
1. The independence of  the judiciary should be guaranteed by the state and 
enshrined in the constitution or the laws of  the country and should be respected 
by all. (Protection in the law is much weaker than in the constitution, since laws 
can be changed relatively easily).
2. The judiciary must decide cases impartially, on the basis of  facts and in accordance 
with the law, without any restrictions, improper infl uences, inducements, pressures, 
threats, or interferences (improper interference would include interference from 
the state, or from political parties, businesses, etc).
3. The judiciary must have the power to decide all issues of  'a judicial nature,' and 
the courts themselves must alone decide whether an issue is within their legal 
competence.
4. There must not be any inappropriate or unwarranted interference with the 
judicial process, and judicial decisions should not be subject to revision by any 
other body. 
5. Everyone must have the right to be tried by the ordinary courts or tribunals using 
established legal procedures. 
6. A Member State must provide adequate resources to enable the judiciary to 
properly perform its functions.
7. Individuals appointed as judges must have integrity and ability, with appropriate 
training or qualifi cations in law. There should be no improper motive (which 
would include political motives) in their appointment, and no discrimination on 
the grounds of  race, sex, etc.
8. The terms of  offi ce, salaries, etc. of  the judges should be protected by law, and 
judges must have security of  tenure unless they are unfi t to discharge their duties 
because of  their incapacity or behaviour.
The judiciary has always been fairly independent in Nepal. Even during the one-party 
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Panchayat system, which was directly headed by different kings from 1962 to 1990, the 
Supreme Court claimed fairly independent status within the constitutional constraints 
under that system. The 1990 Constitution, which was promulgated after the demise 
of  the Panchayat system had fuller provisions about the independence of  the judiciary 
than did the earlier constitutions, and measured against the standards set by the UN 
Basic Principles, those provisions of  the 1990 Constitution were reasonably good. 
The provisions in the Interim Constitution on the independence of  the judiciary are, 
however, rather weak.
Provisions Regarding the Judiciary in the 1990 and Interim 
Constitutions
Provisions for the Appointment and Removal of Judges in the 1990 
Constitution
In the 1990 Constitution, the provisions for the appointment of  the judges and the 
procedures for their removal were stringent: Article 87(1) of  the 1990 Constitution said, 
'His Majesty shall appoint the Chief  Justice of  Nepal on the recommendation of  the 
Constitutional Council, and other judges of  the Supreme Court on the recommendation 
of  the Judicial Council.' Under Article 117, the Constitutional Council consisted of  
the prime minister as chair, the minister of  justice, a judge of  the Supreme Court, 
the speaker of  the House of  Representatives, the chairman of  the National Assembly, 
and the leader of  the opposition in the House of  Representatives. The Constitutional 
Council was designed not to exclude politicians, but to enable political compromise. 
According to the 1990 Constitution, the Judicial Council was to consist of  the chief  
justice, the minister of  justice, the two senior-most judges of  the Supreme Court, and 
one distinguished jurist to be nominated by the king on the recommendation of  the 
Council of  Ministers. In this council, the two persons with government support (the 
minister and the jurist) would be outweighed by the three judges, who would supposedly 
have been uninfl uenced by party loyalties. For the removal of  the judges of  the Supreme 
Court, Article 87(7) provided that judges of  the Supreme Court could only be removed 
for incompetence, misbehaviour, or failure to discharge the duties of  his/her offi ce in 
good faith, by a resolution of  the House of  Representatives, or by a two-thirds majority 
vote of  all its members that required the king's approval. This power was never used. 
A judge of  the Appellate and District courts could be removed by a recommendation 
of  the Judicial Council on the approval of  the king; the grounds were the same as for 
removing Supreme Court judges (Art. 91).  
Provisions for the Appointment and Removal of Judges in the Interim 
Constitution
Under the Interim Constitution, the chief  justice is still appointed on the recommendation 
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of  the Constitutional Council, but that body is effectively dominated by the executive. 
And the Judicial Council is signifi cantly less independent of  the executive than it was 
under the 1990 Constitution. On the face of  it, the provisions for the removal of  judges 
in the Interim Constitution are similar to the provisions in the 1990 Constitution, 
but if  the legislature is dominated by political consensus, there is a risk that Supreme 
Court judges could be removed by political consensus too. Lower court judges are 
still removed by the Judicial Council, which may be executive-dominated. And there 
is, worryingly, a new ground for removal of  lower court judges: on the grounds of  
'deviation of  justice'; this language may open the way for the executive to remove judges 
who make decisions that the executive does not like. The Interim Constitution also 
includes a vague qualifi cation about a candidate's moral character, which it says needs 
to be considered during a candidate's appointment, but such vaguely worded criteria 
can prove problematic—who is qualifi ed to determine a candidate's character, and what 
characteristics would disqualify a candidate on the grounds of  poor moral character? 
Remuneration
Article 87(11) of  the 1990 Constitution guaranteed that 'the remuneration, privileges, 
and other conditions of  service of  the chief  justice and other judges of  the Supreme 
Court shall not be altered to their disadvantage'; a similar provision was made for judges 
of  the Appellate and District Courts.  These provisions are retained in the Interim 
Constitution.
Lack of Immunity 
One of  the basic principles of  the UN General Assembly Regulations is absent from 
both the 1990 Constitution and the Interim Constitution—the provision that judges 
should have immunity from civil or criminal action for what they do or say as judges. 
Without this guarantee of  immunity, judges face the risk of  being sued or even criminally 
prosecuted for the remarks they make or for the actions they take in the course of  their 
work. The fear of  reprisals in such situations may also prevent judges from speaking 
and acting freely against the powerful.
The Annual Report
An inroad into judicial independence seems to have been made by the Interim 
Constitution requirement for an annual report by the judiciary to be made to the prime 
minister, which would include not only statistics and information about important 
precedents, but also critical comments made by higher court judges about judges in the 
lower courts. Though the judiciary, like any other government agency, ought to report 
annually, there are some implications, or at least overtones, about this measure that is 
of  concern: reporting to the prime minister, who is the head of  government, seems to 
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suggest some accountability to government. However, since the Interim Constitution 
was amended in 2008, the judiciary’s report is to go to to the president.
Use of Judges for Non-judicial Work
The use of  judges for non-judicial work in some countries, and in Nepal too, has given 
rise to concerns about how judges may be used to chair highly controversial inquiries. In 
the 1990 Constitution, there was a provision (retained in the Interim Constitution) that 
judges could do only judicial work, but this provision was intended only to complete the 
separation of  the lower judiciary from the civil service, not to ensure that judges would 
not be involved in politically sensitive inquiries. Judges are permitted to be involved 
in teaching and research. And the Interim Constitution retains the more worrying 
provision, also from the 1990 Constitution, that lower court judges may be used for 
election work; apparently such assignments have become common. Such work arguably 
brings judges rather too close to politically sensitive activity. 
The Use of Temporary Judges
A provision common to both the 1990 Constitution and the Interim Constitution that 
allows for the hiring of  temporary judges is open to criticism. Such practice is not 
uncommon in many countries, but these judges may be tempted to decide cases in the 
government's favour in the hope that they will be re-appointed as judges after their 
tenure is over. The chances of  such instances occurring increase, of  course, if  the 
appointing body is government dominated.
Retirement
According to the Interim Constitution, Supreme Court judges cannot be appointed to 
any government post after retirement (except to the Human Rights Commission), nor 
can they practice in any court; this is a new provision in the Interim Constitution. On 
the whole, the provision is desirable because of  the risk of  junior judges being overawed 
if  addressed in the courts by their recently retired eminent seniors.
But the provision, which calls for judges to retire at the age of  65, can be viewed as 
being quite restrictive too. It is not necessarily desirable that recently retired judges work 
for the private sector either. For these reasons, some countries have a higher retirement-
age for judges.
New Powers for the Chief Justice
In the Interim Constitution, there are two new provisions giving powers to the chief  
justice that are potentially worrying—especially in view of  the possibility that the 
chief  justice may be less than independent (see above): fi rst, the chief  justice is now 
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allowed to transfer a case from one court to another at the same level if  he believes that 
'dispensation of  justice' may be adversely affected unless the case is transferred; and 
second, the chief  justice may issue instructions to the Supreme Court and other courts 
to make the administration of  justice effective. These provisions may seem like harmless 
measures to promote effi ciency, but they do indicate a highly centralized judiciary; and 
such provisions could perhaps be used to infl uence the outcome of  decisions taken 
by the courts. Like the 1990 Constitution, the Interim Constitution gives the Supreme 
Court the responsibility of  supervising the lower courts, but this particular provision 
seems to give a high degree of  individual power to the chief  justice. 
Some Issues about the Judiciary
Response to Crisis
To be sure, the Supreme Court decided a number of  cases against the government 
during Nepal's trying times and protected some of  the rights of  citizens, including those 
of  children, but there were many occasions when the judiciary could have done more 
to strengthen the rule of  law. The tumultuous period that Nepal recently witnessed saw 
the judiciary sometimes failing to do its job and in fact sometimes working in ways that 
were detrimental to the culture of  democracy. 
For more than three years when Nepali democracy deteriorated, the judiciary remained 
a silent spectator to the whims and fancies of  the king, including when the king 
promulgated dozens of  ordinances. The judiciary's failure to deal with the issues—by 
failing even to schedule hearings of  the diffi cult cases about the situation, damaged its 
reputation as an independent organ. 
Corruption
In recent years, the judiciary has come under considerable criticism for the corruption 
within the court system. Corruption always leads to the denial of  justice, and when 
corruption leads to judges' deciding cases as senior ministers want them to, it breaks 
down the separation of  powers and negates the fundamental role of  the judiciary, which 
is to protect citizens against the excesses of  the executive.
Predominance of Brahmins and Chhetris
The judiciary, particularly of  the senior courts, is dominated by Brahmins and Chhetris. 
Dalits and members of  other marginalized communities wonder if  such a judiciary can 
truly dispense justice in a multi-caste and multi-ethnic society, They question whether 
such judges can understand the diffi culties that their communities face in accessing 
justice, and suspect that the judges will be biased against their communities, which 
already suffer from prejudice and stereotyping by the elite communities.
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Maoist 'Courts'
The justice system, just like other organs of  the state, was adversely affected by the 
11 years of  armed confl ict. In some parts of  the country, people stopped taking their 
cases to court and almost all disputes were settled by the Maoists under their so-called 
'people's courts,' which did not follow the fundamental principles of  justice, rule of  
law, and principles of  natural justice. The Maoists used torture and intimidation, and 
even killed people, if  required, to extract confessions, and they meted out barbarous 
punishment. 
Although the Maoist courts were unconstitutional and sometimes used dubious 
methods, many people in rural areas, mostly the poor and downtrodden, seemed happy 
with these courts because they delivered quick decisions at minimum or no cost. This 
suggests that our system for delivering justice needs to be thoroughly examined in order 
to make it more competent, affordable, accessible, proactive and able to provide speedy 
justice even to the people living in remote and rural areas. Non-judicial bodies and 
tribunals could be set up to complement the existing court system, provided that the 
rules for arbitration in these bodies are clear and based on the free agreement of  the 
parties concerned. This is the basis for arbitration in state-sanctioned courts too. Non-
judicial bodies and tribunals can help in deciding private disputes, especially commercial 
disputes, thus relieving the offi cial courts of  some of  their work. Furthermore, in many 
countries people are allowed to invoke their traditional, or sometimes, religious law, 
provided that these laws do not confl ict with the constitution. The application of  such 
laws is often possible only in areas of  personal relations, like marriage and issues about 
children and family property. 
Reorganization of the Judiciary
What to Do with Corrupt Judges
One important issue is what to do with sitting judges who are corrupt or incompetent. 
To dismiss them, except when their dismissal is in accordance with the constitution, is 
to weaken judicial independence. South Africa, when faced with a judiciary tainted by 
support for the previous racist regime, decided against an outright dismissal of  these 
judges and instead created a higher court, the Constitutional Court, with judges of  
unimpeachable credentials, to set the tone for a new era. In the absence of  a constitutional 
court in Nepal, one solution would be to replace Supreme and Appellate Courts judges 
as they retire with lawyers of  outstanding record and integrity, who would set the 
standards for the entire judiciary. Another solution would be to devise a scheme that 
would encourage judges who are not up to their responsibilities into early retirement. 
Oversight of the Judiciary
The question of  how to judge the judges themselves is a crucial and diffi cult question 
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that a constitutional democracy must address. To maintain constitutional order and to 
protect the rights of  citizens, the judiciary must be kept independent from any kind of  
interference. The problem is that judges who are corrupt or who are not working to 
the best of  their abilities cannot be replaced easily, for example, by voting them out of  
offi ce, since judges are not directly elected by the people (although this is done in some 
US states, it is  very rare).  
In cases of  very serious misbehaviour by Supreme Court judges, there is a constitutionally 
sanctioned procedure that can be used by the legislature to remove the judges. This is 
desirable and should be continued. But, though this procedure has never been used, it 
may be unwise to leave removal to a political body alone. In some countries such removal 
cannot take place without a recommendation from a tribunal comprising senior judges 
with perhaps a senior non-lawyer. And there may be an argument for instituting some 
complaints procedure against judges, and also for some process under which senior 
judges can be given some formal advice or warning, rather than having, as at present, 
only the possibility of  removal.
To maintain the independence of  the judiciary in the courts below the Supreme Court, 
any disciplinary or other such action taken against judges working in these courts, such 
as the suspension or removal of  judges, should be undertaken by the Judicial Council. 
However, the Judicial Council should be properly equipped with law and institutional 
capacity so that impartial and speedy investigation and action can be taken against 
dishonest judges. In Nepal, there is a custom of  limiting the punishment to forcing them 
to resign or to merely removing them from offi ce, even in cases of  proved corruption; 
no further legal action, similar to that taken against any other civil servant, is taken 
against such judges.   
Constitutional Court
In recent decades, many countries have set up constitutional courts (Germany, Poland, 
Hungary, Russia, Spain, Portugal, South Korea and Italy) with the authority to interpret 
and enforce the constitution. Apart from South Africa, these are civil law countries where 
the courts did not traditionally have the authority to interpret the constitution or review 
legislation for compatibility with the constitution. Nepal could set up a constitutional 
court too, but given that Nepal has a common law system, where the Supreme Court 
has constitutional jurisdiction, do we need a constitutional court? The advantage of  a 
constitutional court is that it has specialist judges, experts in constitutional law, possibly 
including law professors, while the Supreme Court is a 'generalist' court, most of  
whose judges may lack in-depth knowledge of  constitutional law. If  there is a need to 
strengthen the capacity of  the courts to deal with constitutional cases, it might be best 
to take a different approach. A separate constitutional bench could be established in the 
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Supreme Court, consisting of  a minimum of  seven judges, some of  whom might be 
drawn from a pool of  outstanding legal scholars. 
Speedier Justice
At present, the Supreme Court is burdened with too many cases. The Supreme Court is 
the fi nal court of  appeal, but it also is the fi rst court for certain types of  cases. It would 
be possible to make the Supreme Court a true appeal court, with very limited power to 
hear cases in the capacity of  a court of  fi rst resort. Possibly, the Supreme Court should 
have jurisdiction in cases of  disputes between federal units when the country becomes 
a federation. The constitution could also make the Appellate Courts more powerful 
than they are now, in terms of  jurisdiction, competence, resources, and strength, as they 
can provide more speedy justice to the people at the regional level than the Supreme 
Court can. The Appellate Courts could become the principal court for the enforcement 
of  the fundamental rights and for the other types of  cases that at present can go to 
the Supreme Court at fi rst instance. The Supreme Court could then have appellate 
jurisdiction in all the cases decided by the Appellate Court. The name of  the Appellate 
Court might have to be changed.
Appointment Process and the Role of the Judicial Service Commission and 
the Judicial Council
Under the Interim Constitution, as we have seen, the appointment of  the chief  justice 
of  the Supreme Court is mainly made by politicians. The provision under the 1990 
Constitution, on the other hand, was much less susceptible to political infl uence. It 
would be possible to provide for this appointment to be by an independent non-political 
body, giving priority to a candidate's ability and integrity over experience or seniority. 
(This principle is in line with Article 13 of  the UN Basic Principles.) The new situation 
in Nepal is similar to the situation in India, where the government appoints the chief  
justice, and where, in order to avoid controversy, a practice has emerged of  appointing 
the most senior member of  the Supreme Court as the chief  justice. This practice now 
also seems to be emerging in Nepal and could become a controversial issue here. The 
nomination-by-seniority method would perhaps avert controversial appointments, but 
the practice could also lead to the nomination of  a series of  short-term chief  justices 
who are unable to put their stamp on the court.
The principal functions of  the Judicial Service Commission are to recommend to the 
government on appointments, transfers or promotions of  gazetted offi cers of  the 
judicial service, or on disciplinary action to be taken against them. The government must 
act on the recommendation of  the Judicial Service Commission. The provisions of  the 
1990 Constitution, under Article 94, with regard to the Judicial Service Commission 
are fairly adequate and need not be changed, except for making provisions to create an 
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inclusive judicial service with adequate representation of  women and under-privileged 
classes of  society.          
Article 93 of  the 1990 Constitution authorized the Judicial Council to make 
recommendations and give advice on appointments, transfers, disciplinary action, 
and dismissal of  the judges and other matters relating to judicial administration. The 
Judicial Council has been criticized for making the judiciary largely a closed-club of  
bureaucrats, as almost all judges in the courts are appointed and promoted from the 
judicial service, rather than looking more widely. The Judicial Council has also hesitated 
to take disciplinary action against their fellow judges for incompetence or corruption, 
even against judges whose faults were widely reported in the press. This has tarnished 
the image of  the judiciary in the eyes of  the public. 
It has been suggested that the problem lies with the composition of  the Judicial Council, 
where judges have a dominant role. The composition of  the Judicial Council could 
be changed to give other stakeholders predominant positions so that the appointment 
and monitoring of  the judiciary could become more effective. The composition of  
the Judicial Council could be changed to include the following: the chief  justice, the 
minister of  justice, two judges of  the Supreme Court (to be nominated by the full-court 
itself), two distinguished lawyers or legal academicians or jurists, and three members of  
the legislature to be nominated by the legislature itself, including one member from the 
opposition bench (this is based on the South African Constitution Article 178(1)(h)). 
There is, however, room for argument about who should select the lawyers or academic 
members: the Nepal Bar Association is very political, and the appointments made by 
the association could also be infl uenced by politics. One solution would be to nominate 
members without any political affi liation, but even if  such a system were adopted, the 
question would remain as to whether members nominated under this category would 
have the appropriate qualifi cations in law or the relevant experience. There are valid 
arguments for examining the suggestions of  proponents on both sides of  the debate. 
The Pool of Appointees 
A career in the judiciary is not considered a very attractive career choice by many Nepalis. 
The judges and offi cials working in the judicial services are underpaid in relation to the 
services they are supposed to deliver; the nature of  the work involved calls for judges 
to maintain a certain level of  aloofness from society; and they cannot practise law after 
retirement. Furthermore, experienced and able practising lawyers or legal academicians 
hesitate to join the courts unless the terms of  work offered for joining the courts are 
more attractive than those offered for practicing at the bar or in academia. Jobs outside 
the courts are more attractive, not only in terms of  remuneration, but also because they 
give practitioners more access to research, and opportunities for publishing studies and 
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participating in national and international seminars. A judge needs not only independence 
and job security but also adequate remuneration, reasonable working conditions, access 
to research facilities, appropriate working conditions, adequate budgetary resources, 
pension, and a long service-tenure if  he is to dispense justice fairly. 
Prosecutions
Rules about the judicial and legal system have to be seen as part of  an overall, inter-
connected system. The structure and powers of  prosecution have a great deal to do with 
whether the power of  prosecution will be used for political purposes, for victimization 
or to create a culture of  impunity. The independence of  prosecution is as critical to 
justice as the independence of  the judiciary is—as is being increasingly recognized. 
The role of  the attorney general is no less important; unfortunately in most countries, 
the attorney general has to perform a dual role that could prevent him from being 
impartial—on the one hand, he is a legal adviser to the government, often sitting in the 
cabinet and controlling prosecutions; on the other, he is the custodian of  legality. Being 
both a politician, with all the demands such a role entails, and a lawyer, with professional 
responsibilities and certain standards of  conduct, does not allow the attorney general to 
do justice to his work—as has now been offi cially recognized in the United Kingdom, 
the country that gave birth to this curious hybrid. The status and role of  the ministry of  
justice also plays an important part in fostering the overarching notion called the rule 
of  law, as do the roles played by the police and other security forces, the politicians and 
the people. But as has already been mentioned before, the burden of  maintaining the 
rule of  law falls critically on the judiciary. 
Conclusion
It is thus within this broad picture, and the larger context of  reform, of  restructuring, 
inclusiveness, and social justice that the Interim Constitution promises, that the judicial 
and legal system should be designed. We should be forward looking, not afraid to be 
innovative, but at the same time, we must examine the systems of  the past and their 
record. The judicial and legal system cannot be understood without taking into account 
the waves of  changes that will lead to the creation of  a new Nepal. The legal and judicial 
systems too should refl ect the values of  democracy, inclusion, participation, social 
justice, and transparency. We should also refl ect on what the role of  the ordinary people 
in the administration of  justice should be: will the people be subjects and spectators, or 
participants? How can the personnel of  the law refl ect the diversity of  the people of  
Nepal? How far should the legal system respond to the cultural and religious diversity of  
Nepalis? How can we promote the access of  rural and other communities to justice and 
its institutions? Can we move away from the adversarial processes of  the legal system 
to a culture of  mediation? What is the role of  community institutions and procedures 
in the settlement of  disputes? How can the constitution ensure the true equality of  all 
before the law? And how should our universities and other tertiary institutions orient 
T
h
e Ju
d
iciary
230
their research and teaching to respond to the many challenges that the new constitution 
will pose for the government and the people?
Questions
1. Should the new constitution provide for an appointment mechanism for the 
chief  justice that is entirely free of  government or political elements?
2. Should the new constitution have non-lawyers on bodies that are responsible for 
the appointment and discipline of  the judiciary?
3. Should it still be possible to make temporary judicial appointments?
4. Should the constitution give judges immunity from legal action for what they do 
as judges? If  so, should such immunity be granted even if  the judges are proved 
to have been acting on the basis of  wrong motives?
5. Should the judiciary have fi nancial resources that it controls and for which it does 
not have to depend on the government?
6. Should the judiciary have to report annually, and if  so, what information should 
it report and to whom should they report?
7. Should the retirement age of  judges be raised, and if  so, to what age?
8. Should a retired judge be allowed to be appointed to independent commissions 
other than the Human Rights Commission?
9. Should the power to decide important human rights and other cases at fi rst 
instance go to the Appellate Court rather than to the Supreme Court, or even to 
the District Court?
10. Should judges continue to be involved in election work?
11. When a federal system is set up, should each state/unit have its own, complete 
legal system, or should the national legal system be applicable in the unit?
12. How can the new constitution guarantee adequate resources to the judiciary?
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Introduction
A fundamental demand of  people around the world is that their governments provide 
them with security. People hold their governments responsible for maintaining a society 
that follows the rule of  law, a society in which citizens can enjoy their fundamental rights 
and where the government will protect its citizens from criminal acts—whether those 
acts are committed by other citizens or by agents of  the state. The government is also 
expected to protect the state against acts of  aggression committed against it—whether 
those acts are committed by other states or by insurgents within the country. 
Since security is such a fundamental concern of  the masses, the people in power may 
sometimes exploit tumultuous situations in the country—when the rule of  law barely 
holds and when the very existence of  the state seems to be under threat. They may 
take measures ostensibly designed to remedy the situation, but which may actually be 
astute political manoeuvres designed to seize absolute control of  the state machinery. 
Such was the case in Nepal when King Gyanendra, encouraged by the leaders in the 
army, declared an emergency on 26 November 2001. That act by the king heralded the 
beginning of  the demise of  Nepali democracy (a democracy which had been reinstated 
in the country in 1990 with the ending of  the autocratic Panchayat system). A few years 
later, the king would succeed in utterly dismantling Nepali democracy and assuming 
absolute power. The irony was that the emergency, which was supposed to have been 
declared for the greater good of  the people and the country, instead marked the onset 
of  Nepal's darkest political days. Parties were gradually relieved of  their powers to 
rule the country, and the king continued on his path of  political ascent until he ended 
up an absolute monarch. The people, far from enjoying a new era of  liberty, saw their 
fundamental rights stripped away; and the democratic state, the safeguarding of  which 
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the emergency was supposed to guarantee, instead got transformed into a totalitarian 
state.
This chapter is concerned primarily with the possible provisions that the future 
constitution in Nepal could include—provisions that would help regulate relations 
between the security sector and the representatives of  the people, and which would 
prevent events of  the sort that Nepal has recently seen, from happening again. The fi rst 
part of  this chapter examines the effects of  the emergency on the Nepali people and the 
Nepali state. It then traces the series of  events (mainly the violations of  constitutional 
provisions) that paved the way for the king to declare the emergency. And the third part 
addresses constitutional possibilities for ensuring effective regulation and accountability 
of  the security sector.
Emergency, Democracy, and the Contest for Sovereignty
According to Article 115(1) of  the 1990 Constitution of  Nepal, the king could declare a 
state of  emergency in response to a situation of  'grave emergency' arising as a result of  
'war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray.' Conveniently 
for the king, the time around November 2001, when the emergency was declared, was 
a time of  heightened civil confl ict in Nepal. The king was able to claim this as a time 
of  'grave emergency' and a situation that was getting progressively worse—the Maoists 
had stepped up the offensive and were now not just limiting themselves to attacking the 
police, but were also taking on the army. The king thus declared an emergency and took 
on new powers. During the emergency, all the democratic attributes of  the constitution, 
including civil liberties, remained suspended under emergency law.  
Although a state of  emergency is a special situation in which the government has 
greater powers than the constitution usually allows, the 1990 Constitution had been 
actually reasonably cautious about prescribing the number of  rights that could be 
suspended. But the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Control and Punishment) 
Ordinance (TADO), promulgated in 2002, had several clauses directly contravening the 
constitutional order. Section 20 of  TADO conferred immunity on the security forces, 
even in cases of  extreme violation of  human rights, for 'any act or work performed or 
attempted to be performed ... in good faith under the Act.' Emboldened by this carte 
blanche, the security forces arrested hundreds of  people, detained them in unmarked 
places, such as military barracks, and kept them incommunicado, thus protecting the 
state from being held responsible for such actions. Although the right to habeas corpus, 
the remedy for wrongful detention, could not be suspended, no application for it was, 
in reality, ever entertained. 
The emergency allowed the security forces to suppress human rights and prepared the 
ground for the emergence of  an authoritarian state. The period saw a rapid increase in 
the military's size from around 47,000 soldiers to the present offi cial fi gure of  around 
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98,000, strengthening the force's capacity to take control of  the public sphere. Under 
the guise of  the emergency, the state was also able to raise the defence/security budget 
and to promote the security agenda at the cost of  social agendas, and that in turn led to 
an economic downturn, which contributed to increasing poverty and destitution in the 
country. The Unifi ed Military Command structure, comprising all elements of  national 
power—political, economic, informational and diplomatic—was also created during 
this time. With the protection afforded by the Unifi ed Military Command, the security 
forces were able to torture the citizens, perform arrests—even without warrants—and 
threaten and intimidate the common people; large numbers of  people 'disappeared' as 
a result of  the activities of  the security forces; a heightened culture of  impunity took 
hold, and the people became victims of  both non-state and state terrorism, as political 
violence continued unimpeded. 
While it is true that emergencies have been declared in countries like Sri Lanka and India 
(10 times in as many years in the case of  the former), in those countries, constitutional 
democracy has continued to thrive, and the armed forces in those countries have always 
refrained from meddling in politics. Before the king declared the emergency in Nepal, 
in contrast, the leaders of  the Nepali security apparatuses were reportedly goading 
the monarchy to usurp power. The inspector general of  the police (IGP), Pradeep 
Shumsher Rana, for example, once openly advised the king to take over state power, 
right in the presence of  the prime minister, at a meeting in the palace. The infi rmity of  
the government was such that the prime minister could not dismiss the IGP outright. 
Earlier, when the army had disobeyed an executive order given by the prime minister, the 
chief  of  the army staff  was not dismissed; instead, the prime minister resigned. What 
this proves is that the army had by then already sidelined the prime minister and had 
taken over the running of  state affairs. Later, high ranking military offi cers pressured 
the next prime minister to extend the emergency period by asserting, 'The army cannot 
return to barracks once mobilized in counter-insurgency action, without completing 
the task. Therefore, the tenure of  emergency should be endorsed and extended at any 
cost.'
Article 115(2) of  the 1990 Constitution provided that any proclamation of  a state of  
emergency had to be laid before the House of  Representatives for approval within 
three months of  the proclamation. For the emergency to continue, the decision for its 
continuation would have to be approved every six months thereafter, by at least two-
thirds of  the House. The political parties refused to extend the emergency period by 
another term, in opposition to the wishes of  the ruling party, and the prime minister 
decided he was left with no alternative but to dissolve Parliament in order to extend 
the period of  emergency rule. All of  these events indicate that none of  the vital organs 
of  the state under the 1990 Constitution was loyal to the imperative of  strengthening 
civilian rule under that constitution.     
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Through the use of  the emergency order and by mobilizing the armed forces, King 
Gyanendra was able to suspend the entire democratic order in Nepal. Emergency power 
was supposed to have been used in protecting the democratic state, and by managing 
the disruption caused by violence, to return the nation to normalcy. But the continuing 
state of  violence and disorder were exploited by the king to serve his own interests, not 
the interests of  the political system presided over by him.
The Main Factors that Allowed the King to Usurp Power 
Article 35 Violated and the Implications
Under the 1990 Constitution, the decision-making authority of  the king was explicitly 
defi ned thus:
Except as otherwise expressly provided as to be exercised exclusively by His Majesty 
or at His discretion or on the recommendation of  any institution or offi cial, the powers 
of  His Majesty under this constitution shall be exercised upon the recommendation and advice, and 
with the consent of  the Council of  Ministers. (Art. 35(2), emphasis added).
This article was perhaps derived from the Indian Constitution, which prevents the 
president, the head of  state, from having any role whatsoever in vitally important 
decision-making processes. In fact, there have been several instances in India when 
strong-willed prime ministers did not even confi de in the president before making their 
decisions public. The declaration of  the emergency in India on 26 June 1975 is a case 
in point. In Nepal, on the other hand, the emergency declared by the king was not only 
brought about by a direct violation of  Article 35, but according to the Nepali Congress 
president Girija P. Koirala (the then prime minister), the emergency was imposed not by 
the government, but by the army. Neither Koirala, as the president of  the ruling party, 
nor his party's government resisted the move. Rather, the declaration of  emergency was 
actually endorsed by an overwhelming majority of  votes in Parliament. 
Flaws in Article 118 
Article 118 in the 1990 Constitution was designed to provide for civilian control over the 
military through a National Defence Council (NDC). But that Council did not function 
for a decade after 1990 and was activated only as a response to the challenges posed 
by the Maoist insurgency. Furthermore, the NDC, comprising three persons—with the 
prime minister as the chair, the defence minister and the chief  of  army staff—did not 
have a civilian majority because the defence portfolio was usually held by the prime 
minister. 
Article 118(2) of  the 1990 Constitution empowered the king to 'operate and use the 
Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of  the National Defence Council.' However, 
the requirement for acting on the recommendation of  the prime minister was wrongly 
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interpreted as not being compulsory. Thus on the question of  mobilization of  the 
RNA, the discretionary power of  the king prevailed over the power of  the de facto head 
of  government. This practice undermined the executive power of  the elected prime 
minister and the Council of  Ministers.
The fact that the activation of  the NDC was felt to be necessary only in mobilizing the 
RNA in the counter-insurgency campaigns also suggests that national security was not 
a serious concern of  the government. And when the crunch came, the NDC became 
useless as a policy making body for the prime minister. Implicit resistance to the NDC's 
recommendations by the army and explicit use of  discretionary powers by the king, 
in relation to military mobilization, destroyed the relevance of  the NDC as a policy 
organ.
Article 119 and Article 120 Abused 
Article 119(1) in the 1990 Constitution in effect handed over the army to the king, and 
Article 119(2), which was supposed to put a check on the king’s powers over the army, 
was summarily dismissed by the king. Article 119(1) read, 'His Majesty is the Supreme 
Commander of  the Royal Nepal Army.' The follow-up provision, Article 119(2), 
read: 'His Majesty shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief  of  the Royal Nepal Army 
on the recommendation of  the prime minister.' Moreover, the army was governed by 
the Military Act of  1959, issued by King Mahendra. The chief  of  the army staff, in 
accordance with the 'Act on Rights, Duties, Functions and Terms of  the Service of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  1969,' was responsible to the king rather than to the government, 
and the situation did not fundamentally change after 1990.
To make matters worse for the elected government, the army was also deeply imbued 
with the tradition of  looking at the monarchy as the symbol of  national unity and 
stability. Its motto was 'Rajbhakti, Hamro Shakti' (loyalty to the monarchy is the source 
of  our power). All sensitive defence matters—weapons procurement, the promotion 
of  offi cers from the rank of  Lt.-Colonel up, the appointing of  military attachés in 
embassies abroad, the establishment of  new barracks and the expansion of  the armed 
forces—were settled in the palace. The palace's appointing of  numerous retired military 
generals as ambassadors, by invoking Article 120 of  the 1990 Constitution, worked to 
sway the loyalty of  the high-ranking army offi cers towards the monarchy. But although 
Article 120 empowered the king to appoint ambassadors, the king was only supposed to 
exercise the power to appoint ambassadors on the advice of  the cabinet; in violation of  
the constitutional provision, however, this requirement was ignored. The action of  the 
king was challenged before the Supreme Court, which agreed that the king's power was 
to be exercised only on the recommendation of  the Council of  Ministers. Unfortunately, 
the court also held that, because of  another provision in the constitution, it could not 
look into what passed between the Council of  Ministers and the king. 
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Lack of Defence Policies
The government did not publish any white paper on defence, nor did it constitute 
a defence review committee to defi ne a national defence policy. National security, 
therefore, remained incompletely defi ned. In fact, during the democratic period after 
1990, the Defence Ministry was never used in shaping national security policy. Nor was 
the NDC ever used in formulating either national defence and security policies or in 
identifying potential threats to national security.
Lack of Legislative Oversight over the Army
The 1990 Constitution required Parliament to have committees on fi nance, public 
accounts, human rights, and foreign relations, among others. These committees were 
to be watchdogs over the executive and to make recommendations to improve the 
functioning of  government. The State Affairs Committee was, in particular, responsible 
for defence and home affairs. But there were no signifi cant instances of  the parliamentary 
committees exercising their oversight authority in relation to defence and security. They 
failed to play any effective role in guiding or controlling the executive; their roles were 
limited to reviewing and discussing issues and bills sent to them by the full House. 
The committees avoided dealing with crucial issues such as the Tanakpur Barrage case 
and the ratifi cation of  the Mahakali Treaty, which was signed with India in 1996. The 
politicians in the government and the national legislature shied away from sensitive 
issues related to the security forces and military affairs because they felt that internal 
security was the responsibility of  the Home Minister and that the Defence Ministry and 
Defence Minister would look after the army. The legislators neither tried to learn, nor 
did they ever seek outside expertise, when reviewing bills related to the budgeting for 
security and defence. And after the declaration of  the national emergency in 2001, the 
politicians passed security related bills without giving them much thought. They also 
unquestioningly endorsed the transfer of  resources to the security sector that had been 
earmarked for the social sectors.
Some of  the shortcomings described above spring directly from the dynamics of  a 
weak state: when the government does not play an active role in designing state 
policies, when oversight agencies do not work to keep excesses of  power in check 
and when the political leadership acts irresponsibly, the government loses its ability to 
maintain constitutional control. In such a situation, the executive may view the actions 
of  committees as needlessly interfering of  the executive's decision-making authority. 
According to Subhas Nembang, the speaker of  the reinstated House, and formerly a 
chairperson of  the Public Accounts Committee, an investigation of  top security offi cers 
by the Public Accounts Committee on possible fi nancial irregularities was stopped by 
the direct intervention of  the prime minister (who doubled as the defence minister). 
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And in July 2001, the prime minister advised the Public Accounts Committee 'not to 
torture security personnel by calling them for interrogation and seeking explanation 
before the committee.' The prime minister also asked the committee to refrain from 
unnecessarily harassing the chiefs of  the armed forces, the police and intelligence 
services. Furthermore, the parliamentary committees were accused of  overstepping their 
limits by interfering in the sphere of  government authority by none other than Prime 
Minister Girija Prasad Koirala himself. Thus although the government was a creature 
of  Parliament in the parliamentary system, the roles and functions of  Parliament were 
always being undermined by the government itself  (see the chapter on the legislature). 
Recent Developments
The King's Control over the Army Relinquished
After its reconvening following Jana Andolan II, the House of  Representatives stripped 
the king of  his power base—the armed forces. In a declaration made on 18 May 2006, 
the House declared, among other things, that the army would no longer be called the 
Royal Nepal Army, that the cabinet would appoint the commander in chief  for the 
Nepali army, that the title of  the Supreme Commander of  the Army (which used to be 
accorded to the king) was to be scrapped, that any issue of  mobilization of  the army 
would have to be presented to and ratifi ed by a special committee formed by the House 
and that the army would have to be an inclusive and national institution.
Changes in the IC Regarding the NDC, etc
The Interim Constitution provides that the NDC must be constituted under the 
chairmanship of  the prime minister and include only ministers. The Council of  Ministers, 
in accordance with the recommendation of  the NDC, can control, use and mobilize the 
armed forces. Certain provisions in the Interim Constitution have also called for the 
process of  democratizing the armed forces and making the forces more inclusive, by 
requiring that a plan of  action would have to be prepared by the Council of  Ministers 
in consultation with the relevant committee of  the Legislature-Parliament.
Army Top Brass being Made to Answer to the Legislature
With the change in the political equation, a sub-committee of  the Public Accounts 
Committee of  Parliament is reportedly questioning some senior military offi cers on 
'irregularities' amounting to Rs. 2.3 billion, as recorded in the auditor general's report.
Changes to the Provision for Declaring an Emergency
The circumstances under which an emergency may be declared have not been changed 
by the Interim Constitution, but any declaration of  an emergency must henceforth be 
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laid before the Legislature-Parliament within one month of  its declaration and, after 
approval, would be effective for only three months. The Council of  Ministers now has 
the power to declare a state of  emergency.
Suggestions for the Future
The redefi ning of  national security policies and matters pertaining to civil-military 
relations awaits the decisions on the new constitution to be drafted by the members of  
the Constituent Assembly. Now that there is no king, a fundamentally new situation has 
arisen in the country, and the possibilities have opened up for the security apparatus to 
be placed truly under democratic control, in the interests of  the governed. The chapter 
thus examines ways in which security can be improved in the country, an issue that the 
past governments in Nepal should have held at a premium, but sadly did not. It will 
look at international standards for security forces regulation and examine the ways in 
which countries have tried to introduce greater civilian control and accountability vis-à-
vis security. By no means are all these measures usually found in constitutions around 
the world. There are arguments in favour of  not including too much detail regarding 
security in the constitution: if  the detailed arrangements were to prove unsatisfactory, it 
would be diffi cult to change the provisions.
Human Security
If  there is a chapter in the new constitution on directive principles of  policy, matters 
such as the provision of  adequate resources for the police or community policing might 
be mentioned there. But some modern constitutions have refrained from including 
directive principles that cannot be legally enforced. A 'right to life' provision, for 
example, might be interpreted to cover security, but this type of  obligation on the state 
has traditionally been thought of  as requiring the state not to kill, rather than requiring 
the state to positively protect its citizens. There have, however, been a few recent cases 
in several countries where, on the grounds provided by the human rights provisions, 
actions for compensation have been brought against the government or against the 
police for their failure in taking positive steps to avert risks to people's inalienable right 
to life. The Indian courts, for example, have been able to use the right-to-life argument 
as the basis on which to direct the police to carry out certain investigations, and there 
have been similar cases in other countries, such as Bangladesh.
International Standards
There are a number of  sets of  standards and guidelines drawn up at the international 
level for the management of  the security forces and the behaviour of  personnel, and 
most constitutions have some provisions about the security forces, their role and 
control over them. This is not simply a question of  the government's controlling the 
security forces and vice versa, but is, at its heart, a question of  building a relationship 
that is characterized by a reasonable degree of  trust on both sides. The UNDP Human 
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Development Report, 2002, for example, argues very forcefully for strong civilian control 
over the security forces. It suggests that in the absence of  civilian control, the security 
forces tend to be secretive and could create a situation whereby it would be diffi cult to 
hold them accountable for their actions. Furthermore, when the security forces are not 
accountable to the public, the budgets allocated for defence can be greatly in excess of  
what the public deems is acceptable. Such a context, where military spending carries on 
unchecked, breeds corruption—the procurement of  military supplies is a major area 
of  corruption in many countries. The UNDP report suggests the following principles 
for democratic governance in the security sector: 'the sector should be subject to the 
same principles of  public sector management as other parts of  government, with small 
adjustments for confi dentiality appropriate to national security'; the report also calls for 
'a well articulated hierarchy of  authority between civil authorities and defence forces.' 
Civil authorities must have the means and capacity to monitor the security forces. 
How can all these ideas be translated into general provisions in the new constitution of  
Nepal? One constitution that could be referred to is the South African Constitution, 
which has included general principles that apply to all their security forces. From these 
and other provisions in the South African Constitution, the following principles can be 
derived:
• The security forces should be politically neutral.
• The security forces should be under civilian control. 
• The only military force should be the offi cial one.
• The security forces should respect the rule of  law, democracy and human 
rights.
• The security forces should be transparent and accountable.
• The security forces should be regulated by the legislature. 
• The security forces should not obey illegal orders.
• The security forces should defend the national sovereignty and help in 
emergencies.
• The security forces should be disciplined and patriotic.
The Army
In most nations, it is customary for the head of  state to be the commander in chief  
of  the armed forces. This practice survives from the days when the monarch actually 
led his army into battle. Today, the title is often merely formal, especially when held 
by ceremonial heads of  state. Even in countries like the USA, where the president in 
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the role of  the commander in chief  wields considerable power, his powers are limited 
by making him dependent on the Congress for funds for the security forces and by 
the fact that only the Congress is vested with the authority to raise an army. Such a 
balance is important for maintaining civilian control of  the military while at the same 
time preventing the abuse of  that civilian control. In Nepal, however, as we have seen, 
after 1990, the king actually exercised real power even though the constitution had not 
intended to give him this power.  
Constitutions vary in what they say about control over the military. Some defi ne roles 
for oversight bodies that have a majority of  civilian members, maybe including non-
politicians; in Ghana, for example, such a body has the responsibility of  advising 
the president on appointments to the armed forces (and their advice must be taken), 
except during the appointing of  service heads, who are appointed by the president 
in consultation with the Council of  State, which has a wide membership. The same 
body also advises the president 'on matters of  policy relating to defence and strategy 
including the role of  the Armed Forces, military budgeting and fi nance, administration 
and the promotion of  offi cers above the rank of  Lieutenant-Colonel' and draws up 
regulations regarding the organization of  the security forces. And the South African 
Constitution says, in rather general terms, 'multiparty parliamentary committees must 
have oversight of  all security services.' 
The Police
The total strength of  the police (82,000) in Nepal gives a ratio of  one police offi cer 
to about 305 people, which is favourable in comparison with UN guidelines (which 
recommends a ratio of  1:400), but of  these, 20,000 are in the paramilitary units and 
12,000 operate only in the Kathmandu valley; so the number of  police available for 
regular crime control in some parts of  the country is inadequate. Though the police 
force has been developed on the community-based model, in order to create a sense 
of  trust between the police and the community, the public's perception of  the police is 
extremely negative as a consequence of  the criminalization of  this force by the power 
elites. The police have, moreover, been used as a brute force to suppress political dissent, 
civil disobedience movements and political opposition to the regime, rather than to 
bring criminals to justice. Likewise, the Armed Police Force (APF), raised in 2001 to 
deal with the Maoist insurgency, is seen only as riot-control police used to contain 
demonstrations against the regime in power. 
International standards of  various types emphasize that the police must maintain 
high standards of  integrity, respect for privacy, respect for human rights and human 
dignity, transparency and accountability and that they must use force proportional to 
the circumstances, and use fi rearms only in extreme situations. But for any police force 
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to perform at such levels, its personnel should also be reasonably remunerated and 
provided with adequate resources and training.
Another important area that needs to be given high priority is recruitment. The 
recruitment procedures in Nepal, which are currently plagued by a culture of  favouritism 
and political clientelism, only serve to create a corrupt police force. Prudent recruitment 
also means recruiting personnel to suit the needs of  the police force. For example, 
since people will have more faith in a police force that they think understands them, it 
would be wise to recruit more women to deal with law and order situations involving 
women—women are more likely to report violence against them if  they can report to 
women offi cers. 
It is also very important that the police avoid the opposite risks of  having too great a 
freedom from outside control and of  being excessively subservient to the government 
of  the day. The police should be expected to serve every government with equal 
commitment, provided that the government is observing the law and the tenets of  
the constitution. In order to insulate the police service from political control, many 
nations have instituted independent police service commissions. Such police service 
commissions seek to insulate the police service from political control while at the same 
time evaluating the qualifi cations of  the personnel for appointment and promotion.
The relations between the public and the police can be strengthened in various ways: 
by setting up consultative bodies that include the public, by making codes of  police 
conduct accessible to the public and by instituting a civilian body that is responsible for 
the oversight of  the police. Following recent reforms, the police in Northern Ireland, 
for example, take a new oath of  offi ce with an express understanding to observe human 
rights—the police are given human rights training, and the new Policing Board monitors 
the human rights performance of  the police. 
As far as constitutional provisions regarding the police go, it would perhaps not be 
appropriate to include very detailed provisions; broad principles that apply to the police 
force could, however, be included. Some constitutions have general statements about 
the role of  the police. For example, the South African Constitution says:
205(3) The objects of  the police service are to prevent, combat and investigate 
crime, to maintain public order, to protect and secure the inhabitants of  the 
Republic and their property, and to uphold and enforce the law.
More particular provisions that could be included in the constitution relate to police-
public liaison bodies such as the bodies that fi eld complaints against the police (such as 
the South African Police Complaints Commission, which is not a constitutional body 
though it is contemplated by the constitution). Undercover policing operations should, 
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however, be explicitly referred to as being subject to legislation, and obliged to comply 
with human rights standards. Civilian oversight over the government's power to order 
the police to undertake operations that intrude into people's lives, such as phone tapping 
and other such activities should be included in the provisions.
Intelligence Services
Although most societies are subject to increasing levels of  surveillance—partly because 
of  the increasingly sophisticated methods now employed by criminals, and partly because 
of  actual or perceived security threats—people should still be entitled to assume that 
their private lives will be subject to scrutiny only if  they have been reasonably suspected 
of  having broken the law or are imminently likely to break the law. 
As far as possible, domestic intelligence gathering should be governed by the principles 
of  human rights: as little violation of  privacy as possible must be involved. When 
such interferences do occur—such as with the privacy of  the home or with personal 
communications—there should be a monitoring system in place. It has also been 
suggested that intelligence gathering should be separate from law enforcement and 
from politics, and many countries have committees of  Parliament that supervise the 
intelligence services, including the discussions of  their budget (confi dentially). 
There are various models that Nepal can draw on for creating a civilian body to 
maintain oversight of  intelligence gathering units. Canada has a number of  bodies 
with different mandates, including the Security Intelligence Review Committee (SIRC), 
which consists of  three to fi ve senior members of  society who are appointed on the 
recommendation of  the prime minister, after consultation with the leaders of  the 
largest parties in Parliament (and who are not serving members of  Parliament). In the 
UK, the Intelligence and Security Committee, composed of  members of  both Houses 
of  Parliament, is selected to monitor the work of  the intelligence and security agencies 
by the prime minister, after consultation with the leader of  the opposition. This is 
a statutory committee and does not have the same powers as a select committee of  
Parliament. The UK also has a civilian Intelligence Services Commissioner to monitor 
the exercise of  certain powers. In Australia, a parliamentary committee reviews the 
administration of  and the expenditure incurred by the intelligence services. The members 
of  the committee (not ministers) are appointed on the recommendation of  the prime 
minister, after consultation with the leader of  the opposition. The members of  the 
committee are subject to security clearance, and the committee may not be required 
to disclose information that would be prejudicial to national interests. These various 
provisions are not found in constitutions.
Many constitutions make no particular reference to intelligence services, but there 
are exceptions. The South African Constitution, for example, says that any separate 
245
intelligence service must have a head appointed by the president (the head of  government 
as well as head of  state), and that either the president or a member of  the cabinet must 
'assume political responsibility for the control and direction' of  that service. In addition, 
an inspector appointed by the president and approved by the legislature is responsible 
for monitoring the activities of  the service.
States of Emergency
The provisions for declaring states of  emergency should be narrowly drawn. It should 
be very clear when a state of  emergency can be declared, and by whom. The requirement 
for approval of  the declaration by the national legislature is a common precaution in 
many constitutions (and it should not be possible for the government to evade this 
requirement by dissolving Parliament, as has been done in the past in Nepal). And 
while it is important that a state of  emergency should not be allowed to continue for 
long without renewed approval of  the legislature, the need for taking such approval 
should not arise so often that it hinders the employing of  measures necessary to deal 
with the emergency. The human rights that may be suspended during an emergency 
should be as few as possible, and mechanisms must exist to prevent the government 
from abusing such powers of  rights suspension. Some countries have set up special 
tribunals to ensure that the rights of  any person detained during a period of  emergency 
are not violated, and other provisions in their constitutions provide for the monitoring 
of  emergency powers and their use. 
Courts and the Security forces
As a general rule, the security forces should be subject to the law just like any other 
citizen, and ideally, to the same courts. It is common to have separate courts for enforcing 
military discipline, but modern practice has moved away from restricting military cases 
only to military courts.  It is now common, and international standards require it to 
be so, that human rights abuses by forces be subject to trial under ordinary law and in 
ordinary courts. The 1990 Constitution of  Nepal limited the power of  the Supreme 
Court to control military courts, but the Interim Constitution does not contain the same 
exclusion. In addition, although the Interim Constitution says that the National Human 
Rights Commission may not take any action over matters under the Army Act, it seems 
to suggest that this provision does not apply to human rights abuses. Both these points 
are positive.
Other Aspects of Security
There are many other aspects of  security that need to be broadly defi ned. Issues 
pertaining to border security, customs offi cers and prisons could be included in the 
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constitution. Even issues regarding private security fi rms and availability of  weapons 
could probably be outlined. Some constitutions have provisions about the prison service. 
Explicit reference to the other issues is rare. It would be possible for the constitution to 
contain some general principles about how border guards and other disciplined forces 
should be subject to some of  the same obligations as other forces. 
Security Forces and Federalism
In a federal Nepal, the constitution will have to indicate which level of  government is 
to have power to pass laws on matters of  security. In some countries, there is only one 
national police force, in others the states/regions can also have their own police force.
Post-conflict Issues
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the Interim Constitution both contain 
provisions for dealing with issues arising from the history of  the confl ict in Nepal. 
In particular, there are provisions about the integration of  the Maoist forces into the 
regular forces of  the nation and about the demobilization of  the Maoist militia, where 
appropriate. There is also a requirement for setting up a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. 
Discussions about the new constitution should provide everyone, the policy makers and 
the public, with an opportunity to refl ect on the roles that the security forces should 
play in the future. It may also be necessary to have more provisions to specifi cally 
outline the methods in which the former combatants are to be dealt with. Many other 
constitutions in post-confl ict countries have adopted such provisions to deal with post-
confl ict issues.
Questions
1. Should the constitution include general statements about the role of  the security 
forces?
2. Should the constitution require that a committee of  the legislature oversee the 
work of  the security forces, and what should the powers and functions of  such a 
committee be?
3. Should civil society have a role in overseeing the police force?
4. How can civilian oversight of  the intelligence services be secured?
5. In what circumstances should it be possible to declare a state of  emergency and 
suspend some human rights and give extra powers to the executive?
6. Assuming that a declaration of  an emergency needs to be approved by the 
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legislature, how soon must that approval be given, how long should it last and by 
what majority in the House should the resolution approving the declaration be 
passed?
7. How should the new constitution deal with questions related to the civil confl ict, 
including the integration of  the Maoist forces and the rehabilitation of  former 
fi ghters, etc?
8. In a federal Nepal, should there be separate police forces for each new state/
region or just one national police force?
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Introduction
It is one thing to make a constitution. It is quite another to breathe life into a 
constitution—to have it become a living, vibrant document that is used for effective 
governance, for controlling the exercise of  state power, and for promoting the values 
and aspirations expressed in the constitution, to have it become a powerful tool that 
is used by the people to improve their lives. The fortunes of  a constitution are shaped 
by many factors: personalities and elites, political parties and other organizations, social 
structures, economic changes, traditions of  constitutionalism—and by the rules and 
institutions in the constitution itself.    
This chapter discusses factors that infl uence the fortunes of  a constitution and how its 
objectives can be achieved, including the role of  independent institutions, or constitutional 
interpretation, of  protective mechanisms, and of  constitutional amendments.  
Assessing the Success of a Constitution
A country adopts a new constitution because it aims to achieve particular objectives. 
These objectives can vary from one period to another, and from one country to 
another. The objective of  the 1962 Constitution of  Nepal was to reverse the country's 
progress towards parliamentary democracy by introducing the Panchayat system under 
the dominance of  the king. The objective of  the 1990 Constitution was to establish a 
multiparty, parliamentary democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The 2007 Interim 
Constitution intended to provide for an interim government and to provide for the road 
map that would be referred to when making the new constitution, which would have 
an extensive agenda of  reform refl ecting the goals of  the Jana Andolan of  2006. The 
current Interim Constitution is the most ambitious of  all Nepali constitutions so far. It 
aims to create an inclusive state in which all diversities would be respected, to make the 
Maintaining the Role of the Constitution
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society more egalitarian, and to bring about social justice. The Interim Constitution aims 
to achieve these ends by fundamentally restructuring the state. Although, a temporary 
and, as was the intention, a short-lived constitution such as the Interim Constitution 
cannot hope to achieve much of  its agenda, it can at least establish a reform agenda for 
the new constitution. 
It is not easy to assess the success of  a constitution. A constitution's success could be 
ascertained by its durability—by seeing how long the constitution lasts; but a constitution 
can last for a long time without achieving the objectives expected of  it. In a nation that 
has recently emerged from a state of  confl ict, one way to measure a constitution's 
success would be to see if  the constitution helped sustain the new period of  peace; but 
then again, the peaceful state may have been achieved at the expense of  justice or by 
curtailing the people's participation in governance. For a constitution that was created 
to improve the democratic machinery in a country, the constitution's success may be 
judged by the regularity with which free and fair elections were held in the country and 
by determining if  changes of  government occurred peacefully. For a constitution that 
was created with the aim to promote social justice and egalitarianism, its success could 
be measured by determining how inclusive the government became. And yet another 
way to measure a constitution's success might be to see if  the people came to hold a 
favourable opinion about the constitution and became loyal to it. Most constitutions, 
however, have multiple objectives, of  which only a few may be realized (and the few 
objectives achieved might not even have been the most important ones). Thus gauging 
a constitution's success can be an inexact undertaking.
How, for example, should a constitution that has a real impact, but not of  the kind that 
was hoped for, be judged? Since a constitution has its own dynamics, through institutions 
and procedures it sets up, and since society has its own dynamics, through the interplay 
between traditions and development, the situation that transpires after a constitution is 
adopted can change considerably. Such new contexts may render the original aims of  the 
constitution irrelevant, or at least less pressing (for example, a constitution intended for 
bringing about social justice may later be judged by how it accommodates issues related 
to globalization, which places a low priority on social justice). Some scholars say that it 
is impossible to predict the consequences that the adopting of  a particular constitution 
may have. Moreover, since most modern constitutions incorporate ambitious agendas 
related to democratization, ethnic harmony, economic development, modernization, 
and so on, a theory of  causality may not provide a rigorous enough framework to 
gauge a constitution's success. In nations where the constitution is seen as a social- 
engineering device, ordinary people have huge (and often unrealistic) expectations of  
what a constitution will do for them, and thus assessing a constitution's success in 
such contexts becomes an even more diffi cult endeavour. This is certainly the case in 
Nepal today, where the reform agenda that will determine the contents of  the new 
constitution has been created on the basis of  inter-party negotiations and the goals of  
Jana Andolan II.
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Designing and Implementing a Constitution
One of  the most important questions for Nepal is whether the Constituent Assembly 
can design a constitution that will realize the reform agenda. Recent scholarship on 
constitutions aims at turning constitution-making into a science—perhaps over 
optimistically. But if  constitution-making is a science, what are its principles and 
tools? There are at least two dimensions to constitution-making: the making of  the 
constitution and the implementation of  the constitution. Earlier chapters have already 
examined the constitution-making process, and they have analyzed the importance of  
public participation in more detail. 
It is often claimed that the particular benefi ts of  having a participatory process is that the 
constitution will be deemed legitimate and that the people will have enough knowledge 
of  the constitution to be able to use it when they participate in public affairs and to 
protect their rights. This dimension is, therefore, supposed to be closely connected to 
the utility and success of  the constitution.  
As regards the implementation of  a constitution, it is possible to identify three elements—
'implementing, promoting, and safeguarding.' To implement a constitution means to give 
full expression to its provisions: making new laws and policies to give effect to them, 
setting up new institutions (and giving them powers and resources adequate for their 
responsibilities), and repealing laws inconsistent with the new laws and policies. 
To promote the constitution means enforcing these laws, respecting the rights and 
freedoms of  the people, developing constitutional norms, sustaining institutions and 
the rule of  law, holding regular elections, providing access to justice, resolving disputes 
in accordance with the constitution, and facilitating the participation of  the people in 
public and state affairs. 
Safeguarding the constitution means protecting the constitution against hasty amendments 
that detract from the values of  democracy, constitutionalism, and the rule of  law. The 
constitution needs to be safeguarded against amendments and procedures that distort 
constitutional norms or against those procedures that are conducted without regard to 
the law; the constitution must also be safeguarded against procedures that unnecessarily 
call upon the use of  emergency powers. And in extreme cases, safeguarding the 
constitution means protecting the constitution from being scrapped through the use of  
illegal measures such as a military coup. 
There are various constitutional devices that have been employed or prescribed for 
implementing, promoting, and safeguarding constitutions (discussed below). But now 
it is necessary to turn to a second topic: the different approaches prescribed within 
a constitution, which are used for achieving its objectives and the status of  different 
provisions. 
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Components of a Constitution
The provisions of  a constitution can broadly be divided into those that are directly 
binding (having the force of  law), and those that are not directly enforceable (those 
provisions that are framed as principles, directives or policies). The non-enforceable 
provisions may impose moral or even legal obligations on the state, but the state cannot 
be compelled by the process of  law to carry out their suggestions. Rather, the sanctions 
for non-compliance are political. The bill of  rights is an example of  a directly binding 
provision, and directive principles or state policies are examples of  non-enforceable 
provisions. 
The preamble, which often recites the context and purposes of  a new constitution, was 
sometimes regarded in the past as not being legally binding, but some jurisdictions now 
treat it as binding, or at least as an aid for interpreting the constitution. Some analysts 
of  the 1990 Constitution regard its preamble as binding, by referring to Article 116(1), 
which can be read as prohibiting constitutional amendments 'designed to frustrate the 
spirit of  this constitution.' 
Some provisions could be viewed as guidelines; the government may respond to their 
directives at its discretion. There are also provisions that are intended to be binding 
but which depend on further legislation or administrative action before they become 
binding. For example, a right or conduct may sometimes be framed with the attendant 
words 'in accordance with the law,' which means that a law would need to be enacted, 
before the precise, enforceable obligation arises. Other examples are rights, obligations 
or conducts granted or imposed by the constitution that can only be implemented as part 
of  a scheme of  further rules and institutions, such as the freedom of  information.  
Another way to distinguish constitutional provisions is by examining their nature: some 
provisions create rights and obligations or prescribe rules of  conduct, and others relate 
to the structure and status of  institutions. The former can more easily be mobilized or 
enforced by the public than the latter.  
The language in which a provision is cast depends to a considerable extent on the 
provision's status. If  a provision is directly binding, the language used to describe it 
must be as precise as possible, to give suffi cient guidance to citizens and to those whose 
task it is to interpret and observe the constitution, particularly the judiciary. Directive 
principles, on the other hand, can be formulated in broad terms and can be aspirational 
in their tone.  
The above-mentioned permutations of  constitutional provisions give the Constituent 
Assembly considerable fl exibility in deciding which rights, obligations, institutions, 
and procedures must come into force at once, and which can be postponed or made 
subject to 'available resources.' Thus the Indian Constitution, for instance, following the 
Irish Republic's example, made a distinction between binding human rights and non-
253
enforceable directives of  policy (in which were included social and economic rights). 
South Africa, which considered social justice to be imperative for racial harmony, 
made economic and social rights enforceable in its constitution. The Nepali Interim 
Constitution of  2007 makes considerable use of  these different possibilities.1  
While there is something to be said for directives that guide or bind the government, but 
are not enforceable, practice shows that many of  these directives are seldom implemented 
(as was the case with several provisions of  the 1990 Constitution of  Nepal, and as has 
been the experience in India). Politically powerful groups may give in to domestic or 
international pressure to include provisions they dislike only because they know that the 
directives are not enforceable, and they may disregard the provisions later.2 And even 
when a provision is binding, there may or may not be express remedies and procedures 
for its enforcement (remedies are, however, generally provided for human rights).3
In order to clearly register its intentions, the Constituent Assembly will have to pay 
careful attention to the approaches and styles used in drafting the new constitution 
(something which perhaps was not done in the Interim Constitution). As a general 
principle, all constitutional provisions should be binding. Where it is necessary to draw 
up fl exible provisions, the constitution should provide a schedule that sets out who has 
the primary responsibility for implementing the provisions, and the time table within 
which those provisions should be implemented (the Indian government did not provide 
for free primary education, a directive principle of  policy, even more than 40 years 
after its constitution had come into force, although it was obliged to do so as speedily 
as possible). If  the state has refused to implement a provision after, say, fi ve years, 
the constitution could authorize the courts to do whatever is reasonable within their 
capacity to give effect to the provision (the Constitution of  Papua New Guinea contains 
a provision to this effect).  It is also good practice to indicate what remedies are available 
should particular provisions be violated. 
1 The preamble refers to the commitment to competitive multiparty democracy, human rights, inclusion of  marginalized 
communities and restructuring of  the state. Part I defi nes the nation and state of  Nepal—in ways which are aspirational 
rather then representing present reality. Part III (on fundamental rights) makes legally enforceable social and 
economic rights (such as the right to employment and social security). Part IV ('Responsibilities, Directive Principles, 
and Policies of  the State') is the most aspirational section of  the Interim Constitution (and most aspirational of  all 
previous constitutions). For example, it defi nes as the responsibility of  the state 'to enable Madhesi, Dalits, indigenous 
ethnic groups, women, labourers, farmers, the physically impaired, disadvantaged classes, and disadvantaged regions 
to participate in all organs of  the state structure on the basis of  proportional inclusion'). Another state policy is to 
'raise the standard of  living of  the general public by fulfi lling basic needs such as education, health, transportation, 
housing, and employment of  the people of  all regions, by equitably distributing investment of  economic resources 
for balanced development of  the country.' These principles and policies are not legally enforceable: 'No question shall 
be raised in any court as to whether provisions contained in this Part are implemented or not' (Art. 36(1)). However, 
the next section of  the article says, 'The State shall mobilize or cause the mobilization of  the required resources and 
necessary means for the implementation of  the principles and policies contained in this Part'.     
2 An interesting recent example is the amendment of  the Interim Constitution which provided for the offi ce of  the 
leader of  the opposition 'provided for by law' (Art. 57A). No law was ever passed!
3 Article 107 of  the Interim Constitution has broad provisions for remedies through the Supreme Court, even when 
the constitution has made no specifi ce provision. 
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These suggestions outlined above are obviously more than merely drafting points. As 
contemporary constitutions become increasingly both aspirational and prescriptive, the 
issues of  feasibility, fl exibility, and enforceability become critical—and are fundamentally 
a political issue. Since the nature and roles of  constitutions have changed in important 
ways in the last few decades, it is necessary to consider how these changes affect the 
implementation and enforceability of  constitutions.
Nature and Role of Contemporary Constitutions
The older constitutions were instruments of  rule designed by one community, class 
or region. These constitutions did not by themselves establish the ruler's dominance, 
which was often done by the use of  force. Rather, the function of  the constitution 
was to recognize the dominance of  one group and provide the legal basis for its rule. 
The ruling group may have acquired some legitimacy from the constitution, but the 
constitution was not the basis of  the group's dominance, which lay in the group's 
dominance in social and economic spheres. In these circumstances, the constitution 
was effective as an instrument of  governance. 
Contemporary constitutions, on the other hand, do not refl ect any settled form of  social 
or economic domination. Many recent constitutions have resulted from a stalemate 
when no competing group was able to win an outright victory; this imbalance of  powers 
was often refl ected in the constitution. Some constitutions are truces; the fundamental 
problems were not solved; instead, a framework for competing parties to work together 
in was established by the constitution. Most constitutions created in such contexts 
remain fl uid, subject to changes in political confi guration, and inherently tense. Some 
constitutions have been made under considerable external pressure (bilateral, regional or 
global), indeed, are sometimes imposed (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina). Such constitutions 
may not fully refl ect the wishes of  the infl uential leaders of  local communities. The 
absence of  a clear ruling group committed to the constitution makes its implementation 
or enforcement problematic. 
The problem of  implementing and enforcing a constitution is aggravated by the ambitious 
scope of  contemporary constitutions. The older constitutions dealt mainly with the 
system of  government, establishing principal state institutions, distributing functions 
and powers among them, and providing some basic rules for relationships among them. 
They did not explicitly aim to change society. The limited scope of  those constitutions 
meant that their provisions were largely implemented. Today's constitutions seek to 
solve many social and political problems: of  accountability, corruption, the environment, 
poverty, equitable distribution of  property and other resources, recognition of  new and 
multiple forms of  identity, the democratization of  the party, and political organizations 
and processes. In multi-ethnic societies, constitutions also need to deal with relations 
among ethnic, linguistic, and religious communities and between them and the state 
(compare this situation to the earlier simpler situations in which the constitutions' main, 
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almost exclusive, concern was with moderating the relationship between the state and the 
citizen). In this respect, the new types of  constitutions are not merely about designing 
and building the state, but also about the more complicated task of  nation building. An 
equally diffi cult task that new constitutions assume is that of  fundamentally reforming 
social relationships and institutions—something that research shows is extraordinarily 
hard to achieve through law (as, for example, was the case in India, where the constitution 
was intended to reform society and bring about greater social justice).  
The agendas that inform the nature of  the newer constitutions are extremely hard 
to implement, and key aspects of  the agendas may run counter to the interests of  
the wealthy and the elite, who, not yet suffi cient in number and divided along ethnic 
lines, may not able to resist the people-driven provisions in constitution-making 
processes; the elite are, however, frequently able to resist the implementation of  such 
provisions. Today's democratic models of  constitution making may render the product 
an imposition of  the ruled on the rulers (but without the ability among the ruled to 
effectuate it)—so much of  the struggle is to constrain and control rulers rather than to 
give them the capacity to rule. The accommodation of  numerous identity interests also 
means that the community can become fragmented and social coalitions for joint action 
on implementation may be hard to sustain. 
The Interim Constitution of  Nepal bears a strong resemblance to the new constitutions 
that have been described above. Nepal's Interim Constitution is committed to 
fundamental social reform (especially as regards the inclusion of  women, Janajatis, and 
Dalits). It is inspired by a new vision and identity for Nepal. It is committing Nepal 
to political and economic values and goals (especially those of  equality and social 
justice) that are fundamentally at odds with the country's traditional structures and 
relationships. And since the relationship between the Maoists and other political groups 
remains unsettled, as do the ideological differences between them, it is likely that when 
the Constituent Assembly starts working on the new constitution, the process might be 
marked by divisiveness. The Constituent Assembly faces the fundamental challenge of  
ensuring that the new constitution can be implemented, enforced, and safeguarded. 
Threats to the Constitution
A constitution needs to be safeguarded against these chief  threats: neutralization 
of  the values of  the constitution, imperfect or incomplete implementation of  the 
constitution, the occasional or systematic disregard of  some of  its provisions, selective 
implementation of  its provisions, and the abuse of  powers given under the constitution 
(for example, the denying of  separation of  powers or the independence of  institutions, 
including the judiciary)
Threats to the constitution are inherent in circumstances that require the strengthening 
of  the powers and capacity of  the state. People have high expectations of  the state as 
an agent for social and economic development and as a solver of  society's problems. 
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But this sense of  dependence is also accompanied by a deep suspicion of  those who 
manage the affairs of  the state—the politicians and civil servants—who are widely 
regarded as self-serving and corrupt. Thus there could be attempts to restrict the 
purposes and modes for the exercise of  state power and to impose high standards for 
the conduct and accountability of  those who wield state power. At the same time, the 
state is the terrain of  internal struggle and confl ict, while externally, there are economic 
and political forces against which the constitution can provide limited resistance.  
A major threat to the integrity of  the constitution is corruption. Powerful interests 
within or external to the country that are not sympathetic to the objectives of  the 
constitution or that wish to buy illegitimate infl uence may use corrupt means to sabotage 
the constitution. Corruption leads to the subversion of  both the values and institutions 
of  the constitution—one of  the surest ways to weaken them, for example, is through 
the fi nancial or political corruption of  the judiciary.
Another major obstacle to achieving progressive social reforms and changes through 
the use of  the constitution is the force and resilience of  social traditions, ideologies, 
and institutions. Among other consequences, the force of  tradition can make the 
disadvantaged fearful of  using constitutional remedies because they might not want to 
provoke political, economic or social retribution from the powerful. 
The wide-ranging ambitions expressed in modern constitutions (particularly as they 
affect class or ethnic interests and identity, such as affi rmative action and social and 
economic rights) may make the constitution controversial and divisive, and may prevent 
it from becoming an unquestioned point of  loyalty and focus. 
The viability and success of  a constitution is premised on the ideology of  
constitutionalism, a belief  in the value of  restrictions on power—expressed as 
substantive and institutional limitations—and the practice of  the rule of  law, with the 
emphasis on rules and the modes of  their enforcement. These ideologies refl ect and 
spring from political and cultural traditions. Paradoxically, countries that try to use the 
constitution for social transformation often lack these traditions. This situation may 
be aggravated if  those who will benefi t from the provisions of  the constitution being 
respected and enforced lack the knowledge of  the role and content of  the constitution. 
These factors can only allow those who are dissatisfi ed with the constitution for one or 
another reason to seek solutions outside the constitutional framework. The military or 
political insurgents, for example, often use this approach, and Nepal has also had to deal 
with the monarchy and the Maoists using this approach. Sometimes the constitution 
can be delegitimized by its adherents, as political parties in Nepal are alleged to have 
done to the 1990 Constitution, thus opening challenges to the constitution from its 
detractors. And fi nally, delegitimization, it is said, can come from the very ambitiousness 
of  a constitution, when it raises hopes that cannot be satisfi ed, thus exposing the 
constitution's ineffectiveness. 
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How to Safeguard the Constitution? 
Compared to the attention that is now being paid to the process of  making the 
constitution, relatively little thought has been given to how to implement and safeguard 
it. The issues of  implementing and safeguarding a constitution were not of  much 
concern in the older constitutions. In the older constitutions, it was assumed that the 
real protection of  the people and their rights lay in the political processes stipulated 
by the constitution—the executive would be scrutinized by the legislature, and in the 
common-law world, the constitutional jurisdiction of  the courts could be used as a 
check. But in the recent, more ambitious constitutions, which are diffi cult to safeguard 
and enforce, most of  the attention has been focused on ways to make the constitution 
effective.
Two dimensions are noticeable in modern approaches to ensuring enforcement and 
protection of  a constitution. One is to insert mechanisms into the constitution itself  
('internal'); the second is to secure support from outside the constitution, in civil society 
and other sites of  infl uence and power ('external').  We'll take a brief  look at each of  
these dimensions before elaborating on them further with the help of  comparative 
experiences.
Contemporary constitutions, characterized by extreme distrust of  politicians and 
bureaucrats, normally provide some institutional rules to encourage the spirit of  
the constitution. And in a paradoxical way, the constitution is devoted in substantial 
measure to neutralizing politicians, regulating their conduct, and removing certain 
critical and sensitive powers and functions from them. The powers of  state institutions 
are prescribed with great precision; the purposes for which powers may be exercised are 
specifi ed; and rules are established to remove confl icts of  interests, through codes of  
conduct and other mechanisms. Collective rights supplement individual rights; and it is 
likely that there would be greater resort to using enforcement mechanisms in respect of  
collective rights. A number of  politically neutral, independent institutions are set up to 
exercise sensitive functions, insulating them from political infl uences and manipulation 
(see below). Certain responsibilities (for which the government may not have much 
appetite) are given to independent commissions: human rights, in general, and those 
of  vulnerable communities, in particular; protection of  the environment; prevention 
and control of  corruption. There is a greater concern with enforceability: remedies 
are formulated, non-judicial bodies such as ombudsmen with enforcement powers 
supplement the judiciary, and easier access to them and to the courts is provided.    
As for the external dimension, some constitutions are made with international 
participation, and there are explicit or implicit understandings that the international 
community would guarantee the constitution's integrity. Elections, regarded as central to 
the democratic operation of  the constitution, are monitored and occasionally supervised 
by external actors. The international community takes a dim view of  constitutional 
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coups and is prepared to impose sanctions or mediate a way back to legality. As 
has already been noted, the international agencies encourage participatory ways of  
making constitutions, to make people aware of  democratic values and procedures, 
and to facilitate the people's participation in public affairs and in the enforcement of  
the constitutional remedies. Some constitutions recognize the role of  civil society, to 
supplement others' efforts at public education, advocacy and enforcement, and social 
reform, without which many provisions of  the constitution may remain dormant. And 
rules about the practices used by political parties are adopted to lay the foundations of  
democracy in the wider society.
Internal Devices for Implementing and Safeguarding the 
Constitution 
Supremacy of the Constitution
Constitutions usually proclaim their own supremacy, that is, the rule that the constitution 
is superior to all other laws, and laws are invalid if  they confl ict with the constitution. 
The typical way to express this principle is as was done in the Interim Constitution 
(Art. 1):
(1) This Constitution is the fundamental law of  Nepal. All laws inconsistent with 
this Constitution shall, to the extent of  such inconsistency, be void.
(2) It is the duty of  every person to uphold this Constitution.
Sometimes the formulation is broader, to indicate that all institutions of  the state, as 
well as all persons, are bound by the principles of  the constitution. For example, the 
Ghanaian Constitution, in respect of  the bill of  rights, states:
 The fundamental human rights and freedoms enshrined in this chapter shall be 
respected and upheld by the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary and all other 
organs of  government and its agencies and, where applicable to them, by all 
natural and legal persons in Ghana, and shall be enforceable by the Courts (Sec. 
12(1)). 
Protecting the Constitution against a Coup
A constitution cannot do much to protect itself  against its overthrow: several 
Nigerian constitutions, for example, made illegal the overthrow of  the government 
or the constitution, but this provision could not prevent the constitutions from being 
overthrown. The constitutions of  today try to deal with the role of  security forces 
(which pose the greatest threat of  a coup), and seek to subordinate the armed forces 
and police to civilian authorities (but even this measure may not prove effective if  the 
armed forces are determined to overthrow the government). 
Some protection against an overthrow of  the constitution lie in (a) popular support 
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for the constitution and its legitimacy, which may be strengthened by the constitution's 
effectiveness and from the people’s being knowledgeable about the constitution; and (b) 
external support for the constitution in the form of  sanctions, as discussed above.  
Protecting the Constitution against Hasty or Retrogressive Amendments
Sometimes a constitution made with wide participation or after elaborate negotiations 
between key actors can be changed fundamentally, often speedily (as with the 
independence constitution of  Kenya, which was transformed within a year from a 
parliamentary to a strong presidential system and from a quasi-federal to a highly unitary 
state). Today, constitution makers pay particular attention to the process for amending 
the constitution (especially where the legislature is unicameral), partly because some 
recent constitutions have been compacts between ethnic communities, rather than 
merely the product of  a specifi ed, general majority (as in Bosnia-Herzegovina—this is 
somewhat analogous to the normal rules on amendment in a federation where all states 
are involved, as the federation is regarded as a compact). 
The following are some aspects of  the provisions for making amendments that the 
Constituent Assembly in Nepal may wish to consider:
• Should some principles or provisions be made unalterable? Some constitutions 
do this (for example, in Germany and Switzerland), and in India, the Supreme 
Court has established the doctrine that the basic features of  the constitution 
cannot be amended (republicanism, secularism, federalism, and human rights). 
• Should all provisions be amended through the same process? The amendment 
process should refl ect the fact that not all provisions are of  the same importance. 
Many constitutions provide for different methods for amending different 
provisions (such as in Canada).
• Should there be a specifi ed period between the introduction of  the bill for the 
amendment and its passage at the fi nal reading, to allow time for discussion 
and refl ection? Some constitutions provide that the introduction and fi nal vote 
should be held at separate sessions of  the legislature, spread over a fi xed period. 
Others are more stringent and say that the legislature should be dissolved after 
the introduction of  amendment proposals, and the fi nal vote be taken by the new 
legislature. 
• Should there be a period of  time after the adoption of  the constitution during 
which no amendment can be introduced? (East Timor has a 10-year moratorium). 
During this period, people can build knowledge of  the constitution, and the 
government and others can begin the serious attempt of  implementing it.  
• Or should the constitution require periodical reviews to consider the need for 
M
ain
tain
in
g
 th
e R
o
le o
f th
e C
o
n
stitu
tio
n
260
amendment? There was such a provision in the 1990 Fiji Constitution that was 
imposed after the military coup, which led to a thorough review of  and a more 
democratic constitution seven years later. The Portuguese Constitution envisages 
reviews every fi ve years.
• Should bodies other than the legislature have a role in amending the constitution? 
This approach would be consistent with the view that constitution making is a 
participatory process.
• Specifi cally, should a commission be set up to collect public views (as is often 
done before a constitution is made)?
• What should be the voting requirement for amendments? 
• Should there be a referendum? If  so, what kind of  a referendum? It has been 
argued that the referendum (which has a majoritarian bias) is unsuitable for multi-
ethnic states. 
Limiting Emergency Powers
Emergency powers can often be abused: the declaration of  emergency can be a disguised 
form of  coup (see the chapter on security). In emergencies, the executive gets extensive 
powers of  law-making and is able to suspend or place restrictions on human rights, 
which would otherwise not be permitted. Today, under the pretext of  fi ghting 'terrorism,' 
much ordinary legislation (not requiring a declaration of  emergency) has been passed in 
numerous countries, which derogates seriously from basic human rights. 
It is not possible to dispense with emergency powers altogether, for there can be 
occasions (whether as a result of  natural calamities or insurgencies) when special 
powers become necessary. But it is important to clearly state in the constitution the rules 
governing the declaration of  emergencies and the use of  special powers. The abuse of  
powers can be minimized in the following ways: by prescribing the only reasons for 
which an emergency can be declared; by requiring parliamentary approval within a short 
period of  the declaration of  the emergency, and for renewals (perhaps with escalating 
majorities), power in parliament to end the emergency; by prohibiting derogations from 
specifi ed rights; and by providing courts or other independent institutions access to 
review the use of  powers and appropriate remedies.
Judicial Review and Enforceability
In common law countries (including Nepal), fi nal decisions on the interpretation of  
the constitution are made by the judiciary. In civil law countries, interpretation was left 
to the legislature. However, now most civil law countries have a constitutional court or 
council that reviews legislation for compatibility with the constitution (China being the 
big exception). Judicial review is considered essential for maintaining the integrity of  the 
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constitution and as an essential aspect of  the separation of  powers. Judicial review also 
helps to expound and develop the constitution (and removes the necessity of  frequent 
amendments, as the US experience shows). The enforceability of  the constitution 
facilitates the growth of  constitutionalism and the rule of  law. The authoritative status 
of  the courts enables judges to resolve critical political and social disputes and helps to 
maintain peace and order in society. Through the way judgments are written, courts can 
play an important role in educating people about the importance of  human rights and 
constitutionalism and the balancing of  different values. For this to happen, it is essential 
that the courts enjoy legitimacy and the respect of  the people, which comes from judges 
being free, independent, and competent. These matters have been dealt with in greater 
detail in the chapter on the judiciary. 
Non-judicial Redress
As access to courts can be diffi cult for many individuals and communities because 
they lack knowledge or resources, and since judicial reviews take a long time, many 
constitutions provide a role for special bodies to receive complaints from the public 
about maladministration or violations of  rights. Some bodies have the power to 
investigate and report, some can bring prosecutions, while others may by themselves be 
able to give a remedy, for example in the form of  compensation (as the Human Rights 
Commission can in Nepal). One of  the oldest bodies of  this kind is the auditor general, 
who examines the accounts of  the government and other state agencies and assists 
the legislature in its scrutiny of  the government. The best known of  these bodies is 
perhaps the ombudsman, known in some countries by a different name (in Nepal the 
Commission for the Investigation of  Abuse of  Authority fulfi ls that role, and in Uganda, 
the Government Inspectorate). In many countries, the Human Rights Commission also 
performs this role. In several countries, there is a special body to receive and deal with 
complaints against the police (whose conduct is notoriously hard to regulate, monitor 
or control). Of  growing importance are bodies to fi ght corruption, whose functions 
include setting standards for the conduct of  state offi cials, and investigating and making 
recommendations for prosecution or recovery of  corrupt gains (the Commission for 
the Investigation of  Abuse of  Authority, institutionalized in the 1990 Constitution and 
carried forward in the Interim Constitution, is mainly an anti-corruption body). 
Nepal has considerable experience with this type of  body (as well as with ad hoc 
commissions and enquiries). Their record is, however, uneven (in considerable part 
because of  the lack of  the commitment of  the government—a problem not restricted 
to Nepal). These bodies work well if  they are independent and have enough technical 
and fi nancial resources. For them to be independent, it is important to ensure that 
appointments to these bodies are made impartially, that nominees are chosen on the 
basis of  their qualifi cations, that members cannot be dismissed arbitrarily, and that 
no political or other pressure is imposed on the members in the discharge of  their 
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functions. It is best that these bodies receive their funds directly from the legislature, not 
through government departments. 
Neutralizing Sensitive Responsibilities and Tasks
Many constitutions now try to insulate from political infl uence the exercise of  certain 
kinds of  state power that have a major impact on the fair operation of  the political 
and administrative system, such as prosecutorial functions and the enforcement of  
law, the recruitment of  civil servants, appointment of  independent bodies or offi ces 
concerned with the scrutiny of  the government, currency policies, and the conducting 
of  elections.  Insulation is achieved by giving these powers to independent institutions 
and commissions. The 1990 Constitution introduced some of  these institutions 
and commissions in Nepal (which have now been incorporated in the Interim 
Constitution)—Constitutional Council, Judicial Council, Public Service Commission, 
the Election Commission, and the Election Constituency Delimitation Commission. 
These institutions and the functions they perform are now well accepted in Nepal. 
However, their prosecutorial functions were not made independent in the Interim 
Constitution.
Establishing Conditions for Rule of Law
The rule of  law is a complex concept, but, put simply, it means that the affairs of  the 
state and its relations with the people are conducted strictly in accordance with the 
law, especially the constitution. The law itself  must be fair and respect fundamental 
human rights. It is up to the courts, not the executive, to determine the validity and the 
meaning of  the law. All state authority must be founded on the law. The law must bind 
all, including the government, and all citizens must receive equal treatment before the 
law.  No one is above the law. The law must be administered impartially, without fear 
or favour. An important function of  the rule of  law is to limit the powers of  the state 
and to protect citizens and communities against the arbitrary acts of  the state or other 
forces. 
Particularly important to the rule of  law is a strong, effective and independent legal 
system. It requires a strong and competent legal profession. In order to enable people 
to seek the help of  courts to enforce their rights, legal aid should be provided to the 
needy. An effective legal system requires that the attorney general, who is head of  the 
system and the chief  legal adviser to the government, be independent. It also requires 
an independent system of  prosecutions. Unfortunately, this is not the case in Nepal, as 
prosecutions are under the attorney general, who has no security of  tenure.
A major defi ciency in Nepal is its weak legal system and the inability or unwillingness 
of  the government to enforce the law to protect the rights of  the people. Powerfully 
placed individuals, including politicians, are allowed to conduct illegal activities with 
impunity. Corruption within the different branches of  the legal system further weakens 
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the protection of  the law. State and private authorities will have to make major efforts to 
strengthen the rule of  law, for without the rule of  law, the constitution means little. 
Constitution Implementation Commission
The experience of  the 1990 Constitution (and of  numerous other countries) is that 
governments implement only those provisions that they like, and that civil society is 
too weak or unqualifi ed to do much about it. The failure to implement the constitution 
fully can also arise from the lack of  expertise or resources. To make up for the 
lack of  political will or the scarcity of  resources, an independent commission, with 
considerable resources, could be established for a period of  10 years or so to ensure full 
implementation of  the constitution. This chapter has already indicated how much new 
legislation (and the repealing of  old laws) and the establishing of  new institutions are 
needed to give effect to the ambitions of  contemporary constitutions. The commission 
would have the responsibility, in conjunction with the government and civil society, to 
review the old and prepare the new legislation, ensure the transfer of  powers to regions 
(in the case of  federalism or decentralization), and facilitate the establishment of  new 
institutions. The commission would also promote knowledge of  the constitution and 
facilitate the participation of  communities and NGOs in public affairs. The commission 
could report periodically to the nation through the legislature on progress and bring to 
the legislature's attention obstacles preventing full and effective implementation of  the 
constitution. 
Protecting the Constitution from the Outside
People as Guardians
This chapter has already given an indication of  how external forces can assist in enhancing 
the legitimacy of  the constitution and fostering respect for it. Here we consider one 
major source of  support—the people themselves. Ultimately, the people have to be the 
guardians of  the constitution. A major problem in many countries that are trying to 
introduce or strengthen democracy is that they focus almost exclusively on restructuring 
state institutions, including adopting separation of  powers, re-distributing powers, and 
incorporating bills of  rights. Little effort is made to educate the people on the values 
and practices of  democracy or to disseminate information about the role and contents 
of  the constitution. A democracy can develop only if  people understand the values of  
their rights and learn how to use them to pursue their interests, within the framework 
of  the law. When electing their representatives, the people must learn to make informed 
decisions based on policies and the record of  candidates—the power of  the vote is 
often greatly underestimated. They must understand how to hold public authorities 
accountable, and they must not be afraid to do so. They must take responsibility for the 
promotion of  democracy and rights. They must seize opportunities to become involved 
in the conduct of  public affairs. They can also act as agents of  accountability in the 
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following ways: 
• by providing alternative budgets or analyses of  draft state budgets;
• by publishing annual assessments of  the record of  government and corporations 
on human rights, social justice, environment and natural resource policies, and so 
on;
• by providing alternative reports to regional and international human rights 
supervising bodies on the national record;
• by undertaking constitutional litigation to prevent the state or private interests 
from breaching the constitution or law.
Since individuals work together with others, the role that civil society and non-
governmental organizations can play is sometimes recognized and protected in the 
constitution, such as in the Philippines, where the constitution says:
The State shall respect the role of  independent people's organizations to enable 
the people to pursue and protect within the democratic framework their legitimate 
and collective interests and aspirations through peaceful and lawful means.
People's associations are bona fi de associations of  citizens with demonstrated 
capacity to promote the public interest and with identifi able leadership, 
membership and structure (Artical XIII (Sec. 15)).
Conclusion
Implementing a constitution is not merely about this or that provision, or even the 
totality of  the constitution, important as these are. It is about the inculcation of  a culture 
of  respect for and discipline by the law, acceptance of  rulings by the courts and other 
bodies authorized to interpret the law, giving effect to judicial decisions, acceptance of  
the limits on the government, respecting and promoting human and collective rights, the 
participation and empowering of  the people, and bringing about new understandings of  
authority. It is also about the reform of  society. Much oppression takes place in society, 
such as the oppression of  Dalits and the subordination of  women, and constitutions 
and state agencies can only do so much about these issues. 
Both the Indian and Nepali experiences show the limits of  the abolition through law 
of  untouchability and the removal of  prejudices and practices against Dalits. The 
ambitious agenda of  social reform in the Interim Constitution (and presumably in the 
new constitution) will require leaders with the vision to see that the New Nepal requires 
major social and economic transformation and the courage to bring this about. 
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Design and Regional Planning from the University of  Edinburg. He was a professor 
of  Geography at Tribhuvan University and also worked as regional planner with the 
International Centre for Integrated Mountain and Development for over a decade. 
Among his publications are Urbanization in Nepal, Tourism as Development, Market Towns in 
the Hindu Kush-Himalayas, and Unraveling the Mosaic. 
Geeta Pathak Sangroula is a leading woman advocate of  Nepal. She is currently a 
faculty member of  the Kathmandu School of  Law, where she is the coordinator of  the 
Centre for Women Studies and Resource Development. She has also published various 
articles and co-authored a book Gender and Law: Nepalese Perspective.
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Yubaraj Sangroula has a Phd from Delhi University and a Master's in Law from Patna 
University. He is currently the executive director of  the Kathmandu School of  Law. 
He was a visiting scholar at Georgetown University. He has been a resource person for 
various national and international institutions such as the Bar Council of  Bangladesh, 
Legislative Development Centre, Quezon, the Philipines, Offi ce of  Human Rights 
Commissioner, UN. He is the author of  a number of  books, notably, Jurisprudence and 
Legal Theory, Condemned to Exploitation: Traffi cking in Women and Girls. 
Tek Tamrakar has a Master's in Constitutional Law. He has written dozens of  working 
papers and published numerous articles in different national and international journals. 
He has also authored books on Dalit rights and the domestication of  international 
conventions, and fi led many public litigation cases on behalf  of  the disadvantaged 
groups. He has worked for Pro Public, the NGO Federation, the Centre for Legal 
Research and Resource Development, among others. Currently, he is with the UNDP, 
as programme analyst. 
Mihir Thakur is a constitutional lawyer and anti-corruption expert in Nepal. He holds 
a Master's degree in Comparative Laws from the University of  Delhi. He has taught 
law at Tribhuvan University for over 20 years and has written many essays and research 
articles for leading Nepali journals. The founder president of  the Videh Foundation, he 
is associated with several other civil society organizations.
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About International IDEA
The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance—International 
IDEA—is an intergovernmental organization that supports sustainable democracy 
worldwide. Its objective is to strengthen democratic institutions and processes. 
What Does International IDEA Do?
International IDEA acts as a catalyst for democracy building by providing knowledge 
resources and policy proposals or by supporting democratic reforms in response to 
specifi c national requests. It works together with policy makers, governments, UN 
agencies, and regional organizations engaged in the fi eld of  democracy building. 
International IDEA Provides:
• assistance with democratic reforms in response to specifi c national requests;
• knowledge resources, in the form of  handbooks, databases, websites and expert 
networks; and 
• policy proposals to provoke debate and action on democracy issues. 
Areas of Work
International IDEA's key areas of  expertise are:
• Electoral process. The design and management of  elections has a strong impact on 
the wider political system. International IDEA seeks to ensure the professional 
management and independence of  elections, the best design of  electoral systems, 
and public confi dence in the electoral process. 
• Political parties. Polls taken across the world show that voters have little confi dence in 
political parties even though they provide the essential link between the electorate and 
government. International IDEA analyzes how political parties involve their members, 
how they represent their constituencies, and their public funding arrangements, 
management and relationship with the public. 
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• Constitution-building process. A constitutional process can lay the foundation for peace 
and development or plant seeds of  confl ict. International IDEA provides knowledge 
and makes policy proposals for constitution building that is genuinely nationally 
owned, sensitive to gender and confl ict-prevention dimensions, and responds 
effectively to national priorities.
• Democracy and gender. If  democracies are to be truly representative, then women--who 
make up over half  of  the world's population--must be able to participate on equal 
terms with men. International IDEA develops comparative analyses and tools to 
advance the participation and representation of  women in political life. 
• Democracy assessments. Democratization needs to be nationally driven. The State of  
Democracy Methodology developed by International IDEA allows people to assess 
their own democracy instead of  relying on externally produced indicators or rankings 
of  democracies.
Where Does International IDEA Work?
International IDEA works worldwide. It is based in Stockholm, Sweden, and has offi ces 
in Latin America, Africa and Asia. 
Which are International IDEA's Member States?
International IDEA's member states are all democracies and provide both political and 
fi nancial support to the work of  the institute. They are: Australia, Barbados, Belgium, 
Botswana, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Germany, India, 
Mauritius, Mexico, Namibia, the Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and Uruguay. Japan had observer status. 
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Creating the New 
Constitution: 
A Guide for Nepali 
Citizens
After Jana Andolan II, there have been many debates on the 
forms of  a new Nepali constitution. So Creating the New 
Constitution: A Guide for Nepali Citizens comes on the heels of  
a lot of  rich discussion on and research into contemporary 
issues that Nepali constitutional experts have had to grapple 
with. But still the book offers further insights into the 
issues.
The book presents a brief  history of  past constitutions 
in Nepal from the perspective of  constitution making. It 
includes a somewhat more detailed examination of  the 
substance of  the 1990 Constitution, analyzing its strengths 
and weaknesses, in the expectation that this will help readers 
better understand the current issues and debates. It identifi es 
some proposals and controversies surrounding political 
reform. It also provides references to the experiences of  
other countries that are worth considering.
The Constituent Assembly members, who have been 
entrusted with the task of  writing a new constitution, 
should fi nd the book very useful. So should civil society 
members, constitutional lawyers, media people, who have 
been debating over the visions that the new constitution will 
both encapsulate and fulfi l.
International IDEA/Nepal
Jhamsikhel-3, Lalitpur, Nepal
Tel: 977-1-5535252
Fax: 977-1-5535252
E-mail: info-nepal@idea.int
Website: www.idea.int/asia_pacifi c/nepal
ISBN: 978-91-85724-51-2
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